

Pamphlet No. 5 and the freedom to publish at
Iowa State College

by

Muriel Ann Weir

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This study of the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, is dedicated to the memory of Robert E. Buchanan, Dean Emeritus. In the course of this study and from her own conversation with him, the author developed a high regard for Dean Buchanan.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 6, 1943, the fifth pamphlet in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, originating in Iowa State College's Department of Economics and Sociology, was sent to its subscribers--farmers, congressmen, educators and other interested persons. Within several days, the first indications of the coming controversy reached the Iowa State campus catching almost everyone by surprise, including the pamphlet's author, O. H. Brownlee.

Pamphlet No. 5, entitled Putting Dairying on a War Footing, had advocated, among other things, that less whole milk be channeled into butter production and that margarine as a butter substitute be made more readily available by the lifting of stringent governmental regulations. The pamphlet's author also suggested that "margarine compares favorably with butter both in nutritive value and palatability."¹ The dairy interests in the midwest and especially in Iowa objected vehemently to the pamphlet's statements about butter and

¹O. H. Brownlee, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, no. 5 (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1943), p. 30.

margarine and were joined by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation in demanding that the pamphlet be withdrawn. What became known as the "oleomargarine controversy," "the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5," or even as "the bull butter battle," resulted in retraction of the pamphlet on July 12, 1943, its re-writing, and its reissuance the following May and the resignation of Theodore W. Schultz, head of the Department of Economics and Sociology. The incident focused national attention on Iowa State College in 1943, and today is not forgotten.

The facts of the controversy are known to those persons who were involved in the incident, although from their own perspectives. However, nowhere in writing has the complete story been presented in detail, although references to the events can be found in articles and books. Charles Hardin in Freedom in Agricultural Education wrote an excellent summary of the events from the issuance of Pamphlet No. 5 to its retraction. In Lauren Soth's Farm Trouble and in Earle Dudley Ross's The Land Grant Idea at Iowa State College there are short references to the controversy, and Chester Kerr in A Report on American University Presses mentioned the retraction of the pamphlet on oleomargarine in 1943 as the only case found in his study involving censorship of a university press publication after its release.¹ However, these references to

¹Charles M. Hardin, Freedom in Agricultural Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); Lauren Soth,

the controversy only touched on some of the events and went into none of the details. Nor have any of these summaries revealed in depth the conflicts or pressures involved, differing interpretations of events, personalities, or long-range consequences of the controversy.

My intention is to describe in detail the events which surrounded the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5, and the conflicts, pressures and personalities involved. The study will begin with a description of the events leading up to and including the publication, retraction and revision of Pamphlet No. 5. Certain related events at the time of the controversy will also be described and discussed.

The press became involved in the controversy as reporter, commentator and advocate. Several newspapers throughout Iowa carried stories about the dairy protest, the pamphlet retraction, and its later revision. It was through dairy trade publications and advertising in the Des Moines Register that one side of the story was first presented. Later, the editorial pages of the Des Moines Register, Wallace's Farmer, the Cedar Rapids Gazette, and other publications aired the other side. The national press carried the

Farm Trouble (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Earle Dudley Ross, The Land Grant Idea at Iowa State College (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1958); Chester Kerr, A Report on American University Presses (Washington, D.C.: Association of American University Presses, 1949).

story to a national audience, giving Iowa State some unwanted attention. Time Magazine, Reader's Digest, Harper's Magazine, and The New Republic clearly were on the side of the pamphlet's author and editorial committee and critical of the retraction. Thus, as part of a history of Pamphlet No. 5, an overview of the media coverage and editorial comment will be included as Chapter V.

As mentioned, there are several unresolved issues arising from the oleomargarine controversy. One involves the procedures used in reviewing Pamphlet No. 5. Some have said that the pamphlet was improperly reviewed, or not reviewed according to scholarly procedures, contained errors and should have been retracted. Others were of the opinion that Pamphlet No. 5 was reviewed by those persons most competent to do so, was of a timely nature since its purpose was to influence governmental policy, and that because it was semi-popular in nature none of its errors justified retraction. Therefore, the publication and review procedures for Putting Dairying on a War Footing will be discussed in Chapter VI.

The Iowa Farm Bureau Federation's intervention into the controversy on behalf of the dairy interests raises another issue. In 1943, the Farm Bureau and the college's Extension Service were allied by Iowa law. In fact, Farm Bureaus emerged as sponsoring organizations for the

developing extension programs in the northern states, including Iowa, and later became important in lobbying for the Extension Service and other college programs. The issue, therefore, is whether the Farm Bureau intervention was influential in the college administration's decision to jointly review the pamphlet with dairy representatives and subsequently to retract it.

Another matter which deserves attention is the responsibility of the committees instrumental in the review, publication, retraction and republication of Pamphlet No. 5. An economics department committee of four members was authorized by the Iowa State College Press Editorial Board to review Pamphlet No. 5 and all the Wartime Farm Food Policy Series pamphlets for initial publication. After the dairy representatives began their protests to the College, a special faculty committee of five members was appointed by the college president, Charles E. Friley, to report to him directly on the merits and deficiencies of the pamphlet, and another committee of six dairy and six college representatives reviewed the pamphlet and recommended that it be retracted. The suitability and capabilities of these committees and their members deserve analysis, as do the special pressures brought to bear on committee members and the influence of the committees on the course of events. This analysis will be attempted in conjunction with the discussion of publication

and review procedures in Chapter VI.

An important issue which will be discussed in this study is one which was raised by Dr. Theodore Schultz, head of the Department of Economics and Sociology, when he resigned in September of 1943. That is, what is the role of social science research at a land-grant institution--specifically, policy oriented research? Charles Hardin in 1956 wrote that he believed that policy oriented or programmatic research had been quite rare in land grant institutions except that done informally by individual researchers. Hardin believed that Iowa State College was an exception to that rule when, during the decade between 1933 and 1943, the Department of Economics and Sociology presented two pamphlet series, Agricultural Emergency in Iowa (1933) and the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series (1942-1944), of which Pamphlet No. 5 was a part.¹ To attack public policy issues such as was done at Iowa State under Theodore Schultz was sometimes to examine controversial issues. Whether a public institution should engage in public policy research was open to debate in 1943, and to some extent is still. The question as put by Hardin is this: can publicly supported educational institutions freely examine issues which are publicly controversial?²

The question concerning the role of public policy

¹Hardin, p. 133.

²Ibid., p. 1.

research at a land grant college leads to a broader issue; that is, the freedom to do unhampered research and to publish findings at such an institution. This issue in turn leads to the broad implications of Pamphlet No. 5 in relation to academic freedom. Was the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5 a violation of the freedom to publish and of academic freedom?

Each of the foregoing issues will be examined in separate chapters: Chapter VI, the pamphlet's publication and review procedures including the capabilities and suitabilities of the many review committees; Chapter VII, the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation's intervention and effect on administrative policy and the course of events; and Chapter VIII, public policy research at a land grant college and the relationship of the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 to the issues of the freedom to publish and academic freedom.

In order to place the issues in their proper perspective, the original Pamphlet No. 5 will be compared with the revised edition. This comparison should help to clarify the question of whether the pamphlet was properly reviewed and whether it should have been retracted. This analysis will precede the chapters covering the issues. Further, a presentation of the dairy interests' specific objections to the pamphlet's contents will also precede the issues chapters.

The information for the following history of the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 and analysis of issues is based

on interviews with Dr. Oswald Brownlee, Dean Robert E. Buchanan, Mr. C. R. Elder, Dr. Earl Heady, Mr. John Heer, Dr. Elizabeth Hoyt, Dr. J. L. Lush, Dr. Harold Nielsen, Dr. Theodore W. Schultz, Dr. Geoffrey Shepherd, and Mr. Lauren Soth; from correspondence with Mr. Harold E. Ingle; from the files of Schultz, Buchanan, the Department of Special Collections at the Iowa State University Library, and the Iowa State University Press; from newspapers, magazines and journals; and from literature available concerning the Iowa Farm Bureau, the history of Iowa State College, the Agricultural Experiment Stations, the Extension Service, land-grant institutions, oleomargarine and academic freedom.

CHAPTER II.

A HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER PAMPHLET NO. 5,
PUTTING DAIRYING ON A WAR FOOTING

Background Perspectives

The controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 was the result of an interplay of personalities, conflicting views, and internal and external pressures. An understanding of the controversy requires an examination of this interplay, and also a perception of its context--that of a land-grant institution in 1943.

The origin and development of Iowa's land-grant college

Iowa State College was opened in 1869 as Iowa's land-grant institution. This land-grant college designation indicated a form of higher education which was the realization of a new idea in education for the industrialized nation--public education. The Morrill Act of 1862 which chartered the land-grant institutions, provided public land or land scrips to each state. The proceeds from the sale of the land or scrip invested in stock yielding at least five percent were to constitute a "permanent endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical

studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and mechanical arts, in such a manner as the legislators of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life."¹

Thus Iowa State's initial emphasis was on agriculture. Its close relationship with Iowa's agricultural population was strengthened with the passage of the Hatch Act in 1887 which provided funds for the establishment of agricultural experiment stations at land-grant institutions. These stations were to carry out research on a wide variety of agricultural problems "in order to aid in acquiring and diffusing among the people of the United States useful and practical information on subjects connected with agriculture, and to promote scientific investigations and experiments respecting the principles and applications of agricultural science."²

The experiment stations received further funds and additional charges in the Adams Act of 1906 and the Purnell Act of 1925. The Bankhead-Jones Act of 1935 provided for research into basic laws and principles relating to agriculture. Also, the Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to:

¹Morrill Act, 12 Stat. 503 (1862).

²Hatch Act, 24 Stat. 440 (1887).

Encourage research into laws and principles underlying basic problems of agriculture in its broadest aspects; research relating to the improvement of the quality of, and the development of new and improved methods of production of, distribution of, and new and extended uses and markets for, agricultural commodities and by-products and manufactures thereof....¹

Such research included studies done in agricultural economics.

The function of the Agricultural Experiment Station at Iowa State College, as stated in the 1935 Organizations and Regulations, was to "utilize all of the facilities and techniques developed by the arts and sciences in the solution of the problems relating primarily to agriculture and rural life."² The staff members of the experiment stations, including the Iowa State College Agricultural Experiment Station, were composed of some individuals who devoted full-time to research and others who divided their time between research and teaching, or between research and extension work. Thus a faculty member of a college department would likely be a part-time experiment station staff member as well.

The agricultural experiment stations were funded by federal grants-in-aid and by state appropriations. In spite of the federal government grants to the land-grant colleges in

¹Bankhead-Jones Act, 49 Stat. 436 (1935).

²Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Organization and Regulations (Ames: Iowa State College, 1935), p. 6.

the form of land grants or scrips, experiment station monies, and later, extension service grants, these colleges have remained essentially independent of federal controls. In fact, Lauren Soth, agricultural economist and editorial writer, wrote in 1957 that "federal control over the state institutions has been notable for its absence."¹

The passage of the Smith-Lever Act in 1914 broadened the original mandate to Iowa State College. Prior to 1914, many of the land-grant colleges were carrying on off-campus programs to reach farmers who had not attended college. Iowa State College had been doing this since 1906. These activities became known as extension work and its success led to growing support for federal aid to such a program.² The Act of 1914 provided for an Extension Service which was to aid in "diffusing among the people of the United States useful and practical information on subjects relating to agriculture and home economics and to encourage the application of the same."³ Each state was given a basic grant of \$10,000 plus additional money prorated on the basis of the state's rural population,

¹Soth, p. 98.

²William J. Block, The Separation of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. 47 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 5.

³Smith-Lever Act, 38 Stat. 372 (1914).

a grant which was to be matched by the state government.

Since 1923 at the national level, the Extension Service has been supervised by a representative of the Secretary of Agriculture--the Director of Extension. Ultimate authority has been with the Secretary of Agriculture. Each land-grant college under a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Department of Agriculture established a special administrative division known as the State Extension Service. A director for the State Extension Service was to be chosen by the college's governing board subject to approval by the Secretary of Agriculture. The director was and is subject to disciplinary action from the college president and from the Secretary of Agriculture. But, as William Block points out in his study of the separation of the Farm Bureau and Extension Service, neither the secretary's veto power nor authority have been used to any extent, and the State Extension Service has developed a considerable degree of independence of the Washington office. Furthermore, the "Memorandum of Understanding" of 1914 limited the national director's authority over state programs to "joint supervision with the director of state extension."¹ The ties between the State Extension Service and the federal Department of Agriculture allowed for as much state autonomy as did the federal funding of the

¹Block, pp. 5-8.

College and the Experiment Station.

While federal intervention in Extension programs was limited, the local and state Farm Bureaus in Iowa were a powerful influence. The Smith-Lever Act in 1914 required that the federal grants-in-aid be matched by contributions from state or local governments or individuals. The Iowa statute conditioned the establishment of county extension organizations upon the formation of county agricultural associations with a certain number of members who paid annual dues. Farm Bureaus emerged as sponsoring organizations at the county levels.¹ By 1919, a statewide Farm Bureau Federation had been organized, and in 1920 the American Farm Bureau Federation was formed.² By 1943, the Farm Bureau was a powerful lobbying organization at state and national levels.

The close relationship between agricultural interests and the land-grant colleges is pertinent to the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5. This closeness has led, in Soth's words, "to feelings among farm pressure groups that they 'own' the college--a feeling that is not completely unwarranted."³ It

¹Charles M. Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 38-40.

²D. G. Groves and Kenneth Thatcher, The First Fifty (Lake Mills, Ia.: Graphic Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), p. 28.

³Soth, p. 102.

may be true that all public institutions have been under pressures when dealing with controversial issues, but it could be argued that agricultural colleges have experienced unique pressures:

Agricultural research and Extension workers operate in relation to their clientele with an intimacy which is difficult for their more cloistered colleagues to understand. Agricultural scientists often carry on experiments with farmers literally peering over their shoulders. Sometimes ingenious stratagems have to be devised to keep untested results from premature application. Extension specialists from the state colleges find their local meetings blazoned in press headlines, and the county farm and home demonstration agents are continuously on the firing line.¹

This close relationship explains in part the quick and angry reaction of Iowa dairy interests to the Pamphlet No. 5. The controversy was made more heated because the research for Pamphlet No. 5 was done under Project 818 of the Agricultural Experiment Station, as were all the series pamphlets. Also, the pamphlet was published by the Collegiate Press under the imprint, "Iowa State College Press," which made the pamphlet appear to be college sponsored. The dairy interest reaction can be best stated in its own words: "We can understand the surprise of the industry that a publicly supported institution of the second largest butter state in the Union should sanction such a gratuitous slap at the creamery industry."²

¹Hardin, Freedom, p. 7.

²Dairy Record (St. Paul, Minn.), 28 April 1943.

Iowa State College in 1943

In April of 1943 when Pamphlet No. 5 was published, the United States was well into World War II. The land-grant institutions, according to Earle Ross in a history of Iowa State, were strategically available as war training centers and had been alert to the possibility of war since the declaration of limited emergency in September of 1939. The land-grant college association meetings were devoted to the theme of preparedness before the war, and to the emergency during the war. Iowa State College too was aware of the crisis and was well prepared for it. Ross noted that from the late 1930's on, the College was alerted to the national scene through lectures, broadcasts, forums and student discussions. When the war broke out, Dean T. R. Agg of Engineering was appointed head of a committee which was to have general supervision of training programs. Various military training programs were established so that, as a mobilized campus, Iowa State College had a larger military than civilian enrollment in its total student body of approximately 8,000. By the spring of 1944, 170 staff members had been drafted, forcing those who remained to double their teaching loads.

Research and Extension personnel were as concerned with the war effort as were the teaching faculty members. The

¹Ross, pp. 211-223.

Agricultural Experiment Station, in addition to maintaining its long-range projects, sponsored research which would be of direct application to the war effort. In addition to several studies directed toward food shortage problems, there were Experiment Station projects in marketing, finance and consumption.¹ One of these projects was the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, which was the work of the Department of Economics and Sociology, a subsection of the Experiment Station. Pamphlet No. 5, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, was part of this series.

Major personalities in the controversy

Dr. Theodore W. Schultz, as head of the Department of Economics and Sociology and a member of the committee which reviewed Pamphlet No. 5, was a key person in the controversy. He came to Iowa State College in 1930 after receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. By 1935, Schultz was head of the economics department.

Prior to the oleomargarine controversy, Schultz had not been a stranger to controversy. In a letter to Dr. Edward S. Allen in December of 1970, Dr. Schultz wrote, "It was apparent to me at once that to the faculty at Ames and at many quarters in the state, what I said was sheer heresy and was in

¹Ibid., p. 216.

bad 'academic taste.'"¹ There were some who publicly defended Schultz ideas, such as the editors of Wallace's Farmer who continued their support throughout the controversy. In 1932, Wallace's Farmer wrote that Schultz was "a remarkable young man because he had the courage to tell the truth about the tariff to an Iowa audience."²

Dr. Schultz was responsible for developing the Department of Economics and Sociology into an outstanding one in the field. A series of pamphlets published during the Depression were very popular and built up a good deal of support for the department. Schultz as head was able to use this support to build an excellent department.

The Depression and the New Deal had pulled several people off the faculty, many to Washington. Dr. Schultz then found himself in the position of deciding what to do about the future of the department, and ended up in the office of the college president, Raymond Hughes, making that decision. Dr. Schultz wanted either to shut down the department or double the budget to bring new people in. The time was ideal in Schultz's mind to get rid of the "deadwood." However, to

¹T. W. Schultz to Edward S. Allen, 17 December 1970, Personal Papers of Edward Allen, Ames, Iowa.

²Wallace's Farmer and Iowa Homestead (Des Moines, Ia.), 5 March 1932, p. 121.

replace them with good people would cost some money. President Hughes, according to Schultz's account in a 1971 interview, asked Schultz to offer a judgment: "Should Mr. X come back?" Schultz said no. "What about Mr. Y?" asked Hughes. Again Schultz said no. Hughes then announced to Schultz, "You've got the money." Thus the department got outstanding economists who ended up later at some of the best schools.¹

Dr. Schultz believes that the fact that the Department of Economics' ability to build itself up when other departments were in need of money, and the department's special reviewing privileges, were responsible for some ill feeling on the part of some of the College's technical departments--a feeling which persisted to the time of Pamphlet No. 5.² Also, because social sciences were relatively new at Iowa State in 1943, there is reason to believe that the nature of social science research was not entirely understood. Charles Hardin wrote in Freedom in Agricultural Education that the Iowa affair pointed up a split between physical and biological scientists versus social scientists:

Having become conscious of this split during a visit in Ames in 1943, the writer discussed the matter in a number of other states. Many respondents were

¹Theodore W. Schultz, interview, 8 January 1971.

²Theodore W. Schultz, interview held at University of Chicago, 12 December 1972.

alarmed then at the mutual distrust between the two great branches of science (but especially at the suspicion in which social scientists were frequently held by the other branch)....Here is one of the major obstacles to the fulfillment of publicly supported research institutions of their obligation freely¹ and effectively to examine controversial issues.

During the course of this study, the words and actions of Dr. Schultz are very often presented, and should show where he stood and something of his relationship to others.² A comment from Robert Buchanan, director of the Agricultural Experiment Station, concerning Schultz may be further illuminating. During the proceedings of the Agricultural Board of the National Research Council, of which Director Buchanan was a member, Schultz was being discussed as a possible candidate for the Board:

Chairman Coffey: I suspect he [Schultz] is the type of person that rather enjoys taking on additional things. Is that correct Dean Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: I think so. I think he rather enjoys having a finger in a good many different pies. On the other hand I think that as far as I know it hasn't been self seeking on his part. I think that opportunities have come to him. He has been asked or invited and has made good in the things that he has been doing. I would agree with Dr. Griggs that he was doing more things than he ought to do. That was evident at the campus--he

¹Hardin, Freedom, p. 122.

²One member of the faculty in 1943 said in a 1972 interview that the head of the economics department had previously offended a number of people on campus and in the state by his somewhat dictatorial manner.

was just into too many things and he just didn't have time to look after some of the things that needed looking after in his own department.¹

Because Pamphlet No. 5 was done as part of an Experiment Station project, Dr. Robert E. Buchanan became a major figure in the controversy. In 1943 he was director of the Agricultural Experiment Station at Iowa State, dean of the Graduate College and head of the Department of Bacteriology. He had become the first dean of the Graduate College in 1919 after serving for five years as dean of Industrial Science. In 1933 Dean Buchanan was given the responsibility of the directorship of the Agricultural Experiment Station in addition to his responsibilities as dean of the Graduate College. Since the Graduate College and the Station were both concerned with research, this seemed a logical integration.²

The research for Pamphlet No. 5 was done as part of Project 818 of the Experiment Station which eventually made Director Buchanan responsible for its contents. Buchanan had become involved as a proponent of economics research years previous to the wartime series. During the Depression, he was instrumental in paving the way for an emergency series of

¹Agricultural Board of the National Research Council, Proceedings, University of Minnesota, 25-26 September 1944, (Typewritten), Buchanan Papers.

²Ross, p. 193.

pamphlets to be done in the Department of Economics. In 1940, Dean Buchanan and R. K. Bliss who was director of the Extension Service, were both active supporters of free research in economics during an incident over the Extension Service's franking privilege. The incident arose over an article by Dr. Margaret Reid, a faculty member of the Department of Economics, in the Iowa Farm Economist's April, 1937 issue. The article, entitled "Taxing the Chain Store," discussed the rationale for taxing chain stores and concluded such businesses should not be taxed if the interest of the consumer were in mind. Three years later the Extension Service was billed for sending out the April 1937 issue, because the bulletin did not relate exclusively to "cooperative agricultural extension work" and thus was not frankable.¹ Both Buchanan and Bliss resisted the order, and after much correspondence and a personal trip by Buchanan to Washington, the matter was dropped. Thus Buchanan and Bliss won a victory for economics research and for the college's freedom from federal controls.²

¹Third Assistant Postmaster General to Ames Postmaster, 7 October 1940, Robert E. Buchanan Papers, Iowa State University Library Department of Special Collections, Ames, Iowa.

²R. E. Buchanan to Dean H. P. Rusk, 19 December 1940, Buchanan Papers.

Dr. Theodore Schultz has said that Dean Buchanan was a "rock of Gibraltar" throughout the pamphlet controversy. Schultz said in an interview that "the thing to see in Buchanan is his belief in truth and the advancement of knowledge." However, Buchanan had two blind spots often found in great men, according to Schultz. One was that he did not believe that the special interests in the state had as strong an influence as they did. The other weakness as Schultz saw it was Buchanan's desire to save the reputation of the college instead of saying "no" to retraction.¹ Buchanan and Schultz both voted with the joint dairy-college committee to retract the pamphlet, provided that it would be rewritten and reissued in an expanded form.

The Des Moines Register in an editorial on February 23, 1973, wrote of Dr. Buchanan after his death that he was not only a scientist of great accomplishment in research, but he also was a skilled and well-liked administrator of other scientists. The editorial went on to say that for years, agricultural education and research in Iowa were directed by the famous "big three"--Bliss, Buchanan and Kildee.² Because the Pamphlet No. 5 controversy involved protests by members of

¹Theodore W. Schultz, interview held at University of Chicago, 8 January 1971.

²Des Moines Register, 23 February 1973.

agricultural special interest groups, the other two men in the "big three"--Director R. K. Bliss and Dean H. H. Kildee--were involved in the controversy as well.

Ralph K. Bliss was director of the Agricultural Extension Service at Iowa State College in 1943, a post he had held since 1914. The Extension Service had been in existence at Iowa State since 1906, but the passage of the Smith-Lever Act in 1914, "inaugurated auspiciously the modern extension service."¹ According to Ross, Bliss was the real founder of the modern service: "Under his competent and understanding guidance the service had become well established by the time that the emergent demands of world conflict were forced upon it."²

Director Bliss's involvement in the controversy was not direct, insofar as can be determined. However, because of the Extension Service's close ties with the Iowa Farm Bureau and because of that organization's position against the pamphlet, Bliss may have brought some pressure to bear upon President Friley and his handling of the affair. This thesis is supported to some extent by the statement of an administrator in a 1972 interview, that at that particular time the

¹Earle Dudley Ross, The History of Iowa State College (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1942), p. 288.

²Ross, Land-Grand Idea, p. 156.

Extension Service was quite completely dominated by the Farm Bureau and the various farm organizations.

In any case, there is no doubt that Director Bliss would be extremely concerned over what the dairy and Farm Bureau's protests might do to the Extension Service. It is interesting to note that in 1943, Director Bliss received the annual award of the American Farm Bureau Federation for Distinguished Service to American Agriculture.¹

Henry H. Kildee was Dean of Agriculture at the time of the Pamphlet No. 5 controversy. He had become dean in 1933, the same year that Director Buchanan assumed his position as director of the Agricultural Experiment Station. Kildee was the chairman of the joint dairy-faculty committee. One hint of how he was perceived by the state's dairy interests might be inferred from a statement in the Creamery Journal, a dairy publication from Waterloo, Iowa. In reporting the meeting between President Friley and the dairy interests on May 19, 1943, the Creamery Journal wrote that President Friley intimated that Prof. C. A. Iverson, head of the Dairy Industry Department and H. H. Kildee, Dean of Agriculture would be members of the joint committee.²

¹Iowa State College, Yearbook: The Bomb, 1943 (Ames: Collegiate Press, Inc., 1943), p. 28.

²Creamery Journal, June 1943.

Dean Kildee was not happy about the publication of Pamphlet No. 5 as shown by his own words:

Had you had an opportunity to analyze this pamphlet in a painstaking manner, I am sure that you would agree with me when I state that the fact that this pamphlet was published by any unit of a land-grant college is much more amazing and shocking than is the fact that the joint committee unanimously recommended, and President Friley approved the recommendation, that this publication be retracted. In fact, neither the joint committee nor President Friley could have done anything else.¹

The president of Iowa State College in 1943 was another major figure in the controversy. Charles E. Friley came to Iowa State College from Texas A. and M. in 1932 to be dean of the Industrial Science Division. When President Raymond Hughes resigned in 1936 because of poor health, Friley, as Hughes' choice, became president on March 17, 1936. Earle Ross viewed Friley as a man who was

to be numbered among a new generation of land-grant leaders who recognized not alone the great responsibility of training experts in the various branches of technology, but no less that of providing a competent, rational understanding of the broad social implications of applied science in all realms and of the consequent essential place of the general subjects.²

President Friley was involved in the controversy over

¹Dean H. H. Kildee to Carl Hamilton, 1 September 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²Ross, Land-Grant Idea, p. 207.

Pamphlet No. 5 from the beginning. It was to Friley that the dairy interest representatives came with their complaints. At his first meeting with the dairy group representatives, after some very harsh criticisms of the college by the dairy people had already been made public, President Friley stated that the right of the college "to publish facts is not debatable."¹ Friley stood firmly by this statement for some time and was applauded by many, including the editors of the Des Moines Register. C. R. Elder, who was Extension Editor in 1943, stated in 1972 that "Dr. Friley really leaned over backward to insist on the right of publications to be published and distributed."² According to Theodore Schultz, President Friley did stand firmly by his statements until the report on Pamphlet No. 5 was forwarded to him by the special committee which he appointed.³ At that time, President Friley seemed more anxious to have the matter settled in a way satisfactory to the dairy representatives.

It should be noted that President Friley was in a difficult position. The special interest groups in agriculture

¹Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

²C. R. Elder, interview held at Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 10 July 1972.

³Theodore Schultz to Joseph Willits, 22 September 1943, Personal Papers of Theodore W. Schultz, University of Chicago.

were important to the college's future appropriations, while national organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Association of University Professors were able to harm Iowa State's national reputation.

President Friley's position in the controversy, which was something of a middle road, can best be described in his own words. In a letter on June 16, 1943, to the six faculty members of the joint faculty-dairy committee and Chairman Kildee, Friley wrote:

In my original statement to the dairy group I said that the bulletin must stand or fall on its merits as determined by competent authorities on the basis of objective evidence.

The Iowa State College can have only one objective in research--that is, to provide completely accurate and pertinent information. The issues at stake here go far beyond the matter of the accuracy or inaccuracy of bulletin No. 5. It touches on the reputation of the College and of research men. If errors have been made, we must be the first to acknowledge and correct them. I have enunciated this principle to many people and shall continue to do so. If we are wrong, we are in no way hurt by a free acknowledgement of the mistakes and prompt correction. If we are entirely right on any particular issue and are unanimous in that conviction, it is¹ equally important that we stand for that right.

In a December, 1943, article published in the The Alumnus Friley wrote:

Any member of the Iowa State College staff has the right to speak or publish on his own responsibility;

¹Charles E. Friley to H. H. Kildee, P. Mabel Nelson, C. A. Iverson, T. W. Schultz, G. S. Shepherd, W. G. Murray, 16 June 1943, Schultz Papers.

this right has never been in question. The Iowa State College has the right and obligation to make sure that the manuscripts accepted for publication have been submitted in advance to the approved methods of faculty review, criticism and final approval provided under institutional regulations, that they are factually correct, and that the subject matter is presented in a manner that will assure the most effective and constructive results.¹

Dr. Schultz was rather critical of Friley and Friley's actions during the controversy. In a letter of resignation to President Friley on September 15, 1943, Schultz listed several issues which he felt needed to be resolved in order to save the major academic assets of the social sciences. He wrote that it was fully recognized that the office of the President must at all times be fully cognizant of the environment and the traditions that limit the performance of the Iowa State College. Schultz continued:

Nevertheless, these limits do not justify the actions of the President's office within the last few months with relation to the social sciences. These actions have undermined the morale of the staff in the Department of Economics and Socioloty, have created widespread uncertainty among other faculty members and have jeopardized the institution's reputation for scholarship.²

These actions will be detailed later in this chapter.

Schultz in his letter to Friley, also enunciated his

¹Charles E. Friley, "Right to Speak or Publish Has Never Been in Question," Alumnus of Iowa State College, December 1943, p. 75.

²T. W. Schultz to President Charles E. Friley, 15 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

position that faculty at Iowa State College had the duty to serve first and foremost the general public interest. Friley seemingly did not agree. In a dictated statement by Schultz immediately following a conference with President Friley prior to the letter of resignation, Schultz discussed Friley's position on this point of private versus general interests:

The point that disturbed me more than any other in the President's discussions in terms of his basic long-run values was with reference to the distinction between private and public interests. When this point came up he set out to defend [it] and argued that it was not only necessary but proper for the Iowa State College to serve without reservation the interests of special groups in agriculture, and indicated that there was no such thing as a general interest to which staff members need have allegiance.¹

Oswald H. Brownlee, as author of Pamphlet No. 5, was an important figure in the controversy. He was a graduate student and research associate in economics when he wrote the controversial pamphlet, and because of this status, Dr. Schultz as head of economics, the pamphlet review committee, and Director Buchanan were held responsible during the controversy and were the public spokesmen. However, Brownlee too played a large role during the controversy, principally during the rewriting process, as will be shown in this paper. Brownlee spent almost an entire year of his graduate studies

¹T. W. Schultz, "Dictated Statement Immediately Following Conference from 11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. through Lunch Hour with President Charles E. Friley," 17 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

in rewriting the pamphlet.

Director Buchanan often supported and praised Brownlee, and on completion of the revised version wrote, "You have made a substantial contribution to the economics of a very involved situation."¹ From all available evidence, Putting Dairying on a War Footing was the product of Brownlee's research work, and ideas.

The Controversy Unfolds

Development of the pamphlet

Pamphlet No. 5 was part of the economics department's Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, which was patterned after the very successful Depression series, The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa.

In 1933, Dr. Theodore Schultz and some economics colleagues went to Director Robert Buchanan as head of the Agricultural Experiment Station with the idea of putting aside the department's long term research for about six months, and addressing the staff energies to the crisis at hand--Depression economy. An emergency pamphlet series which would acquaint the Iowa citizens with economic issues was thought to be the best vehicle for addressing the crisis. Director Buchanan agreed to support the Series, and according to Dr. Schultz in a 1972 interview, he pushed for the transfer

¹R. E. Buchanan to Oswald Brownlee, March 20, 1944, Buchanan Papers.

of personnel from one Experiment Station project to another, for the franking privilege to be used with the pamphlets, and for a special reviewing committee to be established. These actions indicated Director Buchanan's strong support for economic policy research at Iowa State. The reviewing committee was composed of Schultz; the Deputy Director of the Experiment Station, William H. Stevenson; Dean of Agriculture, Henry H. Kildee; and Director of the Extension Service, R. K. Bliss. This committee reviewed, revised, and published the pamphlets in a much shorter time than would a routine reviewing committee for the Experiment Station or the College. The pamphlets all came out on schedule.¹

As it turned out, the Depression series was extremely successful. According to Dr. Schultz, it was clear after a year had elapsed that "this was one of the most extraordinary things the College had done during the Depression that the people had responded to."² The series brought strong support for the department, which the College was able to utilize in order to build up that area of study. The popularity of the series was indicated by the need for a second printing.

Thus the idea of a series of pamphlets to address the new crisis--World War II--followed logically from the previous

¹Theodore W. Schultz, interview, 12 December 1972.

²Ibid.

success. In his book, Freedom in Agricultural Education, Charles Hardin wrote in 1955 that both pamphlet series were "the most striking, consistent, systematic attack by a team of social scientists" on interrelated public policy issues.¹

According to Theodore Schultz in a presentation before the Board of Education in 1943, the pamphlets in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series developed from six policy studies done by economics staff entitled "Elements of a Price Policy For Agriculture." The studies revealed "1. that price uncertainty was checking expansion in livestock; 2. that as livestock numbers increased feed would become the limiting factor; 3. that corn and wheat acreages should be increased to give us more feed and food."² In September of 1942, the Secretary of Agriculture asked the Department of Economics and Sociology to undertake studies of United States Department of Agriculture food policy.

The understanding with the Secretary of Agriculture was (1) that the U.S.D.A. would provide the economics staff at Iowa State with all data and information available; (2) that experts on the U.S.D.A. staff would help when needed; (3) that no one making the studies would be on the U.S.D.A. payroll;

¹Hardin, Freedom, p. 133.

²T. W. Schultz, "Outline of a Presentation Before the Board of Education on 'Studies of Government's Food Policy,'" 22 June 1943, Schultz Papers.

(4) that the studies would be made available to other federal agencies; (5) and that the department would maintain the right to publish.¹

The studies for the pamphlet, including Pamphlet No. 5, were done under the Agricultural Experiment Station Project 818, which involved transferring considerable staff in preparation of the studies. According to Schultz in his Board presentation, a "seminar" was established to direct the nature and scope of the work. Each study was made available as an "Administrative Memorandum," not for publication, and criticisms were obtained from experts in government, public officials, colleagues at sister institutions and from others. Finally each study went through at least six revisions and rewrites before publication.²

It should be noted here that the pamphlets in the War-time Farm and Food Policy Series were reviewed and criticized by an editorial committee in the Department of Economics and Sociology, composed of faculty members, Albert G. Hart, Margaret Reid, Theodore W. Schultz, and Walter W. Wilcox. This varied from the normal Agriculture Experiment Station procedures for Station-sponsored publications, which would have involved review by an interdisciplinary committee appointed by Director Buchanan. As noted before, an exception was made in the case

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

of this series and also the Depression series, both of which were done as Experiment Station projects. The reason for the exception was time. Regular review procedures were slow, and the studies' value was enhanced by their timeliness. The pamphlets were then published by the Iowa State College Press which did not follow its normal review procedures either.¹

After the decision had been made to do the pamphlet series, the department through Dr. Schultz petitioned the Rockefeller Foundation for a grant of \$10,000 to prepare and publish the studies. Dr. Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation Social Science Division had spoken previously to Schultz about the possibility of the department using Rockefeller funds. Willits was interested in supporting more social science research and had been impressed with the previous pamphlets from the department. Thus, when the request from Schultz and the department was made for funds, they were at once approved.²

The Iowa State College accepted only those gifts which were "consonant with the major purpose of the institution and with which there is complete agreement."³ The Rockefeller

¹Theodore W. Schultz, interview, 12 December 1972.

²Ibid.

³R. E. Buchanan to Mr. Albrecht, 3 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

Foundation gift was channeled through the Agricultural Experiment Station and put in a special account called "trusts and specials." The funds were not then confused with funds from other sources.

However, the Rockefeller Foundation grant was in many ways unique. It stipulated that if the department head, Theodore Schultz, should terminate at Iowa State or if he should not use all the funds, the remainder would revert to the Rockefeller Foundation. The money, \$10,000, was given to the economics department to be administered and used as Dr. Schultz desired. Normally, funds were under the jurisdiction of the college president, a division dean, or head of the Experiment Station.¹

The Rockefeller grant was used for paying the costs of making the studies for the pamphlet series (including travel, clerical and statistical assistance) and for publication costs. The Collegiate Press was compensated for publishing the series from Rockefeller money as well as from the sale of the pamphlets.²

The preceding gives an overview of the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series and some background for Pamphlet No. 5,

¹Theodore W. Schultz, interview, 12 December 1972.

²R. E. Buchanan to Mr. Albrecht, 3 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

Putting Dairying on a War Footing. Pamphlet No. 5 was conceived and written by O. H. Brownlee, who had served for four months in 1942 as business analyst for the Dairy Section, Food Branch, Price Division of the Office of Price Administration. It was during this time that Brownlee dealt with problems in establishing dairy product price ceilings and made surveys of the dairy production and demand situation nationally. Brownlee then returned to Iowa State in his capacity as graduate student and research associate. Brownlee described the conception of the pamphlet in a typewritten manuscript that he entitled, "A Biography of Pamphlet No. 5 By the Author."

Professor Schultz, in his capacity as advisor to Secretary Wickard, was becoming increasingly aware that government policy with respect to dairy production and consumption was inadequate to cope with the problems which were rapidly arising. When the author vigorously expressed himself relative to what he considered to be popular misconceptions in viewing the dairy situation, Professor Schultz suggested that the ideas expressed be more clearly formulated and made available for staff criticism.¹

So Brownlee wrote a paper entitled "Elements of a Positive Dairy Program" in November 1942, which was circulated nationwide to research workers in economics, dairy industry, and dairy husbandry. This paper, which was a nucleus for the later published pamphlet, dealt with price policy and urged that milk be shifted from less to more important uses.

¹(O. H. Brownlee), "A Biography of Pamphlet No. 5 by the Author," (1943), Schultz Papers.

Numerous comments and criticisms were made.

Later, the staff in economics decided to include in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series a study of the national dairy situation. Thus several topics added to the forerunner manuscript became the basis for Pamphlet No. 5. In addition to price policy, sections were added dealing with rationing of dairy products, reorganization of milk distribution and substitution of margarine for butter.¹

Schultz wrote an outline entitled "Putting Dairying on a War Footing," which was presented at the joint dairy and faculty meeting when Pamphlet No. 5 was retracted. In it, he explained the problem that the pamphlet was addressing and the purpose of the study. He wrote that the War, on one hand had greatly expanded demand for food, especially fats and proteins. On the other hand, the War had made it much more difficult to expand production. Dairying was subject to two pulls as well. "These two pulls, one on the demand side and the other on the supply side--pulling in opposite directions--represent the war emergency as it confronts the dairy farmer and the dairy industry."² The purpose of the study, "Putting Dairying on a War Footing," was thus two-fold:

¹Ibid.

²T. W. Schultz, "Putting Dairying on a War Footing, Tentative and not for publication," (July 1943), Schultz Papers.

One. To indicate the nature of the wartime demands for and supplies of dairy products in order to make evident that the difference between the production and the total demands is such that we are confronted with a milk shortage of about 20 billion pounds; and

Two. To indicate what can be done (1) to reduce the shortage of dairy products, and (2) to minimize the adverse effects of the shortage of dairy products.¹

As with other pamphlets in the series, Pamphlet No. 5 was reviewed and criticized by the editorial committee in the department. Also, according to the "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5 By the Author," Director Buchanan was consulted about the section on revision of sanitary standards, and Professors C. A. Iverson and C. Y. Cannon of the Dairy Industry Department and Animal Husbandry Department, respectively, read the manuscript and made suggestions. "However, the final decisions as to the materials included in the pamphlet rested with the author and the editorial committee."² The accounting by Brownlee differed slightly from Buchanan's recollection in interview. Director Buchanan said that he had never seen Pamphlet No. 5 when he received a telephone call regarding the newly breaking controversy.³

Brownlee in his "Biography" noted that both Iverson

¹Ibid.

²(Brownlee), "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5."

³Robert E. Buchanan, interview held at Iowa State University, 19 July 1972.

and Cannon suggested omitting the section on oleomargarine--Iverson because of the anticipated dairy reaction, and Cannon because he did not accept the research conclusions. However, according to Brownlee, the furor which developed over Pamphlet No. 5 was never anticipated by him or by the editorial committee.¹ Iverson seems to have been the only one who may have foreseen some problems.

In regard to publication of the pamphlets in the War-time Farm and Food Policy Series, Director Buchanan explained in a letter written in December of 1943, that the decision had been made to publish the pamphlets through a non-sponsored channel. The reasons for this decision were that the subjects of the pamphlets did not totally concern agriculture, the audience for the studies was not altogether the same as for other station publications, and private publication would be relatively expeditious. From the point of view of the Experiment Station, Director Buchanan pointed out that publication by the Collegiate Press, a privately financed corporation, was the same as publication by any private book company or publishing concern.²

The Collegiate Press, Inc., published books using the

¹Oswald H. Brownlee, interview held at University of Minnesota, 20 May 1972.

²R. E. Buchanan to Leroy Snyder, 16 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

insignia, "Iowa State College Press," when these books had been approved by a college designated editorial board. The Iowa State College Press Editorial Board in 1942 voted to publish the pamphlets comprising the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series under the "Iowa State College" imprint, if approved by the committee of economics staff in charge of their preparation--Albert Hart, Margaret Reid, Theodore Schultz and Walter Wilcox.¹

Thus, after going through four revisions and after approval by the economics department review committee, Pamphlet No. 5 was submitted for printing by the Collegiate Press. The pamphlet was originally scheduled to appear on March 15, but due to a printing error did not appear until April 6. Copies of Pamphlet No. 5 were then distributed to "numerous dairy products manufacturers and members of dairy producers associations as well as to research workers, policy formulators and regular subscribers to the series."²

At least some of the pamphlets in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series were sent out under a cover letter signed by Director Bliss and Director Buchanan on Extension Service stationary. The first pamphlet, Food Strategy by

¹Iowa State College Press, Minutes of Meetings of Editorial Board, Meetings of 4 December 1942 and 24 November 1943.

²(Brownlee), "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5."

Margaret Reid, was sent to some individuals free of cost with an enclosed letter dated February 1, 1943, signed by Bliss and Buchanan. It read in part:

We have been studying intensively the farm and food field at the invitation of the federal government and with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation and Experiment Station. The findings are now being published by the Iowa State College Press.¹

Another letter, this one with no date, read:

Enclosed herewith is another pamphlet growing out of the studies which have been made by the Department of Economics and Sociology, Iowa State College, related to wartime farm and food policy. These studies were made as a part of project 818 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, assisted by a grant from the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation.²

These two letters indicated that both the Extension Service and the Experiment Station did sanction the pamphlet series. However, according to Harold E. Ingle, who was managing director of the Collegiate Press in 1943, the series pamphlets were published by the Press. "That is, the Press and its Editorial Board approved them for publication and thereby for the full process and responsibility of editing, design and production, advertising and sales, and distribution. Thereby, also, I think it follows, the Press took responsibility as publisher

¹R. K. Bliss and R. E. Buchanan to "Sir," 1 February 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²R. K. Bliss and R. E. Buchanan to "Sir," n.d., Buchanan Papers.

for the content."¹ Thus the recipient of Pamphlet No. 5 was reading a booklet published by the Collegiate Press under the imprint of Iowa State College Press, edited by the economics department editorial committee, for which the research was done under an Experiment Station project, and financed in part by the Rockefeller Foundation. Although Director Buchanan became responsible for the pamphlet after the controversy, it was not an official Experiment Station publication.

Dairy groups and Farm Bureau object to Pamphlet No. 5

The first attacks on Pamphlet No. 5 began appearing soon after its distribution. In an editorial in the April 28th issue of the Dairy Record, a "newsweekly of the dairy industry," published in St. Paul, Minnesota, Putting Dairying on a War Footing was described as a "dud better left unwritten."

We can understand the surprise of the industry that a publicly-supported institution of the second largest butter state in the Union should sanction such a gratuitous slap at the creamery industry. But Dairy Record is more surprised that Mr. Theodore W. Schultz, the head of Iowa State's department of agricultural economics, and a member of the editorial committee, should have sanctioned a repetitious peroration of a topic that has been thoroughly discussed--and discussed better than is done by this unknown member of his staff.²

During the month of May, the storm of protest broke.

¹Harold E. Ingle to Ann Weir, 26 October 1972, Personal Files.

²Dairy Record (St. Paul, Minn.), 28 April 1943.

The May issue of the Creamery Journal, out of Waterloo, Iowa, contained an article which stated that immediately on "appearance of the pamphlet, a number of Iowa dairy leaders were on their way to the college to confer with officials as to why the economists should ignore the corn, hog, poultry, butter tradition of farming which dairymen have fought to hold for fifty years."¹

This may have been a reference to a delegation of dairy representatives who came to Iowa State in early May to discuss their grievances with President Friley. Although there was no specific record of the date of the meeting, apparently a large number of dairy industry representatives did come to Ames, found that President Friley was not available, and thus met with other campus representatives. According to several accounts, over 100 dairy people met with Iowa State faculty including members of the economics department staff. According to Brownlee's account, there was a rumor at the time that the inability to meet with Friley prompted the dairymen to "publicly expose their demands and to employ procedures which were somewhat unusual in pressing these demands."²

The Dairy Record had this account of the meeting in its May 19th issue:

¹Creamery Journal (Waterloo, Ia.), May 1943.

²(Brownlee), "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5."

Dr. Friley was unable to meet with the group, but the dairymen, refusing to be placated by other college representatives, demanded, and secured, an audience with the college president for Wednesday of this week....

Author of the pamphlet is O. H. Brownlee, research associate in economics, but the ire of the dairy organizations assembled here last week was directed less at Brownlee who was regarded as an underling, than it was at Theodore Schultz,¹ head of the Department of Economics at Iowa State.

The article continued with a quote of a public statement issued by Julius Brunner of Osage, president of the Iowa Association of Local Creameries, which was also quoted in a May 15th article in the Des Moines Register--the first time most of the public became aware of the controversy. The statement said: "Dairy farmers will be satisfied with nothing less than a recall of the pamphlet, denial of faculty responsibility for it, and removal from the faculty of Iowa State College of its authors as self-convicted incompetents."² It was through this statement that the dairymen first made public their grievances. Bruner's statement, as quoted in the Des Moines Register, read:

"We have read this pamphlet with astonishment," Bruner's statement said. "Iowa dairy farmers, who have brought the state up to rank second in butter production, resent publication of the pamphlet by Iowa State College. They would have ignored it, if it had been published by the manufacturers of oleomargarine and various substitutes for butter. But, on its face,

¹Dairy Record (St. Paul, Minn.), 19 May 1943.

²Des Moines Register, 15 May 1943.

this pamphlet is published by the college that the dairy farmer willingly and liberally has taxed himself to maintain and support over a long period of years.¹

It is unclear at what point before the dairymen converged on Iowa State and arranged for a meeting with him, that President Friley became aware of the situation. He was sent a letter dated May 6, 1943, from a lawyer, Addison M. Parker, who had often represented dairy farmers. The letter was extremely critical of the pamphlet's statements and perturbed at the damage done to the dairy industry as a result of the pamphlet. The closing sentence of the letter asserted: "The dairy industry of Iowa feels that, like Caesar, it has been stabbed in its own house by its friends."² The tone of the letter was strong enough to portend future troubles. However, President Friley did not respond to the letter until May 20, 1943, and it is possible that he was out of town during the beginning of the troubles, as he was when the dairy representatives first converged on Ames demanding an audience with him.

It is clear that President Friley would have been aware of the unfolding and threatening controversy by the time he had returned from his New York trip. By May 15th,

¹Ibid.

²Addison M. Parker to Dr. Charles E. Friley, 6 May 1943, Schultz Papers.

three important events had taken place. The angry meeting between the dairy representatives and college representatives had occurred, a meeting had been arranged between Friley and 16 dairy representatives for May 19th, and the Des Moines Register and several other state newspapers had on May 15th carried the dairy industry's objections, which had been made public through a prepared statement on May 14th.

So it was in an atmosphere of heated and divisive conflict that President Friley, Director Buchanan and Dr. Schultz met with the dairy industry representatives on May 19th. According to the Creamery Journal, 125 dairy farmers, creamerymen, and other dairy products processors attended, representing each of twelve associations affiliated with the Iowa State Dairy Association.¹ This is far more than the sixteen representatives named by Julius Brunner in the May 15th Register article as those who would accompany him to the meeting. There were also many representatives from Iowa State College.

Prior to the meeting President Friley received a letter from Director Buchanan which contained facts and suggestions that might be of use to Friley in his handling of the protest. These suggestions were requested by Friley, and were developed in part as a result of a conference called by Dean Kildee at Buchanan's suggestion, and attended by George Godfrey,

¹Creamery Journal (Waterloo, Ia.), June 1943.

director of Agricultural Relations; Leland G. Allbaugh, associate director of the Extension Service; and Murl McDonald, assistant director of the Extension Service.

The letter contained some suggestions which Dr. Friley appeared to utilize. Buchanan wrote that the College in its publications should attempt to assemble, evaluate and interpret data that are of significance in those fields in which it has competence to speak. "The propriety of publication in these fields is not in question."¹ However, wrote Buchanan:

We should use all reasonable precautions in the presentation of materials to make sure that the facts are actually as presented and that we avoid inadequacies, errors and improper evaluations and interpretations. If by inadvertance there have been published statements which can be shown to be untrue, there should be prompt correction by adequate publication and publicity.²

This paralleled closely President Friley's statement, although different in emphasis, at the meeting on May 19th with the dairy representatives: "There can be only one issue as regards this discussion. That is, the legitimacy of the facts and perhaps the form and clarity of the phraseology used in stating those facts."³

Another of Buchanan's suggestions read:

¹R. E. Buchanan to Charles E. Friley, 17 May 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

However, the fundamental right of the staff doing research to analyze and present data which he unearths cannot safely be abridged by any external agency or pressure group. No censorship by self-appointed guardians of vested interests can be tolerated; the right of the institution to publish facts in America is not a debatable question. Otherwise the whole framework of academic freedom, indeed of freedom of speech is gone. Presumably we are fighting a war to protect these freedoms.¹

According to the Des Moines Register, President Friley made a similar statement at the meeting:

The right of professors to produce such works, he emphasized, is based upon the right of free speech for which, he observed, this war is being fought.

"The fundamental right of a member of the college staff," Dr. Friley said, "doing research to analyze and present data which develop from his studies cannot safely be abridged by any agency.

"The right of this institution to publish facts is not a debatable question in this nation. Otherwise, the entire framework of academic freedom, and even of freedom of speech, is gone, and the usefulness of the institution is at an end."²

The comparison indicates that President Friley did depend heavily on the advice of Director Buchanan, at least in some respects. It is not clear from the record of the May 19th meeting whether Friley accepted some of Buchanan's other observations; such as his belief that the author of Pamphlet No. 5 was essentially correct in the facts, although "the form in which certain statements were made by the author was not in

¹Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

²Ibid.

accord with the axioms of best educational policy."¹ (Buchanan pointed out that there were not many such slips, but the more unfortunate were publicized.) It is clear from the record that President Friley went beyond Director Buchanan's suggestions when he announced his proposal at the dairy protest meeting that a committee from the college staff meet with a committee representing the dairy interests to "review this bulletin paragraph by paragraph to determine by objective evidence the accuracy of the contents."² Director Buchanan in his letter had suggested that a conference of technical and economic staff be held to discuss the problems involved in the controversy. However, in retrospect, Dr. Buchanan has said that the joint committee idea was a good one.³ The idea for a joint committee came from Dr. Schultz himself, according to President Friley in a letter to Walter W. Wilcox, one of the economics department editorial committee members.⁴

A joint committee was the nature of President Friley's approach to the meeting and to the controversy. The dairy

¹Buchanan to Friley, 17 May 1943.

²Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

³Robert E. Buchanan, interview.

⁴President Charles E. Friley to Walter W. Wilcox, 23 August 1943, Buchanan Papers.

industry accepted the committee suggestion, and did not press their former demands for the firing of the Series' editorial committee and the pamphlet author.

According to accounts of the meeting in the Des Moines Register and in the Creamery Journal, the agenda included a review of the background of the studies in Wartime Farm and Food Policy by Dr. Buchanan and Dr. Schultz. They were applauded "courteously but not vehemently." President Friley read his statement, and at the end of the meeting, made his suggestion for a joint committee. Fred Larabee, president of the Iowa Dairy Association, who presided over the meeting, accepted Friley's suggestion for the dairy representatives.¹

In addition to President Friley's statement and the statements of Director Buchanan and Dr. Schultz concerning the background of the pamphlet in question, the agenda included many dairy representative statements, most of which echoed the idea that the pamphlet statement was out of place in publications sent out by Iowa State College. One statement which gave some indication of the economics behind the dairy protest was, ". . . you can say all the beautiful things you want about fluid milk but it takes other products to sustain the price."² Pamphlet No. 5 had advocated channelling less whole

¹Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

²Creamery Journal, June 1943.

milk into butter and more into circulation.

However, the statement at the meeting which received the greatest coverage by the Des Moines Register and which may have had a greater effect on the course of events was made by Francis Johnson, president of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. His statement raised unequivocally one of the central questions of the pamphlet controversy; that is, what is the role of public policy research at a land-grant institution? Johnson's statement was undoubtedly important for its influence on the college because of the Farm Bureau's close ties with the Iowa State Extension Service. Johnson's statement read in part:

"I feel it is my responsibility to inform those responsible for the administration of Iowa State college that Iowa farmers are alarmed over the apparent tendency to make over Iowa State College into a tax-supported blueprint of Harvard University.

"Iowa farmers are not unappreciative of the function performed by free-lance educational institutions. Our land-grant colleges, however, were not established for that purpose.

"Iowa farmers are not ashamed of the 'cow college' label sometimes used to describe Iowa State. We only hope that it will continue to be worthy of that label...."

"By making impractical suggestions or recommendations," he said firmly, "it is possible for college professors to do more harm than good. The true test of the value of most research on matters of public policy is determined by the eventual acceptance and use of the recommendations. The college cannot justify its existence on the basis of mere 'irritational value'."

Johnson alluded to the pamphlet as an illustration of "something more important than the specific issue involved in this instance."

He recalled a letter to the editor of the Des Moines Register, published in September, 1942, and written by Albert G. Hart, one of the editorial committee approving the pamphlet under fire.

The letter, Johnson charged, accused members of the congressional farm bloc, farm organization leaders "and even the members of organized farm groups of sabotaging our American form of government, and, inferentially, at least, of being guilty of treason."

"Iowa farmers," Johnson read to Friley, "deeply and rightfully resent such characterizations of them by professors in their own agricultural colleges.

"They also resent the intolerance of such self-appointed, inexperienced political strategists.

"These two incidents indicate that there is something wrong with the college atmosphere, which causes such things to come to the surface."¹

According to the Creamery Journal account, after the group meeting, President Friley met in conference with one representative of each of the twelve affiliated organizations of the Iowa Dairy Association. He there proposed that the college committee for the Joint Committee be composed of three members representing the agricultural division and three members of the economics staff. The Creamery Journal also wrote that Friley "intimated that Prof. C. A. Iverson, head of the Dairy Industry Department and H. H. Kildee, Dean of Agriculture would be members."² One of these two men did in fact become a member of the joint committee. The other, Dean Kildee, became chairman.

¹Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

²Creamery Journal, June 1943.

The meeting thus ended and its participants dispersed. Most of the activities from the time of the May 19th meeting until the Joint Committee meeting of dairy and college representatives on July 12th, occurred "behind the scenes." There was some public debate of note, however, during the month and a half between meetings. Only three days after the May 19th meeting, Francis Johnson made public his objections to another pamphlet in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series by Dr. Albert G. Hart. Johnson stated that Pamphlet No. 8, Wartime Farm and Food Policy, placed full blame for present and potential inflationary tendencies on farm prices, and omitted all reference to labor and industry's part in the picture. He stated, "We would like all the facts, not just those critical of agriculture."

"If this study had acknowledged openly by statement that labor and industry might have, and probably do have, an equal responsibility for present or future inflation--with labor control a major factor--we could not be too critical of the pamphlet," the farm leader added.

"What the authors have omitted is what bothers us. We are concerned over the attitude with respect to the type of cooperation being given by our great agricultural education institution to our farm people and farm organizations of the state."¹

On May 25, 1943, two days after Johnson's statement, the Iowa Farmer's Union became involved in the controversy by defending the Series pamphlets. This stand taken by Donald W.

¹Des Moines Register, 23 May 1943.

Van Vleet, president of the Farmer's Union, was maintained throughout the controversy. Van Vleet's statement attacked Johnson as favoring inflation, attempting to prejudice farmers against labor, and trying to get even with Dr. Hart, because Hart had the courage to criticize the farm bloc.

Van Vleet also stated:

The Farmer's Union fights for the average American farmer who believes in democracy. We will fight for the freedom of expression by college professors as well as freedom of expression by farm leaders. Johnson criticized the college for its report on the use of dairy products. Now he has extended this little witch hunt and by threat and pressure is seeking to smother free thought at our state schools.¹

There was other public debate in the press during the weeks following the May 19th meeting, both for and against the dairy groups' protest. Iowa newspaper editorials and letters to the editor indicated that interest in the controversy was widespread. On June 3, 1943, the Des Moines Register reprinted excerpts from Pamphlet No. 5 on its editorial page. The editor's note preceding the reprinted portions of the pamphlet said that the excerpts were being presented by the Des Moines Register

in order that its readers may have a better understanding of the points in dispute. It should be recognized that this brief summary does not do justice to the whole argument of the author, O. H. Brownlee and his collaborators, since it does not

¹Des Moines Register, 25 May 1943.

include any of the analysis of milk supply, price policy, sanitary standards and so on.¹

The Register reprint of pamphlet excerpts afforded many Iowans their only exposure to the actual content of Pamphlet No. 5.

It was the dairy interests, however, who kept the controversy in the news during the month and a half before the Joint Committee meeting. On Tuesday, June 15, 1943, the American Dairy Association took out a full page advertisement in the Des Moines Register. The advertisement stated in bold print: "WE DAIRY FARMERS WANT TO KNOW--":

RECOGNIZING THE STANDING OF Iowa State College as one of America's outstanding agricultural institutions, five million dairy farmers are shocked at the rumpus created by the much-discussed Pamphlet No. 5. These issues are rocking the very foundation of diversified farming--a system that has made America the food basket of the world. The situation is serious for it challenges the dairy farmer's way of life. That's why 5,000,000 dairy farmers feel they're entitled to straightforward answers by Iowa State College to these frank questions concerning the issues at hand: (1) Does the Iowa State College propose that the housewives of America be denied butter and be forced to accept a product they have refused on its own merits? (2) Is the Iowa State College taking a stand against the Government's Wartime Food Production Program calling for approximately two billion pounds of butter to meet the 30% to 50% "set-aside" for the Armed Forces, Lend-Lease and the 13 pound per capita supply for civilian requirements? (3) As a school of science does the Iowa State College go on record in approving cottonseed oil and other vegetable fats injected with synthetic Vitamin A as the equal or superior of butter in food value? (4) Does the Iowa State College advocate shifting from the

¹Des Moines Register, 3 June 1943.

successful system of diversified farming to an untried, unprepared, theoretical plan of food production when all the world faces hunger?¹

On the day of the full-page advertisement, a meeting of 100 dairymen took place in Ames. They had gathered to discuss a recent rollback in butter prices ordered by the Office of Price Administration. However, the group took advantage of the situation and passed a resolution concerning Pamphlet No. 5. It read in part:

We contend that this pamphlet jeopardizes the national war food program which calls for two billion pounds of butter for the armed forces and civilian use in 1943....

We further contend that this pamphlet has done untold injury to a basic industry which means an annual income to the state of more than 100 million dollars per year, and which is vital to the maintenance of soil fertility and permanent agriculture.

We place responsibility for this pamphlet on the Iowa State college and hold the institution accountable to the dairy industry and the citizens of Iowa.²

The dairy industry was not the only group maintaining pressure on the College during the time preceding the joint meeting of college and dairy representatives. The Iowa Farm Bureau continued to apply pressures as well. Thomas W. Keenan, a member of the State Board of Education until July, 1943, recounted the June 22nd meeting of the Board in a

¹Des Moines Register, 15 June 1943.

²Creamery Journal, July 1943.

letter to the Des Moines Register. He wrote:

The last meeting of the board which I attended was held in Ames in June. At that time the attacks from the Farm Bureau were the most violent and we spent the entire afternoon discussing Pamphlet No. 5.¹

It was at this board meeting that Schultz had outlined the origin of the "Studies in Government's Operation" which became the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series of pamphlets. The background and procedure of the pamphlets as presented by Schultz appeared earlier in this paper. As Keenan described the meeting:

As the research had been conducted and the pamphlet produced by a committee headed by Professor Schultz, he led the discussion and explained the pamphlet and the controversy to us. He said the trouble with the pamphlet was that the material had been boiled down and boiled down to get into smaller compass until the array of facts, supporting the conclusion announced in the pamphlet, had been pretty well boiled out of it; that they were then engaged in the task of rewriting the pamphlet, putting in those supporting facts to make the conclusions announced in the pamphlet more obvious....

At that point I interrupted him and asked if the rewriting of the pamphlet would change any of the conclusions arrived at in the pamphlet. His answer was "absolutely no. The new material will only give added support to those conclusions."²

¹Des Moines Register, 9 September 1943.

²Ibid.

College and dairy preparations for meeting of Joint
Committee of Twelve

On the campus of Iowa State, President Friley had appointed a Special Committee to analyze the Pamphlet No. 5 and report back to him. The committee's chairman was George W. Godfrey, director of agricultural relations for the college. Other members were C. Y. Cannon, Professor of Animal Husbandry; B. W. Hammer, Professor of Dairy Industry; Pearl Swanson, Professor of Food and Nutrition; and B. H. Thomas, Professor of Animal Husbandry. On June 30, 1943, a report was filed with President Friley.

"Putting Dairying on a War Footing; An Analysis," the Special Committee's report, was primarily directed at the pamphlet's arguments for shifting resources from butterfat production to other areas. The thesis in Pamphlet No. 5 which most angered the dairy interests concerned the nutritive value of oleomargarine and butter. In the beginning of the pamphlet, Oswald Brownlee wrote:

The total food supply could be increased by shifting some of the resources now engaged in producing milk for butter into providing milk to be sold as fluid milk or as evaporated or dried milk or to be made into cheese. A saving in manpower, feed and materials would also be made if some of the resources now going to butter were shifted to the production of hogs or the production of vegetable oils.¹

Brownlee went on in the pamphlet to suggest ways to

¹Brownlee, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, p. 2.

shift resources from less essential to more essential uses. Among these, he suggested establishing milk prices so that as much milk as possible would be diverted into products using milk solids and making deferments of dairy workers based on production of milk for whole milk products or cheese rather than production of milk as such. Brownlee also suggested the re-examination of the "allotment of fats and the allocation of materials for manufacturing facilities for margarine so that consumers will have a substitute for butter."¹

The Special Committee's report to President Friley stated its interpretation of the main thesis of Pamphlet No. 5 in this way:

The problem presented by Pamphlet No. 5 is the need to increase the utilization of whole milk as human food since probably there can be little further expansion in its production. The solution suggested is to increase the use of milk solids not fat for human food wherever milk is produced, to decrease butterfat production where milk solids are not diverted to human food, and to increase the manufacture and consumption of oleomargarine (margarine).²

The committee's criticism of the pamphlet was expressed first with the statement, "Much of the possible value of Pamphlet No. 5 is lost, however, by its insistence that butter be replaced by oleomargarine when the fat is the only part of

¹Ibid., p. 3.

²George Godfrey et al., "Putting Dairying on a War Footing, An Analysis," 30 June 1943, Schultz Papers.

the milk used as human food."¹

Most of the committee report was occupied with supporting the statement, "The assumption by the author of Pamphlet No. 5 that feedstuffs now used in butterfat production largely could be shifted to hog and poultry production or other uses is in the main fallacious."² The report argued that:

In fact, the continuation of dairy production at present levels and an economic use of rough feeds means that the present production of butter cannot be greatly curtailed if the nation is to:

1. Maintain or increase the present numbers of milk cows;
2. Best utilize the rougher, less productive land;
3. Maintain the present dairy production.³

The Special Committee's criticisms seemed based on the assumption that Brownlee was arguing that nearly all resources be redirected, when in fact he argued that whenever possible they be redistributed. This was in fact a complaint that Brownlee made in "A Biography of Pamphlet No. 5 by the Author."

Whatever its real problems, Brownlee, Schultz and others felt the report contained many errors. On June 14th, Brownlee together with Schultz and Margaret Reid met with the Special Committee to discuss the report prior to submission to President Friley. However, the report was submitted in

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

substantially the same form as it was drafted despite discussion of errors.¹

In the "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5 by the Author," Brownlee wrote that the report was of much importance in determining the course of events:

Previous to this time, President Friley had apparently stood firm in his determination to withstand the pressures of the dairymen and those who had seized the incident as an opportunity to reopen many issues which had supposedly been closed. Friley had been receiving a continued stream of correspondence, largely supporting his position. An advertisement in the Des Moines Register and Tribune sponsored by the American Dairy Association and condemning the college for publication of the pamphlet, failed to stir Friley. However, the report of the fact finding committee indicating that the pamphlet was badly in error definitely weakened Friley's stand.²

Theodore Schultz expressed a similar feeling about President Friley's stand. In a letter to Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation, Schultz wrote that the events since the middle of May, 1943, could be divided into two periods:

The first month was one in which, in my judgment, the President tried and did his utmost to resolve the issues and maintain the standing and preserve the functions of the institution....

About the middle of June, looking back, it now appears that the President must have reached the conclusion that it would be necessary (a) to forego

¹(O. H. Brownlee), "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5."

²Ibid.

his program of reorganizing the Agricultural Extension Service and (b) shrink and limit the functions of social sciences so that controversial issues would be avoided.¹

George Godfrey, Special Committee chairman, may have been under some pressure. According to a Cedar Rapids Gazette editorial on September 22, 1943, the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation was openly "gunning" for Mr. Godfrey, because the "Farm Bureau heads at Des Moines" felt Godfrey had "been influential toward divorce of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service."² Whether this opposition to Godfrey had any effect on his committee's report is entirely speculative without further information.

Subsequent to the meeting between the President's Special Committee and some of the economists, attempt at revision of Pamphlet No. 5 had been undertaken. In a letter to Godfrey, Dr. Schultz indicated that during a discussion with President Friley on June 15th, it was Friley's thought that it would be wise for Schultz and others to take the initiative in revising Pamphlet No. 5. Buchanan had agreed, according to Schultz. He wrote to George Godfrey:

Inasmuch as (a) the pamphlet is virtually out of print, (b) it needs clarification at a number of points (I am thinking of our discussion with

¹T. W. Schultz to Joseph H. Willits, 22 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

²Cedar Rapids Gazette, 22 September 1943.

your committee the other afternoon), and (c) it seems to me it should be documented a good deal more than it has been in view of the importance of the more refined issues that are involved, the pamphlet should not only be revised but substantially expanded. In this I would think a rather liberal appendix be included so that much more of the crucial basic data are available in the pamphlet when a second edition is published.¹

Schultz pointed out that the Special Committee's criticisms were the ones that would be taken into account: "The more I think of the major points that you were raising, the more I am convinced that there needs to be a major clarification in especially section A."²

The procedure as suggested by Dr. Schultz was to first make copies of a revision available to Director Buchanan, who had suggested taking advantage of the Special Committee to criticize and review the revised version.

The second step, then, would be that we would seek to complete this revision, taking account of further comment and criticism with the view of placing before the dairy committee and our colleagues when they meet the revised copy. Do you not agree that there is real merit in this approach? It does, as the President pointed out, give us the initiative. It gives us an opportunity, coupled with a responsibility, of attempting to attain clarification to avoid misunderstandings that are inherent in the present language and to introduce such evidence as is relevant to the analysis.³

¹T. W. Schultz to George Godfrey, 16 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Apparently a revision was prepared. In a letter to President Friley on June 22, 1943, Buchanan wrote that a revision of Pamphlet No. 5 was in his office. He suggested the same basic procedure that Schultz had for review of the manuscript; that is, the manuscript would be reviewed by the President's Special Committee, the Committee would take up items to be discussed with the author and with the economics department editorial committee, and that the manuscript would be reviewed again by the Joint Committee of dairy and college representatives at the scheduled July 12th meeting.

The letter from Director Buchanan was noteworthy in other ways. The opening sentence of the letter read: "In discussion recently you suggested that it would be wise to use our standard procedure in the review of additional pamphlets in the economic series on Wartime Farm and Food Policy."¹ This was the first indication of President Friley's wishes for more rigorous review procedures. In the year following the Pamphlet No. 5 controversy the review procedures of several publications were revised, the Iowa State College Press Editorial Board was restructured, and a report on sponsorship of Experiment Station publications by a special committee appointed by Director Buchanan was issued.

¹R. E. Buchanan to President Charles E. Friley, 22 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

In the same letter to President Friley, Buchanan wrote that he had also received a manuscript entitled "War-time Government in Operation," which was to be part of the pamphlet series. Buchanan wrote that a special technical committee had been appointed to review the manuscript. Although Buchanan wrote that he did not "believe that this is a manuscript which should cause any difficulty when published," the pamphlet was never published as part of the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series.¹ Some details of this related incident will be covered in this chapter.

Regarding the issue of the revision of Pamphlet No. 5, Director Buchanan wrote a letter to the Special Committee members on June 23, 1943, announcing that the revised and enlarged manuscript was in his office. He requested that the committee study the manuscript carefully and take up any points which it may desire with the author and the Editorial Committee.

It is suggested further that it is desirable to have this review go forward as rapidly as possible in the hope that a satisfactory manuscript can be presented on July 12 to the meeting of the committee of twelve representing the dairy interests and the College.²

¹Ibid.

²R. E. Buchanan to George W. Godfrey, B. H. Thomas, B. W. Hammer, C. Y. Cannon and Pearl P. Swanson, 23 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

For some unclear reason, the President's Special committee on Pamphlet No. 5 did not review the enlarged and revised manuscript and meet with the author and editorial committee in time for this revision to be presented at the July 12th meeting. The committee made its report to Buchanan in a letter dated July 14, 1943. Basically the report said that the revision was not ready for publication. Perhaps the committee believed that the problems had been too large to correct in time for the July 12th joint committee meeting. (According to Brownlee in the "Biography," the committee tabled the revision until September in view of the short time before the joint committee meeting. The committee did not postpone its consideration of the revision as is clear from the July 14th report.) The criticisms as outlined in this report were:

- a. The manuscript should be carefully edited. Possibly because of haste in putting the manuscript together, illogical organization of material occurs and, in some cases, lack of clarity in sentences which need to be corrected.
- b. The tables should be checked by technicians in the field involved. Some of the figures quoted are from rather obscure sources and these sources themselves, may need checking as to accuracy.
- c. In the section of the pamphlet dealing with oleomargarine, the statements concerning this product are still in the comparative form which make them more obnoxious to many readers than if they were simple statements. We question, also, the pertinence of

putting so much stress on oleomargarine in the pamphlet which directs itself toward "Putting Dairying on a War Footing."¹

As the meeting date for the joint committee meeting approached, both the college representatives and the dairy interest representatives were involved in their own preparations. Before the meeting, the college representatives and members of the President's Special Committee met with President Friley, according to the pamphlet's author in "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5." At that time, Dr. Schultz indicated the errors in the Special Committee report, and also pointed out the existence of the proposed revision. It was observed that the conclusions in the pamphlet were not altered by the revision.²

The college representatives appointed by President Friley to the Joint Committee were Director Buchanan; Dr. Schultz; Dr. P. Mabel Nelson, head of the Department of Food and Nutrition; Dr. C. A. Iverson, head of the Department of Dairy Industry; and Dr. G. S. Shepherd and Dr. W. G. Murray both of the Department of Economics and Sociology. Dean H. H. Kildee was chairman of the Joint Committee.

The dairy representatives were probably more unified

¹George Godfrey, B. H. Thomas, B. W. Hammer, C. Y. Cannon and Pearl Swanson to R. E. Buchanan, 14 July 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²(Brownlee), "Biography of Pamphlet No. 5."

and prepared when going into the meeting. On June 15, 1943, the six who were to represent the dairy interests met in Ames to plan their strategy. (This meeting was coincidental with the meeting of 100 representatives of Iowa creameries mentioned previously.)

Clarence Nielson, president of the Wapsie Valley Creamery Company in Independence, Iowa, was elected chairman of the committee of six to represent the dairy industry at the July 12th meeting.

The other members of the committee were P. W. Crowley, representing the Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers of Iowa; Julius Brunner, representing the Iowa Association of Local Creameries; Scott Ellis, representing the Iowa Dairy Industry Commission; Ralph Bartlett, representing the Iowa Creamery Operators Association; and A. N. Heggen, representing the Iowa Cooperative Milk Producers Federation.¹

According to an article in the July issue of the Creamery Journal, there was a meeting between the six dairy representatives and 25 other industry representatives at the June dairy meeting in Ames. Present to advise the group were the director of public relations for the National Dairy Council, the General Manager of the American Dairy Association and the president of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. In

¹Creamery Journal, July 1943.

addition, the secretary of the National Dairy Union, although not in attendance, provided an analysis of the pamphlet. There were various other written communications which were read during this meeting, including a letter to President Friley from the President of the Minnesota Dairy Industry Committee who also happened to be president of the American Dairy Association.¹

According to the Creamery Journal account, it was decided that the committee of six should direct its argument against the right of the college to attack a basic industry in the state, and to confine discussion to basic issues rather than to enter into a paragraph by paragraph analysis which was first suggested by President Friley.

Fred Larrabee, then president of the Iowa State Dairy Association, chaired the June dairy meeting. During his opening remarks, the Creamery Journal quotes him as saying:

Dairymen sharply disagree with President C. E. Friley and Dr. R. E. Buchanan of the College, that the question involves freedom of speech. They contend that economists, as individual citizens are privileged to say what they wish but when their names appear on the Pamphlet, as members of a department of Iowa State College, the institution assumes the responsibility and is accountable to the industry attacked, and to the citizens of the state.²

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

The Retraction of Pamphlet No. 5

The meeting of the Joint Committee began in the morning of July 12, 1943, and was held in the Dairy Industry building at Iowa State College. Attending the meeting were the six representatives from Iowa State College; the six dairy industry representatives; Chairman Henry H. Kildee; C. R. Elder, Extension Editor; and E. S. Estel, secretary of the Iowa State Dairy Association. Mr. Estel served as secretary.¹ According to Mr. Elder, in a 1972 interview, the Joint Committee wished to hold its meeting without benefit of the press. However, because the group did recognize the need for some kind of statement, Mr. Elder as Extension Editor was asked to sit in on the meeting.² A Committee composed of Elder, Estel, Dean Kildee, W. G. Murray and Clarence Nielson was set up as a news release committee.³ The halls were full of press people, but none were admitted.

Three of the college people in attendance recalled one technique in particular used by the dairy group at the

¹Cooperative Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics, State of Iowa, "Blue Sheet" 1943, Blue Sheet Collection, Iowa State University Library Department of Special Collections.

²C. R. Elder, interview.

³P. Mabel Nelson, "Handwritten notes of July 12 Meeting," P. Mabel Nelson Papers, Iowa State University Library Department of Special Collections.

meeting. Apparently one of the first questions asked of Director Buchanan was about review procedures. Dr. V. H. Nielsen, now a professor of Food Technology at Iowa State, said that Dr. Iverson remembered Clarence Nielson asking Director Buchanan, "Isn't it true that it is the policy of the Experiment Station to revise every bulletin? Did you do that." Buchanan had to say no.¹

Dr. Geoffrey Shepherd remembered that the first question to Director Buchanan was whether the Agricultural Experiment Station read every bulletin as required in the regulations. This was obviously impossible for any station director to do, as Buchanan pointed out. According to Shepherd, the intent of the question was simply to discomfit Buchanan.²

Mr. Elder's recollection was that Dr. Buchanan was asked, "Did this publication receive the prescribed, normal review of the Experiment Station." The dairymen insisted on a yes or no answer, rather than a qualified one.³

It does seem clear in retrospect that the dairy industry representatives were well prepared, and according to Dr. Schultz, would not have left the meeting without the

¹Verner H. Nielsen, interview held at Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 7 August 1972.

²Geoffrey Shepherd, interview held in Ames, Iowa, 21 July 1972.

³C. R. Elder, interview.

bulletin being retracted. The meeting was not without some college input, however. According to the handwritten notes of one of the college representatives, Dr. P. Mabel Nelson, one of the first orders of business was a presentation by Theodore Schultz on the purpose and background of Pamphlet No. 5.¹ A paper by Dr. Schultz entitled "Putting Dairying On a War Footing" and marked "Tentative and not for publication," was the outline used by Dr. Schultz in his presentation.²

Schultz pointed out that dairying was one of the major sources of food. "Dairying is subject to these two pulls: (1) the demand for more dairy products, and (2) the growing scarcity of feed, manpower and equipment with which to produce dairy products." One of the main purposes of Pamphlet No. 5 as outlined by Schultz was to indicate what could be done (1) to reduce the shortage of dairy products, and (2) to minimize the adverse effects of the shortage of dairy products. In order to reduce the shortage of dairy products, Schultz pointed out that the recommendations of Pamphlet No. 5 were to (1) divert milk solids fed to livestock to human consumption and (2) divert more feed and labor to production of milk where both fat and non-fat milk solids are made available for human consumption.

¹Nelson, "Handwritten notes."

²T. W. Schultz, "Putting Dairying on a War Footing-- Tentative and not for publication," (July 1943), Schultz Papers.

Schultz also pointed out the recommended steps outlined in Pamphlet No. 5 to minimize the adverse effects of a shortage. These recommendations, along with the recommendation to divert skim milk to human consumption, were among those the dairy interests objected to:

- (a) Meet local shortages with supplementary evaporated and dried milk.
- (b) Ration dairy products when the shortage becomes national in scope.
- (c) Make more oleomargarine available to relieve the shortage of butter.¹

The remainder of Dr. Schultz's presentation was concerned with the economic setting of Pamphlet No. 5. He gave some fairly detailed explanations of food shortages and utilization of feed grains by livestock. In conclusion, Dr. Schultz noted:

To restate: The food required for the armed forces, lend-lease and by civilians has expanded greatly. The demand for dairy products has risen most markedly. It is not possible to produce enough milk to satisfy all of these wartime demands.

On the production side feed² supplies have become the major limiting factor.

After Dr. Schultz's presentation, Dr. Buchanan read a statement saying that the College must assume full responsibility for the publication. Then the President's Special Committee's report was read into the minutes.³

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Nelson, "Handwritten notes."

Clarence Nielson read a report, entitled "Statement of Special Dairy Committee to President Charles E. Friley Re: Pamphlet No. 5," for the dairy group. The first sentence was, "It will be observed at the outset that while Pamphlet No. 5 appears to have been published by The Iowa State College Press of Ames, Iowa, there is no such organization."¹ (The Collegiate Press used the imprint of Iowa State College Press for many publications.) The next paragraphs were directed towards Director Buchanan and may amount to the statement which was referred to by Elder, Shepherd, and Iverson:

Furthermore, the Rules of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station with reference to publication of pamphlets and bulletins provides as follows:

"It is the purpose of the Agricultural Experiment Station to encourage and facilitate the publication of the results of the projects as rapidly as they are sufficiently complete and approved.

"Every manuscript originating as a result of work supported in whole or in part by funds of the Agricultural Experiment Station must be approved by the Director before publication. Major publications, such as bulletins, are reviewed by special committees appointed by the Director before approval."

We believe that it is proper at this time to ask the Director of the Experiment Station if he approved the publication of Pamphlet No. 5, and since it must be deemed a major publication was it reviewed by a special committee approved by him as required by the above quoted rule?²

¹"Statement of Special Dairy Committee to President Charles E. Friley Re: Pamphlet No. 5," (July 1943), Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

The report criticized the author of Pamphlet No. 5 for not seeking the advice of experts in other disciplines, most notably in nutrition. The great bulk of the report examined statements in the pamphlet which the dairymen considered to be half truths or unfounded statements. In Chapter IV of this paper, these specific criticisms will be detailed. The following quote from the report exemplifies the arguments used by the dairy committee members and by dairy spokesmen since the beginning of the controversy:

We thus have before us a pamphlet discoursing at length on nutritional values and basing its main thesis thereon, and yet did not have the sanction or assistance in its preparation of a single nutritionist or dietician though many were no doubt available on the faculty of Iowa State College. What shall be said of such irresponsibility coming from those who, as Dr. Buchanan truly said, owe a great responsibility to the people of this state? One can only conclude that the author did not wish to have his argument upset or his conclusions disturbed by the authoritative views of a dietician or a nutritionist.

The pamphlet is filled with half truths, shows on its face a lack of research necessary to permit the author to speak with any authority and should be condemned as much for its omissions as for what it says.¹

According to an Extension press release on the meeting, the college representatives concurred in the objections outlined by the dairy's special report. According to Buchanan, however, the college representatives were able to show that

¹Ibid.

in many cases, the text of the pamphlet did not mean what the dairy report said it meant: "In other cases there were ambiguities; in still others, expressions which we had to admit were expressions of opinion merely and could not be proved."¹

During one of the breaks in the meeting, a faculty member of the Joint Committee, Dr. Geoffrey Shepherd recollected in a 1972 interview that "the Chairman of the committee, a campus official, whispered to each of the campus members of the committee that the college president wanted a unanimous verdict retracting the bulletin as the dairy pressure group wanted."²

The meeting continued into the afternoon. There was discussion of the statement by the dairy representatives point by point, and also some discussion of the proper terminology for margarine. The dairy representatives in their statement, took Brownlee to task for his use of the word "margarine" rather than the legal terminology "oleomargarine."³

From Dr. Nelson's notes, it appears that there

¹R. E. Buchanan to John H. Powell, 12 August 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²G. S. Shepherd, interview.

³Nelson, "Handwritten notes," and "Statement of Special Dairy Committee."

was some general discussion during the meeting of the dairy production situation.

Finally, according to Elder, at the close of the conference, Theodore Schultz made "a very emotional appeal" and "insisted to the group that they were laboring over inconsequential things and they were missing the main thesis of the publication and [not] seriously giving consideration to the very acute problems of the dairy processing industry in Iowa."¹

One thing is definitely known about the meeting of July 12. That is, the joint committee drafted a statement retracting Pamphlet No. 5, "Putting Dairying on a War Footing."

The committee of 12 representing the dairy industry of Iowa and the members of the staff of Iowa State College, have reviewed carefully Pamphlet No. 5 entitled "Wartime Farm and Food Policy--Putting Dairying on a War Footing."

It is unanimously agreed that many of the statements contained in Pamphlet No. 5 are either incorrect or are susceptible to misinterpretation or are inadequately documented as to facts.

In view of these findings it is recommended to Dr. Charles E. Friley, President of Iowa State College, that Pamphlet No. 5 be retracted immediately, officially and in publication.

It is further recommended that the best form of retraction is the preparation of a complete revision which will take into consideration all of the criticisms and suggestions which have been made with reference to Pamphlet No. 5 and shall be worked out with a committee representing the dairy and farm interests of the state.²

¹C. R. Elder, interview.

²Charles E. Friley to the Recipients of Pamphlet No. 5, 28 July 1943, Schultz Papers.

What is less clear about the meeting is the reason why the vote was unanimous, when some of the college members of the Joint Committee were against retraction at least in retrospect. Dr. Geoffrey Shepherd in interview explained his vote:

The creamery pressure group would not have been satisfied with anything less than a public retraction of the bulletin. But in the tradition of independent study and publication at the College, the pressure group's attitude should have been disregarded. I myself was doubtful whether to vote for retraction, until the head of the economics department and the head of the Agricultural Experiment Station had thus voted. They were not willing to stand up for their own actions. I was not willing to do so for them.¹

Director Buchanan in retrospect of thirty years also said that Pamphlet No. 5 should not have been retracted. His reason at the time for voting for retraction was explained, although very generally, in a letter written on August 12, 1943:

It is possible that in discussing retraction and republication the staff backed up farther than it should. The reason behind the action was that those involved in the state represent a large clientele with whom it is highly desirable that the College work amicably. Frankly, it seemed to be desirable to back up to the point where we could get faced in the same direction with the dairymen of the state in order to carry forward satisfactorily our programs of research and education. It is debatable as to whether or not we have gone too far. May I assure you, however, that there are no problems of

¹G. S. Shepherd, interview.

academic freedom or of freedom of speech involved in this particular controversy.¹

Dr. Schultz's explanation for his vote appears in a letter also. In October of 1943, Joseph H. Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation penned a hand-written note at the bottom of a letter to Schultz asking about his signing of the Joint Committee's conclusion. Schultz replied in a letter to Willits on October 16:

The joint committee's report was a mistake. It was born under the most trying circumstances. The faculty representatives were very anxious to patch up the matter, hoping somehow to reestablish working relations with the dairy interest. The dairy spokesman, however, came to the meeting instructed to settle for one thing and one thing only, namely the retraction of the pamphlet. At the end of a very trying day, after some members of the dairy group had indicated they would soon have to leave the meeting, the report was dictated hastily and approved by vote. Looking back, I regret that I did not leave the meeting after it had become evident that it would be impossible to examine the pamphlet on its merits. I stayed in the hope that somehow a constructive solution would be attained. By staying through the voting on the report, although there was no roll call, I, in a sense, tacitly became a party to the report. I made the same general point in my letter of September 15, to President Friley.²

On July 28, 1943, President Charles E. Friley sent a letter to the "Recipients of Pamphlet No. 5, WARTIME FARM AND

¹R. E. Buchanan to V. V. Malcolm, 12 August 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²Theodore W. Schultz to Joseph Willits, 16 October 1943, Schultz Papers.

FOOD POLICY SERIES." The letter contained the statement of the Joint Committee. In addition, President Friley included the following sentence as the last paragraph in his letter:

The above report of the Joint Committee was approved on July 19, 1943, with the proviso that the recommended revision be in the form of a new study of the dairy situation, undertaken cooperatively, and including both wartime problems and those likely to be of interest and concern in the post war period.¹

Thus ended the first phase of the Pamphlet No. 5 controversy--the pressure group protest. The retraction of Pamphlet No. 5 and President Friley's letter announcing the retraction marked the end of the dairy group protest. However, the controversy over the pamphlet was not over. The retraction, President Friley's letter, and other events were elements which resulted in protest from others in the months following the July 12th Joint Committee meeting.

Post Retraction Events

The retraction of Putting Dairying on a War Footing stimulated some editorial comment in the Iowa press, both pro and con. However, by this time the news of the Pamphlet No. 5 controversy and retraction was reaching a national audience.

On July 31, 1943, the Chicago Journal of Commerce carried an editorial entitled, "Research at Iowa State." This

¹Charles E. Friley to Recipients of Pamphlet No. 5, 28 July 1943, Schultz Papers.

editorial looked with considerable disfavor upon the actions retracting the pamphlet: "The great hullabaloo raised at Ames by the state's dairy producers, and the puerile actions of the college administration have cast suspicion on all future publications coming from faculty members." The Joint Committee was referred to as a "packed committee." This "packed committee" after much pressure behind the scenes, "recommended that Brownlee retract his contentions and revise his pamphlet," according to the editorial:

All of which means that hereafter, publications of the Iowa State College will be read with much skepticism. If the pressure groups like the dairy-men in Iowa get research conclusions revised merely by putting the squeeze on the college president and threatening to have the legislature cut the college's appropriations, why should anyone believe that any of the college's future research publications are impartial and not written with an eye to catering¹ to the prejudices of the producers around the state?

During the summer there was some comment coming into the college from persons concerned about the college's reputation. A letter to President Friley from Dr. Walter Wilcox, who was on leave to the Food Distribution Administration, indicated that there were some doubts building as to the college's actions. He wrote in the letter that he had received comments from some who had received the letter of retraction: "The comments on the Series have been highly complimentary and

¹Chicago Journal of Commerce, 31 July 1943.

they interpret your letter as capitulation on the part of Iowa State College to pressure group interests."¹

Although matters seemed to be relatively quiet during the summer following the pamphlet retraction, some actions within the college were building to a climax in September with Dr. Schultz's resignation. President Friley's actions were taking a course which some at the college found distressing.

In July of 1943, the Editorial Board of the Iowa State College Press was reorganized. J. L. Lush of the animal science department became chairman, and President Friley advised the Board that "it is not anticipated that the Editorial Board will at any time delegate its authority for review of manuscripts to any other committee or organization."²

It is noteworthy that Dr. Lush had voted against the Press Editorial Board's delegating review authority to the economics department editorial committee in the first place. In retrospect, Dr. Lush felt that Pamphlet No. 5 was in the main correct in its principles, but that it was filled with sloppy mistakes, which would have been eliminated by a

¹Walter W. Wilcox to President Charles E. Friley, 20 August 1943, Schultz Papers.

²Russell Paul Kaniuka, "A History of the Iowa State University Press" (Master of Science Thesis, Iowa State University, 1961), pp. 34-35.

well-balanced review committee.¹

However, it was a problem that summer of 1943 over another pamphlet in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series that was most pertinent to the Pamphlet No. 5 affair. This second controversy added to the concerns expressed by some, including Dr. Schultz, regarding the role of public policy research at Iowa State. The pamphlet, Wartime Government in Operation, by William H. Nicolls and John A. Vieg, was the one which Director Buchanan mentioned in a letter to President Friley as having no major problems. A six page typewritten paper exists entitled, "A Narrative Chronology of Administrative Procedures Followed with Regard To A Manuscript, 'Wartime Government in Operation,' By William H. Nicholls and John A. Vieg."² The paper, although neither signed nor by-lined, appears to have been written by Nicholls. There also exist several letters related to the affair, as well as reports from the pamphlet's review committee.

The proposed pamphlet was written by William Nicholls, assistant professor of economics, with John Vieg from the

¹J. L. Lush, interview held at Iowa State University, 8 August 1972.

²(William H. Nicholls), "A Narrative Chronology of Administrative Procedures Followed with Regard to a Manuscript 'Wartime Government in Operation,' by William H. Nicholls and John A. Vieg," (1943), Schultz Papers.

Department of History and Government, on leave with the Lend-Lease Administration at the time the pamphlet was written. (He had returned for two weeks to work with Nicholls.) By the time the draft for the first of two proposed pamphlets, War-time Government in Operation, was ready, the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 had arisen. Thus the editorial committee in the economics department was especially critical of the newly proposed pamphlet. By June 15, 1943, according to the "Narrative Chronology," a fifth draft had been prepared and was accepted by the editorial committee of Albert Hart, Margaret Reid, Dr. Schultz and Walter Wilcox.¹

By this time, President Friley had expressed his desire for the additional pamphlets in the series to be reviewed by standard procedures.² Also, according to the "Narrative Chronology," Dr. Schultz had suggested to Director Buchanan that an interdepartmental committee be appointed.³ On June 22, 1943, Buchanan appointed such a review committee: E. W. Lindstrom, Vice Dean of the Graduate School; Iver Johnson, from the Department of Farm Crops; Hester Chadderton, from the

¹Ibid.

²R. E. Buchanan to President Charles E. Friley, 22 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

³(Nicholls), "A Narrative Chronology."

Department of Home Economics Education; and C. H. Matterson and H. C. Cook both from the Department of History and Government. Dr. Lindstrom was appointed chairman. In his letter to the members asking them to serve, Buchanan requested that the committee make its review by June 26--four days after the date of the appointment. "Any questions," wrote Buchanan, "should be taken up with the authors and the Editorial Committee consisting of Margaret G. Reid, Albert G. Hart, T. W. Schultz, and Walter W. Wilcox."¹

Indeed, on Saturday, June 26, the review committee met with Dr. Nicholls and Dr. Schultz. Schultz explained the nature of the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, and Nicholls defended the author's point of view on the various issues raised by the committee. According to the "Narrative Chronology" the following incident occurred during that meeting:

During this part of the proceedings, however, unknown to the others present, Chairman Lindstrom, and then Professor Schultz, were called out of the meeting by President Friley, who allegedly told them that he considered the matter at hand serious, and that the committee certainly would not approve this pamphlet, which was (according to second hand reports) "worse than the Brownlee pamphlet." (No. 5) In this atmosphere of intimidation, the committee voted 3-2 to publish the pamphlet in the college series.²

¹R. E. Buchanan to E. W. Lindstrom, Iver Johnson, Hester Chadderdon, C. H. Matterson, H. C. Cook, 22 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²(Nicholls), "A Narrative Chronology."

On June 28, the review committee sent a report to Director Buchanan saying that by a majority vote the committee recommended publication of the bulletin in the series, provided that certain points were revised.

On June 30, Director Buchanan replied to the review committee asking that it continue as a committee to review changes in the pamphlet. Also, he wrote, "I hope that it may be possible for your committee to make a decision on the basis of unanimous rather than majority vote before final authorization for publication is recommended."¹ In the same letter, Buchanan wrote that he was enclosing a copy of a letter he had written to Dr. Schultz relative to the publication of the manuscript. He also sent a copy of this letter to President Friley. The letter raised a new question; that is, the appropriateness of the manuscript for publication in the series and as a project of the Agricultural Experiment Station. In the letter, Buchanan wrote that the manuscript was an outgrowth of an Agricultural Experiment Station project. "In form, content and objective it should be reasonably consonant with those of the Experiment Station and College."

In my opinion, it is not appropriate that the Agricultural Experiment Station use its funds for research in fields which have very little or no direct relationship to agriculture, even though

¹R. E. Buchanan to E. W. Lindstrom et al., 30 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

these fields may be extremely interesting and important from the standpoint of the public good.¹

Director Buchanan indicated that although the manuscript did have a very direct significance in agriculture, there was almost complete lack of

reasonable justification for the publication of a manuscript of this type as a benefit to agriculture or in securing and tabulating the facts which must be used by those working in agriculture. What I am saying is that a somewhat radical reorientation of the manuscript is advisable.²

Buchanan went on to point out that there was evidence in the manuscript that the authors had in mind the relationships to agriculture and that the relationships were implicit throughout. However, Buchanan felt that what was implicit should be made explicit, and the manuscript should at every opportunity bring out the agricultural implications, if it was to be sponsored by the Experiment Station. Also:

It is the objective in scientific papers to present data, to analyze data, to point out relationships, to enumerate advantages and disadvantages, to discuss alternative (sic), to be objective as is possible and above all to avoid language which would indicate advocacy rather than objective analysis. It must be recognized that in the social science field perhaps more than in other fields topics are discussed which are often considered by our citizens emotionally rather than logically. We must avoid as far as possible the emotional appeal as contrasted with the logical analysis.³

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Charles E. Friley to R. E. Buchanan, 3 July 1943, Buchanan Papers.

Buchanan sent copies of his letter to President Friley, Dr. Nicholls, Dr. Vieg, Director Godfrey, and members of the reviewing committee. One response to that letter came from President Friley in a letter to Buchanan dated July 3, 1943. First of all, President Friley expressed his agreement with Buchanan's statement that the manuscript, Wartime Government in Operation, may not be appropriate to the purpose of the Agricultural Experiment Station. President Friley made another statement in the letter which revealed his opinion toward public policy research:

I cannot escape the conviction that some of the bulletins in this series give the distinct impression that we are attempting to influence policy. This is in no sense a policy-making institution. We are on sound ground only as we study problems and present all facts which clearly arise from the research. Conclusions may, of course, be reached on the basis of these facts, but we must distinguish very rigidly between our conclusions on the basis of fact and specific recommendation that one or another policy be adopted. The latter is entirely a governmental function.¹

On July 2, Dr. Nicholls visited Director Buchanan to discuss Buchanan's criticisms of the manuscript. The two agreed that the review committee's decision should be unanimous since the vote had split on social versus physical science lines, and that such a gap had to be bridged if the committee were to serve a useful purpose. In addition, Nicholls in a

¹Ibid.

"Narrative Chronology" made some observations about Buchanan's stance in the matter.

He [Dr. Nicholls] came away with the impression that, while Director Buchanan was making a fair, honest, and thorough-going effort to establish a policy in a new area, under the severest of pressure, he was still uncertain in his own mind and was obviously still trying to 'feel his way.'¹

There were others who reviewed the manuscript. According to "A Narrative Chronology," Mr. Roger Fleming and Mr. Allan Kline of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation both reviewed the manuscript. Mr. Kline, who became president of the Iowa Farm Bureau the next year, reportedly wrote that the manuscript "seems to me remarkably unbiased and sound and fair in approach."² Roger Fleming, who was director of research at the Farm Bureau, had some criticisms of the manuscript, although he felt that the study was important. In a letter to Director Buchanan, Fleming supported Buchanan's objections to the manuscript as outlined in his June 30th letter. Fleming wrote to Buchanan on July 15, 1943: "The best counsel that I can give is that you insist upon its being written so as to present an accurate, understanding and sympathetic orientation of the broad discussion to the Iowa

¹(Nicholls), "A Narrative Chronology."

²Ibid.

situation."¹

Leland G. Allbaugh, associate director of Extension Service, was also given the manuscript to review. He reportedly felt that the manuscript should be carefully combed to avoid the appearance of "name calling." He also seemed doubtful of the administrative expediency of publication in light of the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5.²

Meanwhile, Dr. Nicholls began revision of the manuscript. He first tried to meet Director Buchanan's objections. Nicholls sent a memorandum to Buchanan outlining proposed changes, and Buchanan responded with a tentative approval. In his memorandum, Dr. Nicholls also suggested that ". . . the physical scientists on the committee should be willing to accept a sufficiently broad definition of 'research' to cover legitimate current work in the social sciences, if unanimous approval was to be likely enough to make further time and effort in revision profitable." In his reply, Director Buchanan enclosed a note from Dean Lindstrom indicating willingness to accept the broad definition of "research."³ Nicholls then proceeded with his revision over the next three

¹Roger Fleming to R. E. Buchanan, 15 July 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²(Nicholls), "A Narrative Chronology."

³Ibid.

weeks.

On July 23, the revised manuscript was returned to the review committee. On July 31, the committee unanimously recommended the manuscript for publication. However, publication of the pamphlet was not to be.

On August 3, Director Buchanan and Dr. Nicholls met regarding the manuscript. Buchanan was still uncertain as to its appropriateness. Also, the President and the newly constituted Iowa State College Press Editorial Board had yet to approve. However, Buchanan promised to push the manuscript through to a final decision.¹ Professor Nicholls followed up this meeting with a letter outlining his arguments for the appropriateness of the manuscript in the pamphlet series.²

The next day, August 5th, Dr. Nicholls was informed that Buchanan was inclined against publication in the pamphlet series. On August 6th, William Murray, acting head of the economics department, informed Dr. Nicholls that the manuscript, while having real merit, should be published by an outside firm. (The authors signed a contract in early September with a Philadelphia publishing firm.)³

¹Ibid.

²William H. Nicholls to R. E. Buchanan, 4 August 1943, Buchanan Papers.

³(Nicholls), "A Narrative Chronology."

On the same day, August 6, Dr. Nicholls sent a letter thanking Director Buchanan and the reviewing committee for their fairness, promptness and painstaking care. Buchanan replied to Dr. Nicholls' letter:

I hope that we never come to the point which demands agreement in conclusions and thinking. I could imagine nothing much more sterile academically. What you are able to do is to recognize that not all differences in opinion apparently can be satisfactorily reconciled. Most important is that we make every reasonable effort each to understand the other's point of view and to be tolerant of it. I am afraid this sounds like a bunch of platitudes, but I think nevertheless it quite directly illustrates our thinking. What we as administrators must do is as far as possible to maintain an environment in which men with originality and conviction can make their contributions to our thinking.¹

From the evidence it would appear that Director Buchanan was the one who made the final decision regarding the Nicholls-Vieg manuscript. However, in "A Narrative Chronology," Dr. Nicholls outlined some of the procedures at the presidential level. Apparently, the revised manuscript was sent to President Friley who referred it in turn to Librarian Charles H. Brown. Brown reported back to President Friley on August 6.

Dr. Brown's report was a scathing one. According to Dr. Nicholls in "A Narrative Chronology," "Dr. Brown's report

¹R. E. Buchanan to William Nicholls, 13 August 1943, Buchanan Papers.

condemned the manuscript in the most extreme and dogmatic manner." He questioned "the competence of the authors in the field of study, asserted that it was based on opinion rather than fact, and charged that it was unscholarly both in presentation and in lack of documentation."¹ These were serious charges as Dr. Nicholls pointed out. They were "too serious to serve as the basis of an administrative decision without any opportunity for the authors to be heard in their own defense."² Nicholls claimed that all the objections raised by Dr. Brown had been raised and met by the reviewing committee and Director Buchanan.

It is not clear whether President Friley had anything to do with the final decision regarding Wartime Government in Operation. Clearly Dr. Nicholls believed that he did:

So far as is known Director Buchanan made the final decision against publication of the manuscript by the College. He undoubtedly acted under considerable pressure, however, as had the All-College Committee, in spite of which it handed down a unanimously favorable final report. Indeed, it is reported that the President telephoned Dean Lindstrom in a personal rebuff³ for his favorable decision in this final report.

Director Buchanan, writing in December of 1943 to the President of the Iowa State College Alumni Association, expressed his view of the situation. He wrote that he

¹(Nicholls), "A Narrative Chronology."

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

recognized that there had been some criticism of the manner in which the pamphlet, Wartime Government in Operation, had been handled.

There had been some criticism on the part of the Farm Bureau that in our discussions of the agricultural problems there had been no survey of the difficulties in the present situation brought by labor and by government. The manuscript, while it had many agricultural implications, was found when submitted to discuss a whole series of subjects relating to our whole economic war setup. Those of us who read the manuscript felt sure that it was worthy of publication. However, the subject matter was such that it did not seem appropriate to the sponsorship of an Agricultural Experiment Station. Even though the manuscript was passed as to validity and timeliness by a faculty committee, I did not believe that the subject matter, quite irrespective of treatment, was such as to warrant sponsorship by the Station. . . I therefore took the matter up with the author, and after entirely free discussion it was agreed that the manuscript would be published as a book quite without institutional sponsorship....¹

The issues raised by the handling of the manuscript, Wartime Government in Operation, did not immediately fade away. They were raised again and made public by Dr. Theodore Schultz upon his resignation from Iowa State College.

The Resignation of Theodore Schultz

The resignation of Theodore Schultz on September 17, 1943, was a major event in the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5. The protest from special interests had abated, while the

¹R. E. Buchanan to Leroy Snyder, 16 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

protests from academicians, national organizations, and others were beginning. The resignation of Dr. Schultz stimulated a renewed interest and discussion about Pamphlet No. 5 as well as in the broader questions of the freedom to publish at Iowa State.

Dr. Schultz directed his eight page letter of resignation to President Friley. Prior to release of his letter, Dr. Schultz met with President Friley to discuss the resignation, and problems related to Pamphlet No. 5. Following this meeting, Schultz dictated a statement of his views of this meeting, September 17th, from 11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. The dictated statement is an illuminating document. However, there is unfortunately no way to corroborate Schultz's story with that of President Friley.

The letter of resignation was written on September 15, and discussed by President Friley and Dr. Schultz on September 17, although it was not released to others until after the conference. Therefore, the contents of the letter of resignation will be analyzed prior to discussion of the conference between the two men.

The opening sentence of the letter read, "The series of events during the last few months have brought about a crisis in the development of the social sciences on this campus." Schultz went on to outline the development of social sciences at Iowa State remarking that it was a "distinct

credit to the administration of Iowa State College that through their efforts an unusually vigorous development was encouraged."¹ However, because the war economy was a prosperous one and the citizens of Iowa no longer depressed, the interest and acceptance of changes in the social organization was no longer as viable. Organized pressure groups were once again pressing for the maintenance of the status quo and of established policies, according to Schultz.

At this point, Dr. Schultz took to task some of the faculty members who had not distinguished between interests of particular agricultural groups and the general public interest.

The failure to have served, first and foremost, the general welfare of the state and nation has quite understandably created expectations that the facilities and faculty of Iowa State College were primarily here to serve agriculture in ways prescribed by the organized pressure groups in agriculture regardless of the effects of² what was done upon the public interest generally.

Dr. Schultz then directly confronted President Friley in the letter, writing that while he was cognizant of the limits placed upon the President, "these limits do not justify the actions of the President's office within the last few months with relation to the social sciences." Schultz wrote

¹T. W. Schultz to President Charles E. Friley, 15 September 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

that the entire social science faculty was frustrated and in a state of demoralization. In order to save the "major academic assets in the social sciences" and in order to safeguard the college from undesirable pressure group action, Dr. Schultz argued that decisions must be reached and actions taken by the President's office on a number of "specific issues which now represent breaches of good faith between the administration and the social science faculty."¹ Dr. Schultz then outlined eight issues which he felt were ones which President Friley "must" take action on.

The first of these eight issues was the revision of Pamphlet No. 5. Schultz wrote that there was abroad the belief that it was the wish of the President's office that the revision be postponed indefinitely. Schultz urged President Friley to explicitly state the procedures which would be followed in revision, and then outlined certain conditions for the revision. Further, Schultz discussed the retraction and especially President Friley's letter to the recipients of Pamphlet No. 5, which stated that a "new study" would be undertaken. Schultz wrote:

While the subsequent developments which led to the sending of the President's letter under date of July 28 to the recipients of Pamphlet No. 5 are not known to me, that action in itself caused a serious loss of confidence in the integrity of the

¹Ibid.

Iowa State College both on the part of its faculty members and on the part of scholars elsewhere.¹

The second issue which Dr. Schultz felt should be addressed was the stopping of a publication in the Iowa Farm Economist. Schultz claimed that the uncertainty caused by the actions of the President's office in stopping of the publication, "Stretching Our Feed Grain Supplies," must be removed. Schultz argued that the magazine's Editorial Board must be given the responsibility to pass on the analyses presented in articles submitted for publication, and further that it should be evident that the administration has confidence in the abilities of the editors. Dr. Schultz attached with the letter a statement from the Editorial Board of the Iowa Farm Economist outlining proper procedures for handling materials submitted for publication. He asked that this statement be approved by President Friley.²

Issue number three was entitled, "Removal of Atmosphere of Intimidation Regarding Publication on Controversial Issues." It basically dealt with the Nicholls-Vieg manuscript, Wartime Government in Operation. Dr. Schultz outlined some of the history of the affair and then noted, "The relationship of the author to the all-college committee and to the Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station were

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

wholly satisfactory; in fact, they were constructive and profitable to all concerned." However, wrote Dr. Schultz:

When this manuscript came to the President's desk, there certainly was no longer a question of deciding upon the validity and competence of the study. The only question at this stage was whether or not, in terms of the public relations of the College, it was expedient to have the Collegiate Press, Inc., or the Agricultural Experiment Station publish the manuscript. Instead of distinguishing between these two decisions, the President entered on a procedure that was wholly ex parte. The President sent the manuscript to Librarian Charles H. Brown for review, in doing so completely ignoring the professional work that had gone into the preparation, review, and criticism of the manuscript by the All-College Committee.¹

The Schultz letter suggested that the President's office repair the damage by assuring staff members that it will abide by the decisions of regularly constituted review committees.

The fourth issue was in regard to the Iowa State College Press Editorial Board as newly reorganized. Dr. Schultz wrote that the social sciences must have a representative on the Board. He complained of the one remaining representative having been dropped.

Issue number five concerned a radio program on Station WOI conducted by Dr. Bryce Ryan of the economics and sociology staff, which was ordered discontinued by the director of the station. Schultz's letter claimed that this was done without

¹Ibid.

any consultation with the staff member involved or any faculty advisory group. "The manner of this action as executed appears, on the basis of the restricted evidence available to me, to have been not only highly arbitrary but designed to shield the President's office from any responsibility in the act."¹

The evidence which Dr. Schultz relied upon, came at least in part from Bryce Ryan. In a letter to Dr. Schultz dated September 9, 1943, Dr. Ryan explained what had happened. On July 23, 1943, Dr. Ryan's commentary program, "Inside the News," was ordered discontinued by the Director of Station WOI. Dr. Ryan was told that criticism of the series from within the college was so insistent that no other course was possible. "It was distinctly understood that the Director was acting in response to pressure which he could not resist....Since it appeared that no amount of faculty and public support for the program would influence the decision, I inferred that it came from some high administrative office."²

According to Dr. Ryan's letter, "the major grounds upon which the order to discontinue rested were in regard to

¹Ibid.

²Bryce Ryan to T. W. Schultz, 9 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

college policy; the program was allegedly spreading unverified, interpretive material under the authority of an institution reputed to present only verified facts." Dr. Ryan noted that the program which replaced his also presented many statements of speculation.¹

The sixth issue which Dr. Schultz discussed concerned the Rockefeller Gift Fund. The Schultz letter claimed that Dr. Joseph H. Willits, director of the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, held Dr. Schultz primarily responsible for administering the funds. Schultz then wrote that he had been informed that President Friley had ordered the business office to not pay any further bills drawn against the grant. According to Dr. Schultz, this action had been taken without consultation with him. Schultz's recommendation was that as soon as the outstanding bills drawn against the account, including the revision of Pamphlet No. 5, had been paid, that the unexpended portion be returned to the Rockefeller Foundation.²

The next issue was closely related to the previous one. Dr. Schultz recommended that the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series be discontinued. There were seven remaining studies which had been approved by the President's office as

¹Ibid.

²Schultz to Friley, 15 September 1943.

appropriate for publication. "Subsequent developments have made it impossible for the staff to continue work on these manuscripts, and it is the judgment of the editorial committee, in which I concur, that the series be discontinued with an appropriate letter to the subscribers."¹

The final issue which Dr. Schultz discussed was a special committee organized to reshape the Department of Economics and Sociology. Dr. Schultz, as head of the Department of Economics and Sociology and chairman of the Social Science Center, was neither consulted nor advised by the President's office of the plans and purposes for setting up of such a committee.

The creation of this committee and the instructions given to its members indicate plainly that the President is inviting proposals that the Department be divided and that the professional privileges of the staff members be restricted and that the Department's functions be severely limited. No committee could conceivably affect the welfare and effectiveness of the staff in Economics and Sociology more vitally than this one.²

Dr. Schultz recommended to the President that this committee be immediately disbanded.

The Schultz resignation letter next addressed itself to suggestions as to how the college could best meet future pressure group demands so as not to see a recurrence of the Pamphlet No. 5 type of incident. The three recommendations

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

that Dr. Schultz outlined were significant because they illuminated some of the deeper rifts at the Iowa State College. As Ray Anderson, the Cedar Rapids Gazette farm editor, wrote in the September 19th issue, "The recent oleo-butter fracas in Iowa today appeared purely incidental to deep-rooted differences at Iowa State College which culminated temporarily Friday evening with the announced resignation of Dr. T. W. Schultz...."¹

The first suggestion was that the faculty be organized and orderly in dealing with outside pressures. "An orderly procedure for faculty participation in policy decisions regarding scholarship, research, conditions of tenure, and publication policies should be worked out at once."²

The second suggestion concerned the creation of a "philosophy of faculty objectives." "The situation unfortunately remains that a large proportion of the faculty have not as yet developed a clear appreciation of the difference between the serving of special interest group ends and the serving of the general interest."³ Dr. Schultz suggested that the only way to rectify this situation was the initiation

¹Cedar Rapids Gazette, 19 September 1943.

²Schultz to Friley, 15 September 1943.

³Ibid.

of an educational program from the President's Office.

The third suggestion from Dr. Schultz was that faculty members should be made aware that an insubordinate act of influencing an interest group to bring pressure against the President's office or any administrator would result in the expectation of resignation. Schultz based his suggestion on a rather interesting allegation:

Although no attempt has been made to investigate the circumstances, it has been reported to me that members of the Iowa State College faculty helped create the inflammatory interest group demands with respect to the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5. It is also often stated that when members of the Iowa State College faculty do not agree with policies of the administration, they sometimes go to the interest group with which they have the closest dealings and get them to bring pressure on the President's office for modification of the policy.¹

Before closing his letter with the announcement of his resignation, Dr. Schultz encouraged President Friley to meet with the staff of the Department of Economics and Sociology to indicate what kind of charter the social sciences were to have at Iowa State College. According to Schultz, a number of members of the economics and sociology faculty were on the verge of leaving: "They cannot stand much longer the uncertainty and the demoralizing atmosphere that now exist." Schultz urged President Friley to be explicit about the actions to be taken with regard to the issues that were raised in the

¹Ibid.

letter of resignation.

In my opinion this statement to the Economics Department staff by the President should give assurance (a) that the Department will not be divided, (b) that there is to be freedom to work on national and other problems, even though they are controversial in nature, and (c) that there will be a continuation of a liberal policy permitting staff members to accept assignments away from the campus when the significance of the assignment and the probable developments of the talents of the individual merit such arrangements.¹

Dr. Schultz closed his letter:

Mr. President, I have given much thought to ways and means of discussing these issues with you in an atmosphere conducive to clear thinking and constructive solutions. I want to be sure that our primary concern will be the welfare of Iowa State College. I do not want to protect my position or enhance my role at the College. So that our discussion may be as free as possible from any concern about my personal and professional interest as a member of the staff, I shall submit my resignation from the Iowa State College when we meet to discuss these matters on September 17.²

Indeed, on September 17, a Friday, Dr. Schultz met with President Friley to discuss the resignation. Schultz had been offered a position at the University of Chicago, and this offer, in Schultz's words, "has given me an opportunity to do what needed to be done here."³

As mentioned, Dr. Schultz dictated notes immediately following his conference with President Friley. Schultz

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³T. W. Schultz to James G. Patton, 23 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

described President Friley as being "extremely calm, considerate, genuine and in appearance very straightforward," throughout the meeting.¹

In the dictated statement, Dr. Schultz said that he began the meeting by indicating that "the department including myself was quite aware of the need of handling studies in controversial fields in ways which would not jeopardize the institution...."² He also indicated that he was aware that he had in a sense been insubordinate for the first time by discussing internal matters with people from outside the college. This discussion was with Mr. Roger Fleming and Mr. Allan Kline of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. (In the dictated statement, Dr. Schultz did not relate the contents of these discussions.) "The President then said that there was no need for my considering the resignation, he was sure that the agreement was there, that the mistakes and difficulties could be cleared up and that he genuinely hoped we could proceed to discuss the issues in that vein."³

The two men then discussed some of the statements made in the Schultz letter of resignation. The first issue

¹T. W. Schultz, "Dictated Statement Immediately Following Conference from 11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. through lunch hour with President Charles E. Friley," 17 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

discussed was that of the reorganization of the department. President Friley said that there was no desire to divide the department; that he had notified Dr. Murray, acting head of the department; and that the committee was composed of superiors of the College. The committee was to give President Friley an advisory opinion.

Next, Dr. Schultz wrote that he indicated to President Friley his feelings about the roles of Director Buchanan and Leland Allbaugh, associate director of the Extension Service. Schultz believed that the work of these two men was the foundation of the success and performance of the economics department, that they were no longer being given the support of the President's office, and that Buchanan found himself less in the role of senior dean. "This greatly augmented the position of Director Bliss and Dean Kildee--that the consequences of this were very sharply limiting the function and role of economists and that it would mean many frustrations to the Department."¹ President Friley, according to Dr. Schultz, defended steps he had taken.

The discussion then moved to Pamphlet No. 5. President Friley said that he had been misinterpreted, and that it was his intention to see Pamphlet No. 5 revised and republished. Dr. Schultz then reminded President Friley of the last

¹Ibid.

paragraph of his letter withdrawing the pamphlet and his comments to the press.

This led to a fairly sharp discussion in which the President attempted to defend the fact that it should be a new study and that we should serve the dairy interests of the state, quite losing sight of the responsibility of the college in its research to maintain integrity of scholarship. I reminded him that this was an extremely serious point, one in which he and the institution would be judged for decades and that if we did not revise it that men who are our peers will bring in an adverse judgment, which neither he nor the institution could live down.¹

President Friley responded that the matter was in the hands of the review committee. He did agree to abide by the decision of the committee should it be to republish.

Regarding the Iowa Farm Economist article, President Friley claimed, according to the Schultz statement, that it was Director Bliss, not he, who had stopped the article. Dr. Schultz said he would have to take cognizance of those who had indicated to the contrary. Schultz also wrote in the statement that he had been informed that another article had been stopped.

There was some discussion of the Nicholls-Vieg pamphlet and Professor Brown's role in review. President Friley did not defend the steps taken including what Mr. Brown had said.

The discussion drifted from the Ryan radio program to the Rockefeller gift funds and continuation of the pamphlet

¹Ibid.

series according to Schultz's dictated statement. President Friley agreed to unfreeze the Rockefeller funds and expressed his hope that the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series be continued as long as they were in the framework of procedure in the Experiment Station.

In his dictated statement, Dr. Schultz summarized some of the conversation. In this account, Dr. Schultz wrote:

The comments on the changing role in the positions of the administrative offices at the deans and directors level were not revealing. It struck me that the President was essentially unprepared at my statement that Buchanan was no longer in the role of a senior dean and that Allbaugh had little or nothing to say on the extension side. I doubt if he had been aware how great this change had been or may need a correction on his part. I cannot say for sure.¹

Finally, in a section of "Additional Comments," Dr. Schultz related some further details of the conversation. He wrote that he had spoken "exceedingly frankly" with respect to his appraisal of various individuals. Of Mr. Kildee, he said, "I commented upon my belief that Mr. Kildee's capacities were too restricted and limited to induce competent scholars to the staff...." He wrote that "Mr. Bliss was no longer able to develop extension programs that were meaningful and significant to the State." Of Francis Johnson of the Farm Bureau, Schultz expressed the opinion that Johnson wished staff members,

¹Ibid.

especially in economics to be subservient to the Farm Bureau. Mr. Kline, however, "has a broad concept of the necessary prerequisites for scholarship in the social sciences." (Mr. Kline later became Iowa Farm Bureau President.) Dr. Schultz wrote that, "On the positive side, I commented freely on my unusual confidence in Buchanan."¹

Dr. Schultz wrote then of the special interests versus the general welfare. He wrote that President Friley's discussion most disturbed him in terms of long run values in regard to public versus private interests.

When this point came up he set out to defend and argued that it was not only necessary but proper for the Iowa State College to serve without reservation the interest of special groups in agriculture, and indicated there was no such thing as a general interest to which staff members need have allegiance.²

Dr. Schultz rebutted this statement and indicated his belief that the matter of private versus public interests went to the heart of the matter. He emphasized the difficulties of obtaining the objective of serving the general welfare, and how long it would take people and interest groups to sense these distinctions. Wrote Schultz, "It was my guess that the President was inclined to weaken, and accept my exposition and analysis."

This led me to say that there were only a very few institutions in the land grant colleges which

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

safeguarded the right of social scientists to do untrammelled work. I stated that I looked for most of those centers to fold up, that we were the first and foremost among them, that our day was probably over, that this meant that the detached scholarly work would have to be done at such institutions as Harvard, Stanford and Chicago. This was very regrettable and I disliked to believe that we would have to limit outstanding scholars to these few institutions and not any of them in the very colleges and universities created to serve agriculture and the working classes, as is the case of the land grant college.¹

According to Dr. Schultz's account, President Friley was visibly depressed. He was hurt by Schultz's statement in the letter of resignation, "I have lost confidence in the administration of Iowa State College." This statement was thus changed by Schultz to read "To become Professor of Agricultural Economics of the University of Chicago." President Friley then, according to Schultz, begged that the resignation be held off until school began in two or three weeks. Schultz responded that he would have to submit it now.

"In leaving he wished me godspeed and said that I could believe with sincerety that he would always wish me well."²

On Saturday, September 18, the day after the conference between President Friley and Dr. Schultz, Iowa newspapers carried the story of Schultz's resignation, as announced on Friday by President Friley. The newspapers reported Friley as saying, "I greatly regret the resignation of Dr.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

Schultz. He has developed the department at Iowa State into one of the outstanding organizations of its type in the United States. Every effort will be made to keep the department of economics and sociology on this continuing high plane of service to the state and the nation."¹

It was the following day, Sunday, September 19, that the story relating to the letter of resignation by Dr. Schultz appeared. Apparently the letter was released or leaked to the press sometime between Friday and Sunday. The Cedar Rapids Gazette carried the story, "Dissensions Revealed by Dr. Schultz," on page one; the Des Moines Sunday Register carried the story on the first page of Section four, "Freedom at Iowa State Curbed, Schultz Says."

The Des Moines Register article quoted the resignation letter at length. It also pointed out that while much of the letter dealt with internal matters, reference was made to external factors as well, indicated by pressure groups. The article pointed out that first on the "bill of particulars" which Dr. Schultz said needed remedying was the incident of Pamphlet No. 5, which precipitated the controversy over oleo-margarine and butter. However,

While this was the major pressure action to which Dr. Schultz referred, it is known that he also felt that the opposition of the Iowa Farm

¹Des Moines Register, 18 September 1943.

Bureau federation to the policies of the economics department also played a part.

Presumably some of the Farm Bureau opposition stemmed from what was termed the administration policy of investigating the possibility of separating the extension service from the Farm Bureau tieup at state and particularly at county levels.¹

The Des Moines Register article, written by J. S. Russell, farm editor, mentioned criticism which stemmed from the appearance on campus of James Patton, president of the National Farmer's Union, and Paul Appleby, undersecretary of agriculture. Both men came at the instigation of the economics department, and both were said to be disliked by the Farm Bureau.² (In fact, Dr. Schultz in his dictated statement did refer to the opposition of Roger Fleming of the Farm Bureau to a conference with Appleby or Patton when he was expressing himself on various persons.)

The Cedar Rapids Gazette carried the story on Sunday with a banner headline, "Ames Upheaval Forecast." Ray Anderson, farm editor, also wrote of the Farm Bureau, as well as detailing much of the letter of resignation.

Dr. Schultz in his letter of resignation referred to the Iowa Dairy Association but did not name the Iowa Farm Bureau federation specifically as an external pressure group. It is known, however, that the federation has entered into the affair in recent weeks by consultation with the state board of education and otherwise.

¹Des Moines Sunday Register, 19 September 1943.

²Ibid.

It is also known that the Farm Bureau has been dissatisfied with George Godfrey, who several years has held the title of director of agricultural relations to the President of Iowa State College.¹

Most of the Gazette article consisted of quotes from the Schultz letter of resignation. There was one other insight offered by Ray Anderson, however. After quoting the portion of the letter which warned President Friley that "a number of leading professors are on the verge of submitting their resignations," Anderson wrote: "This hint was confirmed by the Gazette farm editor Saturday in conversation with members of the economics and sociology staff at Ames."²

On Monday, September 20, the Cedar Rapids Gazette carried a story on Governor Hickenlooper's stated confidence in the administration of Iowa State College. At the end of the article by Ray Anderson appeared a summary of an International News Service report of an interview with Francis Johnson of the Iowa Farm Bureau. Johnson reportedly termed the pamphlet and Dr. Schultz's resignation as "minor incidents" in the Iowa State College situation. "Johnson said the Farm Bureau's position is a fight to keep Iowa State College an institution of 'practical agricultural education and scientific research along agricultural lines.'"³

¹Cedar Rapids Gazette, 19 September 1943.

²Ibid.

³Cedar Rapids Gazette, 20 September 1943.

The International News Service also reported Farm Bureau sources as declaring that "the stage was set for the departure of Schultz before the 'oleo pamphlet' incident developed. He was placed in an 'unworkable situation,' they declared." Also the Bureau disclosed that it had "interceded in an effort to have Schultz remain on the faculty."¹ This last statement is ambiguous and unsubstantiated by any further evidence. However, Dr. Schultz did indicate in his "Dictated Statement," following his meeting with President Friley, that he had in a sense been insubordinate for the first time in discussing internal matters with individuals from outside the college: Allan Kline and Roger Fleming.²

The newspaper references to conflict between the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and the economics department was not referred to directly by Theodore Schultz in the letter of resignation nor in public statements. However, in a letter to Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation, Dr. Schultz did refer directly to this problem:

During the past two years this favorable environment has (increasingly) been threatened by the unsympathetic attitude of our leading farm organization, the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. Its unfriendly expressions centered on two issues: One, the proposed plan of the college to study and reorganize the relationships of the Agricultural

¹Ibid.

²Schultz, "Dictated Statement."

Extension Service to the state, broadening its services and freeing it somewhat from the control of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. A year and a half ago the President appointed a leading economist, who was at that time on leave of absence with the government, to return to the college to the position of Associate Director of Extension. It was his task to study and formulate recommendations for improvement of the Agricultural Extension Service. Two, studies coming out of the Economics Department. A number of the staff here published analyses bearing upon parity prices, parity income, crop control, storage programs, credit for small farmers, the commodity loan rates, the continuation of farm programs to restrict production when the food requirements for war called for an expansion policy--these and other studies and statements on policy were not in harmony with the program and policies advocated by the National Farm Bureau Federation. (The manner in which I express this would tend to over-state the apparent conflict. It was not as open and fundamental as this suggests, but the fact remains that the gap was a growing one and has been intensified by the war because of the radical changes that have been required in order to mobilize our resources for war purposes.)¹

In the same letter, Dr. Schultz referred to the college president's relationship to the economics faculty. He corroborated the newspaper's conclusion that many resignations may be imminent. He wrote of President Friley's proposed visit with the economics faculty on the 24th of September:

The President is to meet with the faculty of the Department of Economics and Sociology Friday. This will be one of the critical dates. This meeting will in a sense decide whether or not leading members of the department will wish to

¹T. W. Schultz to Joseph H. Willits, 22 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

continue as staff members of Iowa State College or seek employment elsewhere. It may lead to a whole series of resignations. On the other hand, under most optimistic developments it may lead to the reconstitution of the conditions that are necessary to command the energy and time of competent scholars in this field.¹

A memorandum dated September 22, 1943, was submitted by the faculty of the Department of Economics and Sociology to President Friley prior to the meeting between them. The memorandum was introduced by a statement expressing the faculty's appreciation of the atmosphere of tolerance and freedom on the campus which existed prior to "present conditions affecting the work and development of the Department of Economics and Sociology."² The statement continued with an expression of concern at the events of the past months which imperiled this environment.

This "Memorandum to the President's Office" set forth several issues which the faculty wished discussed frankly by the President at the meeting. The first was "Controversial Issues and the Social Sciences." Because studies of economic, social or political relationships often deal with problems concerning which conflict occurs, read the statement, to avoid all controversy is to neglect many urgent and vital problems.

¹Ibid.

²"Memorandum to the President's Office from the Faculty of the Department of Economics and Sociology," 22 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

The faculty did recognize, however, "the necessity that each individual subject himself to the disciplines of sound scholarship and review of his studies by unbiased experts competent to judge the validity of his work."

The second issue raised by the memorandum dealt with research concerning state and national problems as well as local ones. The faculty argued that the scope of social science studies should go beyond the confines of the state if they were to make a significant contribution to the state. Iowa farmers were affected by developments in other areas, according to the faculty's argument.

The third issue was that of research for the general public versus special interests. The social sciences must study problems from the point of view of the general welfare rather than of special interests, which are frequently dominated by short-run considerations.

The faculty in its statement recognized that the President's office was subject to many outside pressures. However, it said the President's office had the responsibility of securing the basic conditions necessary to maintain research that contributes to the welfare of the people of Iowa and the United States.

It is, therefore, essential that the President's Office give assurances that the freedom of research and publication that has existed will not be

jeopardized or infringed. Without such assurances carried forward into constructive cooperative action through regularly constituted procedures, it is impossible to retain and build a strong faculty that will recapture and preserve the respect and confidence that has existed in the past throughout the state and the nation.¹

The fourth issue concerned general publication procedures. This faculty document recommended a strengthening and faithful following of Experiment Station procedures which had been developed to ensure the validity of research findings and their unimpeded publication. The faculty, however, said it considered it important to make clear the distinct functions and responsibilities of authorship, review, and administration of public relations. The document recommended that an Experiment Station committee be appointed to deal with the unresolved issues.

The fifth issue raised concerned Pamphlet No. 5. The faculty asked that the President assure it that the pamphlet would be published without delay in order to restore the integrity of the department and the college.

The sixth point urged the President to affirm his agreement with the policies and procedures outlined by the editorial committee for the Iowa Farm Economist.

The seventh issue dealt with the Extension Service. The faculty noted the demand and need for adult education on

¹Ibid.

economic and social problems and that the Extension Service had responsibility for fulfilling this function. The faculty committee urged that vigorous efforts continue to be made in this regard and that the President's Office assure that the task of building a constructive economic and social education program in the Extension Service would be pursued with vigor and determination.

Departmental procedures were the subject of the eighth issue. The faculty statement supported the pledge by the President's Office that the Department of Economics and Sociology would not be divided. The faculty statement said that it was recognized that such unity involved administrative participation of several deans and directors. "We feel that these relationships should be clarified and that the Department should cooperate in developing more formal procedures."

Next, the statement recommended that procedures be established which would facilitate fuller interdepartmental cooperation.

The tenth issue involved departmental policies. The desire, as stated in the memorandum, was for the department to be run in a democratic fashion. The faculty wished the President's assurance that the department faculty would have an active voice in the determination of policies, the development of procedures, and the selection of personnel, including the head of the department.

Finally, the memorandum stressed the need for continued cooperation between the economics and sociology faculty and the President's Office. "First steps in the solution of many of the issues raised herein could be undertaken promptly, and the faculty of this department would appreciate being advised of the actions."

The memorandum closed with the positive statement that the faculty desired "to participate fully in a constructive program of research and teaching at Iowa State College."

The memorandum was signed by the "Committee for the faculty of the department: Arthur Bunce, Chairman; Gale Johnson; Frank Robotka; Geoffrey Shepherd; Wallace Wright."¹

Another significant publication in the days following the resignation appeared on the editorial page of the Des Moines Register on September 24, 1943. This was an article by Dr. Schultz: "Iowa State College and Social Science Research." The article appeared after Schultz had sent three statements to W. W. Waymack, editor of the Des Moines Register. Waymack combined these statements into one. The same statements were sent to the Cedar Rapids Gazette and Wallace's Farmer, two other publications that were sympathetic and supportive of Dr. Schultz and his department.

The article attempted to answer the questions: "Why

¹Ibid.

should this type of research (Pamphlet No. 5) be carried on at the College?" "What should be the relationship between the college and various special interest groups?" "How might this relationship be put to constructive rather than to destructive use?"¹

Dr. Schultz wrote, "If the people of Iowa believe, as I think they do, that the most serious problems affecting their well-being over the next few decades lie in the fields of economics, government and social organization, they have a strong interest in having the results of unbiased, timely and courageous research in the social sciences." The question then was, who is to carry out this research?

Dr. Schultz in the article argued that private institutions could not carry the entire load, and the federal government was increasingly under pressure from agricultural groups on a national scale. Thus the question followed, "Should state supported institutions such as Iowa State College assume a far greater part of the necessary research and educational functions of the social sciences?"

YES, IF THESE TASKS ARE TO BE DONE IN THE VOLUME,
AND WITH THE DEGREE OF OBJECTIVITY AND THE TIMELI-
NESS WHICH THE PRESENT CRITICAL STATE OF OUR
SOCIETY DEMANDS.² (Emphasis is Schultz's)

¹Des Moines Register, 24 September 1943.

²Ibid.

In order for the college to accept the burden, however, it must have strong public support and administrative backing, Schultz said.

Schultz then considered the effect of special-interest pressure groups on social science research. Schultz wrote that "undercover activities were usually the avenue taken by a pressure group when the leaders find that scientific research may interfere with their vested interests." It was at this point that Dr. Schultz mentioned by name the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. It was, according to Schultz, the most important special-interest group.

It is the social sciences which will reveal answers unpalatable to special interests. For this reason, wrote Schultz, the social science departments in many of the land grant colleges have been the weakest departments. "It is a distinct credit to this state and the special interests within it that they have permitted and encouraged the development of a social science staff as now exists at Iowa State College."

Dr. Schultz then asked a question of the people of Iowa:

How can Iowa State college relate itself to the special interest groups and the general population of the state in such a way that unbiased research in the social sciences can be prosecuted with vigor?¹

¹Ibid.

Vigorous research, according to Schultz was only a beginning. It must be followed by an equally vigorous educational program.

Schultz then returned to the question of interest groups. He pointed out that in a state where there were many occupations, no one interest group dominated. In fact, he pointed out, "already the attacks by the dairy interests have generated offsetting action by the soybean growers, who are interested in the oleomargarine market for their soybean oil."

However, this balancing of special interests was not the case with respect to the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, according to Dr. Schultz. While Schultz recognized that a strong farmer's organization for the prosecution of its interests was desirable, there was inherent danger that the power of the organization would not be limited to the interests of the general populace.

THIS MONOPOLY IN THE REPRESENTATION OF FARMERS' INTERESTS MAY CAUSE IT TO UNWITTINGLY STIFLE THE RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF IOWA STATE COLLEGE WHICH IT BELIEVES ARE CONTRARY TO ITS SPECIAL AND OFTEN SHORT TERM INTERESTS.¹ (Emphasis in original.)

Schultz's article then outlined rules he considered necessary for the smooth functioning of free research. Basically, the College must adhere rigorously to the principle of serving first and foremost the general interest. While

¹Ibid.

recognizing that this rule did not exclude serving special interests, the criterion against which all publications and utterances of the Iowa State College staff should be tested was put simply by Schultz: "IS THE ANALYSIS CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL WELFARE OF SOCIETY?"

The corollary of this rule, as presented by Schultz, was that interest groups must discipline themselves and their leaders to respect this as the only justifiable function of Iowa State College. Dr. Schultz recognized that honest differences of opinion could occur as attempts were made to establish criteria by which to judge the appropriate spheres of faculty and interest-group activities. "But with good will and a mutual willingness to tackle the problem according to rules agreed upon before a conflicting situation arises, much progress can be made along the lines indicated." Schultz continued, "The Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, because of its monopolistic position, must either adopt these rules and live by them or the case for social sciences in Iowa is lost."

Dr. Schultz closed by writing that Iowa State College had lost prestige and faculty morale by the events that surrounded Pamphlet No. 5. However, the high price paid may not have been too dear "provided this experience has made clear to the state that new rules and safeguards are needed."¹

¹Ibid.

Before he left Iowa State College, Dr. Schultz wrote several letters to individuals in the state. Among these were letters to Jim Russell, the Des Moines Register farm editor, and Donald Murphy, editor of Wallace's Farmer. These two editors were thanked for their support and also for their excellent coverage of the Pamphlet No. 5 events.¹ Another letter was written to Dr. Charles H. Brown, Librarian at Iowa State and the man who wrote the report to President Friley on the Nicholls-Vieg pamphlet, Wartime Government in Operation. The letter praised Brown for his contributions to the college by developing the resources of the library.

The keen, critical, penetrating mind that you have brought to play upon issues both large and small has given tone and atmosphere that has contributed to quality and competence. Your sharp vivid expressions have very often punctuated foibles and exposed superficialities. Because you have been courageous and willing to venture, you have at times undoubtedly hurt some individuals and you have made mistakes. (I would have to say that your memorandum to the President on the Nicholls-Vieg manuscript was a mistake.) But these have been merely off-shore ripples that should not and do not detract from the larger current of constructive contributions² that have flown from your effort and personality.

In the months following Theodore Schultz's departure from Iowa State College, a number of national magazines

¹T. W. Schultz to Jim Russell, 19 September 1943, and T. W. Schultz to Donald R. Murphy, 28 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

²T. W. Schultz to Charles H. Brown, 28 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

carried stories concerning the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5: Harper's, Time, The New Republic, and Reader's Digest. The contents of these and other National media articles, as well as Iowa's newspaper coverage, will be discussed in Chapter V. The articles in The New Republic and Reader's Digest will be discussed in the section on the actions of the American Association of University Professors and the American Civil Liberties Union.

The Revision of Pamphlet No. 5

The composition of the committee to review the revision of Pamphlet No. 5 and to work with its author, O. H. Brownlee, was initially the same as the President's Special Committee on Pamphlet No. 5 chaired by George Godfrey: B. H. Thomas, B. W. Hammer, C. Y. Cannon, and Pearl Swanson. Director Buchanan appointed this committee on July 27, 1943, as the Agricultural Experiment Station review committee for the revision of Pamphlet No. 5.

On November 23, 1943, Dr. R. M. Hixon of the Chemistry Department was appointed to fill the vacancy left by Dr. Hammer's resignation. Then on December 14, 1943, George Godfrey wrote to Director Buchanan stating that he would be forced to discontinue his work on the committee due to poor health. Godfrey suggested that Dr. Hixon be appointed chairman--and that Iver Johnson from the farm crops department

be appointed to fill the vacancy.¹ Johnson had served on the committee reviewing the Nicholls-Vieg pamphlet, Wartime Government in Operation. Buchanan apparently took Mr. Godfrey's advice. At some point, C. A. Iverson of dairy industry was also appointed.

On October 12, 1943, Brownlee wrote to Dr. Schultz and stated that the committee had approved an outline for the revision of the pamphlet. The outline, according to the letter, was very close to the outline of the original pamphlet. Brownlee also wrote that he had completed one-third of the manuscript and expected to finish the task in two or three weeks.²

The first indications of how the revision was progressing came in correspondence between Dr. Margaret Reid, Brownlee and Buchanan. Dr. Reid, one of the economics department's editorial committee members, was in Washington, D.C. on December 23, 1943, when she wrote two letters--one to Brownlee and the other to Buchanan. Her letter to Brownlee was apparently in response to a letter from him. Dr. Reid expressed her concern over Brownlee's report that members of the review committee were attempting to rewrite parts of the

¹George Godfrey to R. E. Buchanan, 14 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²Oswald Brownlee to T. W. Schultz, 12 October 1943, Schultz Papers.

pamphlet manuscript. She was disturbed by what it might signify "concerning the committee's attitude and later behavior and of the precedent which it may provide for further manuscripts which may be written by members of the economics department."

Many people in the college and in the department have a stake in this manuscript. Your stake is a little different from that of others and in some ways it is even less. You perceive the difference I am sure. You have already given a great deal of time to the manuscript and further delay is, I am sure, very irksome because you feel unable to continue with other work. You can apply whatever pressure you can to get the committee to give the "go-ahead" signal. It is most important in this situation not to let your impatience to get finished lead you to consent to anything to which you do not fully subscribe, either in the separate statements or in the emphasis. Damage to your professional standing can only arise if this publication falls short of being a well-balanced analysis of the subject in the light of pertinent data which are available.¹

In a letter dated the same day as the letter to Brownlee, Dr. Reid wrote to Director Buchanan that she had heard that the review committee was doing some rewriting. She also enclosed her letter to Brownlee. Dr. Reid told Buchanan that she believed continued delay which did not contribute to an improved pamphlet manuscript was very undesirable.

Reid warned Buchanan that suspicion was deepening in

¹Margaret G. Reid to Oz, 23 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

many quarters that no publication was forthcoming. She pointed out that no manuscript of this type could ever be brought to a point where a group of people would not be prepared to make further suggestions for "improvement".

Dr. Reid wrote that it could be argued by some that only by attempting to rewrite the manuscript and by conferring many more times with the author could the members become sufficiently educated on the subject to render a competent judgment. She wrote:

Have the members grown fearful of making a decision for the simple reason that they feel at sea in dealing with a method of analysis foreign to their thinking? Certainly last June there was much evidence that the committee was having difficulty with marginal analysis. I do not think that too much attention can be given to the fact that the committee members have been asked to appraise something outside the special field of competence of every one of the members. It may be also that the committee members have grown fearful of the extent and the nature of the controversy. If this is true responsibility¹ for the decision should be moved to a higher level.

Director Buchanan answered Dr. Reid's letter on December 27th. He first indicated that Mr. Brownlee had contacted him before the letters had arrived. Brownlee had received his letter before Buchanan and was concerned that Dr. Reid had misunderstood him. Brownlee, according to Buchanan's letter to Reid, had assured Buchanan that he was reasonably

¹Margaret G. Reid to Director Buchanan, 23 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

optimistic about the committee.

In answering Dr. Reid's concern about undue delays and perhaps an unwillingness to publish, Director Buchanan wrote that the publication had been requested by the Board of Education, President Friley, and that he himself sincerely wished to see it done. "There are some problems apparently still connected with it in the minds of the committee, but I believe that the only problems involved are those which must be finally settled by the committee itself."¹

Before responding to Dr. Reid's concern that the committee was rewriting the pamphlet, Director Buchanan noted the helpfulness of the new members--Johnson and Hixon. This was perhaps to refute Dr. Reid's remarks concerning the competency of the committee.

As far as the question of rewriting was concerned, Buchanan noted that the committee was attempting to formulate some statements to be turned over to the author Brownlee. It was distinctly understood by all, wrote Buchanan, that nothing would be published that did not fully meet the approval of the author.

Buchanan expressed his belief that the committee was doing a good job and would continue to do so. He suggested

¹R. E. Buchanan to Margaret Reid, 27 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

that the delay may have been caused by the difficulty on the part of the committee and the author of getting the pamphlet revision done. He said that the members of the committee had praised Brownlee's attitude.

Concerning Reid's suggestion that the responsibility be moved to a higher level, Buchanan expressed his belief that a committee of peers was the most democratic method. "For me to step in and issue a directive, I am quite sure would do more harm than good."¹

In the letter of December 27th to Reid, Director Buchanan indicated that the committee had had several meetings to date.

On January 5, 1974, R. M. Hixon, chairman of the review committee, wrote to Brownlee. It had come to the attention of the committee that it was "being" accused of attempting to rewrite the pamphlet." The letter was being written to prevent the spread of such misunderstanding, Hixon wrote

In the letter, Hixon stated that the committee was not satisfied with Brownlee's second revision of Pamphlet No. 5, and that the necessary changes had been discussed with Brownlee.

In a meeting of the Committee with members of the Economics Staff, you stated that your own ideas had become "grooved" and you doubted your ability

¹Ibid.

to revise the manuscript to meet the criticisms of the Committee. Mr. Nichols suggested that the Committee attempt to edit your manuscript, or the original pamphlet, as a means of centralizing their own opinions and also as a means of assisting you to "divert your own thoughts from their present groove."¹

Dr. Hixon then told Brownlee that the committee had acted on Mr. Nichols suggestion. Among other things, the committee gave considerable attention to the outline of the pamphlet because some members of the committee felt that the material was not well organized either in the original or in the revised versions.

Dr. Hixon closed the letter with:

If you consider that this material might be of assistance to you, the Committee will be glad to have you take advantage of their efforts. To prevent any accusation that the Committee is forcing its opinion upon you, it is suggested that you request the material and that the request be approved by the Head of your Department.²

The manuscript was apparently returned to Brownlee as indicated by letter from Brownlee to the committee members on January 21, 1944. This was a letter of transmittal of still another revision. Brownlee acknowledged that he had taken into account the comments and criticisms of the committee. However, Brownlee did note in the letter that he

¹R. M. Hixon to Oswald Brownlee, 5 January 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

had differed on some points of criticism as well as accepting some.

Brownlee first noted that he had interpreted the committee's suggestions by recognizing more fully in the pamphlet the nutritive value of dairy products and by stating more explicitly the complexity of the problem. He rejected the "implication" that the dairy industry should be "streamlined."

Brownlee wrote that he had accepted the committee's suggestions relative to the section on production adjustments. However, the section on adjustments in consumption was one upon which Brownlee acknowledged there was less than complete agreement.

It should be acknowledged, perhaps in the preface, that the data are at least "things that pass for facts," but that the emphasis given to various points is a matter of judgment. If you are not satisfied with my presentation, I would suggest that you be given space running concurrently with my presentation for rebuttal.¹

In his letter to the committee, Brownlee next explained his reasons for maintaining emphasis on oleomargarine in the subsection on alternative foods. There was no specific reference in Brownlee's letter to criticism of the oleomargarine emphasis by any of the committee's members. However, such

¹O. H. Brownlee to R. M. Hixon, C. Y. Cannon, Pearl P. Swanson, C. A. Iverson, B. H. Thomas and Iver J. Johnson, 21 January 1944, Buchanan Papers.

criticism might be inferred from Brownlee's lengthy rationalization. In concluding this discussion, Brownlee wrote, "Thirdly, and perhaps most important, regardless of the title of the publication and the subject matter which should have been included originally, margarine has to be discussed rather freely in the reissue."

The next item discussed in the letter was rationing. Here again Brownlee appeared to disagree with the committee's criticism when he asserted that "rationing of fluid milk by dealers is hardly impersonal."

There are distinct inducements for dealers not to offer the same terms to all if dealers are the rationing agents. One of the problems is to minimize such inducements. This can be done best, in my judgment, by formal rationing.¹

After mentioning omission of the section on post-war considerations and his desire to include a table of contents and an appendix, Brownlee closed his letter, "I shall be available for discussion with you collectively or individually at any time."²

Oswald Brownlee's revision was not acceptable to the review committee. On January 28, 1944, one week following Brownlee's transmittal of his latest revision, the committee wrote to Director Buchanan that it had been able to achieve its objective in part only. The committee from the start had

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

realized its responsibility and had worked diligently and cooperatively with the author to aid him in reconciling the divergent viewpoints, according to the letter. In spite of all this, "the latest revision (3rd) is argumentative and misleading."¹ The committee was unable to recommend the publication of any of the revisions submitted to it: "The revisions lack objectivity and none has been scholarly in its treatment of the subject."

The committee unanimously presented its analysis of the problems with the pamphlet and made several alternative recommendations for executive action.

The problems noted by the committee were that:

I. The dominant theme in Pamphlet No. 5 should have been an analysis of the problems associated with the shifts of milk solids from animal use to human consumption.

II. The message referred to above was subordinated in the original edition and has been kept subordinated in subsequent revisions. In a joint committee meeting with certain staff members of the Department of Economics and Sociology, the author stated that his ideas had become "grooved." The Committee has devoted a great deal of its time editing the revisions submitted to assist the author in "getting his thoughts out of groove." The author's persistence in subordinating the major thesis is stated clearly in his letter of ²January 21st accompanying the last revision.

¹C. Y. Cannon, C. A. Iverson, I. J. Johnson, Pearl Swanson, B. H. Thomas and R. M. Hixon to R. E. Buchanan, 28 January 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

The committee's letter then suggested several alternative procedures to expedite publication including the appointment of a new Experiment Station review committee, the separation of the materials on oleomargarine from the Pamphlet No. 5 into a new pamphlet on the competitive inter-relationships of fats and oils, and appointment of an all-college committee to rewrite Pamphlet No. 5.

Finally, the committee wrote that it had completed its period of usefulness in revising Pamphlet No. 5. The committee had agreed that there were several major changes as well as some minor ones required. Although the changes had been brought to the author's attention, they had been ignored. "The Committee has become convinced that the author lacks the necessary objectivity, or is so dogmatic in his convictions that he is unable to see the problem in its proper perspective. It is possible that he may be the victim of circumstances."¹

In closing, the committee stated that executive action was required in order to resolve the situation.

In response to the committee's letter, Director Buchanan wrote "A Statement to the Joint Meeting of the Station Committee on Review of the Manuscript of Pamphlet No. 5 and the Advisory Council of the Department of Economics and Sociology." Buchanan wrote in this statement that he had

¹Ibid.

asked that there be a joint meeting of the review committee and the advisory council of the economics department. The reason for this joint meeting was his receipt of a letter from the review committee--the letter discussed above.

Following a transcript of the letter, Buchanan wrote that the purpose of the committee's letter was to place the problem of revision of Pamphlet No. 5 squarely in the lap of the director of the Agricultural Experiment Station. Buchanan reported that he regretted that the committee seemed to feel this would be necessary. He recognized the need for something to be done, but first made some general comments.

One such comment concerned the importance of publication as soon as possible:

Revision and republication was the recommendation of the Committee of which Dean Kildee was chairman. The report was approved by President Friley. Revision and publication has been the announced policy of the Experiment Station. We are informed that it is expected by our governing board, the State Board of Education. It is expected by our friends in the dairy group. Republication is not only necessary; it is overdue.¹

Director Buchanan also commented on statements in the committee's report referring to the author Brownlee. Buchanan thanked Brownlee for "the patience which he has shown under

¹R. E. Buchanan, "A Statement to the Joint Meeting of the Station Committee on Review of the Manuscript of Pamphlet No. 5 and the Advisory Council of the Department of Economics and Sociology," (January 1944), Buchanan Papers.

somewhat difficult conditions."

To the best of my knowledge and belief he has worked actively on the revision of the manuscript. Particularly do I wish to commend him for the fact that under some pressure he has not developed a martyr complex. This would not have been too difficult under the stress of current pressures.¹

Director Buchanan also thanked the review committee for its long and intensive study. He stated that he believed the committee was in a position still to contribute to solution of the problem.

One statement in the committee's letter "puzzled" Buchanan. The sentence was: "It is possible that he (the author) may be the victim of circumstances." Buchanan understood this statement to mean that there was some review committee feeling that other members of the economics staff or persons other than Iowa State staff members may have been bringing pressure to bear upon Brownlee. "I have no evidence whatsoever that this is the case. In fact, when in correspondence with other individuals if there has been any evidence of misunderstanding, the author has taken it upon himself to clear matters promptly and has volunteered to my office all correspondence that had pertinence."²

The correspondence involving Dr. Margaret Reid, Brownlee and Buchanan may have been one example of the "outside

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

pressure" to which the Experiment Station director believed the review committee was referring indirectly.

Director Buchanan also noted that the review committee had been criticized for actively discussing committee proceedings with individuals who were not committee members and, in some cases, with individuals from outside agencies. "I know of no reason why such discussions should not take place, provided they are not carried on to the detriment of progress and the reaching of final agreements on the part of the committee."

After these preliminary comments, Buchanan responded to the review committee's three alternative recommendations. To the suggestion that the pamphlet be divided into two manuscripts, Buchanan replied that it was a revision of Pamphlet No. 5 in its entirety which had been authorized.

The third recommendation had been for the appointment of an intra-college committee to review the pamphlet manuscript. While noting that transferring the solution of a rather difficult problem elsewhere should be welcomed by the Experiment Station director, Buchanan wrote, "The fact remains, however, that the problem is a problem of the Experiment Station, and the recommendations should come from the station."

It was the recommendation that a new Experiment Station review committee be appointed which Buchanan accepted--in modified form. Buchanan's proposal for a solution to what

seemed an impasse took the form of six steps. First, the review committee would be continued, but would be asked to designate one of its members to serve on a special subcommittee. The second part of the proposal was for the Advisory Committee of the Department of Economics and Sociology to designate one of its members to serve on the special subcommittee. Director Buchanan and Brownlee would also serve on the subcommittee, with the former serving as chairman.

Steps four and five outlined the procedures to be used in review. The subcommittee would meet each day at a fixed time for two to four hours in order to aid the pamphlet author in developing a manuscript satisfactory to the subcommittee. Should there be an irreconcilable division of opinion among the subcommittee members, the review committee and the Advisory Committee would be convened to consider the problem.

In part five, the procedures were outlined for consideration of the pamphlet manuscript once the subcommittee was satisfied. The manuscript would then be submitted to the review committee. If the manuscript did not receive unanimous approval from the review committee, the Advisory Committee would be asked to sit with the review committee in an effort to secure a satisfactory adjustment. "If any member of the Review Committee disagrees with any statement approved by the majority, consideration will be given to inclusion of his

signed objections in an appendix."¹

The sixth part was a request that the "present meeting" (joint meeting of the review committee and the Advisory Committee) be regarded as executive and, hence, its proceedings as confidential. Further, Buchanan requested that no member of either committee discuss procedures or progress with anyone outside the group without special clearance of the group.

In other words, until there is reasonable time to get the job done, our meetings will be executive sessions exclusively. This is to avoid any possible recriminations as to conduct of members of the subcommittee, the Review Committee or the Advisory Committee.²

Buchanan did ask for one exception: that if necessary, he be able to consult with President Friley, Dean Kildee, Director Bliss or Director Godfrey.

In closing, Director Buchanan asked for a frank discussion of his proposals and stated that he would accept a better proposal if one could be formulated. "If not, since administrative action has been asked for, we will proceed on the plan which I have outlined."³

The request for confidentiality may have been an attempt on Buchanan's part to cut off pressure by representatives of both sides of the conflict. As hinted in the letter,

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

the committee was under some criticism for discussing its proceedings with persons outside the college community. This could have included representatives of the dairy industry. On the other hand, Brownlee may have been thought by some committee members to be under pressure from departed economics faculty members, specifically, Professors Schultz, Reid, Hart and Wilcox.

Apparently, Director Buchanan's proposals were put into effect. In a letter to Dr. Walter W. Wilcox on February 17, 1944, he wrote:

During the past several weeks I have come to have a high regard for Brownlee and his ability to reason, his desire to be fair, his willingness to recognize a better approach when suggested. I have worked with him, Johnson and Thomas from two to four hours a day for two weeks. My knowledge of economics has progressed.¹

The two men referred to may have been B. H. Thomas of the review committee and Gale Johnson of the Department of Economics and Sociology.

Between January 28th and March 17th, when the final version of Pamphlet No. 5 was submitted, there was some press pressure on Director Buchanan and the committee.

On February 12, 1944, the Des Moines Tribune carried an article entitled, "Pamphlet 5? Not Out Yet." Director

¹R. E. Buchanan to Walter W. Wilcox, 17 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

Buchanan quoted the last three paragraphs in a letter marked "confidential" to the "Members of the Review Committee on 'Pamphlet No. 5':

To a statement by a usually reliable source that the pamphlet was in the hands of the director of the experiment station for final approval, R. E. Buchanan, director, replied that he had not seen it.

Buchanan stated that the appearance of the pamphlet depends on the work of the committee headed by Hixon.

"I had hoped it would be out before this.¹ The committee just hasn't done the job," he said.

In his letter to the committee members, Buchanan outlined what he had written to the news editor of the Tribune, in reply to the news article. First of all, he criticized the use of the "usually reliable source," saying that either this person was honest, but grossly misinformed, or simply dishonest.

The statement in the article that the director "replied that he had not seen it," was untrue, according to Buchanan. Also untrue, he wrote was the statement, "The committee just hasn't done the job." Buchanan wrote that there was no statement which could be construed in that way.

Finally, Director Buchanan explained his policy whenever he received an inquiry as to what had happened to the revision of Pamphlet No. 5. His answer was always that since

¹R. E. Buchanan to Members of the Review Committee on Pamphlet No. 5, 14 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

the appointment of the committee in July, 1943, the manuscript has been under review and substantial progress has been made.¹

In reply to Buchanan's letter to him, J. S. Russell, acting managing editor of the Tribune, wrote the director a letter marked "PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL."²

The letter from Russell asked Dr. Buchanan just what he did say since he, Buchanan, charged "falsification." As to the "responsible person" who was quoted as saying that the manuscript had been turned over to Buchanan's office, Russell asserted that Buchanan was wrong in refuting the reliability of this person. Russell claimed knowledge of the identity of that "responsible person."

The letter asked Dr. Buchanan for the facts of the situation and promised that amends would be made should the Tribune be in error.

It is because I consider you to be essentially a fair person that I am addressing this personal note to you. The reporter for our papers was given the assignment to find out about the pamphlet and this assignment is being given her again. I really think it is some of the public's business. She was given to understand in one instance that it was none of her business, nor presumably that of the newspaper.³

¹Ibid.

²J. S. Russell to R. E. Buchanan, 15 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

³Ibid.

Director Buchanan replied immediately to Mr. Russell's letter, sending on February 17th a six-page letter which detailed his position on the entire matter surrounding Pamphlet No. 5. Buchanan wrote that he wished for someone on the Register and Tribune staff to understand his viewpoint.

First of all, Dr. Buchanan dealt with his criticisms of the Tribune story. He wrote that Brownlee had told him that it had been some weeks, possibly some months, since he, Brownlee, had told the Tribune reporter about turning over a revision of the manuscript to the review committee. (Thus, it appears that Brownlee was the "usually reliable source.") The implication in the news article that this was a final revision was incorrect, wrote Buchanan. He then wrote that he had charged inaccuracy and not falsification.

Buchanan wrote that it was untrue that the revision had been placed in his hands at the time he was contacted by the reporter, and he had so informed the reporter. Insofar as the statement that the committee just had not done its job, attributed to Buchanan, he wrote that he could not see how such a statement could be inferred from what he did say. "To tell her, as I did, that the committee had not completed its work and that the manuscript was still in the hands of the review committee is quite another thing from the statement that the committee just hadn't done its job, with its implied

criticism."¹

Director Buchanan continued his letter to Mr. Russell with a recounting of his perceptions of the events of recent months related to Pamphlet No. 5. This narrative serves to tie together the events from the original publication of Pamphlet No. 5 to a point prior to its republication as seen through the eyes of R. E. Buchanan.

To begin, his statement described "a series of mistakes made here at Iowa State College and outside the institution in handling the problem of the famous Pamphlet No. 5." According to the letter, the manuscripts published as the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series were handled exactly as were all manuscripts which were not college sponsored. The original pamphlet was not meant to be a sponsored publication, but rather a publication similar to any published in a technical or scientific journal. The Collegiate Press was privately owned: "It was assumed, therefore, by the Economics group sponsoring the series that inasmuch as the pamphlet was not included in any one of our regular bulletin series, printing and publication by this press would constitute unsponsored publication."²

¹R. E. Buchanan to J. S. Russell, 17 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

However, a special indicia, "Iowa State College Press," was used, allowable providing there was approval of a special committee set up by the president, wrote Buchanan. This "special committee" was the Press Editorial Board which, as noted previously, voted to allow the economics department review of the pamphlets in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series.

When the controversy broke, the dairymen "dumped the whole matter upon President Friley's lap." Buchanan expressed his opinion in the letter that he, as director of the Agricultural Experiment Station, should have been contacted instead. However, "...at no time since the publication of this pamphlet has any member of the dairy interests entered my office or discussed the problem with me."

With regard to the protest meeting of representatives of the dairy interests with President Friley, Buchanan again reiterated his support of Friley's statement that the right of the staff to publish was not debatable. Buchanan said he felt that it was unfortunate that the dairy group challenged this statement, and that Francis Johnson of the Iowa Farm Bureau used the opportunity as a sounding board for some of his personal grievances.

Buchanan's comments turned to the Joint Committee of dairy and college representatives. At the meeting when the Experiment Station was attacked because the manuscript had not

taken normal routes, Buchanan agreed to accept at that late date the responsibility.

By agreement with the staff, I assured the dairy group that, while there had been no intention of institutional sponsorship of the publication, the Experiment Station was ready to assume the responsibility. This avoided a lot of legalistic and, I felt, wholly unprofitable discussion.¹

In discussing the report made by the dairy group at the Joint Committee meeting, Buchanan expressed his opinion that the dairy group (1) located certain technical inaccuracies, (2) challenged a number of statements as being ambiguous, and (3) challenged the accuracy of certain statements, "but the validity of the challenge was open, so far as I could see, to serious doubt." In the first case, Buchanan felt that the technical inaccuracies cited "did not make a particle of difference" from the standpoint of the main thesis of the pamphlet. In regard to the ambiguities, normally they would have passed without question, but there was the possibility of misconstruction, the Director said.

Buchanan's comments concerning the Special Committee which President Friley appointed to review the Pamphlet No. 5 were significant, especially since this committee became the station review committee for the revision.

President Friley's committee on review of the manuscript did not include any member of the

¹Ibid.

Economics staff. This committee found some errors in technological statements and brought in a report which was read to the joint committee. I have never in any way criticized this report. I feel, however, that it did not do entire justice to the pamphlet. It located certain technical inaccuracies. It showed some lack of appreciation of the use of marginal analysis as a technique useful in economics.¹

Later in the letter, Buchanan again mentioned this review committee. As director of the Experiment Station, he was in the position to appoint a committee to review the pamphlet, and it was understood that this committee would function as any station committee. In order that there be no criticism of his choice, Buchanan wrote that he asked Friley's Special Committee to serve. Although Buchanan felt that this was a wise procedure at the time, he recognized it as a mistake at the point of writing his letter to Russell. One or two members of the committee should have been appointed from the economics department.

In referring to the Joint Committee's decisions regarding the pamphlet and the subsequent actions of President Friley, Buchanan wrote that the college group made two suggestions. One was that if it was possible to move back to a point where the college group could work with the dairy representatives, it was advisable to do so. Secondly, "there had been evidence of need for revision. The copies of the pamphlet

¹Ibid.

had all been disposed of. It was agreed, therefore, that the pamphlet should be republished with recognition of college sponsorship."¹

After the college and dairy joint committee submitted its report, it was approved by President Friley.

The president then took an action which was not in any way contemplated by the committee. He sent a letter to each individual who had received a copy of the pamphlet calling attention to the fact that errors had been discovered in the publication and that a revision would be prepared which would be college sponsored. Some statements made in this letter were greatly resented by certain members of our staff and by some individuals who received the letter.²

Buchanan next alluded to the division that had developed among members of the college staff: "I don't need to tell you that some of the members of our staff, perhaps unwisely, participated in the discussion by condemning in letter and in conversation the staff in Economics for its stand."

In regard to Theodore Schultz's resignation, Buchanan wrote that it had come as a blow to him. He had been endeavoring for several years to build up the staff in agricultural economics.

My principal efforts over the last few months have been an attempt to prevent the complete disintegration of what I regarded as an unusually competent group of individuals. You are of course aware that my point of view with regard to their competency is not shared by all members of our staff. This has not

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

made my task any too easy. I think I have the confidence of the entire staff in Economics and of most of those members of the staff in the technical fields. Unless something entirely unforeseen develops, I do not expect to have the disintegration which appeared inevitable at one time actually occur.¹

Buchanan in closing wrote that he hoped Russell could see from what he had said the reasons why he would not publicly criticize the committee with which he had been working so actively and cooperatively. He would be willing to have more off-the-record discussions, although not with a reporter who was inexperienced.

Director Buchanan received several letters from various interested persons around the country in the last weeks before the pamphlet was published. Letters came from two former Iowa State faculty members--Walter Wilcox and John Vieg.

Dr. Wilcox wrote from his new position on the faculty at the University of Wisconsin. He stated that he was sorry to hear that difficulties growing out of the pamphlet were continuing. He had heard that the committee had been unable to approve the revised manuscript. "I surely hope that you will be able to overcome these difficulties without further deterioration of relationships within the faculty or between the college and the public," he wrote.²

¹Ibid.

²Walter W. Wilcox to R. E. Buchanan, 14 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

His point in writing was to express his thoughts on what he saw as the significant differences between Iowa State's faculty and the faculty at Wisconsin.

According to Wilcox, newspaper reports indicated that the Regents at Wisconsin investigated his connection with the pamphlet on oleomargarine and only approved his appointment after assuring themselves that there was none.

Professor Hobson tells me this was not the case and that on their second meeting they discussed my qualifications for the position but did not ask for nor go into the details of my connection with the pamphlet. He has informally reported this to the college faculty committee but his report and the fact that I was appointed does not fully satisfy them in view of the press reports. It seems probable that they will insist that the President formally report to them on this topic before they will be satisfied that academic freedom was not jeopardized in the way my appointment was handled.¹

The difference according to Wilcox, between the faculty at Wisconsin and the faculty at Iowa State was the former's interest as a collective group in those matters which may only subtly touch upon the questions of academic freedom.

Director Buchanan replied with some frankness to Dr. Wilcox's letter: "Your note, irritating as it was, was welcome." Buchanan asserted that Wilcox's statement that the committee could not approve the revised manuscript was mistaken. Further, Buchanan wrote: "Your implied criticism to

¹Ibid.

the effect that it is high time I did something about a serious situation might be backed with at least some constructive statement."¹

Buchanan addressed himself to Dr. Wilcox's statement on his Wisconsin hiring. It was "all very well," wrote Buchanan, that the faculty at Wisconsin was suspicious that some assurance had been given concerning Wilcox's lack of a tie with the oleo pamphlet, and that they had asked the President to assure it that this was not so.

But what about the first meeting? Are they demanding complete refutation of the press statements? If such a scandalous situation existed in Iowa, not only the faculty, but the people and the press would protest vociferously. An example, Wilcox, of the pot calling the kettle black. When you stop to think of it, what has the University of Wisconsin ever done to seriously combat the domination of the dairy pressure groups in that state? The State of Iowa, in spite of the short-comings of I.S.C., hasn't been quite as black as Wisconsin. Isn't that really true?²

Director Buchanan was also direct in this statement to Wilcox, "While I don't in any way blame you for going to Wisconsin, you should remember that your resignation at the critical moment here was anything but helpful."

The remainder of Buchanan's letter revealed some important aspects of Buchanan's attitude regarding economics

¹R. E. Buchanan to Walter W. Wilcox, 17 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

research at Iowa State. These statements echo those he made in his letter to Mr. Russell.

First, Buchanan stated that, "We are here honestly trying to build a strong research program in economics. We are making substantial progress. We will make more in the future. If I did not feel sure of it, I would get out of the job."¹

Secondly, Buchanan made his statement about his high regard for Brownlee.

The letter to Dr. Buchanan from John A. Vieg on February 22, raised some points about the potential of an investigation by the American Association of University Professors into the Pamphlet No. 5 affair. These comments will be dealt with later in this chapter. Dr. Vieg also wrote that President Friley had written to him on February 16th saying the revised edition of Pamphlet No. 5 was being typed and that, hopefully, it would go to press shortly.

To this, Director Buchanan replied in his letter of February 28th, that he was of course in hopes that Pamphlet No. 5 would soon appear. He had been, however, endeavoring to avoid pressure upon the author and upon the committee to force either to take actions either considered undesirable.

¹Ibid.

Our greatest present problem seems to be undue pressure from various friends to bring pressure upon the author and the committee. Apparently no matter how often we reiterate the statement that we expect to publish the manuscript, our friends have quite consistently taken the attitude that they would believe it when the manuscript was actually published.¹

As to the hints of an investigation by the American Association of University Professors, Buchanan replied that it was a "matter of considerable indifference" to him. He was not sure that being on the receiving end of a properly conducted investigation would not be a relief.

It was on March 16, 1944, that the review committee submitted the final revision of Pamphlet No. 5 to Director Buchanan, with a minority report attached. According to the letter accompanying the pamphlet, the final manuscript was the best compromise that the committee had been able to obtain between conflicting areas of opinion.

The Committee feels that a better treatment of the subject matter could have been obtained had it not been for certain limitations imposed by the fact this is a revision of the former publication, "Putting Dairying on a War Footing."²

Regarding the minority report, the letter read: "The Committee is in agreement that the technical subject matter is essentially correct. There is considerable discussion, however,

¹R. E. Buchanan to John A. Vieg, 28 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²R. M. Hixon to R. E. Buchanan, 16 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

regarding emphasis and inference in certain parts of the manuscript. A minority report is attached."¹

The minority report was submitted by C. A. Iverson and C. Y. Cannon. It objected to the revision on two grounds. One was that although the title was Putting Dairying on a War Footing, it dealt with undue emphasis on oleomargarine. The second objection was "that by statement and by inference it places Iowa State College flatly behind the controversial movement to remove all regulations (except labeling) governing the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine."²

On the day after the committee submitted the final draft, Dr. Buchanan wrote to President Friley. The letter referred to the minority report, stating that he had tried but failed to contact Iverson and Cannon prior to releasing any publicity with reference to the fact that the manuscript was on his desk. Buchanan did not feel that it was necessary to issue statements concerning objections until the manuscript was actually published. He did, however, inform President Friley that he thought it wise to write a short foreword to the pamphlet giving its history and incorporating a brief statement or paragraph concerning the views of Professors

¹Ibid.

²C. A. Iverson and C. Y. Cannon to Ralph Hixon, 16 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

Iverson and Cannon.¹ Such a statement reflecting the views of Iverson and Cannon was never included in the final revised publication.

Publicity regarding the submission of the manuscript was dated March 17, 1944. It was a brief statement that the manuscript had been approved by the reviewing committee and was in the hands of the director of the Agricultural Experiment Station. Printing was expected soon after the middle of April.²

Director Buchanan wrote a letter to Oswald Brownlee on March 20, 1944, to express his appreciation for the way Brownlee had developed the revision of Pamphlet No. 5.

I was afraid you might get discouraged and be tempted to do something less than your best. I don't question but what critics may find what they regard as flaws. But in my opinion a very good job has been done; you have made a substantial contribu³tion to the economics of a very involved situation.

It was on March 20th, also, that Director Buchanan sent a special delivery letter to President Friley in Chicago regarding whether to invite certain individuals representing the

¹R. E. Buchanan to President Charles E. Friley, 17 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²Information Service, Iowa State College, "News Release," 17 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

³R. E. Buchanan to Oswald Brownlee, 20 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

dairy interests to look over the revised manuscript. In conference with Dr. William Murray, chairman of the economics department, Director Buchanan had drafted a letter to be sent to Clarence Nielson, who had chaired the dairy committee representatives on the Joint Committee of Twelve. As Buchanan wrote to President Friley: "I am inclined to think, after a good deal of consideration, that it is wise to issue this invitation. This is particularly true because of the inference given by the committee of twelve to the effect that the cooperation of the dairy group would be asked in the final revision of the manuscript."¹ Buchanan quoted the exact phraseology of the committee's statement which did say that a revision would be made "and shall be worked out with a committee representing the dairy and farm interests of the state," wrote Buchanan:

We have interpreted this as meaning that there would be complete and adequate consultation with members of our staff representing the various technical fields. I believe, however, that it may be wise to go beyond this in dealing with this particular problem.²

In addition to Clarence Nielson, Buchanan recommended sending letters to Howard Hill of the Farm Bureau, possibly individuals from the Grange and from the Farmer's Union. It

¹R. E. Buchanan to President Charles E. Friley, 20 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²Ibid.

would be understood that this was to be done in confidence with no publicity until the pamphlet was published.

President Friley apparently agreed to Dr. Buchanan's suggestions since letters were sent to Nielson, Hill and Donald Van Vleet, president of the Iowa Farmer's Union, inviting them to come to Ames to examine the manuscript. Buchanan assured each recipient that the invitation to review the pamphlet was not in any way to be interpreted as an effort to forestall any criticisms he might make following the publication of the pamphlet. The review of the pamphlet by these persons from outside the college was to occur before publication--"at least before final proofs are read."

Clarence Nielson was the one who responded immediately to the invitation. He chose two persons to accompany him to the campus as Buchanan had suggested. The two were Ed Estel and A. N. Heggen. They came to the campus on or around March 30th to review the pamphlet revision. In a letter to Dean Buchanan, following the visit to Ames, Nielson wrote that he wanted to make certain that there was no misunderstanding concerning the discussion which had taken place a few days before in Ames.

The letter indicated that Nielson and Estel hoped that Buchanan would give every consideration possible to suggestions they had made and that they would be given an opportunity to see the sections of the bulletin which they felt were

factually inaccurate and inadequately documented. However, later in the letter, Nielson wrote that there was only one "small section" involved.¹

On April 6th, Buchanan responded to Mr. Nielson. He stated that he believed the discussion and objections centered very largely on the treatment of taxation.

Mr. Brownlee has taken under consideration the suggestions which you made and has prepared a revision which, I believe, cares in part for the objections which were raised. It has seemed to me that this is a very fair statement of the situation. There are one or two statements I recognize which you will not approve. It is probably best to let them stand. As you know, we do not wish in any way to embarrass any criticisms which you may have eventually of the manuscript when published.²

Enclosed with the letter was a copy of the revision of page 34A, which "had the maximum of controversial items included."

There was some additional correspondence between Nielson and Buchanan. Basically, Mr. Nielson continued to have some reservations but seemed to feel that Buchanan had "no doubt done the very best job you thought possible."³

¹C. Nielson to R. E. Buchanan, 1 April 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²R. E. Buchanan to Clarence Nielson, 6 April 1944, Buchanan Papers.

³C. Nielson to R. E. Buchanan, 8 April 1944, Buchanan Papers.

The review by members of the Iowa Farm Bureau and the Iowa Farmer's Union was not recorded. However, Howard Hill did respond that he had forwarded Buchanan's letter of invitation to Allan Kline, and Kline responded that he would be willing to look at the revision. The new leadership of the Iowa Farm Bureau was apparently more positive towards Pamphlet No. 5.

In spite of the letters of invitation to review to those outside the college, the pamphlet revision was probably not much delayed in publication. Only three days after receiving the approved revision from the review committee, Buchanan forwarded a copy of the manuscript to the Bulletin Office for editorial corrections. In a letter to Dr. Albert Hart dated March 27th, Buchanan indicated that the manuscript was in the hands of the printer.

In the letter to Hart, Buchanan made another comment of interest.

You may not know that representatives of the dairy group called upon President Friley to suggest that the revision not be published. Later they called on me. In both cases they were told that there could be no turning back. I am inclined to think that we will have reasonable cooperation from them in the future in cases where their help in getting data will be needed.¹

Pamphlet No. 5 was ready for distribution by April 27,

¹R. E. Buchanan to Albert Hart, 27 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

1944. Advance copies were sent to newspapers around the state with a news release dated for 11 a.m., Tuesday, May 2, 1944. The new edition was, according to the release, "not only a revision but an enlargement of the controversial first edition."¹

The revised edition of Putting Dairying on a War Footing opened with a foreword by Director Buchanan. In it, Buchanan summarized some of the objections by the dairy groups.

- a. That some of the statements made in the pamphlet were incorrect in whole or in part or were inadequately documented through reference to source material.
- b. That certain statements were ambiguous or at least were subject to misinterpretation.
- c. That some topics were amplified in the discussion quite beyond that needed to establish the main thesis of the publication. The topics particularly criticized as over-amplified or not pertinent were: those concerning sanitary regulations as trade barriers, the competitive relationships of oleomargarine and butter, and the efficacy of taxation as a means of preventing misbranding and fraud. It was urged that a disservice was rendered to the dairy industry by discussion of the comparative nutritive values of oleomargarine and butter and the significance of state taxes as trade barriers.²

¹Information Service, Iowa State College, "Iowa State Issues Revised Version of Dairying Pamphlet" (news release), 2 May 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²R. E. Buchanan, Foreword to Putting Dairying on a War Footing, rev. ed., by O. H. Brownlee, Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, no. 5 (Ames, Ia.: Collegiate Press, Inc., 1944), p. 1.

Director Buchanan pointed out in his foreword that the publication dealt with some of the problems of the production and distribution of dairy products. The analysis, however, was not meant to guide producers and consumers in their operations. "However, individuals are interested in the effectiveness of current policies in achieving the objectives for which these policies are designed."¹

Significantly, Buchanan wrote that the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series was not an official series of the Agricultural Experiment Station. He wrote that since many readers assumed that Pamphlet No. 5 was a Station-sponsored publication, it was agreed that the Experiment Station would assume the responsibility. It was also agreed that the author would be invited to prepare a revision which would go through the standard Station review procedures.

The analysis in the revised edition was, according to the foreword, a consideration of developments of the past year in addition to what may be expected in the future. Thus, "some of the points made in the previous analysis have been given added emphasis, some have been omitted and new points have been added." The author had documented facts more fully. "He has endeavored to show the pertinence of the survey of certain controversial items to the main purpose of the pamphlet."²

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

According to Theodore Schultz, the revised pamphlet was "no surrender." "In spite of many obstacles and difficulties Buchanan and Brownlee have succeeded during these many months in making the revision what a revision implies in professional work."¹

With the revision of Pamphlet No. 5, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, came an end to the controversy surrounding the pamphlet. Controversy concerning the issues raised by the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5 did not die as quickly. One measure of the extent of the involvement in the controversy was the entry of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Association of University Professors into the debate.

AAUP and ACLU Involvement

The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) never became involved in a formal investigation of the events surrounding Pamphlet No. 5, although such an investigation was considered by both organizations.

A hint of the possibility of AAUP entry into the controversy occurred even before Theodore Schultz resigned in September of 1943. On August 25, 1943, Ray Wakely, the head of the sociology subsection in the Department of Economics and

¹Theodore Schultz to Joseph H. Willits, 12 May 1944, Schultz Papers.

Sociology, wrote to Schultz:

Regarding strategy, it seems to me this is a case for possible investigation by the AAUP. It is not a difficult case involving dismissal of a staff member, but it is a limitation of academic freedom by the Administration; perhaps, rather, limitation of academic freedom of the Administration by outside forces. In such a case the forces "high pressuring" the Administration might be taken for an airing if it seems worthwhile to do so, and the Administration is at all favorable. This would make possible a friendly investigation, which might show up the forces responsible for the change.¹

In October of 1943, the general secretary of the AAUP, Ralph Himstead, made public the "probable" investigation of Iowa State College for "suppression of 'academic freedom.'" Himstead in a statement to the press, said, "In the light of information available to the national officers of the American Association of University Professors, it is probable that an investigation will be authorized."² Himstead said that numerous requests for an investigation had been received by the AAUP following Dr. Schultz's resignation.

If the facts of the total situation as reported to us are accurate, there are involved in the situation issues of academic freedom and larger issues concerning the relation of publicly controlled educational institutions to private interests and the public at large.³

¹Ray Wakely to T. W. Schultz, 25 August 1943, Schultz Papers.

²Des Moines Register, 2 October 1943.

³Ibid.

A Western Union day-letter was sent to President Friley on October 2nd concerning "the situation at Iowa State College resulting from the publication of Pamphlet No. 5." President Friley replied to this letter on October 5, 1943.¹ Interestingly, Ralph Himstead did not again correspond with Friley until April 12, 1944, when he acknowledged the October reply to his day-letter.²

According to Director Buchanan, as recorded in an interview on July 19, 1972, he went to Washington, D.C., at the request of President Friley in order to assure the AAUP that Pamphlet No. 5 would be republished.³ This visit apparently was on October 5, 1943, as indicated by President Friley's letter to Himstead on October 5th. The personal visit may have served its purpose for a time, as no inquiries were made of the College between October of 1943 and April of 1944.

John Vieg, who was in Washington, D.C., working for the Bureau of the Budget, wrote to President Friley on February 10, 1944, regarding the status of the AAUP potential

¹President Charles E. Friley to Ralph E. Himstead, 5 October 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²Ralph E. Himstead to President Charles E. Friley, 12 April 1944, Buchanan Papers.

³R. E. Buchanan, interview.

investigation. Vieg had spoken with Himstead to check on the accuracy of a report that the Association was on the point of sending a committee to Ames to make a formal investigation of the status of academic freedom. Vieg wrote that he wanted to urge postponement of such a decision if it proved to be true. As he had expected, it was not true. "And, unless I miss my guess, it will not make any such inquiry if the new version of Pamphlet No. 5 is published without much additional delay," wrote Vieg. He then asked President Friley when the revision was to appear.¹

On April 12, 1944, Ralph Himstead wrote to President Friley and acknowledged the October 5th letter from Friley as well as Buchanan's visit.

Himstead wrote that the Association office had received many communications and much documentary material on the publication of Pamphlet No. 5 since the October letters. The purpose of the April 12th letter was to request further information.

First, Mr. Himstead asked for clarification concerning the reported existence of a special committee which scrutinized the factual accuracy of Pamphlet No. 5 prior to the meeting of the Committee of Twelve. Himstead asked:

¹John A. Vieg to Charles E. Friley, 10 February 1944, Buchanan Papers.

Was there such a committee and by whom was it appointed? What instructions were given this committee and by whom? Who were the members of the Committee? What was the basis of determining the Committee's membership? When was the Committee appointed? Did the Committee make a report? If so, when and to whom? What use was made of the Committee's report? If the Committee did file a report, it would be helpful to our understanding of the case if you would send us a copy of it.¹

Secondly, Secretary Himstead referred to the last paragraph of the July 28, 1943, letter sent to recipients of Pamphlet No. 5 by President Friley. This was the paragraph which read:

The above report of the Joint Committee was approved on July 19, 1943, with the proviso that the recommended revision be in the form of a new study of the dairy situation, undertaken cooperatively, and including both wartime problems and those likely to be of interest and concern in the post-war period.²

In regard to this statement, Himstead asked whether the action of the Committee of Twelve on July 12th was its final action or whether its action of July 12th was reviewed on July 19th by some other body, which approved the committee's action "with the proviso." Himstead asked which interpretation was correct. If the committee's action was reviewed by another body, what was that other body, asked Himstead. Further, Himstead wanted to know what was meant by the statement that

¹Himstead to Friley, 12 April 1944.

²President Charles E. Friley to Recipients of Pamphlet No. 5, 28 July 1943, Schultz Papers.

a new study of the dairy situation was to be undertaken cooperatively.

In closing, Secretary Himstead wrote that the Association believed the importance of the issues warranted careful investigation.

The Association has been requested to make that kind of investigation. We suggest that it would be desirable if the Administration of the College also requested the help of the Association in clarifying the facts. We believe that such a request would be desirable both educationally and as regards the relationship of Iowa State College to the public. I hope that you and your administrative advisors will give this suggestion careful consideration.¹

On April 24, 1944, Director Buchanan wrote to President Friley in regard to the Himstead letter. He made several comments and suggestions, "offered for what they are worth."²

Director Buchanan noted that Himstead's letter was the first AAUP acknowledgement in Buchanan's knowledge, that Iowa State College was under investigation. Buchanan suggested that in reply, President Friley should ask what were the issues allegedly involved in the situation. He suggested asking for copies of the statements made by the AAUP to the press concerning the issues involved.

Buchanan further suggested writing:

¹Himstead to Friley, 12 April 1944.

²R. E. Buchanan to President Charles E. Friley, 24 April 1944, Buchanan Papers.

Newspaper statements relating to proposed investigations by the A.A.U.P. have suggested two accusations: one, that there has been some suppression of academic freedom or freedom of speech; the other, that under special pressure from interest groups, actions detrimental to academic freedom have been taken. When you have told us quite exactly, we will be in a position to cooperate with you in getting at the truth.¹

Buchanan then referred to Secretary Himstead's suggestion that Iowa State ask the AAUP for help in clarifying the facts. Buchanan wrote that, in his opinion, this was not wise. He suggested Friley write: "It is the considered opinion of myself and colleagues concerned that you are mistaken in your analysis and that an investigation is not called for." Buchanan did suggest that Iowa State College should offer every reasonable assistance on the part of its administration.

Buchanan next directed his attention to Himstead's questions concerning a "special committee." Buchanan outlined the answers to each question, stating essentially who was on the committee, that the committee reported to the president, and that its report was submitted with other reports to the Committee of Twelve. Buchanan then suggested that Friley reply:

Having complied with your request, we have the following equally reasonable requests to make of you:

¹Ibid.

1. What is your purpose in securing this document? You have given us no statement as to what you are investigating.
2. You speak in the vaguest terms of "the situation," and "issues allegedly involved" etc. What, very specifically, have you been called upon to investigate?¹

Buchanan then dealt with Himstead's questions concerning the last sentence of the letter retracting Pamphlet No. 5 from President Friley to the recipients of the pamphlet. Secretary Himstead was wrong in his interpretation of this sentence, according to Buchanan, who suggested that the following be written to the AAUP Secretary:

The President himself approved the unanimous report of the committee of twelve. It was not reviewed by any other body. Neither of your alternative assumptions is therefore correct. The approval of the report of the committee by the President was a normal action indicating that the recommendations would be put into effect and that the work of the committee was complete.²

Director Buchanan suggested that Himstead be asked for reasons for the "unfortunate misinterpretation." "Are you inferring that the President who set up the committee was not competent to accept the report? And to carry out the recommendations of the committee?"

Director Buchanan made several comments intended to clarify the sentence in question. He wrote that the sentence was intended to implement the recommendations of the Committee

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

of Twelve but did not mean that the dairy pressure groups were to be called in to help rewrite the pamphlet.

Director Buchanan next explained the statements that Pamphlet No. 5 was to be a "new study of the dairy situation" and that it was to be "undertaken cooperatively." The former could be explained by what had transpired. That is, that Mr. Brownlee, the pamphlet author, had accepted the invitation to revise the publication, and in so doing, had expanded the study so that it included both wartime problems and those likely to be of interest and concern in the post-war period.

The statement that the study was to undertaken cooperatively was explained by the fact that it had been decided that the college would assume institutional responsibility and, thus, the pamphlet would go through normal review procedures. This meant that the pamphlet would be reviewed by a committee of college staff members.

Finally, Buchanan wrote that the pamphlet manuscript was in the process of publication and would be sent to Secretary Himstead in its proof stage.¹

There is no evidence that President Friley incorporated Director Buchanan's suggestions in a letter to Secretary Himstead. A formal investigation was never undertaken by the AAUP, however.

¹Ibid.

The American Civil Liberties Union became involved in the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 in a somewhat indirect way. In The New Republic on February 14, 1944, an article appeared which was entitled, "Academic Freedom and the Catholics." The author, J. M. O'Neill, in addition to being a professor at Brooklyn College in New York, was chairman of the Committee on Academic Freedom for the American Civil Liberties Union.

The article was principally about a case at Notre Dame where a faculty member had been dismissed. However, several lines of copy were devoted to Iowa State College, which O'Neill characterized as vying with Notre Dame "for the foot of the class." O'Neill wrote that "Mr. O. H. Brownlee published a pamphlet giving facts in regard to margarine, its nutritive value, its palatability, its cost, and relating these factors to the present butter shortage."¹ Professor O'Neill then quoted from an article that had appeared in the December issue of The Reader's Digest:

The moment the pamphlet came from the press, there was the very devil to pay. Blasts of anger shattered the calm of Iowa, Wisconsin, and the Dakotas, and dairymen demanded Brownlee's scalp. Newspapers scoffed at college professors, and suggested wholesale resignations. The battle still rages. Late communiques report that Brownlee is

¹J. M. O'Neill, "Academic Freedom and the Catholics," The New Republic, 14 February 1944, p. 206.

absent on leave, that Dr. T. W. Schultz, his department chief, has chucked his job and escaped to Chicago, and that President Friley of Iowa State College has placated¹ the dairy interests by disowning the heretical tract.

O'Neill wrote that the two cases of Notre Dame and Iowa State College were perfect examples of the two great types of academic freedom cases.

The Iowa State College case illustrates the second great type of academic freedom cases. It is concerned not with the freedom of opinion and speech of the citizen who happens to be a teacher, but with the freedom to speak, to teach, to publish the truth as he sees it on the part of the teacher and research scholar. Probably no literate person questions the truth of Mr. Brownlee's findings on margarine, but some people didn't like the truth and so demanded his scalp.²

Professor O'Neill also stated that although he had seen "no statement in Friley's words," the Iowa State President had given up without a fight the "fortress of truth and the public interest--if press reports were approximately true."

O'Neill wrote:

Had President O'Donnell and President Friley believed sufficiently in academic freedom, when the alumni who did not like Dr. McMahon's opinions, and the dairymen who did not like Mr. Brownlee's truth, demanded scalps, these presidents would have defied their pressure groups, would have explained their obligations as educators, and have given good lessons (where they were apparently badly needed) in the purposes of colleges and universities, and in

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

the sacredness of truth and freedom of opinion in a free civilized society, as distinct from a totalitarian society.¹

It was not until late in March that Director Buchanan responded to this article. It may be that it was Dr. Albert Hart who brought the article to Buchanan's attention. Dr. Hart sent a copy of two letters he had written on March 21st-- one to Professor O'Neill and the other to Bruce Bliven, editor of The New Republic.

Dr. Hart wrote to O'Neill that he neither objected to the discussion of the pamphlet affair nor did he desire a "whitewash." However, he did find it "unfortunate" that O'Neill had based his discussion on the loose account given in The Reader's Digest. There were several inaccuracies that were thus incorporated into the O'Neill article, such as the statement that Mr. Brownlee was on leave. Dr. Hart did suggest several documents that would serve as better evidence should the Civil Liberties Union decide to look into the matter, and further suggested that President Friley and Director Buchanan be contacted for their sides of the story.²

Dr. Hart's letter to Mr. Bliven was a cover letter for a copy of his letter to O'Neill.

¹Ibid.

²Albert G. Hart to J. M. O'Neill, 21 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

Of note, Dr. Hart wrote to Bliven:

You will note that I have not objected to the general impression Professor O'Neill conveys. For my own part, I am not quite so sure that the answer is as Professor O'Neill--or as myself a few months ago (sic). But I do not gather that Professor O'Neill is trying to mislead his readers, and his interpretation in my view is within the range of defensible interpretations of the full record.¹

On March 27, 1944, Director Buchanan wrote to Albert Hart thanking him for the copies of his letters. He wrote: "I can agree wholeheartedly in the general argument and conclusions, it is so unfortunate that with plenty of good facts on which to build argument, there should be recourse to poor data."² On the same day, Director Buchanan also wrote letters to J. M. O'Neill and Bruce Bliven. In both letters, Buchanan made a statement similar to Dr. Hart's; that is, that the article was not based on the essential facts. Buchanan wrote to O'Neill that he agreed with the overall analysis of the necessity and importance of academic freedom in our institutions of higher education. "I am, frankly, however, quite astonished at the statements which you have included with reference to Iowa State College."³

¹Albert G. Hart to Bruce Bliven, 21 March, 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²R. E. Buchanan to Albert G. Hart, 27 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

³R. E. Buchanan to J. M. O'Neill, 27 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

Because, Buchanan said, he believed that O'Neill had attempted to make a "simple explanation of what in fact was a very involved matter" and which had very little to do with academic freedom, he listed several points he considered pertinent to the situation.

The first concerned O'Neill's statement that he had "seen no statement in President Friley's words." Buchanan then suggested that O'Neill should have endeavored to obtain President Friley's statement that the right of a member of the staff to publish results was not debatable, and that a publication which occurs in some regularly sponsored and official publication should go through regular review channels. "May I say that I feel that you have done both an individual and an institution a great disservice in not checking upon your facts more competently," wrote Buchanan.

Director Buchanan also refuted the statement in The Reader's Digest, quoted in O'Neill's article, which reported that Brownlee was absent on leave. There had been no suggestion either by the institution or by Brownlee that he should go on leave, wrote Buchanan.

In his letter, Buchanan pointed that President Friley and the State Board of Education had consistently refused to comply with suggestion from pressure groups that there be dismissals from the staff. Further, he wrote:

You know perfectly well that had there been any item involving academic freedom at this institution, there would have been an investigation by the A.A.U.P. There has been no such investigation. It is conceivable, however, that the institution should ask for an investigation in order that it might be officially cleared of the charges which you have made against it.¹

Director Buchanan next dealt with the subject of sponsorship of publications saying that a "large part of the misunderstandings centering around Mr. Brownlee's publication" had to do with the implications of sponsorship. He pointed out that a committee had been appointed to prepare a report on publication procedures; that the report had been unanimously accepted by the cabinet of the Agricultural Experiment Station, and by the entire Station staff; and that the report was then being studied by faculty committees in other areas of the institution. "May I insist that the whole procedure is the very antithesis of the statements which you have made with reference to academic procedures here," wrote Buchanan.

Buchanan's last point was that Brownlee had prepared a revision which had been accepted and was in the process of publication: "I can conceive of nothing in this procedure which in any way involves academic freedom."

In conclusion, Director Buchanan asked that Mr. O'Neill in some manner attempt at least to get together the pertinent

¹Ibid.

facts and publish "a retraction of those statements and implications which are demonstrably untrue."¹

Director Buchanan's March 27th letter to Bruce Bliven, editor of The New Republic, was published in the May 1st issue of that magazine. This letter covered many of the same points which were made in the letter to Mr. O'Neill. Buchanan opened the letter:

May I express to you our extreme regret that Mr. J. M. O'Neill in your February 14th issue of The New Republic beginning on page 206, should have made statements with reference to academic freedom at Iowa State College which are not at all in accordance with the facts.²

As in his letter to O'Neill, Buchanan refuted the statement that Friley had "given up without a fight."

President Friley, both in writing and in official public statement, committed himself as follows:

1. The right of a member of the staff of the Iowa State College to publish the results of his work was not in question by the institution and from his point of view was not even debatable. (I know of no stronger expression than this in the development of academic freedom.)³

Buchanan continued with a reiteration of what Friley had stated concerning the review procedures which are necessary

¹Ibid.

²R. E. Buchanan to Bruce Bliven, 27 March 1944, Buchanan Papers.

³Ibid.

when a professor seeks publication in an official college publication:

In other words, it is expected that the determination of acceptability of a manuscript for publication in an official college series should be on the same basis as the determination of acceptability by any standard scientific or technical journal.¹

The Director next pointed out that President Friley had refused to entertain recommendations of pressure groups that there be dismissals in the Department of Economics. Mr. Brownlee, he stated, was a member of the staff and had been working on a revision of the pamphlet in question. "If, as seems not improbable, Mr. Brownlee will be called into military service, he will be given leave with the understanding that...his place will be held for him until his return from the service," wrote Buchanan. This was the only specific reference to the fact that Brownlee was not on leave, as had been alleged in the O'Neill article.

Next, Buchanan stated that O'Neill's impression that the purpose of the pamphlet written by Brownlee was to give facts in regard to margarine was mistaken. The discussion of margarine was incidental to the much broader subject of putting dairying on a war footing, according to Buchanan.

In closing, Director Buchanan wrote:

If there were any point to it, a complete discussion of the controversy here at Iowa State College,

¹Ibid.

which frankly revolved largely around sponsorship of publications and not around problems of academic freedom, might be submitted. To the best of my knowledge and belief, there is no problem of academic freedom involved. At the present moment, through staff committee studies on the meaning of sponsorship with reference to academic publications, there has been developed a document which has the unanimous approval of the staff of the Agricultural Experiment Station and which I believe to be the clearest expression¹ of policy that has been developed in this field.

J. M. O'Neill, signing his letter as "Chairman of the Committee on Academic Freedom of the American Civil Liberties Union," responded to Director Buchanan's letter in the same issue of The New Republic.² This was Professor O'Neill's only response to Director Buchanan.

O'Neill cited three sources of information concerning the violation of academic freedom at Iowa State College. Two of the sources were Des Moines Register articles. One article concerned Dr. Schultz's letter of resignation on September 19, 1943, written by J. S. Russell. The other was, according to O'Neill, an article in the Des Moines Register on September 23, 1943, written by T. W. Schultz himself: "This contains seven specific charges, including the 'fact that the social science staff has decided, in view of the present restriction of academic freedom, that the wartime farm and food service should

¹Ibid.

²J. M. O'Neill, "Correspondence," The New Republic, 1 May 1944, p. 607.

be discontinued."¹

There was no article in September 23rd's The Des Moines Register by T. W. Schultz. There was an article on September 24th by Schultz entitled, "Iowa State College and Social Science Research," but this article did not contain the quote O'Neill included. The quote came from the September 19th article by J. S. Russell, outlining the contents of Schultz's letter of resignation. Also incorrect was the term wartime farm and food "service" rather than "series."

The third source which O'Neill mentioned was an article in the December, 1943, Harper's Magazine by Wesley McCune entitled, "The Oleomargarine Rebellion." O'Neill wrote:

Mr. McCune reports that President Friley "met for two hours with 100 dairymen," and "arranged for a joint committee of faculty members and dairy representatives to review this bulletin paragraph by paragraph." Note the inclusion of the representatives of the protesting pressure group to study, paragraph by paragraph, a scholarly pamphlet which had been prepared by Mr. Brownlee of the staff of the college under an editorial board which included Dr. Schultz (who has since resigned to go to the University of Chicago), Dr. Walter Wilcox (who has since resigned to go to the University of Wisconsin), or A. G. Hart, who is now working for the Treasury Department in Washington, and Dr. Margaret Reid, also working for the government in Washington; all recently of the Department of Economics and Sociology at Iowa State College.²

O'Neill asked whether President Friley or Dr. Buchanan wished to be understood as contending that a pamphlet prepared

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

under the editorial supervision of Schultz, Hart, Reid and Wilcox needed to have the imprimatur of the dairymen. "The very appointment of such a committee after the controversy that had been stirred up by the dairymen is an affront to academic freedom, to scholarship, and to the whole faculty of Iowa State College."

O'Neill wrote that he found little but "words of protest and hackneyed words of devotion to academic freedom" in all that Dr. Buchanan had written. There was one inaccurate statement which O'Neill admitted to--that Brownlee was on leave. "I cannot figure out how the physical presence of Mr. Brownlee in Ames, Iowa, rather than in Timbuktu or Shangri-La, has anything at all to do with whether or not the principles of academic freedom have been violated," wrote O'Neill. He did state for the record that Brownlee was not on leave.

In conclusion, Professor O'Neill wrote that he believed it most unfortunate that Dr. Buchanan did not utilize the opportunities available to him to look into the matter somewhat more carefully before writing his letter. "I still believe that it is impossible for anyone to read the detailed published discussions of the Iowa State case and to avoid the conclusion that it is a clear and extreme case of denial of academic freedom."¹

¹Ibid.

A letter on June 12, 1944, from Director Buchanan to Mr. Roger Baldwin, chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union, indicated that at some point Buchanan believed that the Committee on Academic Freedom under J. M. O'Neill was investigating Iowa State College. Buchanan's opening paragraph read:

Dr. Elizabeth Hoyt of our Department of Economics and Sociology asked me to read certain correspondence between her and Mr. O'Neill. This recalled to mind the fact that in a recent telephone conversation in New York you suggested that it would be appreciated if I sent you in writing certain statements for your consideration and your files. These statements have to do with the "investigation" undertaken by the Committee on Academic Freedom of the American Civil Liberties Union. They relate to articles appearing in The New Republic signed by J. M. O'Neill....¹

Buchanan made several observations and comments in the five page letter to Baldwin. His first comment revealed that he had been in New York, and had called Mr. Baldwin's secretary. He said that when he called he stated that if Mr. O'Neill wished to see him, he would be glad to make himself available-- that if O'Neill's committee wished to secure additional facts, he would be in a position to assist. "The secretary of the Civil Liberties Union informed me that Mr. O'Neill, Chairman of your Committee on Academic Freedom, felt that his committee's information was adequate, but that if I desired to

¹R. E. Buchanan to Roger Baldwin, 12 June 1944, Buchanan Papers.

see him, a meeting could be arranged," wrote Buchanan. He explained that he was not desirous of asking for a hearing or conference, but simply wanted to make himself available.

Director Buchanan's second point related to his stance in regard to academic freedom; in the exposition he revealed some of his feelings about the charges made against him.

I am personally tremendously concerned with the maintenance of academic freedom at the Iowa State College. I am perfectly sure that every one of your correspondents who is at all in touch with the facts with reference to the matter will testify to the truth of this statement. Beyond question, I have much more information relative to all of the points at issue than your Committee on Academic Freedom can possibly have...I have done my best to make sure that there should be no taint of denial of academic freedom at Iowa State. In all of this I have worked very closely with all the parties concerned. These individuals include Dr. Schultz, Dr. Hart, Dr. Reid, Mr. Brownlee, Dr. Wilcox and the administration of the institution. Any and all of these individuals would, I am sure, be glad to verify my statements. To anyone knowing the facts, the statement by Mr. O'Neill, "It is most unfortunate that Mr. Buchanan did not utilize the exceptional opportunities which were available to one in his position at Iowa State College to look into this matter somewhat more carefully before writing the above letter to you," is to anyone really acquainted with the situation a confession by Mr. O'Neill and by your committee that they are quite out of touch with the actual situation.¹

In his third point, Buchanan tried to determine whether or not O'Neill was writing with the full backing of the American Civil Liberties Union. Buchanan cited a letter to Dr. Elizabeth Hoyt from Mr. O'Neill which said that he, O'Neill,

¹Ibid.

was acting on his own and was not making the ACLU responsible.¹ However, Buchanan wrote that he had understood during the telephone conversation with Baldwin that the ACLU did support O'Neill's statements and procedures.

Since Buchanan did assume that O'Neill had the backing of the ACLU, he wrote that he wanted to point out some specific instances in which the Committee on Academic Freedom's lack of regard for reasonable rules of evidence must interfere with acceptance of findings. Buchanan first recounted his refutation of O'Neill's statement that President Friley had not defended academic freedom when under attack. After reiterating Friley's statement, he wrote:

And what does Mr. O'Neill say in his reply? "In all that Dr. Buchanan has written to you, Mr. Editor, and to me, I find little but words of protest and hackneyed words of devotion to academic freedom." A refutation of a false statement made by Mr. O'Neill calls for an explanation and a correction, and not an unintelligent recourse to personalities.²

The rhetorical question by O'Neill--"Does President Friley or Director Buchanan wish to be understood as contending that a pamphlet...needs to have the imprimatur of dairymen..."--

¹Dr. Elizabeth Hoyt said in 1975 that she had gone in 1944 to the ACLU office in New York and had spoken with the executive secretary, because she believed that the wrong person, Director Buchanan, was being blamed. When she told Buchanan about the meeting, he was pleased. "He didn't say much; just that he hadn't liked any of it," said Dr. Hoyt. Dr. Elizabeth Hoyt, interview held at Iowa State University, 6 May 1975.

²Buchanan to Baldwin, 12 June 1944.

was next dealt with by Buchanan. The answer, he wrote, was obviously "no."

But the asking of the question implies that there has been some dereliction on the part of the institution. Certainly no agency such as a dairymen's group should be in a position to require the affixing of its imprimatur or its indicia, nor to censor or to control content. Neither in the preparation of the original manuscript nor in its revision by the author has there been any effective pressure as suggested in the question. Had Mr. O'Neill or your committee informed themselves (as they readily might have done) concerning the actual events of the last several months, the lack of pertinence of the innuendo would have been obvious. I am completely at a loss to know why your committee sponsors the publication of material which is so completely, at variance with the actual development of the case.¹

The statements about Mr. Brownlee's leave or lack of it, were next discussed by Buchanan, who suggested that O'Neill used the statement that Brownlee was on leave as evidence proving the collapse of academic freedom at Iowa State. There was no other possible explanation, according to Buchanan, for the inclusion of the statement.

When I, in my reply, show the statement made by Mr. O'Neill to be wholly false, he replies that he can't see that the presence of Mr. Brownlee in Ames or in Shangri La has any bearing upon the subject at issue. But Mr. O'Neill can't dodge by this maneuver the fact that he bases an accusation as to violation of academic freedom in part upon Mr. Brownlee's leave.²

In regard to O'Neill's statement about Dr. A. G. Hart and Dr. Margaret Reid being "recently of the Department of

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

Economics and Sociology at Iowa State College," Buchanan challenged the inference that these individuals were no longer staff members. Both Hart and Reid were in fact on leaves of absence working for the government on problems of emergency priority, according to Buchanan.

In his concluding paragraph, Director Buchanan discussed his view of the situation at Iowa State College relating to the question of academic freedom. He wrote that the charges made in Dr. Theodore Schultz's letter of resignation were Schultz's considered point of view, that they were made carefully and thoughtfully, and that they deserved careful consideration. Mr. O'Neill and his committee had every right to examine Schultz's charges and draw their own conclusions, according to Buchanan. "I cannot here pass my personal judgment upon the validity of Dr. Schultz's contentions beyond the statement that after a careful study of the evidence it is my belief that there is at the present time no matter of academic freedom involved."

Buchanan wrote that the committee might examine the evidence and draw a conclusion different from his own:

Those conclusions, however, should not be based upon misstatements and misinformation picked up secondhand in the popular literature. The dairymen in Iowa made the serious blunder of trying their case in the public press. I am afraid that you have made it quite impossible for your organization to function in the solution of our problems by the fact that you have resorted most unfortunately to the same procedure. There is no attempt on the part of

Mr. O'Neill to array the facts. Instead he builds a whole series of conclusions on premises which are in part, demonstrably false. Any good which might be done is completely vitiated by the inclusion of these false premises. I can reach no other conclusion than that your committee has disqualified itself by self-evident bias.¹

A letter written on June 13, 1944, was sent to Dean Buchanan, Professor Edward S. Allen and Professor Elizabeth Hoyt by the American Civil Liberties Union. This letter--written and sent before Buchanan's June 12th letter was received by the ACLU--was signed by Lucille B. Milner, Secretary. However, according to a follow-up letter on June 16, the letter had been written and prepared for Roger Baldwin's signature and inadvertently signed by Lucille Milner.²

The letter was written to the three Iowa State staff members because they had "severally approached" the ACLU concerning Pamphlet No. 5. The letter stated that the assumption made by the three that the ACLU had investigated the situation and had arrived at certain conclusions was false. "Our Committee on Academic Freedom started to make an inquiry but desisted when we were advised by the American Association of University Professors that they were undertaking an investigation."

¹Ibid.

²Lucille B. Milner to R. E. Buchanan, Edward S. Allen and Elizabeth Hoyt, 13 June 1944; and Milner to Buchanan, Allen and Hoyt, 16 June 1944; Buchanan Papers.

The letter next clarified the situation concerning The New Republic article. The key statement was that Mr. James M. O'Neill wrote the article on his own responsibility. However, since the ACLU had been approached concerning the article's errors, Mr. O'Neill was conferred with:

We conclude that (1) Prof. O'Neill's comments did not misrepresent the essential facts as reported in what are generally regarded as reliable publications and as far as we know were never refuted; (2) that such minor errors as are cited do not qualify the essential facts; (3) undisputed facts reveal an issue of academic freedom not of the same character as Notre Dame, to be sure, but equally serious in their¹ implications to freedom of research and publication.

Both Director Buchanan and Dr. Elizabeth Hoyt wrote responses to the ACLU letter. (These letters were addressed to Lucille Milner because the letter clarifying the signature mistake had not yet been received.) Dr. Hoyt wrote on June 14th that she would indeed be very happy to acknowledge that Professor O'Neill did not misrepresent the essential facts-- that academic freedom was challenged at Iowa State College. "It was, and the challenge was met successfully by the defenders of freedom on campus," wrote Dr. Hoyt:

It seems to me, however, that Professor O'Neill said a great deal more than that freedom had been challenged. He implied, certainly, that we had

¹Milner to Buchanan et al., 13 June 1944, Buchanan Papers.

fallen down in meeting it and that Director Buchanan was at fault.¹

Director Buchanan's letter to Lucille Milner was written on June 17th. In it, he asked that his remarks relative to the backing of Mr. O'Neill by Mr. Baldwin and the committee be disregarded. "May I say that under the circumstances I seriously question the propriety of Mr. O'Neill's signing himself as chairman of the Committee on Academic Freedom. The connotation certainly was that he was acting with the approval and full knowledge and backing of this committee."²

The exchange of letters between the ACLU and members of the Iowa State College staff ended with a letter from Roger Baldwin on June 21, 1944. Baldwin had apparently received Buchanan's June 12th letter and wrote, "We are distressed as you that there should be any question of fact between us." He wrote that differences of opinion were bound to arise and that the heart of the controversy rested upon judgments of just how far the facts at Iowa State College did involve questions of academic freedom.

Baldwin discussed point by point the "facts" in dispute. First of all, he again clarified that the ACLU had not

¹Elizabeth Hoyt to Mrs. Milner, 14 June 1944, Buchanan Papers.

²R. E. Buchanan to Lucille Milner, 17 June 1944, Buchanan Papers.

gone into the case of Pamphlet No. 5. It had been discussed at one meeting, but it was decided that the AAUP would cover the ground more adequately. "As a general policy, we do not take up cases investigated by the AAUP unless there is some legal action to be taken. We satisfied ourselves that there was none."

Secondly, Mr. Baldwin indicated that Mr. O'Neill's involvement in the case was due solely to the article which he personally wrote. At no time did the ACLU committee meet to consider the points raised by Buchanan and others challenging O'Neill's facts, according to Baldwin.

I have no recollection of telling you that the Committee was behind him. Neither he nor we have ever made any such statement. The Committee merely stated that the issue was only one of academic freedom and characterized it briefly. In that sense we supported Mr. O'Neill officially.¹

Mr. Baldwin wrote that he was confident that Professor O'Neill would correct any factual misstatements. "But save for rather trivial points, he states that he has not received any evidence of misstatements or misrepresentations, though your letter to me may supply him with sufficient basis for that."

In regard to a meeting between Buchanan and the Committee, Baldwin stated that since the matter involved Mr. O'Neill personally, the members were reluctant to arrange such

¹Roger Baldwin to R. E. Buchanan, 21 June 1944, Buchanan Papers.

a meeting. He expressed regret that a personal meeting between Buchanan and O'Neill fell through.

In conclusion, Baldwin stated that the ACLU would await the AAUP report "in the confidence that it will do justice to all contentions."¹

As has been noted, no formal investigations were ever undertaken by either the American Association of University Professors or the American Civil Liberties Union. However, pertinent statements did appear in publications of both organizations. In the ACLU's report published in June of 1944, there was a statement: "Only three teachers in colleges or schools were forced out because of their opinions, so far as the record shows.... Professors T. W. Schultz and Walter Wilcox at Iowa State College, who resigned in the midst of a controversy following the publication of a pamphlet favorable to margarine."

The Union's Committee on Academic Freedom concluding that no legal action was possible, issued statements in regard to both, scoring the action of the college authorities. Both cases are under investigation by the American Association of University Professors.²

In its 1943 report to the AAUP members on academic freedom and tenure, Committee A made the following reference

¹Ibid.

²American Civil Liberties Union, Report of the ACLU in the Third Year of War, In Defense of Our Liberties (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1944), pp. 54-55.

to the situation at Iowa State College:

Within the last four months the newspapers have been describing with what precision it is not one of the responsibilities of Committee A to determine, the propriety of a college administration's procedure in reference to the work of teachers convinced of the¹ nutritive value of oleomargarine vis-a-vis butter!

There was no formal investigation or report made by the AAUP.²

Postscript--Who Left?

The reissuance of Pamphlet No. 5 in May of 1944 and the abating of the threat of investigations in June, marked the last of the events relating to the controversy over the pamphlet, Putting Dairying on a War Footing. However, there is one last question which should be investigated--a question that may have related directly to the pamphlet controversy. That is, were there "wholesale resignations" from the staff of the Department of Economics following Théodore Schultz's resignation? This migration was intimated by Dr. Schultz, and even today statements are made concerning the "decline" of the Department of Economics and Sociology following Schultz's departure. Although it would be difficult to determine motivations

¹Ralph Himstead, ed., American Association of University Professors Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: AAUP, 19 February 1944), p. 26.

²Virginia White to Ann Weir, 15 May 1975, Personal Files.

for resignations, it is possible to determine who did leave and when.

All four members of the Department of Economics' committee for review of the pamphlets in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series left Iowa State College. Albert G. Hart was on leave to the Department of the Treasury as principal economist in 1943 and 1944; a research economist for the Council for Economic Development from 1944 to 1946; and visiting professor, professor and then chairman of economics at Columbia University from 1946 on. Margaret G. Reid was on leave from Iowa State as an economist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture from 1943 to 1948; on the faculty of the University of Illinois from 1948 to 1951; and on the faculty at the University of Chicago since 1951. As previously noted, Walter Wilcox went to the University of Wisconsin in October 1943 where he stayed until 1949, when he went to work for the federal government. The fourth committee member was Theodore Schultz, who as noted, went to the University of Chicago, where he became chairman of the Department of Economics in 1946.¹

Another faculty member who was a part of the events surrounding Pamphlet No. 5 was William H. Nicholls, one of the

¹"Handbook of the American Economic Association," American Economic Review, 54 (January 1964).

authors of the Nicholls-Vieg pamphlet, Wartime Government in Operation. Nicholls left Iowa State College in 1944, was an assistant professor at the University of Chicago from 1945 to 1948, and became professor at Vanderbilt University thereafter.¹

In the 1943-1944 Bulletin of Iowa State College, Theodore Schultz is listed as head of the Department of Economics and Sociology, and 25 persons are listed under him as faculty members from assistant professor through professor.² In the 1945-1946 Bulletin, thirteen faculty members' names do not reappear or were shown as "on leave," but did not in fact return to Iowa State.³ D. Gale Johnson, who may have been the economics faculty member to serve on the subcommittee to review the revised manuscript of Pamphlet No. 5, left Iowa State in 1944 to go to the University of Chicago as a research associate, although he did not receive his Ph.D. from Iowa State until 1945. He joined the faculty at Chicago in 1946, was dean of the Division of Social Sciences from 1960 through 1970, and became chairman of the Department of Economics in

¹Ibid.

²The Iowa State College Bulletin (Ames: Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, 1943-1944), p. 183.

³The Iowa State College Bulletin (1945-1946), p. 199.

1971.¹

Arthur Cyril Bunce resigned from the Iowa State staff on December 31, 1943.² Rainer Schickele and John A. Hopkins left Iowa State in 1943 and 1944 respectively.³ Two other faculty members were listed in the 1943-1944 Bulletin whose names did not reappear in the 1945-1946 Bulletin.

Two of the sociologists in the Department of Economics and Sociology left in 1943 and 1944. Bryce Ryan, whose WOI Radio program was mentioned in Theodore Schultz's letter of resignation as being cancelled due to administration pressure, was on leave with the U.S.D.A. in 1943, and with the U.S. Zone Headquarters in Germany from 1944 to 1946. He then joined the faculty at Rutgers.⁴ Another sociologist, C. Arnold Anderson, during 1944, was a visiting professor at the Harvard University. He went to the University of Kentucky in 1945, and has been on the faculty of the University of Chicago since 1958.⁵

¹American Men and Women of Science: The Social and Behavioral Sciences I and II (New York and London: Jaques Cattell Press, 1973), p. 1141.

²The Iowa State College Bulletin (1944-1945), p. 183.

³"Handbook."

⁴American Men and Women, p. 2125.

⁵Ibid., p. 48.

Thus, 13 members of the economics and sociology faculty--exactly half--appear to have left Iowa State College in the year following the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5.

Finally, it is worth noting what happened to Oswald Brownlee, who, as author of Putting Dairying on a War Footing, was one of the persons most involved in the whole controversy. He received his Ph.D. from Iowa State College in 1945, after nearly a year's delay due to the revision of Pamphlet No. 5. He then became an assistant professor at Iowa State, a position he held until 1947, when he went to Carnegie Institute of Technology for one year. Brownlee was assistant professor at the University of Chicago from 1948 to 1950, and has been at the University of Minnesota since, where he is professor of economics.¹

¹American Men and Women of Science: Economics (New York and London: Jaques Cattell Press, 1974), p. 71.

CHAPTER III .

PERSPECTIVES ON PAMPHLET NO. 5, PUTTING DAIRYING ON A
WAR FOOTINGA Comparison of Original and Revised Editions of
Pamphlet No. 5

Any casual browser through the series of pamphlets entitled Wartime Farm and Food Policy might take special notice of Pamphlet No. 5, principally because there are two versions. If only the second version is available, one notices the inclusion in the title of "revised edition." In some libraries, the original edition is bound with President Friley's letter of retraction. Any of these signals would indicate that Pamphlet No. 5 had an unusual history.

When one has available both versions of Pamphlet No. 5, several differences are readily apparent. These differences will be covered in this chapter. This discussion will not appraise the validity of the research or results in Pamphlet No. 5. However, some research and conclusions concerning dairying made about the time that Pamphlet No. 5 was written will be included.

In addition to the differences in the titles of the two versions of Pamphlet No. 5--one reading "revised edition"--the cover of the second edition reads, "A Pamphlet of the Iowa

State College Press, Published in 1944, by the Collegiate Press, Inc., Ames, Iowa." The original reads only, "The Iowa State College Press, Ames, Iowa." The reason for this was apparently a result of the confusion caused by the special indicia, "Iowa State College Press." The revised edition and all subsequent pamphlets in the series were printed with this indicia plus the reference to the press' title, "Collegiate Press."

If the casual browser were struck by the imprint of "revised edition," the reason for revision would become clear upon reading R. E. Buchanan's foreword to this edition which was discussed in Chapter II. In short, Buchanan pointed out the dairy and farm groups' contentions, then explained the purpose of the pamphlet. The differences between the original and revised versions were elucidated by the following:

The analysis has been redirected toward further consideration of some of the developments which have occurred during the past year and with some forward look toward those which may be expected in the near future. In consequence, some of the points made in the previous analysis have been given added emphasis, some have been omitted, and new points have been included. Particularly has the author documented the discussion more fully. He has endeavored to show the pertinence of the survey of certain controversial items to the main points of the pamphlet.¹

¹R. E. Buchanan, Foreword to Putting Dairying on a War Footing, rev. ed. by O. H. Brownlee, Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, no. 5 (Ames, Ia.: Collegiate Press, Inc., 1944), p. 2.

The pamphlet, thus, did fulfill in part the statement by President Friley in his letter to the recipients of Pamphlet No. 5 that a new study would be undertaken, "including both wartime problems and those likely to be of interest and concern in the post-war period."¹

One of the most obvious differences between the two versions was length. The original Pamphlet No. 5 was 35 pages with no appendix. The revised edition was 47 pages plus 16 pages of an appendix, comprised almost entirely of tables of data relating to much of the pamphlet's substantive information.

Another immediately apparent difference between the two versions was terminology. Original Pamphlet No. 5 referred to the butter substitute as "margarine," the revised edition to "oleomargarine." This terminology had been brought up by the dairy representatives to the Joint Committee of Twelve. According to them, "margarine" was not a legal term for the butter substitute.

The basic differences between and similarities of the contents of the two pamphlets are revealed by a comparison of the section entitled "The Findings" in the original version, and a section entitled "Summary" in the revised. The original

¹Charles E. Friley to Recipients of Pamphlet No. 5, 28 July 1943, Schultz Papers.

version's "Findings" were broken down into "The Problem" and "The Solution." The revised edition simply summarized the pamphlet's findings, including the problems and solutions in one section. Because the two pamphlets vary greatly in organization, compared points may be taken out of their printed order.

The first point made in both pamphlets was the same-- that demand for dairy products would exceed the supply. In the revised edition, the figures were updated.

The second point made in the original pamphlet was that there probably would be shortages of all dairy products. Products such as fluid, evaporated and dried milk, read the pamphlet "are economical, are important to good diets, and have few very satisfactory substitutes," and thus their production at high levels should be maintained.

Even though some of the milk solids are lost in the whey, cheese is a concentrated and economical food. Butter is in a somewhat different class. It is a high cost fat; and only a small part of the skimmed milk, a by-product of its production, goes to human food. Vegetable as well as some other animal fats can be produced at less cost of manpower and other resources. These can be used in margarine to make up the butter shortage.¹

If this second "problem" in the original pamphlet is combined with its "solution," then the two pamphlet versions

¹O. H. Brownlee, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, no. 5 (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1943), pp. 1-2.

can be compared. A solution suggested for making the best possible use of dairy resources was: "Establishing prices of milk and milk products so that as much of milk as feasible is diverted into products utilizing the essential milk solids,...."¹

The revised pamphlet, like its predecessor, suggested that there would be shortages of all dairy products. In somewhat different language, the revised edition referred to the value of whole milk products:

Because of the high nutritive value and relatively low resource costs of whole milk and milk products utilizing...all of the milk solids, efforts should be made to stimulate increased production of milk in areas where all the milk solids can feasibly be made available for human consumption.²

A suggested solution in the revised version for increased production of milk where the whole milk solids were utilized was somewhat different from the original suggestion of establishing prices "...so that as much milk as feasible is diverted into products utilizing the essential milk solids,...."

Ordinarily such encouragement could be offered by increasing the prices for milk. However, given the existing economic and political framework within which the war economy is functioning, the

¹ibid., p. 2.

²O. H. Brownlee, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, rev. ed., p. 3.

payment of subsidies may offer a more practical alternative than would increased milk prices.¹

The author, Oswald Brownlee, handled the discussion of butter somewhat differently in the revised edition than he had in the original, for which he had written that butter was a high-cost fat only a small part of which, skim milk--a by-product of butter production--was used as human food. In the revised edition, he wrote:

Additional butterfat could be provided without increasing the total output of milk or decreasing the total production of other dairy products if the fat content of butter was lowered or if the butterfat content of such products as fluid milk, evaporated and condensed milk, dried whole milk, and cheese was reduced and the butterfat thus extracted was diverted into butter. Another alternative which could also be employed to minimize any adverse effects of these expected shortages upon the general level of nutrition and morale is the provision of additional quantities of acceptable low-cost alternative foods.²

In the original version, Brownlee stated in the "Problem" section: "Margarine production has not been increased sufficiently to make up for the shortage of butter. In addition, taxes and other restrictions on the sale of margarine are discouraging its use." In the solution section, the author wrote:

Re-examine the allotment of fats and the allocation of materials for manufacturing facilities for margarine so that consumers will have a substitute for butter. Restrictions on the sale of margarine--

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 4.

state excise taxes, license fees, etc.--should be removed so that its consumption may be encouraged.¹

In the revised edition, Brownlee dealt with the oleomargarine question in a more carefully worded way. In the summary section, he wrote:

The provision of satisfactory alternative foods to make up for shortages of fluid milk, cheese, evaporated milk, and dried milk probably would prove extremely difficult. Although various combinations of foods are satisfactory as nutritional substitutes, few are likely to be highly acceptable in the diets of many consumers. Furnishing consumers with an alternative fat spread to make up for any shortage of butter may be less difficult. Although there are many fats which could be substituted for butter, the most generally acceptable fat spread now available is oleomargarine. The increasing reliance of our population upon such foods as bread, the complementarity with breads of fat spreads, and the possibility that consumers may prefer maintenance of the usual butterfat content in other dairy products rather than more butter are among the factors which bring up for critical re-examination the whole system of restrictions that have been placed upon the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine.²

One other area in which the two pamphlets were similar was in the suggested methods of increasing the production of milk. The original version of Pamphlet No. 5 suggested that draft deferments of dairy workers be made conditional upon production of milk for whole milk products or cheese rather than production of milk as such. "This sort of policy may encourage some sellers of cream to shift to selling whole milk

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 3.

²Brownlee, rev. ed., pp. 4-5.

or to producing other livestock." Also, Pamphlet No. 5 in its original version suggested subsidies be granted to producers enabling them to secure equipment and make changes necessary to sell whole milk rather than cream. Concurrently, "A subsidy to butter producers should not be granted."¹

The revised edition of the pamphlet suggested that increased production of dried skim milk could be encouraged by:

- a. Increasing the prices for dried skim milk or by paying subsidies to milk producers to increase their returns from selling whole milk rather than cream.
- b. Paying subsidies to milk producers for adjusting their production methods and securing equipment acceptable for the manufacture of dried skim milk.²

In the original version, the introductory findings section contained a suggestion concerning the revision of sanitary standards, which was not included in the revised edition's summary. It was, however, included in the text and thus given less emphasis. The original version suggested the unification of sanitary standards based upon analysis of the milk itself, rather than the barns, cows, and other production facilities, would do much toward shifting milk out of butter production and toward the interchange of milk between markets.³

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 3.

²Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 4.

³Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 3.

The revised version also suggested unification of sanitary standards. It said: "In order to assure adequate milk at reasonable cost to consumers, careful study needs constantly to be given to the reduction of costs of milk production. Items in sanitary codes causing unnecessary expense to milk producers should be eliminated." Also related to the original version was the statement in the revised edition that care should be used to see that the requirements for equipment and the care of the dairy herd are germane to the production of acceptable milk.¹

Finally, there was an area covered in the original pamphlet which was deleted from the revised edition. That was the discussion of reorganizing milk distribution to eliminate duplication of routes and consequent waste of manpower.

The final points in both summaries which can be compared concerned rationing. The original pamphlet version simply stated in its "solution" section:

Ration butter, cheese, and evaporated and dried milk to consumers. But fluid milk rationing should be resorted to only after the possibilities for supplementing shortage areas with fluid milk and evaporated and dried milk from surplus areas have been exhausted.²

The revised Pamphlet No. 5 was much more extensive in

¹Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 29.

²Brownlee, orig. ed., pp. 3-4.

its summary discussion of rationing and in part reflected changes that had taken place between the pamphlet editions. Consumer rationing of butter, cheese and evaporated milk had been in effect for some time, according to the revised edition. In some larger cities, limitations on fluid milk had been established.

Such limitations have been invoked in many markets to divert milk away from fluid milk use and into manufactured dairy products. Unless all of the milk solids from the milk thus diverted are made available for human consumption, such limitations do not appear to be desirable.¹

One can see from this statement that Brownlee's argument in the original version for better utilization of whole milk was not dropped in the revised edition. This argument was in fact important in both versions of Pamphlet No. 5.

In contrast to the original edition, Pamphlet No. 5, revised edition, did advocate rationing of fluid milk if necessary. Brownlee suggested that if large reductions in consumption were necessary, then rationing of milk "...in a manner similar to that by which meats, fats and oils and some other foods are rationed is likely to prove most equitable."²

Comparison of the introductions to the two pamphlets indicates what is true throughout--in the revised edition,

¹Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 5.

²Ibid.

author Brownlee was much more careful to develop his argument and also to defend it. What is most important here is the question of how the controversial discussion of diverting resources away from butter production and into fluid milk and oleomargarine was handled. It is worthwhile to compare the two versions' detailed discussion of these points.

As was true in the introductory chapters, the organization of the following pages of each edition of Pamphlet No. 5 varied greatly. The original pamphlet had two parts: Part I, "The Findings," which has been discussed, and Part II, "The Analysis." Part II opened with a discussion of "Why Attention is Focused on Dairy Products," "Wartime Demands for and Supplies of Dairy Products," "Potential Supply of Milk," "Shortages of Dairy Products," "What Can Be Done," "Waste in the Distribution of Milk," and "Topics To Be Discussed." These "topics" were considered in some detail, and formed "a basis for formulating suitable policies to direct the production of milk, the allocation of supplies among various dairy products, and the distribution of fluid milk,...." These topics were:

- A. The relative nutritional importance of various dairy products.
- B. Farm price policy for dairy products.
- C. Paying subsidies to milk producers.
- D. Revision of sanitary standards.
- E. Deferment of dairy workers.

- F. Meeting local milk shortages with supplementary dehydrated products.
- G. Margarine as a substitute for butter.
- H. Rationing dairy products.
- I. Reorganizing fluid milk distribution.

In the revised edition, "I. The Nature of the Problem," "II. Wartime Adjustments in the Output of Dairy Products," "III. Wartime Adjustments in the Consumption of Dairy Products," "IV. Some Postwar Implications of Wartime Developments in the Dairy Industry," and "Appendix" all followed the Summary which has been discussed.

The differences in organization of the two pamphlets may have reflected an attempt by the author to be more "scholarly" in his presentation. For example, the original version began "The Analysis" with an overview of the existing dairy situation; that is, wartime demands and supplies for dairy products. However, the opening paragraphs again stated the author's conclusions about needs for policy changes:

Milk is of great nutritional importance in American diets. Insofar as possible, the output of fluid milk and of dairy products that contain all or most of the nutrients provided by milk should be maintained or even increased. If this is to be accomplished important changes are needed in our price and subsidy policies and in sanitary standards established for farms producing milk for these products. Butter is less important in our diets than are some of the other products. Its output should

be contracted if the feed and labor used in producing it can be shifted to more important uses.¹

On the other hand, the revised edition dealt with the overview of the existing dairy situation with little discussion of policy changes. The chapter on the "Nature of the Problem" opened:

This pamphlet is an analysis of some alternative solutions to problems arising because, during the war period, the available supplies of milk and dairy products will be less than the demands. Because of their importance in the human diet, careful study is desirable to analyze how best to put production, distribution and consumption of dairy products on a war footing.²

The narrative then went on to discuss why milk was one of man's most useful and satisfactory foods without discussing the less important status of butter.

In his discussion of the wartime demands and supplies of milk, Brownlee, in the original pamphlet, analyzed the potential supply of milk. He suggested that even without critical labor shortages and with feed for dairy cows, it was doubtful whether the expected shortages for 1943 could be eliminated. A definite physical limit to the increase in milk production existed, and two years were required for a heifer calf to become a producing cow. There were, according to the author, some cows farmers were not planning to milk in 1943

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 5.

²Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 7.

that could be so utilized. But these added cows brought into production would add little to total supplies.

This means that the maximum number of cows which can be milked in 1943 is now virtually determined and that most of the increase in milk production which might be obtained must come from better feeding of existing cows. A total production somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent greater than that of 1942 is probably the outside limit of milk output that could be obtained in 1943. Much of this increased output would probably go into butter rather than into the more essential uses, so that even though we might increase production, our supplies of the most nutritive products would still be less than what will be required. Furthermore, increasing milk production may not be in line with the best use of our resources.¹

In the revised edition, the chapter on the "Nature of the Problem" included no discussion of possible solutions to the shortage problem. This discussion was handled in the chapter on "Wartime Adjustments in the Output of Dairy Products," wherein Brownlee discussed the potential for increasing milk production. The discussion in the revised edition of the physical limits to increasing milk production and the desirability of attaining maximum milk output covered the same points made in the original version, but in much greater detail. In introducing these points, Brownlee wrote that "Adjustments which could be made in the production of dairy products fall essentially into two categories: (1) increasing the production of milk for all uses, and (2) shifting the use

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 8.

of milk that is produced."¹

As in the original version, the physical limits to wartime increases in milk production were discussed. Brownlee pointed out again that cows not being milked could be brought into production, although this discussion was more detailed.

Also, as in the original version, Brownlee mentioned that milk production might be increased, but he wrote that this increase might be as much as 25 percent on some farms.

Increases of this magnitude, however, would require very large increases in the grain consumption of dairy cows, and would not be possible on all farms even though the grain were available. An increase in milk production of 5 to 10 per cent (or 6 to 12 billion pounds) over 1943 is probably the maximum which could be expected from heavier feeding of existing cows.²

At this point, the revised edition went into a discussion of the desirability of attaining maximum milk output, whereas the original version at the same point said only that increased milk production may not be in line with the best use of resources. In fact, the revised edition discussed the "relative efficiencies of producing given amounts of food nutrients by various alternative means." This was a major focus appearing later in the original version and was one section in dispute. Therefore, a comparison of how the two versions handled the material is important.

¹Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 12.

²Ibid., p. 13.

The original version's discussion of the relative efficiencies of various products was covered in a section entitled, "A. The Relative Efficiencies and Nutritional Importance of Various Dairy Products." The key to this section was summarized by this statement:

We have neither unlimited feed nor unlimited labor with which to secure additional milk; the feed and labor necessary to produce it can also be employed in turning out other commodities. Hence we must compare the relative importance of separate dairy products with the other commodities which could be produced with this feed and labor before we decide whether or not we should increase or even maintain milk output.¹

The revised edition also pointed out that unlimited feed, labor, and materials would not be available:

Increased feed intake of cows would have to be primarily feed grains diverted from use by other kinds of livestock. Similarly, some of the additional labor that would be required to increase the output of dairy products is now being used in turning out other foods or war materials. An appraisal of the desirability of increasing milk production should take into consideration the relative efficiencies of producing given amounts of food nutrients by various alternative means. Comparisons should deal with (1) the relative efficiencies with which various kinds of livestock convert feed into food, and (2) the relative efficiencies with which various kinds of livestock convert labor into food.²

In the first version of the pamphlet, the importance of increasing production of milk versus other foods was

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 11.

²Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 13.

weighed in terms of the use to which it was put. Milk going into butter, wherein the skim milk was not used for human consumption, was pointed out as far less important in the human diet than whole milk or milk products utilizing all of the milk solids, such as dried or evaporated milk. Cheese was mentioned as containing virtually all the protein and fat in the milk but as lacking milk sugar. A portion of the riboflavin and some vitamins were lost in the whey when making cheese. Butter and fluid cream contained substantially only butterfat.

However, neither butter production nor utilization of fluid cream need result in the loss of the rest of the milk solids if the skim milk is used for human consumption. About one-sixth of the skim milk by-product of butter is expected to be salvaged in the form of dried skim milk in 1943. Similarly, if the whey can be salvaged, cheese production need not result in the loss of riboflavin¹ and other nutritive elements remaining in the whey.

This suggestion for better utilization of butter and cheese by-products was an important aspect of Pamphlet No. 5's suggested changes in the dairying industry. The revised edition also covered this area, although not in the same chronological order. After the discussion which was quoted previously, the revised edition discussed how dairy cows were highly efficient in comparison with other kinds of livestock. "The efficiency of milk production is determined by the pattern

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., pp. 12-13.

of its utilization as human food. Dairy cows of average productivity or above whose output is consumed as whole milk rank highest in the efficiency converting feed into protein and rank second only to hogs in converting feed into total food energy." Additional production of milk should thus be encouraged where humans can consume all of the essential ingredients.¹

In a later section of the revised edition, it was pointed out that "...at present considerable amounts of skim milk, buttermilk, and whey contribute much less to human nutrition as livestock feed than if they were consumed as food." Further:

It is easier to get more skim milk for human nutrition since its quantity is much greater than that of either whey or buttermilk. More than 35 billion pounds of skim milk were fed to livestock in 1943. Drying skim milk appears to be the most feasible method for making larger quantities of the non-fat solids available for food.²

Thus in evaluating the relative efficiencies of producing food nutrients by various means, the use to which the milk was put was determined as important. Also important, according to both pamphlets, was the examination of the efficiency of various milk products in terms of feed and labor used in producing them. In the original version was written:

¹Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 14.

²Ibid., p. 18.

Some of the feed and labor going to dairy cows might, for example, be used to produce beef cattle or hogs. Hence it is also important to weigh the contribution of these commodities as well as various milk products in determining whether to produce meat or milk.¹

The revised edition suggested that an appraisal of the desirability of increasing milk production should take into consideration the relative efficiencies of producing given amounts of food nutrients by various alternative means. The comparisons, according to the pamphlet, should deal with "(1) the relative efficiencies with which various kinds of live-stock convert feed into food, and (2) the relative efficiencies with which various kinds of livestock convert labor into food."²

The original version suggested that dairy cows compared favorably with other animals as converters of feed into energy (calories) if all of the solids in the milk were used for human consumption.

As converters of feed and labor into protein, dairy cows rate very high, if the whole milk is utilized. But the labor cost of providing food energy (calories) from milk is considerably greater than providing food energy from some meats. And if only the butterfat is made available for human food, the dairy cow rates³ very low as a source of either energy or proteins.

The revised version of Pamphlet No. 5 also stated that

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 13.

²Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 13.

³Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 14.

as converters of feed into total energy or protein alone, dairy cows were highly efficient in comparison with other livestock. Again, as in the original version, the efficiency of milk production was determined as dependent on its pattern of utilization as human food: "Dairy cows of average productivity or above whose output is consumed as whole milk rank highest in the efficiency of converting feed into protein and rank second only to hogs in converting feed into total food energy."¹

At this point in the revised edition discussion, there was a variation from the original version. The original Pamphlet No. 5 stated that if only the butterfat were made available for human food, then the dairy cow rated very low as a source of either energy or protein. The revised edition read:

If only the butterfat is used for human consumption and the skim milk is fed to hogs, the amount of protein made available for food from a given amount of feed is relatively low in comparison with that made available from other kinds of livestock. The amount of food energy made available as food, however, is relatively large, falling below only that from hogs and that from dairy cows from which whole milk is utilized.²

The revised edition continued with a discussion of the desirability of encouraging increases in the production of

¹Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 14.

²Ibid.

milk if fat is the only portion of the milk solids used for human food.

Additions to the present supply of animal fats can be produced at lower feed costs if the additional feed required is fed to some other kinds of animals, particularly to hogs. Or it may be advisable to shift more land from growing feed to the production of oil bearing seeds. In many cases, an acre of land will produce more fat if used for growing oil seed crops than if used for growing feeds for livestock.¹

The original version also had dealt with the production of fats. Milk was viewed as an inefficient source of fat when compared with other animal sources, and even more inefficient when compared with the more important plant sources. The pounds of fat yielded per acre and per man hour were said to be considerably less than those provided from hogs, peanuts, flaxseed or soybeans.

The original version's conclusion to the discussion of the relative efficiencies of various dairy products was that milk production could not be increased enough to meet all demands.

Consequently, it is important to concentrate attention on the maintenance or increase of the supply of those products that make all of the essential milk nutrients available for human consumption. If the skim milk is not being used for human food we should try to salvage it or shift the milk into uses other than butter.²

¹Ibid.

²Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 16.

The revised edition suggested that an increase of from only three to five percent in milk production was probably economically desirable. Increasing milk production was but one of the adjustments which could be made. "Another adjustment which is perhaps of greater importance is improving the pattern of utilization of the milk that is produced." One way suggested for accomplishing this was through diverting some milk from one product to another: "However, we do not have sufficient information to determine accurately the 'best' allocation of the milk that is produced. The most important gains can be attained by greater utilization as food of some of the milk solids now being fed to livestock."

The suggested method of greater utilization of milk solids was to increase the amount of separated milk, buttermilk and whey made available directly as human food.

Some young animals must be fed milk. But at present considerable amounts of skim milk, buttermilk, and whey contribute much less to human nutrition as livestock feed than if they were consumed as food. It is easier to get more skim milk for human nutrition since its quantity is much greater than that of either whey or buttermilk.¹

Thus, the two versions of Pamphlet No. 5 did cover the same points and arrive at similar conclusions in this area.

The area in the original Pamphlet No. 5 which caused the greatest amount of criticism was that of the discussion of

¹Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 18.

oleomargarine as compared with butter. In addition to the summary discussion of butter and margarine in the introduction, the original version of Putting Dairying on a War Footing suggested in several places contracting the production of butter and developing satisfactory substitutes. In fact, the original version placed much emphasis upon this contracting of butter production, as well as the better utilization of skim milk:

No single food makes quite the same contribution to the diet as does whole milk, thus making it difficult to find suitable substitutes. Butter, however, has a very close nutritional substitute that can be produced at considerably less cost. These nutritional and cost differences provide the key to what should be done in milk.¹

On the other hand, the revised edition saved its discussion of butter substitutes, except for the summary, for a special section entitled, "Alternatives for Butter." There was a discussion in the revised edition of lowering the butter-fat content of other dairy products in order to provide more butter, but no mention was made of butter substitutes at that point.

The easiest way to compare the two versions of Pamphlet No. 5's coverage of the comparative values of butter and margarine is to compare the special sections in each version devoted to the topic. In the original version, the section on

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 11.

margarine was entitled, "Substituting Margarine for Butter." It began by noting that not enough butter could be produced to satisfy consumer demands and that it would also be necessary to reduce the intake of fats as a whole. However, civilian morale could be maintained if low-cost substitutes which altered consumption patterns as little as possible were made available.

On the basis of average returns received from resources employed in producing milk for butter and in producing vegetable oils, one-half of the crop land and one-eighth of the labor necessary to turn out butter would produce enough vegetable oils which, when converted into margarine, could entirely displace butter. Margarine compares favorably with butter both in nutritive value and palatability.¹

However, according to the pamphlet in its original form, despite the efficiency and food value of margarine, dairy interests had been rather effective in suppressing its use. There was a high federal tax on colored margarine; at least half of the states had excise taxes on margarine; one-third of the states had imposed license fees on retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers of margarine; and 31 states prohibited the sale of colored margarine. "While these restrictions do not prohibit the sale of margarine, some of them do have the effect of increasing its cost to consumers. Others increase the difficulty of breaking down the popular belief that

¹Ibid., pp. 29-30.

margarine is definitely inferior as a food."¹

Author Brownlee suggested that the entire margarine situation probably needed re-examination. The War Production Board had increased the 1943 allocation of fats to 80 percent above the amount used in 1941, equivalent to an increase of less than two pounds per capita over the year before. Since butter supplies available to consumers would probably be about five pounds less per capita, the margarine allotment for 1943 might be at least triple that used in 1941.

Apart from requiring accurate labeling of the product and the preservation of sanitary methods of manufacture, we also need to abolish the restrictions on the sale and manufacture of margarine. We might even go so far as to allow its being colored to resemble butter, and we certainly should allow its being flavored to maximize its palatability.²

The revised Pamphlet No. 5, as in its original version, concluded that supplies of butter for civilian consumption in 1944 would be about 12 pounds per capita as compared with 17 pounds in 1935-39. Although butter was pointed out as a source of food energy, fatty acids and vitamin A, in view of large average per-capita fat intake, "the reduction in fat consumption due solely to this reduction in better supplies is likely to have little adverse effect upon the health of most American consumers."³

¹Ibid., p. 30.

²Ibid.

³Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 35.

The revised version discussion then turned to the question of butter as an important source of Vitamin A, a contention made by the dairy groups. While recognizing that butter provided about one-eighth of the average requirement for vitamin A at seventeen pounds per capita, "a reduction in the average per capita butter consumption of 5 pounds per year would represent a reduction of approximately only 4 percent in average vitamin A intake,..." However, average intake of vitamin A was estimated at over 25 percent in excess of the average requirement. Thus reduced butter consumption would pose no problem in this regard. In fact, Brownlee suggested that even with no other changes in consumption, reduced butter supplies would have few adverse effects on human health, and thus no alternative spreads had to be made available. However, the facts that fat spreads were complementary of bread, an important source of cereals, and that consumers noticed shortages of butter more than other commodities were cited as reasons to develop alternatives.

Although data are not complete on the extent to which these various foods are actually used as alternatives for butter, available data indicate that oleomargarine is the most widely used and probably the most acceptable by consumers as a replacement for butter. Consumption of oleomargarine for the United States is expected to be between 2 and 2½ pounds per capita more in 1944 than it was on the average in the years 1939-42. Consequently, it is of importance to consider the effects which increased use of oleomargarine as food would have upon the welfare of

consumers and butter producers, if consumers are given more opportunity to obtain it.¹

This was the paragraph which introduced the subject of oleomargarine. The author continued with a statement that the provision of additional oleomargarine was unlikely to affect butter prices since demands were high relative to supplies. Further, Brownlee indicated that where both oleomargarine and butter were available, some people would use both and some would use one or the other: "It is of interest, however, to consider the effect upon the health of those consumers in whose diets butter might be replaced by oleomargarine."

The comparative nutritional values of oleomargarine and butter were then considered. It was pointed out that fortified oleomargarine was legally required to contain a minimum of 9,000 International units of vitamin A per pound. The average vitamin content of butter was about 13,500 units. Approximately 90 percent of all oleomargarine was fortified, according to the pamphlet.

Aside from the question of vitamin A, the pamphlet covered the subject of the nutritive values of oleomargarine and butter simply with a quote from a circular published by the National Research Council. The quote basically concluded that the best evidence available indicated that when fortified

¹Ibid., p. 39.

"margarine" was used in place of butter, no nutritional differences could be observed. The quote emphasized that all margarine should be fortified.

The revised pamphlet also covered the trade barrier issue which was introduced by the quote, "Although fortified oleomargarine is nutritious and acceptable by many consumers as a spread, there are several kinds of trade barriers to its use."¹ This sentence may have been the revised version of the original statement: "Margarine compares favorably with butter both in nutritive value and palatability."²

As in original Pamphlet No. 5, the revised edition pointed out the various federal and state taxes and license fees on oleomargarine--including the 29 states which prohibited the sale of oleomargarine (down from 31 at the time of the original pamphlet).

The federal laws were originally adopted to aid in identifying oleomargarine and preventing its fraudulent sale as butter. State oleomargarine legislation has been aimed not so much at preventing fraud and misrepresentation as providing protection for particular competing products.³

Because butter is yellow in color it was cited as a reason oleomargarine manufacturers tried to color their product

¹Ibid., p. 39.

²Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 30.

³Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 40.

yellow. Consumers, according to the pamphlet, had a right to demand that products be clearly identified.

Taxes and other similar devices, however, are not the sole nor the best means for enforcing identification. The relatively heavier taxation and frequent outright prohibition of the sale of colored oleomargarine cannot be justified on grounds of preserving the product. As is true with any food product, misrepresentation can be controlled by labeling requirements coupled with state and federal inspection of the conditions of manufacture and distribution, enforced through a technique such as licensing.¹

In the final chapter of the revised edition of Pamphlet No. 5 entitled, "Some Postwar Implications of Wartime Developments in the Dairy Industry," Brownlee made some concluding comments about oleomargarine and butter. Brownlee recognized that the restrictions on the sale and manufacture of oleomargarine were of importance to the incomes of dairymen, and viewed in isolation, the restrictions were of little significance to consumers. Brownlee then responded, in effect, to the dairy interests' objections:

However, the ramifications of using such a procedure to influence incomes are of much greater significance than the immediate effects upon the price of butter and other dairy products. Such restrictions interfere with organizing our economy in a manner which will enable maximum production from our limited resources. Extension of this principle to other fields would tie the economy in knots and make its proper functioning impossible. The long-run effect of attempting through artificial price maintenance to influence the distribution of incomes may be a drastically smaller total income to distribute. Each group trying to get a

¹Ibid., p. 41.

larger share of the national income through such restrictions may find that although its share is larger, its absolute quantity may be smaller than would be obtained in an economy in which such restrictions were absent. Furthermore, even in the short-run, retaliatory action against not only butter but other dairy products is encouraged by the restrictions imposed on oleomargarine.¹

Although the two versions of Pamphlet No. 5 were different in many ways, the revised edition did cover the same ground; its conclusions, however, were more general in nature. Dr. Schultz wrote that the revised edition was "no surrender."² It could be said that the revised edition was a better organized, written and documented bulletin. As author, Oswald Brownlee pointed out, "If you say something in 60 pages instead of 25 or 30, whatever it was, the statements are softer or not as provocative...but they're all there." The revised pamphlet was an attempt "to make everything as unambiguous as possible and completely documented so it couldn't be challenged," according to Brownlee.³

Pamphlet No. 5, when it first was written as part of the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series was intended as a policy influencing bulletin; a fact which is implied in the series' title. According to Geoffrey Shepherd, a member of the

¹Ibid., pp. 46-47.

²Theodore Schultz to Joseph Willits, 12 May 1944, Schultz Papers.

³Oswald H. Brownlee, interview.

economics department and an author of series pamphlets, Pamphlet No. 5 was "more hastily written than the regular bulletins because it dealt with current situations and came out with recommendations of what the government needed to do."¹ The nature of the series as policy research was in fact the basis for its review procedures. The nature of the series was also suggested as a reason for the writing style and lack of documentation in the pamphlet.

In any case, the lack of documentation, the "provocative" nature of some of the statements, and some errors have been cited as reasons why Pamphlet No. 5 was retracted. However, if Pamphlet No. 5 had been originally issued as it was written in the revised form, it would appear likely to have received as much pressure against it as it did in the original form, since it was the basic thesis of the pamphlet to which the dairy interests objected. And if the dairy interests and the Iowa Farm Bureau had never attacked Pamphlet No. 5, it likely never would have been retracted. The key point, however, seems to be whether Pamphlet No. 5's basic thesis could be defended in the form in which it was originally presented. Because this involves the whole question of review procedures, the issue will be discussed in Chapter VI. It is important to note here that the revised edition of Pamphlet No. 5 did not

¹Geoffrey Shepherd, interview.

back down on its major points, thereby, in some respects, vindicating the original pamphlet.

1943 Research on the Comparative Values
of Butter and Oleomargarine

There were several documents and articles relating to the nutritive value of oleomargarine, released about the time of the original Pamphlet No. 5. A brief summary of these documents may serve here to illustrate the current thinking about the subject at the time the pamphlet was written and read.

In Director Buchanan's files is a reprint of an article from The Journal of the American Medical Association of August 22, 1942. This article came out under the auspices of the Council on Foods and Nutrition and was entitled, "The Comparative Value of Butter and Oleomargarine." The report summarized several relevant studies and concluded:

It is therefore possible to conclude that at present there is no scientific evidence to show that the use of fortified oleomargarine in an average adult diet would lead to nutritional difficulties. A similar statement is probably justified in the case of growing children, but preliminary results from animal experiments indicate that more work is necessary before any specific conclusions can be made. Since the nutritional factors have not all been identified, and since butter contains numerous additional fatty acids..., the consuming public has a right to demand that the practice of identifying oleomargarine and butter so that anyone can¹ differentiate between them should be continued.

¹Council on Foods and Nutrition, "The Comparative Nutritional Value of Butter and Oleomargarine," The Journal of the American Medical Association, 119 (22 August 1942), 1427.

Another paper in the files of Dr. Buchanan is a "Report on Butter Substitutes" by the Committee on Public Health Relations of the New York Academy of Medicine. The date of this unpublished report was February 1, 1943, and, thus, it was prepared at about the time of the original version of Putting Dairying on a War Footing. This report stated that when oleomargarine was fortified with vitamin A in the required amount, it was the nutritional equivalent to butter. "Moreover, since the minimum vitamin A content of 'enriched' oleomargarine is fixed and the amount of this vitamin in butter may range from 500 to 20,000 units per pound, 'enriched' oleomargarine was a more dependable source of vitamin A than butter."¹

Another relevant article was in Science, May 7, 1943, entitled "Some Obstacles in the Path Towards an Optimum Diet. II," by A. J. Carlson. The author suggested that "myopic" federal and state laws and regulations limit free production, transportation and sale of efficient foods.

The experience in Europe and in the United States goes to show that margarines, palatable and of nutritious value, in all probability not inferior to good butter, can be made out of vegetable fats or animal fats other than in milk. Such margarines can and usually are fortified by the addition of the vitamins present in milk fats. We usually add a non-toxic color to winter butter without either labeling

¹"Report on Butter Substitutes by the Committee on Public Health Relations of the New York Academy of Medicine, February 1, 1943." (Typewritten.) Buchanan Papers.

or taxing it, but when this color is added to margarine our federal government taxes it at ten cents per pound.¹

Another topic is worth noting in some of the discussions concerning dairying during the Pamphlet No. 5 period. A. J. Carlson's article appeared in two parts, the first one week before that quoted immediately above. In Part One of the article, "Some Obstacles in the Path Towards an Optimum Diet," Carlson discussed the fact that much valuable skim milk (50 billion pounds per year) was turned into channels other than human food.² Another reference to the misuse of skim milk was made in a "Report of the Special Meeting of the Committee of the Food and Nutrition Board." In these minutes, marked "Confidential," of a meeting on March 26, 1943, there was recorded an amendment to a motion recommending an increase in the amount of dry milk to be added to breads. The proposed amendment read:

THAT THE REQUIRED INCREASE IN SKIMMILK SOLIDS PRODUCTION BE OBTAINED PREFERABLY FROM A PORTION OF THE LARGE RESERVOIR OF SKIMMILK SUPPLIES NOW ON FARMS AND WHICH IS NOT BEING USED FOR HUMAN FOOD.³

¹A. J. Carlson, "Some Obstacles in the Path Towards an Optimum Diet II," Science, 97 (7 May 1943), p. 413.

²A. J. Carlson, "Some Obstacles in the Path Towards an Optimum Diet," Science, 97 (30 April 1943), pp. 389-390.

³"Report of the Special Meeting of the Committee on Milk of the Food and Nutrition Board, March 26, 1943," W. E. Krauss, Chairman. (Typewritten.) Buchanan Papers.

The above references to some literature of the time serve to show that Brownlee's statements were not unsupported. In 1943, not much use was made of dried skim milk for human consumption. Brownlee and others recommended greater utilization of this food resource. In 1943, oleomargarine was gaining acceptance as a nutritional equal to butter, but was still under many federal and state limitations. Brownlee was one of many arguing for relaxation of those limitations. In 1950, President Harry Truman signed the Margarine Act of 1950, which ended 65 years of federal restrictions. In signing he said, "I always thought the tax on margarine was wrong!"¹

¹S. F. Riepma, The Story of Margarine (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1970), p. 108.

CHAPTER IV.

DAIRY GROUP OBJECTIONS

The entire Pamphlet No. 5 affair was prompted by the public criticisms of a variety of organizations representing Iowa's dairy interests. As has been pointed out, the dairy interests most strongly objected to discussion of oleomargarine and the suggestions for shifting resources to the production of milk where all the essential solids went to human consumption. An analysis of the dairy interests' specific objections, however, is important here, especially in light of the controversial results obtained by the dairy groups' pressure on the Iowa State College.

Most of the articles and editorials in the dairy journals made general criticisms of Pamphlet No. 5, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, or else were purely rhetorical in nature. Many of these attacks have been mentioned in this paper, such as the statements that the pamphlet was a "dud better left unwritten," "a gratuitous slap at the dairy industry," or "a repetitious peroration of a topic that has been thoroughly discussed."

Often the statements in the articles denounced individuals and the College. Even after Pamphlet No. 5 had been retracted, there were statements in the dairy journals

suggesting that "those responsible for the autocratic attitude" of the economics department be eliminated from the staff.¹ An example of the nature of some of the attacks is this quote from the April, 1943, issue of the Dairy Record, published in St. Paul, Minnesota:

More often than not, economists of this class are individuals who, early in their college years, developed an uncertainty of their future. Unstable individuals, they may have been unwilling or unable to provide the concentration needed to master the exact sciences, and perhaps they lacked the creative ability to assure success in the fields of expression. Frequently introverts, they were unable to meet their fellow men on the common ground of social intercourse and soon developed a feeling of inferiority.²

It is possible to discern some of the specific criticisms of Pamphlet No. 5 from the dairy journals. A more revealing document is the "Statement of the Special Dairy Committee to President Charles E. Friley Re: Pamphlet No. 5," which was the basis for the dairy groups' presentation during the meeting of the Joint Committee of Twelve on July 12, 1943.³ First, however, there is some relevant information available from an examination of the dairy journals.

In the Creamery Journal, May 1943 issue, light was

¹Creamery Journal (Waterloo, Ia.), August 1943.

²Dairy Record (St. Paul, Minn.), 28 April 1943.

³"Statement of Special Dairy Committee to President Charles E. Friley Re: Pamphlet No. 5," (July 1943), Buchanan Papers.

shed on the dairy position in an article about the pamphlet. The article claimed that the performance of Iowa dairymen left no doubt as to their desire to assist in the war effort.

They [the dairymen] contend that the manufacture of butter must be continued if the dairy industry is to survive after the emergency. They contend that the attack on this basic industry is unwarranted since the protein contained in skimmilk is much needed on Iowa farms for hogs and poultry, and that the increased production of cheese, evaporated milk, and whole milk powder for human consumption should be obtained in areas such as Minnesota, Wisconsin and other states where it would not so seriously interfere with an established economical farm program.¹

An editorial in Hoard's Dairyman, declared that the title of Pamphlet No. 5 was misleading. "Instead of discussing how to use milk solids to better advantage and what methods would increase the production of milk, it emphasizes the use of oleomargarine and declares butter is an expensive fat." Further, the editorial pointed out that the pamphlet stated that one-half of the cropland and one-eighth of the labor necessary to turn out butter would produce enough vegetable oils, which when converted into margarine could displace butter.

First, the editorial objected to the use of the term "margarine" rather than "oleomargarine." Then the statement that margarine compared favorably with butter in both nutritive

¹Creamery Journal, May 1943.

value and palatability was disputed. Science had shown, according to the editorial, that milk fat was superior in nutritional properties to the fats of oleomargarine and that no fat was equal to milk fat in palatability. There is something only in milk fat essential to the health of people.

The cow is not only an important factor in the production of our best food, but nations that have grown strong and resourceful have been those that have utilized the cow to maintain the fertility of the land.¹

In an article in the Creamery Journal announcing that Pamphlet No. 5 had been retracted, some of the dairy objections made public at the joint committee meeting were outlined. "Most objectionable to the dairy interests was the suggestion to make more oleomargarine available as a means of minimizing the adverse effects of the shortage of dairy products." The article pointed out that the claim that "margarine compares favorably with butter in both nutritive value and palatability," drew the most ire from the dairy group, and that it was contended that the statement was made without substantiation. Further, the dairy group charged no supporting evidence was given for the statement that "in spite of the food value and efficiency of margarine, dairy interests have been rather effective in suppressing its use."²

¹Hoard's Dairyman (Ft. Atkinson, Wisc.), 10 June 1943.

²Creamery Journal, August 1943.

Based upon the articles and editorials in the dairy journals, it may be said that it was the oleomargarine statements which drew the most fire. In every article that mentioned specifics, the discussion of oleomargarine was raised. Some of the articles referred to the "oleomargarine controversy" or "Iowa's butter-oleomargarine controversy."

Another helpful document for determining the basis for the dairy objections is the "Statement of the Special Dairy Committee" used by the dairy representatives at the Joint Committee of Twelve meeting.¹ The first five pages of this document discussed general points. The last eight pages pointed out, by page and paragraph, some specific complaints.

The opening statement was, "It will be observed at the outset that while Pamphlet No. 5 appears to have been published by The Iowa State College Press of Ames, Iowa, there is no such organization."

The next point raised in the statement was directed at Director Buchanan. The rules of the Agricultural Experiment Station with reference to publication of pamphlets and bulletins were quoted. These rules stated, in part, that every manuscript originating from work supported in whole or in part by funds of the Agricultural Experiment Station must be approved by the Director. Major publications were to be reviewed

¹"Statement of Special Dairy Committee."

by special committees appointed by the Director before approval. The question was then asked:

We believe that it is proper at this time to ask the Director of the Experiment Station if he approved the publication of Pamphlet No. 5, and since it must be deemed a major publication was it reviewed by a special committee approved by him as required by the above quoted rule?¹

The pamphlet was not a research bulletin as implied, according to the dairy statement, but a "...rehash of old ideas, contains numerous statements and opinions unsupported by facts and as such has no status as a research bulletin."

Pamphlet No. 5 was said to be pervaded by a "spirit of animus and partisanship," perhaps prompted by a lack of knowledge on the part of some economics department staff members relative to the relationship between butter and dry milk. T. W. Schultz was quoted from one of his books as writing, "...it might be necessary to cut the production of butter sharply in order to have more milk for fluid and dry uses." The following quote in the dairy statement may serve to illuminate something of the dairy groups' substantive complaints:

Here is evident the lack of appreciation that butter and dry milk are produced from the same milk and that one of the major problems at present in securing adequate supplies of dry milk is the difficulty of paying adequately for these solids without making the combined butter and dry milk solids price

¹Ibid.

so high as to attract milk away from fluid milk, evaporated¹ milk and cheese products which are also essential.

The statement then went into a quote from a talk which Director Buchanan made to the Ames branch of the American Association of University Professors, wherein he said that administrators and professors were primarily responsible to the people of the State of Iowa. The pamphlet was viewed by the dairy group as inimical to the state's interests and, thus, in violation of Buchanan's statement.

Pamphlet No. 5 was criticized for delving at considerable length into the nutritional value of oleomargarine as contrasted with butter without the sanction or assistance of a nutritionist.

True, the author acknowledges that Professor Margaret Reid gave him valuable assistance "in the paragraphs dealing with the nutritional aspects of milk products." However, in fairness to Professor Reid, it should be said she is an economist and not a nutritionist. It is probable that Miss Reid's name was used for the purpose of giving apparent validity and standing to the statements relative to nutritional values.²

According to the dairy statement, the pamphlet was filled with "half truths." An example of one of these "half truths" was illustrated by a comparison of a statement in the pamphlet with one made by the Council of Foods and Nutrition of the American Medical Association. The quote from Pamphlet

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

No. 5 was:

There is however no evidence to indicate that any health hazard exists if butter is replaced by margarine made from vegetable or animal fats enriched with vitamin A.¹

The dairy group suggested that Pamphlet No. 5's author must have read the statement of the Council of Foods and Nutrition due to the "similarity of languages." The Council on Foods and Nutrition statement was:

"It is therefore possible to conclude that at present there is no scientific evidence to show that the use of fortified oleomargarine in an average adult diet would lead to nutritional difficulties. A similar statement is probably justified in the case of growing children but preliminary results from animal experiments indicate that more work is necessary before any specific conclusions can be made since nutritional factors have not all been identified and since butter contains numerous additional fatty acids of unknown significance the consuming public has a right to demand that the practice of identifying oleomargarine and butter so that any one can differentiate between them should be continued."²

The dairy group noted that the Council insisted that the public be able to differentiate between oleomargarine and butter, and then criticized the pamphlet for saying, "We might even go so far as to allow its (margarine) being colored to resemble butter." At this point, the dairy statement

¹Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 16, quoted in "Statement of Special Dairy Committee."

²Council on Foods and Nutrition, "Comparative Nutritional Value," quoted in "Statement of Special Dairy Committee."

criticized the use of the term "margarine" citing the Iowa Code Section 3093, which read, "'imitation butter shall be sold under the name of oleomargarine.'" Manufacturers of "margarine" were said to be willing to pay a heavy price for substituting that word for "oleomargarine" in the law.

Another quote from the "Statement of the Special Dairy Committee" which may reveal some of the economic considerations in the dairy groups' objections to Pamphlet No. 5 was:

The author of Pamphlet No. 5 fails to take into consideration several production aspects in regard to butter. Butter is in many cases the product of opportunity labor which would be lost in case butter was not produced. Butter is the product of marginal land and of rough feeds which are thus made use of in our agricultural economy. Butter is a necessary by-product to the raising not only of dairy heifers for replacement in Iowa milk-producing herds, but also for herds in the vicinity of larger cities. The latter depend upon the purchase of young cows raised elsewhere.¹

Iowa's dairymen in 1943 were selling farm separated milk; that is the milk was separated on the farms, the cream sold, and, sometimes, the skim milk was fed to livestock. Butter production was an important industry with 190 million pounds produced each year. In comparison, only 95 million pounds, approximately, are produced today. In 1943, there were creameries in many Iowa towns. Thus, the continued production of large quantities of butter was important to the status quo

¹"Statement of Special Dairy Committee."

of the dairy industry in Iowa, and opposition to suggestions for changing this production pattern was a natural outgrowth of the economic facts.¹

According to Oswald Brownlee, there were several reasons why the dairy industry objected to transferring resources from butter production to fluid milk. Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin had a tremendous comparative advantage in the production of fluid milk. However, there were several areas of the country into which milk could not be imported because of the various restrictions imposed by the laws in some states to protect those states' own dairy interests. "So much of the opposition to expansion of fluid milk production in the mid-west came from the other milk producing regions, and that left this region as relying rather heavily on income from butter production," according to Brownlee.²

In conclusion, it may be said that the dairy groups were responding to Pamphlet No. 5's suggestions for changes in the production patterns of milk and most strongly to suggestions for substituting margarine for butter--a product which was important to dairy economics. The many specific complaints were incidental.

¹Verner Nielsen, interview.

²Oswald H. Brownlee, interview.

CHAPTER V.

PRESS COVERAGE

Press coverage of the controversy concerning Pamphlet No. 5 was extensive, ranging from local to national and including special-interest as well as general-circulation publications. Some of the publications covering the incident were obviously expounding a single point of view, the most outspoken being the dairy interest journals, The National Union Farmer, a newspaper of the National Farmer's Union, covered the controversy and editorialized in opposition to the dairy criticisms. (The Farmers Union used the controversy to attack the Farm Bureau and its alliance with the Extension Service.)

General circulation newspapers in the state tended to give prominent space to articles reporting the events. Larger circulation newspapers such as the Des Moines Register and the Cedar Rapids Gazette gave thorough coverage to all major events surrounding Pamphlet No. 5, and their farm editors developed contact with Dr. Schultz and Director Buchanan. The Des Moines Register in fact did emerge as a major source of information about the controversy and attempted to aid several viewpoints. In addition to articles on events, the Register

reprinted several editorials concerning the incident from other newspapers, an article written by Dr. Schultz, excerpts from Pamphlet No. 5 itself, the paid advertisement of the dairy associations, and many "letters to the editor."

Smaller newspapers in Iowa tended to editorialize more freely about the pamphlet controversy than did the larger ones. The national coverage also was less objective; few specifics of the situation were reported.

The Mason City Globe Gazette was unique among the publications cited, because its editor, W. Earl Hall, was a member of the State Board of Education. Its coverage of events was extensive, and its editorials might be significant because the Board exercised jurisdiction over Iowa State College.

The coverage by the dairy journals has been discussed in previous chapters, as has much of the Des Moines Register coverage (for example, the paid dairy interests' advertisement and the article by Theodore Schultz). In this chapter much of the remaining coverage and comment on the Pamphlet No. 5 incident will be recounted.

Small-Circulation Iowa Newspapers

If the reprints in the Des Moines Register from Iowa newspapers were representative of the state's smaller publications, one might conclude that, in general many of these newspapers sympathized with the protesting dairy groups, or at

least expressed a preference for butter over margarine. A section in the Register entitled "Iowagrams," presented some of these small-newspaper opinions immediately following the protests in May of 1943.

The Monona Leader wrote, "Why such a publication should be issued by the farmers' own agricultural college is a question that many farmers are asking when the institution is supported out of the taxes the farmer pays." In the Indianola Record this appeared:

Let us pray that the dairy folks will prove their case. It gags us to think of oleo being considered respectable. Yet we have known¹ dairy farmers to sell their butter and eat oleo.

Two other small newspapers were quoted in the same vein. Only one seemed to support Pamphlet No. 5. The Knoxville Express wrote: "By rationing butter the government has said that we must eat less butter. As it looks to us these college professors are doing nothing more than aiding Uncle Sam in his effort."²

Later in the summer The Kossuth County Advance ran an editorial ridiculing the American Dairy Association advertisement in the Register. The questions in the advertisement were described as inane and the text exaggerated. The editorial

¹"Iowagrams: Margarine vs. Butter," Des Moines Register, 31 May 1943.

²Ibid.

read:

All through the advertisement runs the assumption that Iowa State College--the College itself, not merely the author of the offending pamphlet or his department--had deliberately conspired to injure or ruin the dairy industry. This, too, is simply too unutterably silly to provoke defense. And, of course, the author of the pamphlet and his department, superiors were equally guiltless of any such intention.¹

In closing, the Kossuth County Advance suggested that publication of the advertisement would have provided an excellent opportunity to prove by facts that there never had been and never would be a satisfactory substitute for butter.

After Theodore Schultz's resignation, the same newspaper carried an editorial comment suggesting that the "imbroglio over an Ames college pamphlet" was an example of mishandling from start to finish--on everyone's part:

The young man who wrote the pamphlet claimed oleo was the equal of butter in nutritive value and palatability. True or not, that was a heck of a thing to say in an Ames pamphlet intended for general circulation. It should have been squelched in the bud.²

But, said the editorial, it was not squelched, and the dairy industry hotheads raised a "hullabaloo" and "gave oleomargarine the best advertising it ever had."

The college authorities weakly agreed to cut out the alleged libel against butter, though so

¹Kossuth (Ia.) County Advance, 29 June 1943.

²"Press Comment on Butter and Oleomargarine," Des Moines Register, 9 October 1943.

far as the public has ever been advised, the hotheads never submitted, or even attempted to submit, a shred of proof that the statement in the pamphlet was untrue.¹

The comment was written "by one who without scientific information believes that oleomargarine is not the equal of butter in nutritive value and knows of his own experience that it is far from as palatable as butter."

Another editorial writer for another newspaper, the Reinbeck Courier, also expressed a personal preference for butter although he decried the loss of Schultz. The editorial opened:

We have generally contended that professors were harnessed and that no matter what they actually found in tests, in experiments, or in actual practice, the same could not be effectively released to the general public, unless that knowledge met the approval of those governing the institution politically.²

This contention, according to the editorial was borne out in the oleo fight. "The public does not get what is good for it, in the way of information, but it gets what politicians, farm organizations or other organized groups want it to have." In closing, the editorialist expressed this opinion: "As far as we are concerned, there is no substitute for butter."

A newspaper which was adamantly opposed to Pamphlet No. 5 and seemingly to the Department of Economics was the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

Ames Milepost. When Theodore Schultz resigned, the Milepost suggested that a "general housecleaning might not be a bad thing to start right now, while the going is good."¹

In October of 1943, when Ralph Himstead stated that an investigation of the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5 would be undertaken by the American Association of University Professors, the Milepost carried an editorial about the economics staff:

From every excuse and on every occasion, they appeared as speakers--from the Japanese bath scene description to the boot off the air in a broadcast--they continued their policy of verbiage, with one definite object in view--the new order and the slaps at the Republican party and its leaders.²

The editorial closed with a statement that "the Milepost isn't ready to be made over by at least three members of the staff, whose roots sprang from Germany and England."

National Coverage

The national coverage of Pamphlet No. 5 generally focused on the controversy generated by the protests by dairy-men and the Farm Bureau and the subsequent retraction. An exception to this generalization was an article in the Chicago Journal of Commerce on May 17, 1943, which discussed the forecasted milk and butter shortage in 1943. The article discussed

¹Ibid.

²Ames Milepost, 7 October 1943.

in some detail Putting Dairying on a War Footing, which had just been published. The opening paragraph gives some picture of the "state of the art" concerning shifts in milk output during 1943:

As the food industry prepares for a conference here Thursday on the matter of war food production, trouble develops in the dairy world. The War Food Administration has now issued a statement that rationing of fluid milk is a distinct possibility soon, and Prof. O. H. Brownlee of Iowa State College has just published a study recommending a virtual halt in the production of butter. Readjustments in dairy output seem to be under serious consideration everywhere.¹

It was also a Chicago Journal of Commerce editorial during the summer of 1943 (discussed in Chapter II) which suggested that the college administration at Iowa State had cast suspicion on all future publications coming from faculty members, was one of the strongest statements against the college administration:

Of course there are circumstances under which, as every one knows, it becomes necessary for a college administration to rise above principle and spurn the allurements of reason. But to endanger the reputation of all the academic research done at Ames because of dairymen's yowling, is too great a price to pay for harmony.²

Although it is difficult to know the total extent of coverage outside of Iowa, one can conclude from clippings in the files of Buchanan and Schultz, that it was broad.

¹Chicago Journal of Commerce, 17 May 1943.

²Chicago Journal of Commerce, 31 July 1943.

Clippings from Time Magazine, the Boston Herald, The Watchman, the St. Louis Star Times and the Schenectady Union Star indicate this breadth of coverage. Time in October of 1943 wrote of the incident that the trouble began when "the college published Researcher Oswald H. Brownlee's pamphlet, Putting Dairying on a War Footing." The pamphlet was described as the fifth in a series of "frank and popularly written pamphlets." In describing the controversy which arose the Time writer said:

When buttermakers in the Iowa Farm Bureau bellowed that such a disinterested oleopus as Brownlee's might befit scholarly Harvard but was disloyal in a cow college, Iowa State President Charles Edwin Friley junked the Brownlee pamphlet. When he spoke of drafting a revised text, the packer-minded Chicago Journal of Commerce said he was trying to "bamboozle" the public.¹

The Time article was representative of much of the national coverage, which was not kind to Iowa State College's administration. The Boston Herald had an article on the pamphlet in November of 1943. The pamphlet series was described as "excellent," and a "kind word for oleomargarine" was described as an "unforgiveable heterodoxy" in a dairy state.

For a time it was feared that the college's economics department would be offered up as a living sacrifice to the cause of butter. There was an alarmed cry for academic freedom. Though finally no overt step was taken to abridge the rights of free research and publication, and though Brownlee is to

¹Time Magazine, 11 October 1943.

²Boston Herald, 15 November 1943.

be allowed to write another and revised pamphlet, without let or hindrance, the affair brought discontent to a head. Several members of the department have resigned. Thus the Iowa storm abated a little.¹

The St. Louis Star Times wrote, "The Iowa State constitution may guarantee freedom of speech but, according to the organized dairy interests of that state, the privilege does not apply in discussing the relative merits of butter and oleomargarine."²

In addition to the Time article, three other national magazines printed articles which mentioned or discussed the controversy at Iowa State College. One of these was The New Republic article by J. M. O'Neill, which was discussed in some detail in Chapter II. Discussed in conjunction with that article was a Reader's Digest article of December, 1943, entitled, "Here's Why There's Nothing to Spread on Your Bread." This was the article quoted in The New Republic as saying that Brownlee was absent on leave, Schultz had resigned and that President Friley had placated the dairy interests by disowning the heretical tract.

Harper's Magazine was the fourth national magazine to print an article discussing the Iowa situation. The article was entitled, "The Oleomargarine Rebellion," and concerned the

¹St. Louis Star Times (n.d.), Schultz Papers.

²Wesley McCune, "The Oleomargarine Rebellion," Harper's Magazine, December 1943.

history of that butter substitute.

Margarine has shown itself to have the power of dynamite. It has not only blown up the works at Iowa State College of Agriculture through the suppression of a pamphlet enumerating the virtues of margarine during the wartime butter shortage; it has proved even more powerful. It has breached the Farm Bloc in Washington and split the agricultural lobbies from top to bottom.¹

The article then recounted the events from the issuance of the pamphlet through the resignation of Dr. Schultz and continued with the history of controls on margarine.

One of the last of the national news articles concerning Pamphlet No. 5 was printed in Time magazine on March 27, 1944.

The article was a short one and read:

A cowman's contemptuous word for oleomargarine is bull butter. Last fall the Iowa Farm Bureau, to whom the cow is sacred, got Iowa State College to suppress a scientific pamphlet praising bull butter as a wartime labor saver (TIME, Oct. 11). Whereupon Professor Theodore Schultz, head of the college's famed, farm-focused Department of Economics and Sociology, declared that faculty morale was jeopardized and switched to the University of Chicago. By last week 19 other teachers had quit the college on leave or permanently. Twelve were from Professor Schultz's department, whose remnant inevitably seems cowed. Some had gotten better jobs at Vassar, Wisconsin, Harvard or in Government agencies. Some declared that they were fed-up with the administration's constant cow-towing to the Farm Bureau.²

The National Union Farmer, the "Official Paper of

¹Wesley McCune, "The Oleomargarine Rebellion," Harper's Magazine, December 1943.

²"Bull Butter," Time Magazine, 27 March 1944.

Farmers Educational and Co-Operative Union of America," published in Denver, Colorado, gave coverage to the pamphlet affair. It was apparent, however, that the National Union Farmer had a definite point of view to express. An example was the article concerning Dr. Schultz's resignation headlined, "Free Education Out in Iowa College as FB Gets Professor: Dr. T. W. Schultz Quits as Bureau Gets Its Way; Hits Pressure Groups." An editorial comment preceding the article began:

The Iowa Farm Bureau, built and serviced by government paid Extension agents, has forced the resignation of a nationally known professor from Iowa State College because he would not compromise academic standards and freedom at the demand of the Extension Service's pressure group.¹

The episode was viewed as important because it was said to illustrate the fruition of a danger in the Extension Service-Farm Bureau alliance.

Large Circulation Iowa Newspapers

The Des Moines Register coverage of the Pamphlet No. 5 affair was, as has been noted, extensive. Most of this coverage has already been discussed. In addition to the newspaper's articles, the reprint of portions of the pamphlet, the article by Schultz, and the full page advertisement by the Dairy Association offered Register readers fuller understanding of

¹National Union Farmer, n.d., Schultz Papers.

events than any other publication.

According to Charles Hardin in Freedom in Agricultural Education, the Iowa margarine experience suggested that, if a massive, open attack upon the freedom of publicly supported research occurs, the public will rally to support freedom. He wrote: "During the incident the influential Des Moines Register and Tribune sought, apparently with some success, to rally the public in this fashion."¹

The Register offered only one expression of its own opinion on the subject, appearing on May 21, 1943, immediately following the dairy groups' meeting with President Friley. The editorial concluded:

We repeat that the way the current Iowa dispute about oleomargarine and butter has been handled--by quick agreement on both sides that the issue is not one of the right and duty of professors to try to serve the public interest, but is exclusively a question of accuracy of statement--is excellent.²

The Cedar Rapids Gazette also gave extensive coverage to the controversy. When Theodore Schultz resigned, the Gazette had a banner headline on page one, "Ames Upheaval Forecast." There was one editorial comment of note, appearing on September 22nd, following the resignation. This was a column by "R.F.A." entitled "Shucks. Let's Talk it Over," and

¹Hardin, Freedom, p. 122.

²Des Moines Register, 21 May 1943.

was probably written by Ray Anderson, Farm Editor. It was one of the most insightful comments on the controversy to appear in the press. The comment opened with the question, "Should a person bear an unmistakably barnyard aroma in order to qualify for a position at Iowa State College?"

Essentially that's the issue at Ames.

That's the real behind-the-scenes reason for the current controversy on the campus and in the state which resulted in the resignation of the head of economics and sociology a few days ago.¹

R.F.A. said there was a distinct cleavage on the campus between the technical group and the social science group. "That was evidenced this summer when members of the two dairy sections (dairy husbandry and dairy manufacturing) were openly and bitterly critical of the economics section which was responsible for the controversial oleo-butter pamphlet."

The column pointed out Theodore Schultz's reference in his resignation letter to external pressure groups. Such pressures, according to R.F.A., undoubtedly did exist.

Possibly the most powerful is the Iowa Farm Bureau federation. However, others include the Iowa Farmer's Union, the State Grange, the State Dairy Association, the alumni association, the veterinary association, the grain dealers group, the breed organizations, the political parties, the commodity organizations and many more special interest associations.²

¹Cedar Rapids Gazette, 19 September 1943.

²Ibid.

Pressures also came from Washington, according to the columnist. It was suggested that possibly some of "the unsupported claims about oleo made by a member of the Iowa State college economics staff may have been consciously inspired by Washington inasmuch as a move to popularize oleo started within the United States department of agriculture more than a year and a half ago."

Another reason for the situation was cited as administrative indecision prior to the Schultz resignation.

Dr. Schultz became nationally prominent and for that reason and because of his ability became sort of a "fair haired boy" among the department heads at Ames.

His more or less free lance status aroused jealousies and resentments which boiled into the open when Schultz was backed into a corner by the dairy interests.¹

Another factor in the whole situation was George Godfrey, at least as far as the Iowa Farm Bureau was concerned, according to R.F.A. The Farm Bureau did not like Godfrey, according to the columnist, because as assistant to the President in agricultural relations he was believed influential in the movement towards divorce of Extension and the Farm Bureau.

Another person viewed as being "mixed into the general muddle rather thoroughly" was Leland Allbaugh, associate

¹Ibid.

director of Extension. Allbaugh had been delegated the job of surveying the Extension Service. R.F.A. suggested that although Allbaugh's results had not been spectacular, he had succeeded in getting rid of part of the "dead timber" in Extension.

All the time, through opposition generated until today, Allbaugh is pretty well hog tied. That has been especially true since the Schultz matter exploded and the technical groups scored on the social science groups.

Allbaugh is an economist, a former member of Schultz's staff.¹

As mentioned, the Mason City Globe-Gazette's editor, W. Earl Hall, was a member of the State Board of Education, the governing body of Iowa State College. The Globe-Gazette extensively covered the events of Pamphlet No. 5, and on several occasions made editorial comments.

On May 22nd, following the dairy meeting with President Friley and other Iowa State staff members, the newspaper ran an editorial entitled, "That Butter Pamphlet Will Be Judged by Truth Test." In it, the meeting was described as was the pamphlet. The editorial suggested that perhaps the pamphlet was unduly provocative in its approach. "But the central theme of it is that some important changes are going to be made in the general pattern of the butter industry under the inexorable laws of economics."

¹Ibid.

That claim is either true or false. Either way, now would be a good time to find out. The claim was made after an extensive and thorough-going study by economists not ordinarily unfriendly to farming and not ordinarily accustomed to going off half cocked. Moreover, it was published in full knowledge that it would produce some heated criticism.¹

However, the editorial did point out that if the claim proved false, the scholarly standing of those involved would have been considerably clouded. The author of the editorial did believe that the whole discussion in Ames was a "heartening exhibition of democracy at its best."

In this fact is the best augury that the controversy will be carried through to a satisfactory--even a beneficial--understanding. That's what usually happens when fair minded men, trusting in² the inherent honesty of each other, sit down together.

On July 14, 1943, following the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5, an editorial suggested that the decision "to rescind and rewrite" was probably the best way out of an embarrassing situation. "The little book seems to have gone too far in a place or two so far as facts are concerned and in other places, it was needlessly provocative as to language."

However, the editorial did advise the dairy industry to pay some attention to the pamphlet. "If a future trend is reflected in the ill-fated pamphlet, eyes should not be closed

¹Mason City Globe-Gazette, 22 May 1943.

²Ibid.

on it. Forewarned is forearmed."¹

Another Globe-Gazette editorial appeared in December of 1943 following the appearance of articles in Harper's and Reader's Digest magazines. The editorial criticized the author of the Digest article for misrepresenting the facts, as in quoting Brownlee as stating "margarine is just as nutritive and palatable as butter." Brownlee, in fact, had written: "Margarine compares favorably with butter both in nutritive value and palatability."

The editorial said that such a misquotation was a rather fair indication of the Digest author's scholarly and scientific attributes. These attributes should be considered in evaluating the statement that the Iowa State College authorities have "placated the dairy interests by disowning the heretical tract." "The truth is that the pamphlet was disowned because it couldn't be defended--not even by those responsible for it," the Globe-Gazette editorial said.

Then the editorial quoted from a letter written by Walter Wilcox to the State Board of Education president. The paragraph quoted was as follows:

"As a member of the editorial committee for this pamphlet series, I assumed that publication by the Collegiate Press did not involve college sponsorship. I now realize that it was a mistake to assume the public would differentiate between the publications

¹Mason City Globe-Gazette, 14 July 1943.

of the Collegiate Press and the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station or Extension Service. I regret very much the lack of tact on the part of the author in presenting some points. There were also some minor misstatements of fact in the pamphlet.¹ These are errors for which we must accept blame."

The Globe-Gazette editorial suggested that the quote from Wilcox was a forthright concession of all the shortcomings in Pamphlet No. 5 that had been acknowledged by those who had to accept responsibility for it. "Wilcox, a collaborator on the pamphlet series, admits that the pamphlet ignored the factor of 'institutional responsibility,' that it was provocatively written and that it was not wholly correct factually."²

Walter Wilcox responded to the inclusion of his quote. In a letter to W. Earl Hall, editor of the Mason City Globe-Gazette, he wrote:

Words can hardly express my disappointment in your action. In the first place, that was a personal letter to the President of the Board of Education and I sent you a copy because of your reputation for being one of the ablest members of the Board. In the second place, as you well know the paragraph quoted, taken alone, greatly misrepresents my position on the importance of the errors on the part of members of the Economics Department. Those I enumerated were minor as compared with the mistakes made in attempting to correct the original errors.³

¹Mason City Globe-Gazette, 15 December 1943.

²Ibid.

³Walter W. Wilcox to W. Earl Hall, 23 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

Another point made in the editorial related to the subject of the next chapter--review and publication procedures. The editorial read: "...if the long established reviewing controls had been utilized instead of by-passed, the pamphlet in question would have been defensible--more valuable, not less valuable."¹

¹Mason City Globe-Gazette, 15 December 1943.

CHAPTER VI .

REVIEW AND PUBLICATION PROCEDURES

Putting Dairying on a War Footing was, like the other pamphlets in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, reviewed by a committee of four economics department staff members. This was a variation from the normal procedures used by either the Collegiate Press, Inc. or the Agricultural Experiment Station. This fact has been a focal point of the controversy over the justifications, or lack of them, for retraction. Some have argued that the original Pamphlet No. 5 was poorly written and contained errors which would have been corrected before publication had the pamphlet been properly reviewed. According to this argument, when the dairymen protested against the pamphlet, Iowa State College had to take institutional responsibility and admit its mistakes, one of which was the abdication of proper review procedures. The fact that the revised edition of Pamphlet No. 5 did not retreat from the controversial conclusions was cited by the followers of this line of argument as an indication, if not proof, that it was the pamphlet's mistakes which were its downfall. Even some who believed that Pamphlet No. 5 should not have been retracted,

also believed that review procedures were inadequate, and that fact constituted one of the basic reasons for the controversy.

On the other hand, the argument can be and is made that Pamphlet No. 5 and the other pamphlets in the series were policy studies and "semi-popular" in nature. They were never meant to be well documented and extensive pieces of research but were instead meant to influence governmental policy. Furthermore, in order for these studies to be timely, normal review procedures were inappropriate. Thus an alternative source for publication and review was sought. The dairy and Farm Bureau protests were not directed against the style of writing and organization, nor against the mistakes in the pamphlet, although these points were raised in pushing for retraction. Rather, the protests were concerned with the major thesis and policy statements of the pamphlet, which were upheld in the revision.

It is a thesis of this paper that the procedures in preparation, review and publication of Pamphlet No. 5 were the major reasons that the Iowa State College had to accept responsibility for the pamphlet, although technically it was an unsponsored publication. At the same time, these same procedures were used as justifications for retraction. President Friley chose to rely upon a review of the facts rather than to support the staff of his economics department and the general thesis of the pamphlet.

In order to better appreciate these arguments, it is important to know what review and publication procedures were used and why. It is also important to know why responsibility for the pamphlet did rest with the college rather than with the Collegiate Press, the Iowa State College Press Editorial Board or simply the author and economics department review committee.

As was discussed in Chapter II, the history of the pamphlet series began during the Depression, when The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa Series of pamphlets was published. This series of pamphlets was meant to acquaint the citizens of Iowa with economic issues and was thought to be the best vehicle for addressing the economic crisis at hand. According to Theodore Schultz, Director Buchanan pushed for a special review committee for this series addressing the Depression economy. This special committee was able to review, revise and publish the pamphlets in a much shorter time than would a routine reviewing committee.¹

The idea for the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series to address the war crisis came out of this successful Depression series. As was the Depression series, the wartime series was reviewed by a special committee rather than by an established committee. However, this special committee was rather different

¹Theodore Schultz, interview, 8 January 1971.

in composition from the committee which reviewed the Depression series pamphlets. According to Dr. Schultz in interview, the reviewing committee for the Depression pamphlets was composed of Schultz; William H. Stevenson, the deputy director of the Experiment Station; Henry H. Kildee, dean of Agriculture; and R. K. Bliss, director of the Extension Service. The wartime series was reviewed by four members of the economics staff, a committee much less diverse in composition.¹

R. E. Buchanan in a letter in December of 1943 to the president of the Alumni Association of Iowa State, outlined some of the history of Pamphlet No. 5 in regard to publication. He wrote that under Dr. Schultz, Iowa State's work in agricultural economics had gained marked prestige, and thus the college was often called upon for "...critical analyses of present situations and trends." According to Buchanan, one such request was from the Secretary of Agriculture who wished that certain studies be instituted.²

According to Theodore Schultz, the understanding with the Secretary of Agriculture was (1) that the USDA would provide the Department of Economics with all relevant data and

¹R. E. Buchanan to Leroy Snyder, 16 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

²T. W. Schultz, "Outline of a Presentation Before the Board of Education on 'Studies of Government's Food Policy,'" 22 June 1943, Schultz Papers.

information, (2) that experts on the USDA staff would help when needed, (3) that no one making the studies would be on the USDA payroll; (4) that the studies would be made available to other federal agencies, and (5) that the department would maintain the right to publish.¹

According to another Buchanan letter, a special grant from one of the social science foundations was given with a distinct understanding as to the purposes for which the money was to be used. This was the Rockefeller Foundation grant, which has been discussed. As noted, the Rockefeller monies were channeled through the Agricultural Experiment Station and placed in a special account called "trusts and specials." The monies were used for paying the costs of making the studies for the series of pamphlets (including clerical, travel and statistical assistance) and for publication costs.²

Buchanan's next point in his letter to the Alumni Association president concerned the question of publication of results of these studies. "After considerable discussion it was decided that publication would be through a nonsponsored channel." Publications sponsored by the Agricultural

¹T. W. Schultz, "Outline of a Presentation Before the Board of Education on 'Studies of Government's Food Policy,'" 22 June 1943, Schultz Papers.

²R. E. Buchanan to Mr. Allbrecht, 3 June 1943, Buchanan Papers.

Experiment Station involved review by a committee appointed by the Director and in some ways could be said to represent the views not only of the author but of the Experiment Station as well. The reasons cited by Buchanan for the Station not sponsoring the publication of the series of farm and food policy studies were several. One was that the subjects concerned agriculture, but not altogether. The pamphlet series' audience would not be the same as that of sponsored or official pamphlets. Also, because of the nature of the pamphlets, it would probably be possible to charge a fee sufficient to defray publication costs.

Private publication, furthermore, would be relatively expeditious. The value of the pamphlets would depend in large measure upon their timeliness. After this decision for private publication was reached, Dr. Schultz set up a special committee made up entirely of economists to have the series in general charge. From the standpoint of this office and, I believe, of the institution, the publications were to be in the nature of privately sponsored articles or books.¹

Additionally, Buchanan noted that from the standpoint of the Experiment Station, publication by the Collegiate Press, Inc., was the same as publication by any private book or publishing concern. The Collegiate Press was an independent, non-profit corporation, although administrative control of the Press was vested in a board whose members were college affiliated. Also, any surplus capital accumulated by the Press was to be used for

¹Buchanan to Snyder, 16 December 1943.

the betterment of publications or "the welfare of Iowa State College and its students."¹

Before discussing the role of the Collegiate Press and private versus college sponsorship, the role of the Agricultural Experiment Station should be clarified. Although Buchanan discussed the reasons for the decision that the Agricultural Experiment Station would not sponsor the publication of the studies, he did not explain why such sponsorship was even a question. One of the reasons Buchanan became involved as Director of the Experiment Station was because many persons assumed that Pamphlet No. 5 was station sponsored. The cause of this confusion was the first footnote on the first page of the pamphlet:

*This pamphlet is based on research carried on under Project 818 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. The study also was aided by a grant from the division of the Social Sciences of the Rockefeller Foundation, New York.²

The reason that the pamphlets in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series were under a project number was that considerable time and effort of major staff members in economics, who were also Experiment Station staff members, were devoted

¹Kaniuka, "A History of the Iowa State University Press," p. 8.

²Brownlee, orig. ed., p. 1.

to these studies.¹ Also, the Rockefeller Foundation gift was channeled through the Agricultural Experiment Station. These seem to be the reasons for the footnote statement. The research for the series was carried out under Experiment Station Project 818. However, the results of the research were presented in unsponsored publications.

The timeliness of the pamphlet series was cited by several persons involved in addition to Buchanan, as noted previously. T. W. Schultz, Oswald H. Brownlee, Geoffrey Shepherd and J. L. Lush all gave timeliness as reasons for setting up a different procedure for publication. The question as to whether the series was actually "unsponsored" and privately published was never answered definitively, however. C. R. Elder, who was Extension Editor in 1943, said that there was no question about the responsibility of the college and that the Pamphlet No. 5 was a publication of the college.² The imprint "Iowa State College Press" on the pamphlet did make it appear to be college sponsored and was one of the reasons that the college did take institutional responsibility.

According to Buchanan's letter to the Alumni Association president, the dairy groups' "first item on their docket" was to pin responsibility for the pamphlet on the institution.

¹Schultz, "Outline of a Presentation."

²C. R. Elder, interview.

It had also been found that, perhaps without adequate warrant, the Collegiate Press had used the Iowa State College Press indicia on these pamphlets. I do not have details as to why this was done. Certainly the use of these indicia by the Collegiate Press gave the impression that the series was officially sponsored by the College. As noted above, it had¹ not been intended that it should be so sponsored.

The indicia "Iowa State College Press" was quite prominent on the pamphlet's cover. There was nowhere in the original Pamphlet No. 5 any mention of the Collegiate Press, Inc. "Iowa State College Press" was being used frequently as indicia by 1943. The use of this insignia developed when a plan was worked out by which book publishing would become a supervised activity of the college and the books published would carry the name of the academic institution. A four-point program to achieve university press status for the Collegiate Press was outlined in 1938 to President Friley: (1) the College would give its name and sponsorship to published books, (2) the College would designate an editorial board to review manuscripts to be published under its imprint, (3) the College would permit the Press to act as its agent in the manufacture and sale of books under its imprint, and (4) the College would set up a publication fund.²

¹Buchanan to Snyder, 16 December 1943.

²Kaniuka, "A History of the Iowa State University Press," p. 27.

The plan was approved in November of 1938, and by January of 1939, President Friley had appointed a manuscript-review committee, composed of a chairman and one member each of the College's divisions. Then, in order to establish a "clearly defined working relationship between the Editorial Board of the Iowa State College Press and the Collegiate Press," a memorandum of agreement was adopted. "Under its provisions, the Collegiate Press had exclusive publication and sales rights for books bearing the new imprint."¹

It was thus four years prior to the publication of Pamphlet No. 5 that the indicia "Iowa State College Press" was instituted. The normal review procedure for publication under this imprint was for manuscripts to be channeled through the manuscript-review committee. That committee, however, voted to publish the booklets comprising the series entitled Wartime Farm and Food Policy under the Iowa State College Press imprint if approved by the committee in charge of their preparation--T. W. Schultz, W. W. Wilcox, Margaret Reid and A. G. Hart. Dr. J. L. Lush voted against this motion and, because of his dissent, was made chairman of the Editorial Board when it was reorganized following the controversy.²

So it appears, in retrospect, that the pamphlets in

¹Ibid., p. 30.

²J. L. Lush, interview.

the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series were "unsponsored publications," and that they were published by the Collegiate Press under the imprint of the Iowa State College Press. Harold E. Ingle, who was in 1943 manager of Collegiate Press, Inc. and secretary of the Editorial Board, said in answer to the question, "Were the Wartime Farm and Food Policy pamphlets published by the Iowa State College Press or simply printed by the press with the press imprint?"

They were published by the ISC Press. That is, the Press and its Editorial Board approved them for publication and thereby for the full process and responsibility of editing, design and production, advertising and sales, and distribution. Thereby, also, I think it follows, the Press took responsibility as publisher for the content.¹

Ingle also pointed out, however, that the College was probably responsible as well:

It is true that the Collegiate Press, and subsequently I believe the Iowa State College Press, were separately incorporated. Nevertheless, their governing² Boards were drawn solely from the faculty of I.S.C.

Director Buchanan, in his letter to the Alumni Association president, presented his explanation as to why, when the question was raised, the College accepted responsibility for the pamphlet. In Buchanan's chronology of events, the

¹Harold E. Ingle to Ann Weir, 26 October 1972, Personal Files.

²Ibid.

decision to accept institutional responsibility was not made until the Joint Committee of Twelve meeting at which time Putting Dairying on a War Footing was retracted. It would seem that this responsibility had been accepted when President Friley suggested a joint committee of dairy and faculty representatives, if not when Friley first agreed to meet with the dairy protesters. In any case, Buchanan's reasons for accepting institutional responsibility would seem relevant.

Had we refused to accept responsibility, the whole discussion would have been legalistic. Certainly the College would have been put in the position of trying to dodge an issue rather than to face it squarely. It was agreed by the staff committee that under the circumstances and in order that we get to a discussion of really basic issues, the College assume at that late date responsibility for the series of publications and sponsorship for any additional publications to come out of the series. Here hindsight was certainly much better than foresight.¹

Thus, according to Buchanan, in his letter and in the foreword to the revised edition, the Agricultural Experiment Station assumed responsibility for Pamphlet No. 5 when it became "evident that many readers assumed that it was a Station sponsored publication."²

In retrospect it can be argued that because of the Iowa State College imprint and the Experiment Station project

¹Buchanan to Snyder, 16 December 1943.

²Buchanan, "Foreword," in Brownlee, rev. ed., p. 2.

number, the College did have to accept institutional responsibility for Pamphlet No. 5 and thus for subsequent pamphlets in the series. In view of the Agricultural Experiment Station's involvement in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series, it was a logical office with which to place responsibility, as would have been the Editorial Board of the Collegiate Press, and, thus, the economics department review committee.

It was not until after retraction and the beginning of the revision process for Pamphlet No. 5 was underway, however, that Director Buchanan, representing the Experiment Station, became directly responsible. As Buchanan, himself, pointed out in a letter to J. S. Russell of the Des Moines Register, the dairymen "dumped the whole matter upon President Friley's lap," and never entered Buchanan's office. In Buchanan's opinion, the matter should have been brought directly to the Director of the Experiment Station.¹

It was President Friley who met with the dairy representatives on May 19th and took institutional responsibility. As was shown in Chapter II, President Friley relied heavily upon Director Buchanan's suggestions for what he said at that meeting. He told the assembled dairymen that he regretted any incident that may have given rise to "possible misunderstanding or unhappiness, and that the bulletin must stand or fall on its

¹R. E. Buchanan to J. S. Russell, 17 February 1944.

own merits as judged by competent authorities." The Des Moines Register quoted Friley:

"The fundamental right of a member of the college staff," Dr. Friley said, "doing research to analyze and present data which develop from his studies can not safely be abridged by any agency.

"The right of the institution to publish facts is not a debatable question in this nation. Otherwise, the entire framework of academic freedom, and even of freedom of speech, is gone, and the usefulness of the college is at an end."¹

The above quote from President Friley was quite similar to the statement suggested by Director Buchanan. Another statement did not follow the Director's advice. Friley was reported to have said at the same meeting:

"There can be only one issue as regards this discussion. That is, the legitimacy of the facts, and perhaps the form and clarity of the phraseology used in stating those facts."²

Director Buchanan in his suggestions to President Friley had written:

If by inadvertance there have been published statements which can be shown to be untrue, there should be prompt correction by adequate publication and publicity.³

With regard to this point of Buchanan's, correction was made by adequate publication and publicity, although not

¹Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

²Ibid.

³R. E. Buchanan to President Charles E. Friley, 17 May 1943.

promptly. President Friley, in suggesting that the one issue was the legitimacy of the facts, would appear to have opened the way to outside interference. Charles Hardin, in his book, Freedom in Agricultural Education, discussed "The Iowa Margarine Incident." He wrote that in his judgment, the central issue was falsely stated by asking whether the facts and the inferences of the researchers were correct. "The central issue was whether to maintain a vigorous established team of social scientists whose general competence was widely accepted and who were strongly oriented in their research toward controversial issues of public policy."¹

Hardin's opinions will be discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter, as will the opinions of others. At this point, however, Hardin's opinion as to what "facts" are in policy research is relevant to the discussion at hand concerning President Friley's approach to the developing controversy. Hardin wrote that, in regard to the question of whether "facts" uncovered by research are "right," the difficulty has to do with the nature of facts, particularly "social facts."

More generally, agricultural policy (like other policy) is full of controversial issues in which the facts are often disputed. The writer has listened to fierce arguments over the production and consumption functions in agriculture...and so on, ad

¹Hardin, Freedom, p. 124.

infinitum. In all these battles, the significance for public policy of the controversial facts was apparent to everyone; indeed it was the chief source of conflict. In all such inquiries, of course, a healthy regard for the facts is indispensable. At the same time, a disposition to choke off research because researchers have made (or are alleged¹ to have made) a few factual mistakes is deadly.

Charles Friley viewed the situation as one in which the facts were the issue. Thus, he suggested to the dairymen on May 19th that a committee from the college staff and a committee representing the dairy interests review Pamphlet No. 5 "paragraph by paragraph to determine by objective evidence the accuracy of the contents."²

As noted in Chapter II, President Friley later claimed that the idea for the Joint Committee of Twelve came from Dr. Theodore Schultz. Although the idea of the joint-committee review was not criticized by Schultz nor Buchanan, it would seem an unusual procedure for any college publication, since half of the review committee members had no particular subject matter expertise.

Another review committee relevant to this discussion was appointed by President Friley to analyze Pamphlet No. 5 and to report directly to him. Both Oswald Brownlee and Theodore Schultz noted in the year following the controversy

¹Ibid.

²Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

that they believed President Friley had stood firmly against the dairy pressure until the report of this "Special Committee on Pamphlet No. 5" was made.

This Special Committee, chaired by George Godfrey, director of Agricultural Relations for the College, was discussed in Chapter II. Other members were C. Y. Cannon of animal husbandry, B. W. Hammer of dairy industry, B. H. Thomas of animal husbandry and Pearl Swanson of foods and nutrition. This committee delivered an unfavorable appraisal of Putting Dairying on a War Footing. The economists' objections to the President's Special Committee report were outlined in Chapter II. The report to Friley was probably influential in view of the President's belief that the central issue was the legitimacy of the facts.

The President's Special Committee, the membership of which was void of social scientists, may have been ill-equipped to review the pamphlet without input from economists. Margaret Reid, who did meet with the committee, remarked in a letter to Director Buchanan that "certainly last June there was evidence that the committee was having difficulty with marginal analysis."¹ Director Buchanan made a similar statement in the letter to J. S. Russell:

¹Margaret Reid to R. E. Buchanan, 23 December 1943, Buchanan Papers.

President Friley's committee on the review of the manuscript did not include any member of the Economics staff. This committee found some errors in technological statements and brought in a report which was read to the joint committee. I have never in any way criticized this report. I feel, however, that it did not do entire justice to the pamphlet. It located certain technical inaccuracies. It showed some lack of appreciation in the use of marginal analysis as a technique useful in economics.¹

It was the President's Special Committee which Director Buchanan appointed to review the revised version of Putting Dairying on a War Footing, although there were some changes due to resignations. The work of the committee during the revision process has been discussed thoroughly. However, a comment by Buchanan in the letter quoted above, is worth repeating. He wrote that appointing this committee at the time seemed a wise procedure, but, in retrospect, he felt it was a mistake. One or two members of the economics faculty should have been added to the committee, he wrote.²

The two college review committees for Pamphlet No. 5 after the controversy arose--the Special Committee to the President and the revision review committee--may not have been any more appropriate for the purpose than was the original economics department review committee. Several allusions were made during the period of the controversy concerning the split

¹Buchanan to Russell, 17 February 1944.

²Ibid.

between the social science and the technical departments. In the Cedar Rapids Gazette editorial by "R.F.A.," the cleavage between the technical group and the social science group was evidenced "when members of the two dairy sections were openly and bitterly critical of the economics section."¹ Hardin wrote that he became conscious of a split between "physical and biological scientists versus social scientists" during his visit to Ames in 1943.² Theodore Schultz wrote in his letter of resignation that it had been reported to him that "members of the Iowa State College faculty helped create the inflammatory interest group demands with respect to the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5."³ Director Buchanan in his letter to Russell wrote, "I don't need to tell you that some of the members of our staff, perhaps unwisely, participated in the discussion by condemning in letters and in conversation the staff in Economics for its stand."⁴

Significantly, the members of the President's Special Committee and the revision review committee, were members of "technical" departments: animal husbandry, dairy industry, and

¹Cedar Rapids Gazette, 22 September 1943.

²Hardin, Freedom, p. 122.

³T. W. Schultz to President Charles E. Friley, 15 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

⁴Buchanan to Russell, 17 February 1943.

food and nutrition. (According to Dr. Elizabeth Hoyt, in a 1974 interview, the food and nutrition department was "tied in with butter.")¹ Later chemistry was represented on the revision review committee when George Godfrey had to resign due to health problems.

Whether or not the President's Special Committee for Review of Pamphlet No. 5 was fully competent to analyze the pamphlet, it did make a generally negative report which may have been responsible in part for President Friley's waning support for the pamphlet. In any case, the fact that the latter asked Librarian Brown to review the Nichols-Vieg pamphlet, lends support to the thesis that President Friley was much more concerned with public relations than with supporting a capable and widely recognized group of social scientists. These and other actions by the president relating to review procedures indicate not only his lack of support for his economics staff but an unwillingness to stir controversy. Subsequent to Pamphlet No. 5, President Friley reorganized the Editorial Board of the Collegiate Press, asked that all future Wartime Farm and Food Policy pamphlets be reviewed by standard procedures and according to Schultz's letter of resignation, stopped an article from publication in Iowa Farm Economist.

One indication that President Friley withdrew support

¹Elizabeth Hoyt, interview.

for Pamphlet No. 5 and attempted to see that it was truly "retracted" rather than withdrawn and revised, was his statement in the letter to recipients of Pamphlet No. 5 announcing the decision of the joint committee:

The above report of the Joint Committee was approved on July 19, 1943, with the proviso that the recommended revision be in the form of a new study of the dairy situation, undertaken cooperatively, and including both wartime problems and those likely to be of interest and concern in the post war period.¹

Director Buchanan said of this statement: "The president then took an action which was not in any way contemplated by the committee." Some statements, wrote Buchanan, were resented by certain members of the staff and by some recipients.²

According to Theodore Schultz's dictated statement in September of 1943 following a meeting between himself and the president, the latter "...argued that it was not only necessary but proper for the Iowa State College to serve without reservation the interest of special groups in agriculture, and indicated there was no such thing as a general interest to which staff members need have allegiance."³

If Pamphlet No. 5, Putting Dairying on a War Footing,

¹President Charles E. Friley to "Recipients of Pamphlet No. 5," 29 July 1943, Schultz Papers.

²Buchanan to Russell, 17 February 1943.

³T. W. Schultz, "Dictated Statement," 17 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

had not contained factual errors, then it could be argued, using hindsight, that the pamphlet would have been easier to defend. Perhaps a special review procedure which would have been expeditious, yet would have allowed for non-economics staff input and comment would have resulted in a better product. However, the President's Special Committee was criticized for lack of understanding of marginal analysis, which does not relate to mistakes in "fact." Furthermore, this same committee was in the process of review of the revision of Pamphlet No. 5 for more than seven months, hardly an expeditious process. The facts, as known today, are that Pamphlet No. 5 was reviewed by a special committee of economists after input from specialists of other disciplines and that its major points were upheld. The decisions made by various individuals in authorizing non-traditional review procedures were based upon reasonable arguments and upon the precedent of the Depression series. Director Buchanan may have been motivated in his decision to authorize publication in non-sponsored channels because of his support of the economics staff and his interest in promoting public policy research.

This discussion of the Pamphlet No. 5's review and publication procedures may be closed with an examination of Buchanan's response to and conclusion about the controversy. Sponsorship was, in Buchanan's view, basic to an understanding of "our problems with reference to Pamphlet No. 5."

Because of the importance of sponsorship and because this subject had not been adequately explored, Director Buchanan, in the Fall of 1943, appointed a committee to study the implications of college sponsorship. That committee's report appeared in tentative form in February, 1944. It carefully outlined procedures for publication by college staff members in both sponsored and unsponsored channels. Buchanan wrote:

What we want of course is a carefully thought through policy which we can follow in the future and which will prevent difficulties such as we have had in the immediate past. This, I believe, will constitute a distinct contribution to the whole problem of satisfactory handling of academic freedom in educational institutions.¹

¹Buchanan to Snyder, 16 December 1943.

CHAPTER VII.

IOWA FARM BUREAU INTERVENTION: ITS IMPACT

An examination of the controversy concerning Pamphlet No. 5 is not complete without investigating the impact of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation on the outcome of events. Although the state's dairy interests were politically powerful and undoubtedly vocal, the Iowa Farm Bureau had a larger voice in political affairs generally and particularly in the affairs of Iowa's agricultural college.

Lauren Soth wrote in 1957:

The state Farm Bureaus are powerful political forces in many states but especially so in the Middle West. The strongest state Farm Bureau organization from the standpoint of legislative influence is the Iowa Farm Bureau...The Iowa Farm Bureau completely overshadows other farm organizations in the state, and so maintains a commanding role in the state legislature.¹

The movement to carry information from colleges of agriculture to farmers, the "extension movement," began in the early 1900's and was a stimulus to the development of cooperating associations. In an official Farm Bureau book, The First Fifty, on the history of the movement in Iowa, "corn trains" were described as one of the important steps towards

¹Soth, p. 103.

creation of the Iowa State College Extension Service. These corn trains were, as implied by their name, traveling lecture-demonstration programs for farmers. Other programs in addition to the trains, such as short courses, institutes, and farm demonstrations, "stimulated interest in better farming methods to a point where farmers' demands in the early 1900's surpassed the facilities of the agricultural college." In 1906, the Iowa legislature appropriated \$15,000 for an Extension Department at Iowa State.¹

However, there were no strong farm organizations at this time to fill the need for county leadership in carrying on extension activities, according to the official history. In 1913, Iowa's first county Farm Aid Law was enacted and provided that counties could vote a yearly tax not to exceed \$5,000 for county extension work. A county organization was required to administer the program.

With the assistance of the extension department, numerous groups were formed. Quite often a combination of existing farmers' clubs and neighborhood groups which were not formally structured formed the new association. While bringing the extension program to a great number of people, this also was a means for² farmers to work out their own problems together.

According to Charles Hardin, in Politics of Agriculture,

¹Groves and Thatcher, p. 9.

²Ibid.

in the early years of the county agent movement, federal financial assistance was not firmly established. "A sponsoring group could facilitate administration, add prestige, provide financial assistance, and promote the program before the county boards and (later) state legislatures."¹

In Iowa, as in most northern states, Farm Bureaus began as the county sponsoring associations for extension. The first federal grants-in-aid were provided in 1914 by the Smith-Lever Act. These grants-in-aid were for agricultural extension work but required that the grants be matched by contributions from state or local governments or from individuals.²

The match for the federal monies was provided for in an Iowa statute which conditioned county extension organizations upon the formation of county agricultural associations with at least 200 bona fide farmers who paid annually in dues toward the program. The county boards of commissioners were directed to appropriate to such an organization a sum double the amount provided by dues.³

Soon after the Smith-Lever Act, Farm Bureaus were invited to meet in state agricultural conferences with county agents. Then state federations of Farm Bureaus began to form.

¹Hardin, Politics, p. 39.

²Ibid., p. 40.

³Ibid., p. 38.

Iowa was the first state to be totally organized, according to The First Fifty. There was a Farm Bureau organization and a county agent in every county. "The county agent was the man at the helm, administering the agricultural program under the joint supervision of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service."¹

Federating of Iowa's county farm bureaus became a "lively topic at all county meetings early in 1917." The state supervisor of county extension agents was the man asked to prepare a tentative plan of organization to be presented at a statewide Farm Bureau meeting in December of 1918. Seventy-two counties (of Iowa's 99) were represented, and the vote for unity was unanimous.² The creation of the American Farm Bureau Federation followed in 1920.

Meanwhile, according to Hardin, the Farm Bureau was changing:

Impressed by the role of the government in the War and then motivated by the 1920-21 depression, many farm leaders favored joint political and economic action. The new AFBF and state Farm Bureaus were well-designed to influence government; state and local Farm Bureaus were equally adapted to develop farm cooperatives. The federal Extension Service, which had assiduously promoted Farm Bureaus even to the disparagement of other farm organizations, suddenly found its partner in advancing adult education had unforeseen potentialities.³

¹Groves and Thatcher, p. 16.

²Ibid., p. 27.

³Hardin, Politics, p. 40.

William Block in a study of the separation of the Farm Bureau and Extension Service, suggested that despite the state-wide organizations' interest in commercial and legislative action, "some of the Extension sponsors of state-wide farm bureaus seemed little aware that such organizations might rapidly expand into commercial and political areas which would be subjects of political controversy."

This lessened the possibility of seeing the ethical and practical implications of governmental sponsorship of a private organization which in turn would attempt to influence the policies of government.¹

The result of Extension sponsorship of local cooperating associations of farmers was a national farm organization, which competed with other existing farm organizations for members. According to Block, not only were these other farm organizations bereft of the support of Extension personnel, but they were confronted with a rapidly expanding competitor created by those employees. "That the Extension Service continued to identify itself with those farmers whose formal interests were realized in the Farm Bureau rather than in the others, naturally made the latter very critical of such relationships."

Conflict between farm organizations flared up shortly after the American Farm Bureau Federation was organized, and

¹Block, p. 10.

the Farm Bureau opponents often used the privileged governmental relationships as a focal point of attack.¹

In 1921, after the A.B.F.B. and state Farm Bureaus began acquiring business and political functions, an agreement was formed to define relationships between the Extension Services and the Farm Bureau. This was the True-Howard Agreement, which explained the role of the county agents, and explicitly limited them from any activities relating to recruiting Farm Bureau members. According to Hardin, many Extension and Farm Bureau spokesmen held that the agreement had been strictly maintained. Others, especially Grange and Farmers Unions spokesmen, held the opposite.²

Attacks upon the privileged governmental relationships between Extension and the Farm Bureau by competing groups were made from the 1920's through the period of concern to this study, 1943 and 1944. However, according to Block, opposition to close relationships between state Extension organizations and farm bureaus had been evident but rarely vigorous or effective before about 1939. By 1943, opposition, especially from the National Farmers Union, was strong.

In 1939, a book was published entitled The Agrarian Revival by Russell Lord, which asserted that county agents

¹Ibid., p. 11.

²Hardin, Politics, p. 41.

during the 1920's had to perform prohibited tasks, such as recruiting members, for the Farm Bureaus in order to receive continued financial support. Lord asserted that domination of Extension personnel by superiors at the land grant colleges or in Washington was less damaging to effectiveness than that of local Farm Bureau directors.¹

Block shows that at the end of that same year, 1939, Extension-Farm Bureau unity was impressive. At the annual convention of the American Farm Bureau Federation, a resolution was passed calling attention to both formal and informal arrangements with the Extension Service and suggesting that they be maintained and expanded. According to Block, this resolution "pledged that the national organization would resist all efforts to destroy or impair this fundamental teamwork of education and organization."²

The A.F.B.F. and many of the state Farm Bureaus, including Iowa's, were strong lobbying organizations by 1943. In 1957, Lauren Soth wrote of the Farm Bureau:

It maintains strong legislative lobbying staffs in Washington and in most of the state capitals. During the last several years, since official reports on lobbying expenditures were first required by Congress, the Farm Bureau regularly has been among the first four or five national organizations in total amount spent in lobbying.³

¹Block, p. 30.

²Ibid., p. 31.

³Soth, p. 103.

One hypothesis in Block's extensive study of the separation of the Farm Bureau and Extension Service was that the intensity of activity concerning the separation issue would be greatest "when there was severe competition between formal organizations for influence on governmental policy, members or business."¹ By 1943, activity was sometimes intense on this separation issue.

A major controversy involving Farm Bureau leadership was the Farm Bureau attempt to reorganize the Department of Agriculture so that its action programs could be more easily channeled through agencies favorable to Farm Bureau members and land-grant colleges.

The Farm Bureau attempt to divest these programs of their ties to partisan politics and to channel them through media favorable to itself thus aroused the inevitable opposition of non-Farm Bureau supporters and staff of the action agencies and of the Secretary of Agriculture. This proposal for administrative change brought the newly reactivated National Farmers Union into the fray and antagonized Secretary of Agriculture Wickard, who responded by issuing the memorandum which² threatened to withdraw support for the Farm Bureau.

Other actions' by the Farm Bureau, including a successful move to reduce appropriations to the Farm Security Administration in 1943, were clear challenges to several groups, according to Block. These groups included (1) supporters of the Farm Security Administration, (2) those who supported the

¹Block, p. 243.

²Ibid., p. 244.

increased food and fiber production policies advocated by the Administration and the Secretary of Agriculture, (3) opponents of compulsory production and marketing control policy, and (4) officials of competing farm organizations, who would suspect that any programs administered through local units of the Extension Service would inevitably favor Farm Bureau members in the allocation of benefits.

Out of this complex of opposition came the effort to separate the state Extension Services from the local units of the Farm Bureau by appropriations riders and amendments to the Smith-Lever Act.¹

These separation attempts occurred in 1943.

Thus by the time of the controversy over Putting Dairying on a War Footing in 1943, the American Farm Bureau Federation was a strong lobbying organization with some strong opposition, aimed at Extension and Farm Bureau tie-ups at the local level. This alignment was not formal in every state, and in some states there was no alignment at all. However, Iowa was a strong Farm Bureau state as pointed out by Soth, and the state's Extension Service relied upon its Farm Bureau not only for organizational support but for substantial financial support.²

In addition to opposition at a national level to Farm Bureau-Extension tie-ups, there were varying attempts in some

¹Ibid., p. 245.

²Soth, p. 108.

states to achieve separation. According to Block, the Farmers Union organization in Iowa provided the major support for separation. In the fall of 1942 there were indications "that farmer dissatisfaction within the state and Department of Agriculture resentment from without was raising the specter of divorce."

So concerned was the state college that a new associate Extension director was instructed to make a special study of Extension's relationships with other government agencies and farm organizations. The state Farmers Union, in an attempt to build up opposition before the legislature met, called leaders of other farmer cooperative associations together at Iowa Falls, to hear and to make suggestions which would improve Extension's aid to all farmers.¹

This associate Extension director was Leland Allbaugh.

One more note on background is the award given to R. K. Bliss, Iowa State's Dean of Extension in 1943. He received the annual award of the American Farm Bureau Federation for Distinguished Service to American Agriculture in that year.²

The Iowa Farm Bureau entered the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 at the beginning, when Francis Johnson, the state Farm Bureau president, made a statement at the May 19th meeting between President Friley and the 125 dairy representatives. This statement was quoted extensively in the Des Moines

¹Block, p. 63.

²Iowa State College, Yearbook: The Bomb, 1943 (Ames: Collegiate Press, Inc., 1943), p. 28.

Register and appears as quoted in Chapter II. Johnson stated that he felt it was his responsibility to inform those responsible for the administration of Iowa State that "Iowa farmers are alarmed over the apparent tendency to make over Iowa State college into a tax supported blueprint of Harvard University."¹

Johnson also said that the true test of the value of public policy research was determined by the eventual acceptance and use of the recommendations. "The college cannot justify its existence on the basis of mere 'irritational value.'"

In his remarks, Johnson also mentioned a 1942 letter by Albert Hart, which Johnson said accused "members of the Congressional farm bloc, farm organization leaders, 'and even the members of organized farm groups of sabotaging our American form of government....'" Johnson said that the two incidents, Pamphlet No. 5 and the Hart letter, indicated "that there is something wrong with the college atmosphere which causes such things to come to the surface."²

The Farm Bureau at a national level appeared to support the attack on Pamphlet No. 5, when an article appeared in

¹Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

²Ibid.

an issue of the American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. The article summarized the controversy and concluded:

The picture is much too perfect from the margarine manufacturers point of view, however, to allow these recommendations for the concentration of the dairy industry in fluid milk production to go long unchallenged.

At worst, the dairymen might suggest that if fortified margarine is as good as the booklet asserts, it ought to be used for lend-lease purposes, leaving the home field to butter.¹

Three days after his statement at the May 19th meeting, another Johnson statement was in the Des Moines Register, this time criticizing another pamphlet in the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series. One of the authors of the pamphlet was Albert Hart, and he was criticized by Johnson for placing full blame for present and potential inflationary tendencies on farm prices and omitting all references to labor's and industry's part in the picture.

Following this second statement by Francis Johnson, the Iowa Farmers Union president entered the controversy by publicly defending Hart's pamphlet. A May 25th article in the Des Moines Register reported a statement made by Donald W. Van Vleet who said that Francis Johnson was trying to get "even" with Albert Hart and accused the Farm Bureau of being pro-inflation. Van Vleet said that the Hart pamphlet, written

¹"Iowa Booklet Stirs Storm in Dairy Industry," American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter 22, June 1943, p. 4.

with co-author Mary Jean Bowman, was a sound analysis of the pressures which threaten to burst into wild inflation. "Recalling the Farm Bureau's recent policies on inflation controls, it was only natural that Francis Johnson would take exception to the conclusion in the Pamphlet."¹

The Iowa Farm Bureau opposition to Pamphlet No. 5 was heard by the Board of Education as noted in a "letter to the editor" by Thomas W. Keenan, a member of the Board. He wrote:

The last meeting of the board which I attended was held in Ames in June. At that time the attacks from the Farm Bureau were the most violent and we spent the entire afternoon discussing Pamphlet No. 5.²

According to Block, the Iowa Farmers Union supported the principle of academic freedom and used it as a weapon to attack the Iowa Farm Bureau and the relationship of its units to Iowa State College. In Block's account, the Farmers Union entered the controversy by charging that the state Farm Bureau improperly influenced college policy.

The state board of education then requested that any such evidence be presented to it. When the Farmers Union president refused, saying that two board members were prejudiced because of editorials they had written, the chance to exploit a potential difference between the educational institution and the farm organization evaporated. This opportunity may not have been great as the state Farm Bureau subsequently replaced its tarnished president with

¹Des Moines Register, 25 May 1943.

²Des Moines Register, 9 September 1943.

an uninvolved Allan Kline, and the Farmers Union had too few members and too little general support to be persuasive.¹

This account by Block is substantiated by an article that appeared in the Des Moines Register on October 15, 1943, which reported that the Board of Education voted unanimously to exonerate Iowa State College of all charges of interfering with academic freedom in the butter vs. oleomargarine controversy. The nine member board reportedly took its action after officials of the Iowa Farmers Union "accused the board of intention to 'whitewash' and declined to submit any evidence in support of its claim that 'freedom of education has been restricted at Iowa State College.'"

The Farmers Union officials contended that the board was "prejudiced" and "'unable to make an impartial investigation of its charges.'"²

The effect of the Iowa Farm Bureau interjection into the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 upon administrative decisions cannot here be determined. Some in 1943 did view the Farm Bureau's influence as at least potentially powerful and dangerous. Block wrote:

The subsidy issue continued to divide the Farm Bureau and Administration spokesmen, and the latter now seized upon the Iowa State College butter-oleo controversy

¹Block, p. 63.

²Des Moines Register, 15 October 1943.

as a means of driving a wedge between the Farm Bureau and its Extension Service allies. The pressure exerted upon college research people by forces led by the president of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation could be exploited to show Extension personnel the potential dangers to them from Farm Bureau's and Extension's mutual supporting relationship. The approach was two pronged: that of persuasion and that of publicity. The former path was taken by Secretary Wickard, who saw an opportunity when he addressed the annual convention of the land grant colleges. Appealing to the self interest of college and Extension researchers and administrators, he called upon them¹ to see that their research and teaching were "free."

The speech made by the Secretary of Agriculture was in October of 1944.

Theodore Schultz, as has been noted, wrote on the effect of the Farm Bureau impact. In a letter to Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation, immediately following the resignation letter, Schultz wrote that the social science group at Iowa State had enjoyed an atmosphere conducive to research on vital issues. During the two years previous to the butter-oleo incident, however, this atmosphere had been increasingly threatened by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and its unsympathetic attitudes, wrote Schultz. There were two issues which the Farm Bureau emphasized. One was the proposed plan of the college to "study and reorganize the relationship of the Agricultural Extension Service to the state, broadening its service and freeing it somewhat from the control of the

¹Block, p. 72.

Iowa Farm Bureau Federation."¹ Schultz then wrote that President Friley had appointed a leading economist to study and formulate recommendations for the improvement of the Agricultural Extension Service. This person was Leland Allbaugh who had been mentioned previously in this chapter and in this paper.

A second issue concerned studies conducted by members of the economics department. According to Schultz's letter, economics staff members had published analyses of such issues as "parity prices, parity income, crop control, storage programs, credit for small farmers, the commodity loan rates, the continuation of farm programs to restrict production when the food requirements for war called for an expansion policy," which were not in harmony with the policies advocated by the Farm Bureau. In parentheses, Schultz noted:

(The manner in which I express this would tend to over-state the apparent conflict. It was not as open and fundamental as this suggests, but the fact remains that the gap was a growing one and has been intensified by the war because of the radical changes that have been required in order to mobilize our resources for war purposes.)²

Pamphlet No. 5 was merely an incident in this development of opposition. According to Schultz, Pamphlet No. 2,

¹T. W. Schultz to Joseph Willits, 22 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

²Ibid.

written by himself, was accepted with reluctance, but not openly challenged largely because of his prestige. Pamphlet No. 3 was criticized, and there was open condemnation of No. 8 in an attempt to discredit particularly, Professor Hart, "who has over the last two years focused sharply and effectively upon inflation issues...." Hart had apparently openly condemned the leadership of the American Farm Bureau for its anti-inflation tactics.

The fact that Pamphlet No. 5 brought the organized dairy interests to the surface merely provided an occasion and opportunity for the Iowa Farm Bureau to make a squeeze play on the college. This they did.¹

Publicly, in the Des Moines Register, Schultz wrote again of the Iowa Farm Bureau. He observed that few of the special interest groups in Iowa have a monopoly. Most are kept from activities not in the general welfare because of opposition, or fear of it, of other interest groups.

This is not the case, however, with respect to the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. It is by all odds the leading farm organization in the state. When it speaks as the voice of the farm people it speaks with an authority which cannot be successfully challenged by any other interest group in the state.

The organization of Iowa farmers for the prosecution of their interests is indeed desirable. But inherent in this organization is the danger that the power of the organization will not be limited to the prosecution of the interests of the general welfare.²

¹Ibid.

²Des Moines Register, 24 September 1943.

Schultz expressed to President Friley his belief that Francis Johnson basically and fundamentally wished staff members, especially in economics, to be subservient to the Farm Bureau, while Allan Kline had a broad understanding of the necessary prerequisites for scholarship in the social sciences.¹

Hardin in a discussion of his reasons justifying separation of the Farm Bureau and Extension Service, agreed with Schultz's observations when he wrote that sometimes "Farm Bureaus have talked in a high-handed manner toward the colleges." "In the 1943 Iowa margarine incident, the then state Farm Bureau president was a leader in the attack upon the controversial bulletin." He also wrote:

But the evidence does not all tend in one direction. The writer recently requested the judgment of a number of informed persons respecting which colleges of agriculture had been most effective in analyzing public policy issues since 1920. Among states repeatedly named were several in which strong Extension-Farm Bureau tie-ups obtain. Iowa is an outstanding example. If significant changes in the economics staff at Iowa State College followed the margarine incident of 1943, there were also important changes in Iowa Farm Bureau leadership; moreover, the experience weighs heavily upon the consciences of Iowans today.²

¹T. W. Schultz, "Dictated Statement," 17 September 1943.

²Hardin, Politics, p. 81.

CHAPTER VIII.

PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH AT A LAND GRANT COLLEGE:

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PAMPHLET NO. 5

The Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series of pamphlets was the published result of public policy oriented research at Iowa State College. Some of the pamphlets in the series were controversial, the most notable being Pamphlet No. 5, Putting Dairying on a War Footing. Theodore Schultz noted in a letter to Joseph Willits that Pamphlet No. 2, which he authored, was "accepted with reluctance," and suggested that perhaps because of his standing and prestige, it was not openly criticized. Pamphlet No. 3 was criticized, however, and Pamphlet No. 8, by Albert G. Hart, was publicly criticized by Francis Johnson, president of the Iowa Farm Bureau.¹

Another study which was to have been Pamphlet No. 10 was Wartime Government in Operation, by William Nicholls and John Vieg. As has been noted, this pamphlet appears to have been too controversial to publish in light of the attacks on Pamphlet No. 5.

It was Pamphlet No. 5 which examined what was in 1943

¹T. W. Schultz to Joseph H. Willits, 22 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

a very controversial subject--butter versus margarine. And it was the public controversy in response to the publication of the pamphlet that raised the question concerning the role of public policy research at Iowa State College, a land grant institution. The strength of the protests against Putting Dairying on a War Footing, forced the question (as stated by Charles Hardin), "Can publicly supported institutions freely examine issues which are publicly controversial?"

Theodore Schultz addressed himself to this question when he resigned from Iowa State College in September of 1943. Charles Hardin in Freedom in Agricultural Education also addressed the question. This study of the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 is a study of one incident at one land grant college, and thus cannot be generalized to conclusions about controversial policy oriented research at all land grant institutions. However, both Schultz and Hardin viewed the incident as significant in an examination of the broad issue of public policy research at publicly supported institutions, and their views are important in this study.

Another question raised by the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5 relates to the freedom of the scholar to publish his findings--a very significant part of the doctrine of academic freedom. Was the retraction of Putting Dairying on a War Footing a violation of the researcher's freedom to publish? This question will be discussed as a conclusion to this

chapter and this paper.

Public Policy Research at Iowa State College

When Theodore Schultz decided to resign from Iowa State College, he stated his intention in a letter to President Charles Friley, a letter which became public. In the first paragraph of that eight page letter, Schultz raised the issue of the role of social sciences at Iowa State College.

The series of events during the last few months have brought about a crisis in the development of the social sciences on this campus. For the past several years under the guidance of the President's office and that of the Deans and Directors, the social sciences have been able to establish themselves at the Iowa State College to an extent not found in any other land grant institution.¹

Schultz expressed his belief that the social environment of the 1930's brought about a widespread acceptance that society and especially farm people must find answers to problems which can be solved only in the light of social sciences. It was, according to Schultz, a distinct credit to Iowa State's administration that an unusually vigorous development of these social sciences was encouraged. By 1943, however, "The sense of the existence of unsolved problems to which the social scientist can contribute has faded--..." wrote Schultz. Further, many faculty at Iowa State had not distinguished

¹T. W. Schultz to President Charles E. Friley, 15 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

between the interests of particular agricultural groups and the general public interest.

This crisis, in which the entire social science faculty finds itself frustrated and in a state of uncertainty and demoralization, must be resolved immediately. If we are to save the major academic assets in the social sciences which this institution has acquired over the period of the last 10 years, decisions must be reached and action taken by the President's office on a number of specific issues which now represent breaches of good faith between the administration and the social science faculty. In addition, the resources of the institution as a whole must be mobilized to create safeguards against undesirable pressure group action if the Iowa State College is to continue the social sciences at a level worthy of the time and energy of scholars....¹

The article by Schultz which appeared in the Des Moines Register on September 14, 1943, was the public forum for his views. The contents of this article were presented in Chapter II. However, some of Schultz's statements will be reviewed here. He wrote that Iowans had been increasingly involved in the international picture, as agricultural producers subject to a variety of controls.

If the people of Iowa believe, as I think they do, that the most serious problems affecting their welfare over the next few decades lie in the field of economics, government and social organization, they have a strong interest in having the results of unbiased,² timely and courageous research in the social sciences.

Traditionally such research had been done in the

¹Ibid.

²Des Moines Register, 24 September 1943.

privately owned colleges, wrote Schultz. But special problems had multiplied so rapidly that the nation could not depend solely on these institutions.

Furthermore, it is the tax supported institutions which are the heart of democratic education-- "democracy's colleges." Upon these the development of a better informed citizenry must more largely depend.¹

Schultz argued that if the necessary research and educational functions of the social sciences were to be carried out with the degree of objectivity and timeliness which the critical state of society demanded, strong public support was needed.

After discussing special interest groups in Iowa, including the Farm Bureau, Schultz suggested that "the rules of the game" needed to be re-examined. Because the Pamphlet No. 5 incident made it clear that Iowa State was extremely vulnerable to attack from organized interest groups, and "...because this vulnerability is inherent in the relationships that prevail by our traditions and our rules of the game, these rules need to be carefully re-examined." They may have served when plant and animal improvement was the purpose of research, but obsolete when social studies were at stake.

The rule which Schultz viewed as necessary to provide a safeguard for vigorous research was: "IOWA STATE COLLEGE

¹Ibid.

MUST ADHERE RIGOROUSLY TO A POLICY, IN ALL OF ITS RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, OF SERVING FIRST AND FOREMOST THE GENERAL INTEREST OF SOCIETY."¹ (Emphasis in original.)

In a letter to Joseph Willits written at about the same time as the Register article, Schultz reiterated his belief in the need to establish safeguards for social science research. He wrote that external relationships needed to be examined, and institutional arrangements needed to be established to protect Iowa State and other land-grant colleges when they undertook vital and courageous research in social sciences.²

In his dictated statement following his interview with President Friley on September 17, 1943, Schultz said:

This [discussion of serving the general welfare as opposed to special interests] led me to say that there were only a very few institutions in the land grant colleges which safeguarded the right of social scientists to do untrammelled work. I stated that I looked for most of those centers to fold up, that we were foremost among them, that our day was probably over, that this meant that the detached, scholarly work would have to be done at such institutions as Harvard, Stanford, and Chicago. This was very regrettable and I disliked to believe that we would have to limit outstanding scholars to these few institutions. and not any of them in the very colleges and universities created to serve agriculture and the working₃ classes, as is the case of the land grant colleges.

¹Ibid.

²Schultz to Willits, 22 September 1943.

³T. W. Schultz, "Dictated Statement Immediately Following Conference from 11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Through Lunch Hour With President Charles E. Friley," 17 September 1943, Schultz Papers.

Charles Hardin essentially agreed with the above statement when he wrote that public policy research systematically carried out by college departments in land grant colleges had been quite rare. "Few colleges, primarily in their departments of agricultural economics and rural sociology, have maintained a systematic attack upon a set of interrelated public policy issues (not many have had the resources to mount such consistent attacks, of course.)" Cornell's agricultural economics department had long been involved in policy-oriented analyses, and from time to time on specific subjects, Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois and California had made notable contributions. However, wrote Hardin: "The most striking, consistent, systematic attack by a team of social scientists seems to have been made by Iowa State College, especially during the decade which opened with The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa (1933) and closed with the 'Wartime Farm and Food Policy Pamphlets' (1942-44)."¹

Hardin wrote of the "Iowa Margarine Incident" and made some interpretations and inferences from his review of the situation. As discussed in Chapter VI, Hardin believed that the central issue was mistakenly stated by President Friley in asking whether the "facts" of the researchers were correct, although those facts were important. In his view, the central

¹ Hardin, Freedom, p. 133.

issue was whether to maintain a vigorous established team of social scientists whose general competence was widely accepted and who were strongly oriented in their research toward controversial issues of public policy.

In examining his proposition, Hardin pointed out that we accept as "given" the political society as we know it: "a system of organized political power but one so organized that power controls power--'ambition is made to counteract ambition.'" Further, a fundamental assumption, suggested Hardin, is that the drive for power is widely observable, that it provides an indispensable dynamic, but that it must be checked and controlled.

Again, while we reject scientific "solutions" to political issues, we assert the need to handle them in a prudent and knowledgeable fashion. In part, prudence and knowledge are gained from appeals to reason made on the basis of research and education which is carried on as objectively as possible. The "Wartime Farm and Food Policy Pamphlets" of Iowa State College were distinguished examples of this kind of research and education. Moreover, the series was only one manifestation in a remarkable history of forthright inquiries into controversial issues on the part of an extraordinarily able department.¹

Hardin concluded that it was sound policy to support this kind of attack upon social problems. However, the question of "facts" was raised by Hardin as noted previously and in Chapter VI. The difficulty with this question of "facts" is

¹Ibid., p. 123.

the nature of social facts. "One of the two most controversial statements in the original Pamphlet No. 5 was to the effect that restrictive margarine laws had been enacted under political pressure of organized dairy interests. This is one social fact that can hardly be controverted, although it would, of course, be hard to 'prove.'"

Hardin pointed out that agricultural policy was by its nature full of controversial issues in which facts are often disputed. Facts are often the chief source of conflict.

Thus an examination of the correctness of particular facts in a particular controversy leads back to the more general issue: whether it is sound public policy to maintain vigorous social science research. If the decision is in the affirmative, the community must be prepared for controversy and for mistakes of the researchers at times... In short, institutionalized social science research needs to be appraised over its entire record--....¹

In viewing the pamphlet, Putting Dairying on a War Footing, in the broad context of policy research at a land grant college, one is viewing a paradox. Pamphlet No. 5 and the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series resulted from the efforts of a strong social science department working in sometimes controversial areas. If Hardin and Schultz were correct, then the pamphlet and series were an exception to the rule that land grant colleges were generally lacking in such public

¹Ibid., p. 124.

policy research efforts. On the other hand, Pamphlet No. 5 represented the difficulties faced by social scientists at a land grant college. Hardin wrote that "public institutions are peculiarly vulnerable in attacking politically controversial issues, for they must look to the same public that is divided into interests whose agitation makes the issue controversial." Further, he wrote, "Agricultural research and Extension workers operate in relation to their clientele with an intimacy which is difficult for their more cloistered colleagues to understand."

The extreme proximity to action of the agricultural worker makes him understandably more wary than, say, his liberal arts colleague and makes him perhaps a little less appreciative of the values in abstractions about academic freedom. The agricultural worker, moreover, is used to searching for specific practical answers to specific practical questions. The urge is toward the practical, the immediate, the concrete, and away from the abstract, the long-range, the systematic, and the theoretical....¹

The controversy over the pamphlet, which resulted in Schultz's resignation, was an incident which revealed that under President Friley, public policy research was no longer to receive administrative support, at least for a period immediately following the controversy. Many pressures, from within and from without the college, were upon President Friley. The Farm Bureau opposition to some of the economics

¹Ibid., p. 7.

studies was the most important outside pressure. From within, as noted, opposition came from some of the college's faculty members who were outspoken against the stand taken by economics department members. For whatever reasons, President Friley decided on a course of action, an allegiance to which led to a weakening of an unusual example of strong social science research.

Pamphlet No. 5 and the Freedom to Publish

The protests against and retraction of Putting Dairying on a War Footing exemplified the difficulties in public policy research at a publicly supported institution. However, the protests against Pamphlet No. 5, and the administrative reaction to these protests have implications in another area--that of the freedom to publish (academic freedom). Regardless of the barriers against public policy research at land grant colleges, such research was being done at Iowa State College and had received administrative support. As Hardin pointed out, the most "striking, consistent, systematic attack by a team of social scientists" was made at Iowa State College.¹ Schultz too pointed out that "under the guidance of the President's office and that of the Deans and Directors, the social sciences have been able to establish themselves at Iowa State College

¹Ibid., p. 133.

to an extent not found in any other land grant institution."¹

Thus when the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series was published, the economics staff members had administrative support for their research efforts in various areas affecting public policy. The actions following the protests over Pamphlet No. 5, culminating in the retraction of the pamphlet, could be viewed as interfering with a scholar's freedom to publish his research findings.

In 1940, a statement in final form was worked out in conference between the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges--"the fruit of a quarter-century of thought and labor."² Certain sections of this statement are pertinent to a discussion of academic freedom as related to the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5.

The purpose of this statement is to promote public understanding and support of academic freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures to assure them in colleges and universities. Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.

Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth....

¹Schultz to Friley, 15 September 1943.

²Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 487.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution....¹

In Academic Freedom in Our Time, Robert MacIver discussed in some detail the concept of "the free search for truth." According to MacIver, men have always spoken of two sources of truth--"one revealed truth, God-given or at least delivered by some not-to-be-questioned authority, and the other truth that men discover by the exercise of their own ingenuity." The search for truth as the business of the scholar is truth sought in the second sense only.

Further, according to MacIver, when the scholar says something is true, he means true only so far as our knowledge goes. "When we say 'truth,' we think of knowledge as perspective, as comprehension of the interrelatedness of things and of the systems they thus compose."

It is the search for truth, so understood, and not the mere uncovering of hidden items of knowledge, that raises the problem of academic freedom. There are those who hold that the goal of scholarship is simply to get at "the facts." There are even those who teach as though knowledge were nothing more than an array of separate bits of "information" and who carry on research on the theory that it should have nothing to do with theories but should confine itself to presenting the "evidences" and letting the facts "speak for themselves." If such were indeed the

¹Ibid., pp. 487-488.

goal of scholarship, there would be little need to defend academic freedom, because there would be no one who had much interest in attacking it.¹

MacIver also wrote that what constitutes knowledge is not the data as such, "but the conclusions rationally derived from the data." The relations of things are never given, but always inferred. "Mere items of information do not add up to knowledge. Those who say the scholar should not go beyond the data, beyond the 'facts,' do not understand what knowledge is."

MacIver's conclusions are related to the issue of the retraction of Pamphlet No. 5. Charles Hardin pointed out what he believed was President Charles Friley's mistaken perception of the central issue of the controversy. Friley had said:

"There can only be one issue as regards this discussion. That is, the legitimacy of the facts, and perhaps the form and clarity of the phraseology used in stating those facts."²

MacIver pointed out that so-called "facts" are "opaque by themselves, uncomprehended, intractable until they are given place and proportion and structural significance within a system."

In explaining the relationships of things, the researcher may disturb preconceived opinions.

¹Robert M. MacIver, Academic Freedom in Our Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 4-5.

²Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

He is most likely to do so when his hypotheses, his inferences, run counter to preconceptions that sustain some currently accepted social valuations or group interests or authoritatively based doctrines of any kind. The mere fact that these preconceptions are regarded by the scholar as a proper subject for investigation subjects him to suspicion. In our times this danger besets particularly the social scientist,...¹

The mission of the university as the guardian and advancer of knowledge, confers a high responsibility upon the faculty, the administration and the governing board. According to MacIver, it is a primary duty of the governing board and administration to resist the pressures of ideological groups and of special interests. "It is the duty of governing boards, and of all administrative officials, to protect the faculty against the clamors and demands of those who do not appreciate the goals of scholarship."

The faculty member, too, is obligated by the freedom he claims: "Particularly if his work lies in the social sciences or in other areas where human values and human interests are involved he should be very careful that his own valuations do not color his presentation of the facts of the case."²

MacIver stated that academic freedom is, from one standpoint, "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to

¹MacIver, p. 6.

²Ibid., pp. 7-8.

communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution."¹ If academic freedom is this freedom of the scholar within his field of study, then the issue of whether the rights of the author and reviewers of Pamphlet No. 5 were violated can legitimately be raised.

At this point, it is important to look at the responsibility of the author of Pamphlet No. 5. If a researcher allows his own "valuations" to color his presentation and conclusions, then he has abused his rights of academic freedom. There were some individuals in 1943 who believed that Oswald Brownlee's presentation was colored by his prejudices. However, a comparison of the two versions, the original and the revised, would appear to indicate that the author's conclusions were objectively considered.

It is true that no members of the faculty at Iowa State College lost their positions as a result of the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5. Academic tenure was and is viewed as a procedure to protect academic freedom within an institution, and this procedural right was not violated. However, the right of the author of Pamphlet No. 5 to communicate his conclusions without interference or molestation does

¹Ibid., p. 6.

appear to have been violated.

The administration of Iowa State College had a responsibility to protect its faculty from the "clamors and demands of those who do not appreciate the goals of scholarship." President Friley, in his meeting with the dairy groups' representatives made one statement upholding the doctrine of academic freedom: "The right of the college to publish facts is not debatable." He then said that there could only be one issue in the discussion--"That is, the legitimacy of the facts,...."¹ With this latter statement, President Friley revealed his lack of understanding of the goals of scholarship as "the free search for truth"--as elucidated by MacIver. In then inviting the dairy representatives to review the pamphlet with college representatives," paragraph by paragraph to determine the accuracy of the contents," President Friley opened the doors to those special interests who attacked the right of an Iowa State researcher to publish his findings. Retraction of Pamphlet No. 5 was one result.

It was not the special interests in attacking Pamphlet No. 5 and its author who violated academic freedom at Iowa State College. Rather, it was the college administration, specifically the top administrator, Charles E. Friley, who violated Oswald Brownlee's and the economics review committee's

¹Des Moines Register, 20 May 1943.

right to publish their results. If President Friley had ended his May 19th comments to the dairy representatives after he had defended the right of the college to publish facts, the entire controversy may have died soon thereafter and the blemish on academic freedom at the College would have been avoided. Pressures on scholars to avoid controversial publication and even research come from many sides, including from within the institution itself. A firm commitment by administration and faculty to the free "search for truth" must be paramount.

It is beyond the scope of this study to ascertain the long term effects of the actions of President Friley and others. One immediate effect may have been the resignation of thirteen faculty members from the Department of Economics and Sociology in the year following the controversy. Although it is not possible here to determine the motivations of the resigning faculty members, the loss of half of the department would indicate some dissatisfactions. The administrative actions in response to the controversy over Pamphlet No. 5 certainly may have had a chilling effect on the "free search for truth" by at least the social science researchers.

Charles Hardin in 1955 wrote that social science at Iowa State continued to have an able group, and those constituting it probably enjoyed a happier situation because of what

happened in 1943.¹ The publication of the revision of Pamphlet No. 5 in fact may have indicated that "a lesson" had been learned.

However, the broad implication of the administrative actions in response to the controversy over Putting Dairying on a War Footing is that the academic freedom of the entire institution was threatened. The actions placed in doubt the future of academic freedom at Iowa State College--specifically in areas of public policy research.

¹Hardin, Freedom, p. 236.

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
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APPENDIX

★ ★ WARTIME ★ ★ ★
ARM *and* FOOD POLICY

Pamphlet No. **5** in the Series



PUTTING DAIRYING ON A
WAR FOOTING

by

O. H. BROWNLEE

1943

Twenty Cents

THE IOWA STATE
AMES



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IOWA

WARTIME FARM AND FOOD POLICY SERIES

* * *

To mobilize our nation's giant strength for war necessarily means a drastic readjustment in our ways of producing, distributing, and consuming everything we make. A few laggards, and people working at cross purposes, can slow down the whole nation if government authority is not used to bring them into line. But authority is not a substitute for public understanding and acceptance. As a matter of democratic principle and of efficiency, the citizens must know what has to be done in economic mobilization—and why and how. This series of pamphlets, prepared by members of the Department of Economics and Sociology at Iowa State College, deals with the what, why, and how of agricultural policy and food management.

Previous pamphlets have outlined the broad relations of food to the war effort and sketched techniques of dividing food supplies and getting maximum production. The use of farm prices to obtain the kinds and amounts of food production needed, the mobilization of necessary farm labor and a food rationing program to maintain a high level of morale have been examined in detail.

This pamphlet, "Putting Dairying on a War Footing," deals with an important sector of food production and distribution. Its dominant theme is efficiency in the use of resources, shifts that will save manpower, changes that will make it possible to contribute most to the nutritional health of those who share in the food supply of the United States.

Editorial Committee:

ALBERT G. HART
MARGARET G. REID

THEODORE W. SCHULTZ
WALTER W. WILCOX

Ames, Iowa, March 19, 1943

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PUTTING DAIRYING ON A WAR FOOTING

O. H. BROWNLEE

Research Associate of Economics, Iowa State College

PART I. THE FINDINGS*

The Problem

1. The quantity of dairy products needed for our armed forces and for lend-lease, plus those which domestic consumers would be willing to purchase at ceiling prices will be far greater than the amounts that will be produced during 1943. Total requirements for milk in 1943 are expected to be nearly 140 billion pounds. We will probably produce less than 120 billion pounds.
2. There will probably be shortages of all dairy products. Those such as fluid milk, and evaporated and dried milk are very economical, are important to good diets, and have few very satisfactory substitutes. A great effort should be made to maintain their production at a high level. Even though some of the milk solids are lost in the whey, cheese is a concentrated and economical food. Butter is in a somewhat different class. It is a high cost fat; and only a small part of the skimmed milk, a by-product of its production, goes to human food. Vegetable as well as some other animal fats can be produced at less cost of manpower

* This pamphlet is based on research carried on under Project 818 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. The study also was aided by a grant from the division of the Social Sciences of the Rockefeller Foundation, New York.

Acknowledgements of the professional contributions made by individuals appear at the end.

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and other resources. These can be used in margarine to make up the butter shortage.

3. The desirability of maintaining or expanding the supply of milk depends on the products that are made from it. In spite of this fact workers are deferred on the basis of the number of cows milked, no difference being made between those on farms selling cream to go into butter and those on farms selling whole milk that goes to various products that use all or most of the milk solids. The total food supply could be increased by shifting some of the resources now engaged in producing milk for butter into providing milk to be sold as fluid milk or as evaporated or dried milk or to be made into cheese. A saving in manpower, feed, and materials would also be made if some of the resources now going to butter were shifted to the production of hogs or the production of vegetable oils.
4. Unnecessary sanitary standards make expensive the shifting to other uses milk now going into the production of butter. And the lack of uniformity in sanitary standards makes difficult the interchange of milk between milksheds.
5. Margarine production has not been increased sufficiently to make up for the shortage of butter. In addition, taxes and other restrictions on the sale of margarine are discouraging its use.
6. Much manpower and materials are being wasted in fluid milk distribution. The measures which have been taken thus far to cut delivery costs have not gotten at the heart of the problem—the duplication of milk delivery routes.

The Solution

1. Even if we had the necessary manpower and feed we cannot produce enough milk to meet all expected demands for 1943. Consequently, we need to make the best possible use of dairy resources by shifting them from less essential to more essential uses. This can be accomplished by:

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- (a) Establishing prices of milk and milk products so that as much of milk as feasible is diverted into products utilizing the essential milk solids, and so that the shift from milk to other livestock is deterred in those areas where all the milk solids can be used for human consumption.
 - (b) Making deferments of dairy workers conditional upon production of milk for whole milk products or cheese rather than production of milk as such. This sort of policy may encourage some sellers of cream to shift to selling whole milk or to producing other livestock.
 - (c) Granting subsidies to producers to enable them to secure necessary equipment and make the other changes necessary to sell whole milk rather than cream. A subsidy to butter producers should not be granted.
 - (d) Revising sanitary standards so that they protect consumers' health but do not impose unnecessary costs or aid in the monopolization of the local market. Unification of sanitary standards based upon analysis of the milk itself rather than the barns, cows, and other production facilities will do much toward shifting milk out of butter and facilitating the interchange of milk between markets.
 - (e) Relocating drying facilities so that they may be more fully employed. This will enable the recovery of a somewhat larger proportion of the skim milk now being fed to livestock.
2. Re-examine the allotment of fats and the allocation of materials for manufacturing facilities for margarine so that consumers will have a substitute for butter. Restrictions on the sale of margarine—state excise taxes, license fees, etc.—should be removed so that its consumption may be encouraged.
 3. Ration butter, cheese, and evaporated and dried milk to

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consumers. But fluid milk rationing should be resorted to only after the possibilities for supplementing shortage areas with fluid milk and evaporated and dried milk from surplus areas have been exhausted.

4. Reorganize milk distribution to eliminate duplication of routes and the consequent waste of manpower and materials. This may mean:
 - (a) elimination of home delivery, or
 - (b) pooling of deliveries, or
 - (c) zoning of delivery territory so that one distributor is the sole deliverer in a given section of the market.

PART II. THE ANALYSIS
THE DAIRY SITUATION IN GENERAL

Why Attention Is Focused on Dairy Products

Milk is of great nutritional importance in American diets. Insofar as possible, the output of fluid milk and of dairy products that contain all or most of the nutrients provided by milk should be maintained or even increased. If this is to be accomplished important changes are needed in our price and subsidy policies and in the sanitary standards established for farms producing milk for these products. Butter is less important in our diets than are some of the other products. Its output should be contracted if the feed and labor used in producing it can be shifted to more important uses. At the same time, the production of satisfactory low cost substitutes should be expanded. Consumer rationing should be introduced for those products and in those areas where shortages arise.

Manpower is particularly scarce. Consequently, it should be directed insofar as possible into production that yields the highest possible returns per unit of labor. Additional manpower for turning out war materials and for the armed forces can be provided and we can still produce essential civilian goods if labor is used more efficiently. In many communities the distribution of fluid milk is very wasteful. There is almost universal need for more efficient methods of milk distribution in order to stretch our supply of manpower and at the same time maintain the production of needed milk products without increasing the costs to consumers.

Wartime Demands for and Supplies of Dairy Products

Milk and milk products, like many of our foods, will not be produced in sufficient quantities in 1943 and during subse-

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quent war years to meet the combined demands of our armed forces and lend-lease and at the same time enable civilians to obtain all that they will wish to purchase at ceiling prices.

The Department of Agriculture expects total milk production in the United States in 1943 to be about 118 billion pounds—a figure slightly below the amount produced in 1942. One can only guess at the amounts of milk that will be produced in 1944 and in later years. It seems reasonable to expect that production will not be increased. Production in 1942 was about 5 per cent greater than in 1941 and nearly 20 per cent greater than in 1930. Production for the years 1930 to 1942 and expected production for 1943 is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
MILK PRODUCTION ON FARMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930-43¹

| Year | Billions of Pounds |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1943 (expected) | 118 |
| 1942 | 119 |
| 1941 | 115 |
| 1940 | 111 |
| 1939 | 109 |
| 1938 | 107 |
| 1937 | 103 |
| 1936 | 103 |
| 1935 | 101 |
| 1934 | 102 |
| 1933 | 105 |
| 1932 | 104 |
| 1931 | 103 |
| 1930 | 100 |

¹ Data are compiled from U.S.D.A. sources.

What about wartime demands for milk? Many forces are making demand at existing ceiling prices very high. Civilians' incomes have increased, more dairy products are needed for export to our allies, and a larger quantity will be consumed per capita by our military forces than by civilians. This means a large net increase in the demand for dairy products. If consumers are allowed to buy all of the dairy products

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they will probably wish to purchase, and if military and lend-lease requirements are fully met, about 140 billion pounds of milk will be required for 1943, and at least as much will be required in 1944 and 1945.

Production of various dairy products in 1941 together with the estimated demand in 1943 are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2
1941 PRODUCTION AND 1943 ESTIMATED DEMANDS FOR MILK FOR ALL PURPOSES

| Product | Billions of Pounds of Milk Equivalent | |
|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Production, 1941 | Estimated Demands,* 1943 |
| Fluid milk and cream † | 46.9 | 49.8 |
| Butter † | 44.8 | 54.4 |
| Cheese | 9.3 | 16.4 |
| Condensed and evaporated milk | 7.9 | 9.1 |
| Ice cream | 5.3 | 7.0 |
| Other | 1.0 | 1.9 |
| Total | 115.2 | 138.6 |

* These estimates of total demands for milk are based upon past consumption patterns of civilians and military personnel plus estimated demands for relief and lend-lease. Civilian incomes were estimated to be 15 per cent greater in 1943 than in 1942.

† Dried skim milk is included with the butter and cream. It is processed from the skim milk from these products.

Potential Supply of Milk

Even if we were not faced with critical labor shortages and had all the feed that could be fed to dairy cows, it is doubtful whether the expected shortages for 1943 could be eliminated. There is a definite physical limit to the increase in milk production which might be obtained. Milk output cannot be increased as rapidly as can the production of hogs or eggs. The total number of dairy cows cannot be increased overnight—at least two years is required for a heifer calf to become a producing cow. There are, of course, some cows that farmers are not planning to milk in 1943 that might be milked. But

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the number of these that could feasibly be brought into production will add little to total production. This means that the maximum number of cows which can be milked in 1943 is now virtually determined and that most of the increase in milk production which might be obtained must come from better feeding of existing cows. A total production somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent greater than that of 1942 is probably the outside limit of milk output that could be obtained in 1943. Much of this increased output would probably go into butter rather than into the more essential uses, so that even though we might increase production, our supplies of the most nutritive products would still be less than what will be required. Furthermore, increasing milk production may not be in line with the best use of our resources.

Shortages of Dairy Products

Thus, we may expect a difference of approximately 20 billion pounds between our production and our total demands for milk in 1943. Greater deficits may be expected for 1944 and 1945.

With existing policies, civilians may expect about the situation with respect to various dairy products in 1943 as is shown in Table 3.

What Can Be Done?

With shortages of dairy products looming, administrators directing our food policy have two principal alternatives:

(1) *Produce more.* How much more can and should we try to produce? We must answer this question in terms of the total war situation. If there are more important uses for our manpower, feed, and equipment than producing more milk, we must accept shortages rather than try to expand milk production. We should strive to produce more of some dairy products, but not try to increase production of all milk products.

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TABLE 3

| Product | Supplies Available in 1943 in Contrast With 1942 | Special Conditions Affecting Supply |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Fluid milk | About the same total amount available in 1943 as in 1942. Local demands may not be completely satisfied in the South, in the Pacific Coast area, and perhaps in New England | |
| Butter | About $\frac{2}{3}$ as much will be available for civilians as in 1942 | Production expected to be below last year. Thirty per cent of the butter produced is to be set aside for armed forces and for lend-lease. Storage stocks are very low |
| Cheese | About $\frac{5}{8}$ as much for civilians as in 1942 | One-half of American cheese production set aside for armed forces and lend-lease. Total cheese production, however, is expected to be the highest on record |
| Ice cream | Probably less than $\frac{2}{3}$ as much as in 1942 | WPB has ordered restriction of ice cream production to make more butterfat available for butter |
| Whipping cream | Cannot be sold | WPB order eliminated distribution of cream with a butterfat content of more than 19 per cent. This was to increase butterfat available for butter |
| Condensed and evaporated milk | About as much will be available as in 1942 | Evaporated milk production limited by shortage of steel for cans |
| Dried skim milk | Slightly more than 1942, and about the same amounts as in 1941 | Ninety per cent of spray-process dried skim milk is set aside for army and lend-lease |

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(2) *Divide existing supplies more equitably.* If the product in which there is a shortage has a national market and supplies can easily be shifted from area to area, a nation-wide rationing program is needed. If the supply shortage is local, as is likely to be the case with fluid milk, local programs are needed.

Waste in the Distribution of Fluid Milk

High costs of milk distribution have long been a sore spot in the relations between distributors and both milk producers and consumers. Duplication of delivery routes, the soliciting of customers, provision of special services, extremely high wage rates for milk-truck drivers—all of these have kept costs high. Distribution and bottling charges on a quart of milk delivered to a city consumer's door are about the same as the returns to milk producers.

These high distribution costs are coming in for much criticism at the present time for two important reasons.

(1) In many areas the costs of producing milk have increased, so that higher prices are necessary in order to pay increased wages and to meet other increases in costs. If distribution costs could be cut, then it would be possible to increase the farm prices without increasing prices paid by consumers.

(2) Reorganization of milk distribution could release many workers for other types of work and for the armed forces.

Topics To Be Discussed

As a basis for formulating suitable policies to direct the production of milk, the allocation of supplies among various dairy products, and the distribution of fluid milk, the following topics will be considered in some detail:

- A. The relative nutritional importance of various dairy products.
- B. Farm price policy for dairy products.
- C. Paying subsidies to milk producers.

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- D. Revision of sanitary standards.
- E. Deferment of dairy workers.
- F. Meeting local fluid milk shortages with supplementary dehydrated products.
- G. Margarine as a substitute for butter.
- H. Rationing dairy products.
- I. Reorganizing fluid milk distribution.

A. THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES AND NUTRITIONAL
IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS DAIRY PRODUCTS

Should an equal effort be made to maintain the supplies of all dairy products? The answer to this question obviously depends upon the importance of the various products in our diets, the returns secured from the feed and labor used to produce them, and the extent to which suitable low-cost substitutes can be obtained.

Milk provides us with many different food items. In terms of food value fluid milk ranks highest and butter lowest, as we shall show. Other products lie between these two extremes. No single food makes quite the same contribution to the diet as does whole milk, thus making it difficult to find suitable substitutes. Butter, however, has a very close nutritional substitute that can be produced at considerably less cost. These nutritional and cost differences provide the key to what should be done in milk.

We have neither unlimited feed nor unlimited labor with which to secure additional milk; the feed and labor necessary to produce it can also be employed in turning out other commodities. Hence we must compare the relative importance of separate dairy products with the other commodities which could be produced with this feed and labor before we decide whether or not we should increase or even maintain milk output. If the amount of dairy products we can expect to turn out with a given amount of feed and labor will be worth more to us in winning the war than the other products into

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which these resources might be converted, we should produce the dairy products. If the milk products will be worth less to us than the other commodities, we should not use the feed and labor to produce milk.

The importance of milk depends upon the use to which it is put. Milk going into butter, when the skim milk is not utilized for human consumption, is far less important in the human diet than is whole milk or milk products using all the milk solids. The proportion of the milk solids in any dairy product is an indication of its nutritional rating. In terms of the proportion of the total milk solids contained in them, the various dairy products rate about as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

| | |
|------------------------------------|------|
| Fluid milk | 100 |
| Dried skim or whole milk | 100* |
| Evaporated milk | 100 |
| Cheese | 62† |
| Butter | 30‡ |
| Fluid cream (40% B.F.) | 36‡ |

* Dried skim milk (or fluid skim milk) does not contain the butterfat contained in whole milk but does possess all of the other milk solids and is equivalent to fluid milk as a source of calcium and riboflavin, and the fat from the milk has already gone into butter.

† When the whey is not utilized for human consumption.

‡ When the skim milk is not utilized for human consumption.

Cheese contains virtually all the protein and fat in the milk, but lacks the milk sugar. A substantial proportion of the riboflavin and some of the other vitamins, as well as part of the calcium, is lost in the whey. Both butter and fluid cream contain substantially only the butterfat. However, neither butter production nor utilization of fluid cream need result in the loss of the rest of the milk solids if the skim milk is used for human consumption. About one-sixth of the skim milk by-product of butter is expected to be salvaged in the form of dried skim milk in 1943. Similarly, if the whey can be

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salvaged, cheese production need not result in the loss of riboflavin and other nutritive elements remaining in the whey.

To evaluate the importance of maintaining or increasing the milk supply, it is also necessary to examine the efficiency of various milk products in terms of the feed and labor used in producing them. Some of the feed and labor going to dairy cows might, for example, be used to produce beef cattle or hogs. Hence, it is also important to weigh the contribution of these commodities as well as various milk products in determining whether to produce meat or milk. Some important facts bearing on this decision are shown in Tables 5 and 6.

TABLE 5
RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF VARIOUS ANIMALS IN CONVERTING FEED INTO FOOD

| Animal | Average Calories in the Food as % of Calories in the Feed* | Average Pounds of Protein in the Animal Product per 100 lbs. Dry Matter in the Feed† |
|---------------------------------|--|--|
| Dairy cows (whole milk)..... | 17-25 | 4.6 |
| Dairy cows (butter)..... | 9-13 | † |
| Hogs..... | 20-35 | 2.0 |
| Beef cattle (beef steer)..... | 15-20 | 1.3 |
| Beef cattle (cow and calf)..... | 7-13 | 1.0 |

* Compiled from Armsby and Moulton, *The Animal as a Converter of Matter and Energy*, Chemical Catalog Co., New York, 1925.

† Compiled from W. H. Jordan, *The Feeding of Animals*, The Macmillan Co.; and from Henry C. Sherman, *Chemistry of Food and Nutrition*, The Macmillan Co.

‡ If the skim milk is not fed to hogs, this figure will be approximately zero, but if utilized by hogs, about 0.2 lbs. of proteins will be returned per 100 lbs. of dry matter in the feed. If the skim milk is utilized for human consumption the figure is 4.6—the same as whole milk.

If all the solids in the milk are utilized for human consumption the dairy cow compares favorably with other animals as a converter of feed into energy (calories). As converters of feed and labor into protein, dairy cows rate very high, if the whole milk is utilized. But the labor cost of providing food energy (calories) from milk is considerably greater than

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TABLE 6*
RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF VARIOUS CLASSES OF LIVESTOCK IN
CONVERTING LABOR INTO FOOD

| Animal | Index of Energy Produced in the Food per Man Hour Expended | Index of Protein Provided in the Food per Man Hour Expended |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Milk cow (whole milk) | 100 | 100 |
| Milk cow (butter) | 53 | 0 |
| Hogs | 219 | 98 |
| Beef cattle (steer) | 305 | 113 |

* This table is based upon average yearly labor requirements in the North Central States. These requirements were as follows:

1 cow: 130 hrs. for care, plus 30 hrs. for feed growing = 160 hrs.

1 steer: 8 hrs. for care, plus 24 hrs. for feed growing = 32 hrs.

1 sow and litter: 35 hrs. for care, plus 40 hrs. for feed growing = 75 hrs.

The cow was assumed to produce 5,000 lbs. of whole milk per year; the gain of the steer was 400 lbs.; and the gain of the litter of pigs was 1,125 lbs. (5 pigs, weighing 225 lbs. each).

It was assumed that the dairy cow maintained her weight during the year. However, the weight of the calf was not included, and the gain of the sow farrowing the pigs was not considered. Omission of these factors, however, does not alter the character of the results.

providing food energy from some meats. And if only the butterfat is made available for human food, the dairy cow rates very low as a source of either energy or proteins.

The importance of milk does not rest on its provision of energy (calories), but on the provision of (1) high quality protein, (2) calcium—a nutrient likely to be deficient in many American diets, and (3) the vitamin riboflavin—also a nutrient available in insufficient amounts in many diets. A quart of milk (either whole or skim milk) contains more than twenty times as much calcium as a pound of beef or pork; and milk also rates much above meat as a source of riboflavin. Although both calcium and riboflavin can be obtained from plant sources, with existing food customs increased intake of calcium and riboflavin can be achieved most readily by an increase in the consumption of fluid milk.

These facts make it obvious that milk is an efficient food in American diets only if the essential elements of the whole

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milk are all made available for human consumption. Consequently, we should not attach an equal degree of importance to each pound or gallon of milk produced in the United States.

The desirability of supplying our dietary needs for fat by producing milk for butter calls for further discussion. Fat can also be provided from hogs and from such plant sources as soybeans, flaxseed, cottonseed, and peanuts. Milk is not only an inefficient source of fat when compared with the other animal sources (see Tables 5 and 6), but it is even more inefficient when compared with the more important plant sources. As is indicated in Table 7, the pounds of fat yielded per acre and per man hour from butter are considerably less than those provided from hogs, peanuts, flaxseed, or soybeans.

TABLE 7
FAT YIELDS OF VARIOUS CROPS AND CLASSES OF LIVESTOCK IN
TERMS OF LAND AND LABOR REQUIREMENTS

| Product | Average lbs. of Fat Produced per Acre* | Average lbs. of Fat Produced per Man Hour Required for Care of Crops and Livestock |
|-----------------------------|--|--|
| Cottonseed..... | 69 | 0.5-1.0‡ |
| Soybeans..... | 160 | 13.3 |
| Flax..... | 172 | 14.3 |
| Peanuts..... | 214 | 2.7 |
| Hogs (0-225 lbs.) †..... | 190 | 13.0 |
| Hogs (225-325 lbs.) †..... | 265 | 18.5 |
| Dairy cows (butterfat)..... | 80 | 1.5 |

* Adapted from D. Gale Johnson and T. W. Schultz, *Price Policy and the Fats and Oils Problem*, Memo. No. 4, Elements of a Price Policy for Agriculture, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, Mimeographed.

† Fat returns on hogs of 0-225 lbs. weight assume that the hog is sold at a weight of 225 lbs. Returns on hogs of 225 to 325 lbs. are returns on the weight added after 225 lbs.

‡ Cotton (lint) is also a joint product.

A pound-for-pound comparison of fat yields may lead to erroneous conclusions if there are important differences in the qualities of the fats. Butter provides vitamin A. The

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importance of this vitamin in the diet was dramatically illustrated in World War I by the widespread occurrence in Denmark, of Xerophthalmia, a disease of the eyes, brought about by insufficient vitamin A. However, scientists have been able to produce vitamin A synthetically, and it is now being added to fats other than butter so that they are equal or superior to butter in vitamin A content. Butter, along with other animal fats, also contains certain fatty acids which are held by some to be essential to growth. There is, however, no evidence to indicate that any health hazard exists if butter is replaced by margarine made from vegetable or animal fats enriched with vitamin A.

A further factor must be taken into consideration when comparing the relative efficiency of securing fat from butter and other sources. The skim milk fed to hogs is not entirely wasted; but its indirect contribution to human food is considerably less than if it were directly consumed by humans. Other sources of fat also provide valuable feeds. Soybeans, peanuts and cottonseed provide, in addition to the fats, meals which are rich in proteins. And cotton is jointly produced with cottonseed.

An indication of the output of protein from various fat sources is given in Table 8.

To what kind of policy do these facts point? We cannot increase milk production enough to meet all demands. Consequently, it is important to concentrate attention on the maintenance or increase of the supply of those products that make all of the essential milk nutrients available for human consumption. If the skim milk is not being used for human food we should try to salvage it or shift the milk into uses other than butter. If this cannot be done we may want to shift the resources that have other uses out of butter production and into the production of more important commodities. Although butter may be a cheap source of fat where the labor and roughage cannot be used in turning out other products,

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TABLE 8
YIELDS OF PROTEIN FROM VARIOUS PLANT AND ANIMAL FAT SOURCES*

| Source | Pounds of Protein Yielded | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| | per Acre | per Man Hour |
| Cottonseed..... | 89 | 0.6-1.1 |
| Soybeans..... | 346 | 25 |
| Flax..... | 129 | 11 |
| Peanuts..... | 125 | 2 |
| Hogs, 225 lbs. wt..... | 65 | 3.7 |
| Hogs, 325 lbs. wt. †..... | 54 | 2.0 |
| Dairy cows (skim milk)..... | 89 | 1.5 |

* These comparisons are based on average yields and labor requirements. Obviously, the comparisons do not assume that the same land can be used to produce any of the products.

† Protein and fat added as the weight of the hog is increased from 225 lbs. to 325 lbs.

we must recognize that in many areas there are other sources of fat, both plant and animal, that bring much higher returns for the labor and other resources used than is returned from butter.

B. WHAT PRICE POLICY FOR MILK?

If we are to achieve an increase in the production of milk going into dairy products utilizing all of the essential milk solids, we must make more attractive the incentives which prompt farmers to produce milk for fluid use or for evaporated milk, dried skim milk, and cheese. This might mean taking steps to increase the prices farmers receive for milk or the payment of subsidies to milk producers. It may also mean deferring men from military service if they are necessary to produce milk for essential products.

We need our milk prices established not so that we will get increased production of milk as such, but so that we will encourage the output of milk for fluid use and for use in products which separately or jointly make use of the essential milk solids. Our prices should not encourage producing milk

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for butter alone. And prices should be such as to induce some farmers now producing milk for butter and feeding the skim milk to shift to selling whole milk, wherever it can be used as fluid milk or processed into products containing all the essential nutrients in the milk.

Obviously, such a price policy does not call for a general increase in all milk prices. In areas where high hog prices are contributing to decreased production of whole milk products, steps should be taken to increase the prices which farmers receive for milk if such increased prices will avert a further shift. Such areas are scattered. Some of this shift has been due to the labor shortage. Higher milk prices may not be a significant factor in bringing the labor back to the farms. They may, however, check a further shrinkage.

Since it is neither desirable nor possible for us to try to produce enough milk to meet all requirements, the realm in which price policy is likely to be most important is in connection with the allocation of given milk supplies among the various milk products. By adjusting the prices farmers receive for milk going into various uses so that the most profitable outlets are for milk going into the most desirable products, we would tend to allocate out supplies so that our demands for fluid milk are filled first; those for butter and fluid cream last. The spread between prices paid to farmers for milk going into fluid use or into whole milk products and milk going into butter alone has averaged about 50 cents per cwt. In some areas this spread might well be increased at least \$1.50 per cwt.

A pattern of milk utilization (see Table 2), in which about 40 per cent of the total milk produced goes into butter and only about one-sixth of the skim milk is recovered for human consumption, cannot be blamed upon either the farmers producing cream for butter or the creameries which make butter. The price pattern in some areas is still one which does not sufficiently discourage skimming the milk on the farm,

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selling the cream, and feeding the skim to livestock. If we want to recover this skim milk for human consumption, we must pay for it. When farmers shift from selling cream to selling whole milk, they no longer have the skim milk to feed. With the present shortages of protein feeds this skim milk may be worth as much as \$1.00 per cwt. as feed. In addition farmers must be compensated for taking the additional care necessary to handle the selling of whole milk. Many of the producers in areas where the milk might be shifted into whole milk products will need to make rather important changes in their equipment and production methods if they are to sell whole milk. From 30 cents to 50 cents per cwt. may be necessary to compensate farmers for this additional care. This means that in some areas farmers may have to be paid \$1.50 per cwt. more for whole milk than the returns which they would receive from selling cream.

C. SUBSIDIZING MILK PRODUCTION

Subsidies, like prices, are a means of inducing farmers to produce the kinds and amounts of commodities needed to win the war. In wartime, subsidy programs may also help to maintain retail price ceilings. Grants of this kind are one of the alternatives to higher prices. If a farmer or business man is unable to make ends meet with current ceiling prices and cost conditions, price ceilings must be altered or some other aid must be offered or the farmer or business man may be forced to suspend operations. The puncturing of a few price ceilings may endanger the entire price control program. Through a subsidy, the farmer producing milk or the distributor handling milk may be able to sell at established ceiling prices and still pay the prices necessary to obtain labor and materials.

In several cities subsidies were paid to milk distributors for a short period during the winter of 1942-43 in order to enable them to pay higher prices to farmers without advancing the

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prices charged to consumers and at the same time to maintain distribution margins. These subsidies aroused much criticism and were discontinued early in 1943. Much of the criticism levied against paying such subsidies to processors and distributors seems justified. If subsidies are used to maintain customary distributors' margins, there is less incentive for distributors to look for economies in operation than there would be if pressure on their margins were brought on by rising costs. There are many areas in fluid milk distribution where costs can and should be reduced. Such economies are more likely to be attained only if distributors are forced to make them.

A subsidy of $3\frac{3}{4}$ cents per pound is being paid to cheese processors. This subsidy is to enable cheese makers to pay a higher price for milk than they would otherwise be able to pay and at the same time avoids increasing retail cheese prices.

Incentive Payments

The Department of Agriculture has announced that it intends to apply to Congress for 250 million dollars to offer subsidies directly to milk producers in the form of "incentive payments." Although the details of this program have not yet been announced, it is assumed that these payments will be administered in about the same manner as the Department had planned to administer its "incentive payments" on certain war crops. A farmer may receive a payment of, say, \$1.50 or \$2.00 per cwt. for that part of his milk production which is between 90 per cent and 110 per cent of his production goal. This payment will be in addition to the returns he receives from selling his milk on the market.

Such "incentive payments" appear, upon first examination, to have many good features as a means for getting increased milk output. By this method the amount that might have to

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be spent in order to obtain a given increase in milk production may be less than if the same increase were encouraged by means of higher prices for milk. A price increase has to be paid on all production. The "incentive payment" is to be paid only on the additional production that would not take place at expected prices.

However, there are some very imposing administrative problems that need to be considered in connection with "incentive payments." One of these is the establishment of the production goals for the individual farms. Unless these goals are correctly established, much of the payment may be dissipated in paying for output that would have been produced without the subsidy. If the Department pays only for production between 90 per cent and 110 per cent of the farmer's production goal, it may be making a serious error. For example, if a farmer's goal should be established at less than 90 per cent of what he planned to produce without the subsidy, the "incentive payment" paid only on output between 90 per cent and 110 per cent of his goal will not be effective in inducing him to expand his production. He will not be receiving any incentive for producing more than he had already planned to produce. Much care should be taken in seeing that the goals are high enough. And in order to assure that the "incentive payments" are effective even though the goals may be underestimated, the payments should be made on *all* production in excess of 90 per cent of the goal.

The same general principles should be applied in administering "incentive payments" on milk as in establishing relative prices for milk going into various uses. If "incentive payments" are made to milk producers, they should be made only on milk going into fluid milk products using all of the milk solids, or cheese. There is little justification for granting any subsidy to encourage the production of milk for butter when the skim milk is not used for human consumption.

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Other Subsidies

To increase fluid milk supplies or to get an expansion in milk supplies suitable for essential dairy products may require considerable change in milk production methods in some areas. Cooling the milk, sterilizing the equipment, and keeping the milk free from foreign matter are some of the things which farmers will have to do if they switch from producing milk for butter production to milk for fluid use or for use in cheese or in manufactured products employing all of the milk solids. Subsidies might well be used most effectively in encouraging farmers to make the necessary shifts in the handling of their milk.

For example, subsidies might be paid to farmers to clean up their barns and equipment. This would be of particular importance in the Corn Belt, but would be of less importance in some of the metropolitan milksheds where a large proportion of the milk produced already meets necessary standard standards. Such subsidies might be offered only to those farmers making changes in their production methods so that their milk is acceptable for use as whole milk. They need not be offered to farmers already producing acceptable whole milk. And the payments might be non-recurring. They might be offered for only one year, for once the necessary changes have been made, the price spread between whole milk and cream for butter will probably be sufficient to maintain the gains resulting from the subsidy.

D. REVISION OF SANITARY STANDARDS

Whether milk can be channelled from butter into whole milk products, and particularly into fluid milk, depends a great deal upon the local sanitary standards established for whole milk. Meeting these standards may necessitate major alterations in the barns and other equipment now used by farmers selling cream for butter. Some sanitary standards cause the farmer considerable expense and are more rigorous

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than would be necessary to protect consumers' health. Farmers selling whole milk must, as a consequence, spend considerably more time in milking and caring for the milk, the dairy herd, and the equipment than is necessary merely to produce good quality milk. Revision of sanitary standards in many areas would help to increase the supplies of fluid milk, since it would reduce the costs of shifting to selling whole milk rather than cream for butter.

More uniform standards throughout the country would also make for better use of the nation's milk supplies. Unification of standards would make it easier to shift supplies from one milkshed to another and thus relieve some local shortages. But unification of standards should not mean the incorporation of the highest standards in all areas. It should mean establishing standards which meet necessary sanitary requirements and recognize the need for minimizing excessive use of labor and materials in producing the milk. Often special sanitary standards have been built up by local producers interested primarily in excluding competitors from the market, even though the competitive milk was safe for human consumption. Some requirements that increase costs are maintained in spite of the fact that careful investigations have shown that they do not make for safer milk. By setting sanitary standards solely from the point of view of health protection and not in the interest of milk producers who wish to exploit local consumers, much can be done to expand our supplies of fluid milk.

One of the most important steps which could be taken to unify sanitary standards and still adequately protect health would be to establish the requirements for the milk itself and reduce the requirements for barns, care of the cows, etc. Standards might be established which set up maximum bacteria counts, acidity, and foreign matter and odors in the milk. Milk not meeting such requirements could not be accepted. Herds might be tested only for tuberculosis and

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Bang's disease. This would force farmers to exercise reasonable care and cleanliness in handling the milk, but would not necessitate as many alterations in barns, milk houses, and other equipment as would be necessary if inspections of the cows and equipment were carried out as they are at present.

Pasteurization of the milk is already widespread except in areas where many small producer-distributors dominate the market. Pasteurized milk is not a substitute for clean milk. But adequate pasteurization destroys bacteria responsible for diseases and reduces the necessity for inspections of both cows and equipment. Where pasteurization is not feasible because of the lack of materials for pasteurizing equipment or because of the small volume of milk handled, herds and facilities might be inspected more rigorously. And if raw milk sales are maintained in the larger markets where pasteurization also prevails, only the milk which is not pasteurized need meet the requirements for raw milk.

Unification of sanitary standards is a necessary step toward coordination and integration of milk markets in order to facilitate the interchange of fluid milk supplies. Local shortages of fluid milk have in many instances been averted by arrangements to supplement supplies from other nearby sources. This means breaking down the limits of many milk sheds. The number of producers supplying any market can be determined primarily through sanitary inspection. Unification of standards imposing homogeneous requirements on the milk itself will enlarge the market as well as enable interchange of supplies between markets.

E. DEFERRING DAIRY WORKERS FROM MILITARY SERVICE

There is little question but that a shortage of farm workers looms as a very important factor in limiting milk production. More than one-half of the milk cows on farms in the United States in 1939 were in herds of nine cows or less and could probably be handled by the farm operator and his family.

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Many of these herds were, however, located in the butter-producing areas where the milk that is produced goes into the less important uses from a dietary standpoint. Many of the herds serving the fluid milk markets require labor in addition to that of the farm operator and his family.

TABLE 9

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NUMBERS OF COWS IN VARIOUS SIZES OF HERD GROUPS, 1939*

| Size of Herd | Percentage of Total No. of Cows | Percentage of Total No. of Cows in Herds of This Size or Smaller |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| 1 to 4..... | 27.2 | 27.2 |
| 5 to 9..... | 27.7 | 54.9 |
| 10 to 14..... | 17.6 | 72.5 |
| 15 to 19..... | 9.9 | 82.4 |
| 20 to 29..... | 8.8 | 91.2 |
| 30 to 49..... | 4.9 | 96.1 |
| 50 to 74..... | 1.7 | 97.8 |
| 75 to 99..... | 0.7 | 98.5 |
| 100 to 199..... | 0.9 | 99.4 |
| 200 and over..... | 0.6 | 100.0 |
| All..... | 100.0 | |

* Data are compiled from U.S.D.A. sources.

Although the reports of dairy herd liquidation for slaughter appear to present an inaccurate picture of the actual situation, there seems to be little doubt that the exodus of farm workers into industry and into the armed forces has made it extremely difficult to expand milk production on farms requiring hired labor. A very large part of the fluid milk comes from these farms.

Increasing farm wage rates will, for the most part, be ineffective in bringing the labor back to the farms or in keeping it from moving into industry or the armed forces. Most of the movement of labor will be the result of non-wage factors. In its suggestions to local draft boards relative to the deferment of farm workers from military service, the War Manpower

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Commission has given the handling of dairy cows a high rating. This may check the drain, and in some instances might actually increase labor on dairy farms.

The advisability of deferring farm workers for producing milk depends primarily upon the manner in which the milk is to be used. Labor employed in producing milk for butter when the skim milk can not be used for human consumption could, in many instances, be employed much more effectively in the armed forces, in war industry, or in raising hogs or such oil crops as soybeans and flax. Just as the prices for milk should vary with the use to which the milk is put, so should the rating of dairying as a basis for farm labor deferment vary with the use to which the milk is put. Workers employed in producing milk for fluid use or for use in whole milk products or cheese should be given much more consideration than workers employed in producing milk for butter, if the skim milk is not used for human consumption.

It should be recognized that much of the milk going into butter is produced on small farms employing family labor, while the milk going into fluid milk or cheese and whole milk products is primarily from larger herds. This means that the policy suggested above will not force a great shift of resources out of butter production; but it will recognize the desirability of differentiating between milk used for butter and for whole milk products in the formulation of our production policies.

E. MEETING LOCAL SHORTAGES WITH SUPPLEMENTARY EVAPORATED AND DRIED MILK

Diversion of milk into fluid use in quantities sufficient to meet all requirements might not be impossible. But a more economical means of meeting consumers' requirements for milk solids would be to supplement local sources of supply with dried and evaporated milk. Transportation of fluid

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milk for great distances involves considerable specialized equipment and much care in handling. If dried and evaporated milk could be used to supplement whatever local supplies are available, much of the transport and handling problem could be eliminated.

Of course one cannot supplement fluid milk supplies with these dehydrated products if sufficient supplies of them are not available. Because of the ease in storing and shipping dried skim milk, much of it is being reserved for our allies and our armed forces overseas.

Although civilians will have slightly more dried skim milk in 1943 than they had last year, it will still be a relatively small item. Very little of the dried skim milk produced in 1943 will be available for household use; most of that available to civilians will go to bakeries, confectioners, and ice cream makers. The use of dried skim milk in bread might well be increased. There is a marked deficiency of calcium and riboflavin in the diets of many low-income consumers, and supplementing their diets by providing the calcium and riboflavin through bread may be an efficient means of improving the health of many consumers. It might be well to direct a large part of our supplies of dried milk into use in bread, thus making available less for ice cream makers and confectioners. Bread is consumed by nearly everyone in relatively large quantities. Ice cream and candy consumption is highest in the upper income brackets where the calcium and riboflavin deficiency is less important than it is in the lower income brackets.

Evaporated milk output in 1943 will not be increased because some of the steel needed for cans is being directed to other uses. In order to assure that whatever supplies of evaporated and dried milk we have are used most advantageously, we may also need to allocate them to areas where fluid milk supplies are short. This might mean that in areas

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where fluid milk is plentiful, less evaporated and dried milk would be made available, the bulk of supplies being reserved for areas where there are fluid milk shortages.

By relocating facilities for drying milk and by increasing the steel allocation for canning evaporated milk, however, we may be able to provide considerably more dried milk and evaporated milk than is now scheduled to be produced in 1943. Evaporated milk output could be increased nearly 45 per cent with existing facilities, provided the cans were available. This would leave available for civilian consumption nearly twice as much evaporated milk as will be provided under the present 1943 schedule.

Some of the rollers used in producing roller-process dried milk might be shifted from areas where milk supplies are so short that a roller can be operated for only a few hours each day to areas where they can be operated full-time. Some new spray-process drying plants are being planned. These should also be located in areas where they can be operated full-time. The most imposing problem to be solved in trying to get increased output of dried skim milk is to locate the plants in areas where sufficient milk to keep the plant operating at full-time can be obtained without transporting the milk for great distances. The volume of skim milk fed to livestock in Iowa in 1941 was equal to 500 million lbs. of dried skim milk. It is estimated that out of this quantity only from 20 to 30 million pounds of additional dried skim milk could have feasibly been obtained because of the costs involved in concentrating and transporting the milk from the many small scattered producers.

Milk for dried or evaporated milk must be virtually equivalent in quality to milk for fluid use. This means that so far as quality is concerned producers in the large fluid milk sheds might supply milk for dried and evaporated purposes somewhat easier than it could be supplied in the primary butter-producing areas. Fewer farmers would have to make im-

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portant changes in their production methods in the milksheds than in the butter areas. And the problem of concentrating supplies would be somewhat less imposing. Considerable cheese is also manufactured in the city milksheds in the north central states, but enough milk would probably be available to enable some increases in the production of evaporated and dried milk and some increase in cheese, but butter production would have to be decreased.¹

G. SUBSTITUTING MARGARINE FOR BUTTER

It is clear that consumers' demands for many customary foods cannot be fully satisfied if we are to mobilize our resources most effectively for war. We will not be able, for example, to produce as much butter as consumers will want to purchase. And it will also be necessary to reduce consumption of fats as a whole considerably below the level of last year. However, civilian morale may be kept at a high level within the framework of resources available for the production of civilian goods if we make available substitutes which alter consumption patterns as little as possible and can be supplied at low costs. We cannot afford to shift men and feed into producing more butter. But we can probably afford to increase the production of some other fats, and to expand the processing of margarine.

On the basis of average returns received from resources employed in producing milk for butter and in producing vegetable oils, one-half of the crop land and one-eighth of the labor necessary to turn out our butter would produce enough vegetable oils which, when converted into margarine,

¹ Reduction in butter output would not be necessary if only dried skim milk production were increased, for butter and this product are produced jointly, and do not compete with each other for the raw material—whole milk. However, cheese, evaporated milk, fluid milk, and butter (or dried skim milk) compete against each other for the whole milk supply, and increases in production of any one of the products necessitates a reduction in the output of one or all of the others unless the milk supply itself is also increased.

could entirely displace butter. Margarine compares favorably with butter both in nutritive value and palatability.

But in spite of the food value and efficiency of margarine, dairy interests have been rather effective in suppressing its use. There are high Federal taxes on colored margarine. At least half of the states have enacted excise taxes on margarine; one-third of the states have imposed license fees on retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers of margarine; thirty-one states prohibit the sale of colored margarine. While these restrictions do not prohibit the sale of margarine, some of them do have the effect of increasing its cost to consumers. Others increase the difficulty of breaking down the popular belief that margarine is definitely inferior as a food.

We probably need to re-examine the entire margarine situation. The War Production Board has increased the 1943 allocation of fats to 80 per cent above the amount used in 1941. This is equivalent to an increase of less than 2 pounds per capita over our production of last year. Since butter supplies available for civilians will leave us about 5 pounds less per capita than we had last year, the margarine allotment for 1943 might be at least triple the amount used in 1941. Apart from requiring accurate labeling of the product and the preservation of sanitary methods of manufacture, we also need to abolish the restrictions on the sale and manufacture of margarine. We might even go so far as to allow its being colored to resemble butter; and we certainly should allow its being flavored to maximize its palatability.

But in order to make available more margarine we may have to expand the facilities for its manufacture. It is doubtful whether margarine production in 1943 could be double that of 1942 without additional processing capacity, since 1942 production was the highest on record and little additional facilities for its manufacture were constructed.

Making more margarine available does not force consumers to use more of it. Consumers apparently prefer to maintain

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their consumption of fat spreads—butter and margarine—even though this may mean less of other fats. Processing vegetable fats into margarine is somewhat more costly than processing them into cooking compounds. But the differences in costs are small enough to make it relatively inexpensive for us to follow consumers' preferences in providing more margarine and less cooking fats rather than less fat spreads and a greater quantity of cooking fats.

H. RATIONING DAIRY PRODUCTS²

Adoption of the policies suggested in this study would make more acute the butter shortage, although it would provide more margarine to take its place. In addition it is unlikely that we shall be able to increase the production of cheese and evaporated and dried milk sufficiently to meet expected requirements. Consequently, in order to insure equitable distribution of available supplies among consumers, rationing of some or all dairy products may be necessary.

Many local fluid milk shortages can be handled by supplementing these local supplies with fluid milk from nearby markets where there are surpluses. If the shortages are not confined to a local area but are regional in character, as is apparently true in much of the south, importation of milk from more distant sources or the use of dehydrated products must be resorted to. When shortages become so acute and so widespread as to make supplementation no longer feasible, rationing of fluid milk in the shortage areas to provide equitable distribution of the short supplies should probably be undertaken. Fluid milk rationing for the nation as a whole, however, does not seem necessary so long as our annual milk production totals 110 billion pounds or more, if we see to it that fluid milk has priority on all feasible supplies.

² One of the pamphlets in this series is devoted to a discussion of consumer rationing. Consequently, the present analysis will be framed in very general terms pointing toward only a few of the considerations involved in rationing milk products.

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If the necessity for rationing fluid milk should arise in some localized areas, fluid milk can be included in the group of foods in which is also included evaporated milk and dried skim milk (if such is available for household use). In rationing evaporated milk, differences between the consumption patterns of small children and adults should be recognized, so that ample quantities will be available for children.

Rationing of butter can probably be most easily accomplished by including butter in a group of fats and oils, and assigning points so that the fats which cost least in terms of men and materials can be easily substituted for butter. Cheese might well be in a block of protein foods—meats, eggs, poultry, etc.

I. REORGANIZING MILK DISTRIBUTION.

The present organization of fluid milk distribution is unquestionably one which wastes a great deal of much-needed manpower and materials. One could hardly say that the men employed in distributing fluid milk are loafing. But one can point to many places where important savings of labor and equipment could be made if the present delivery system were reorganized. Duplication of routes, provision of special services, etc., was often questioned during peacetime; this criticism is even more justified during the war when we are in need of all available manpower for use in the military service and in war industry, and when we need to conserve such materials as rubber and automobiles for the long pull ahead. Some consumers have been glad to pay for all services given. However, in many instances consumers have been offered no other alternatives. They were seldom given the opportunity to buy fewer special services with their milk and pay a lower price. Many state and federal milk markets have established the same minimum prices for milk sold out of stores as for milk delivered to the consumer's doorstep. And

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distributors in many small markets establish their prices and discounts so that there is actually a higher price for milk sold in stores than for home-delivered milk.

Even if consumers do generally prefer the present milk distribution pattern to one which provides fewer services but at a lower price, this does not provide a valid basis for continuation of the present pattern during the war. Already those in charge of directing war production have eliminated many products from the list available for civilian consumption. And milk delivered to the consumer's doorstep by one of several distributors might well be another war casualty.

Some steps have already been taken to conserve manpower and materials in milk distribution. Pints and half-pints of milk are no longer delivered to consumers. The Office of Defense Transportation has suggested that the frequency of deliveries by any distributor to any consumer be reduced to one every other day. In some cities alternate day delivery has enabled distributors to reduce the number of trucks and delivery men employed in distributing the milk, but in other areas there has been little saving, for few route trucks have been eliminated and the size of the labor force has not been markedly reduced. Distributors have estimated that the savings from alternate day delivery have amounted to from $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ cents per quart.

Such savings should not be considered insignificant. But alternate day delivery does not eliminate duplication of milk routes, the most important source of waste in milk distribution. The luxury of four or five milk wagons going down the same city street, each serving every fourth or fifth family, can no longer be afforded during the war. Such duplication could be eliminated by any one of several means.

(1) Retail deliveries could be abandoned and consumers could be served only through stores.

(2) Deliveries might be pooled; i.e., one truck might carry

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the milk of several distributors, each consumer continuing to exercise some choice as to the distributor whose milk will be purchased.

(3) Delivery territory within any city might be zoned or allocated. Each distributor would then confine his delivery operations to one district in which he would be the sole operator. Consumers within the district would be forced to either take the milk of the sole distributor in the district or buy milk from the stores.

Whether adoption of the first alternative, abandonment of retail deliveries, would be feasible depends upon a number of factors. Refrigeration facilities in stores in cities where a large proportion of the milk is home-delivered might be insufficient to take care of the additional volume of milk which would be sold out of stores. Then, too, consumers might waste considerable time and materials in getting the milk from the store to the kitchen. The use of paper cartons rather than bottles has generally increased the popularity of store milk (except in cases where a higher price has been charged for milk sold in cartons than for milk sold in bottles), and using paper cartons might make the elimination of home deliveries more palatable to consumers.

The second alternative, pooling of deliveries, would undoubtedly effect a considerable saving in materials. Distributors might concentrate their milk at a single loading station, and each truck would be loaded with the various brands of milk. Consumers could continue to choose the brand of milk they wished to consume. But labor costs might not be decreased a great deal by this method of distribution. The labor involved in sorting out one brand from another within the truck would increase labor requirements on the truck somewhat above their present level. And additional labor would also be involved in loading operations. Travel and tires, however, would be saved.

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Zoning of delivery territory appears to offer the greatest opportunity for effecting savings in distribution. Consumers would have no choice as to which brand of milk was delivered to them, but they might patronize the stores. Some difficulty in allocating territory might also arise. The allocation would probably be most acceptable to distributors if it gave to each an opportunity to maintain his proportionate share of the market. Where the bulk of the distributors are small operators or are producer-distributors, this plan would effect savings primarily in materials.

A part of any savings that are effected by rationalization of milk distribution should be passed on to consumers, since they are receiving less service with their milk. Distributors' profits should probably not be reduced below the level which would have prevailed in the absence of such reorganization or distributors will undoubtedly provide violent opposition.

Whether allocation of delivery territories would be desirable after the war depends upon the success of the plan during the war. If consumers prefer the reduced selection of milk at a reduced price, the program might well be maintained. Much of the competition between distributors, if there is such, would be eliminated, however, and rather rigorous public control of prices and quality would be necessary.


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FARM *and* FOOD POLICY

———— Pamphlet No. **5** in the Series ————

PUTTING DAIRYING on a WAR FOOTING
{*Revised Edition*}

by O. H. BROWNLEE



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FOREWORD

The publication of Pamphlet No. 5 under the title "Putting Dairying on a War Footing" in March, 1943, was followed by protests on the part of certain dairy and farm groups. Representatives of these groups urged:

- a. That some of the statements made in the pamphlet were incorrect in whole or in part or were inadequately documented through reference to source material.
- b. That certain statements were ambiguous or at least were subject to misinterpretation.
- c. That some topics were amplified in the discussion quite beyond that needed to establish the main thesis of the publication. The topics particularly criticized as over-amplified or not pertinent were: those concerning sanitary regulations as trade barriers, the competitive relationships of oleomargarine and butter, and the efficacy of taxation as a means of preventing misbranding and fraud. It was urged that a disservice was rendered to the dairy industry by discussion of the comparative nutritive values of oleomargarine and butter and the significance of state taxes as trade barriers.

Freedom on the part of the members of a research staff such as that of an agricultural experiment station to publish their findings is axiomatic. When publication is regularly or officially sponsored by the station, the manuscripts are reviewed by a staff committee. This is to insure as far as practicable that there be factual reliability in the statements, that the material be presented with real regard to objectivity and without bias, and that the presentation be reasonably adequate from an educational standpoint.

"Putting Dairying on a War Footing" deals with some of the problems in the production and distribution of dairy products. The analysis here presented is not designed to guide producers and consumers in these current operations. In our society these operations are obviously to be conducted as these

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individuals see fit within the framework of existing policies. However, individuals are interested in the effectiveness of current policies in achieving the objectives for which these policies are designed.

The Wartime Farm and Food Policy series, which included Pamphlet No. 5, was not an official publication series of the Agricultural Experiment Station. However, upon the appearance of the pamphlet it became evident that many readers assumed that it was a Station-sponsored publication. In view of this misunderstanding, it was agreed that the Agricultural Experiment Station should assume responsibility. It was further agreed that the author should be invited to prepare a revision which would follow the standard review procedures used with manuscripts for sponsored publications of the Station--procedures which had not been previously followed for pamphlets in this series.

The author, on the basis of the criticisms and suggestions concerning the first edition, has prepared a revision and enlargement. The analysis has been redirected toward further consideration of some of the developments which have occurred during the past year and with some forward look toward those which may be expected in the near future. In consequence, some of the points made in the previous analysis have been given added emphasis, some have been omitted, and new points have been included. Particularly has the author documented the discussion more fully. He has endeavored to show the pertinence of the survey of certain controversial items to the main purpose of the pamphlet. The manuscript was submitted to a committee of staff members of the Agricultural Experiment Station for review--the regular procedure for sponsored publications. It has been approved for publication. To the author and to the committee the thanks of the Agricultural Experiment Station are due for the patience and care used in preparation and review.

R. E. Buchanan,
DIRECTOR

SUMMARY¹

This study is a review of prospective supplies and demands for dairy products in 1944 together with an appraisal of some of the national policies which could be followed in meeting the problems growing out of the dairy situation.

1. The amounts of dairy products required in 1944 for lend lease, for the military forces, and for feeding liberated countries, plus the quantities which consumers will be willing to purchase at ceiling prices, are expected to be considerably greater than the quantities produced. Demands for milk for all uses may aggregate 140 billion pounds or more. Milk production for all uses is expected to be about 115 billion pounds.

2. Although there have been and will be shortages of nearly all dairy products in some areas, supplies of butter, cheese, evaporated milk, and dried skim milk are likely to be proportionately furthest below demands.

3. Because of the high nutritive value and relatively low resource costs of whole milk and milk products utilizing jointly or separately all of the milk solids, efforts should be made to stimulate increased production of milk in areas where all of the milk solids can feasibly be made available for human consumption. Increased production of milk for such uses can be most easily encouraged by increasing the returns which farmers receive for whole milk. Ordinarily, such encouragement could be offered by increasing the prices for milk. However, given the existing economic and political framework within which the war economy is functioning, the payment of subsidies may offer a more practical alternative than would increased milk prices.

¹This project is based on studies carried on under Project 818 of the Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College. These studies were aided by a grant from the Division of the Social Sciences of the Rockefeller Foundation, New York.

Acknowledgments of the professional contributions made by individuals appear at the end.

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4. A net addition to the nation's food supply could be achieved at relatively low costs if larger quantities of the non-fat milk solids now being fed to livestock could be diverted into human consumption. The most feasible method for obtaining such food is through increasing the production of dried skim milk. Increased production of dried skim milk can be encouraged by:

- a. Increasing the prices for dried skim milk or by paying subsidies to milk producers to increase their returns from selling whole milk rather than cream.
- b. Paying subsidies to milk producers for adjusting their production methods and securing equipment so that they can produce whole milk acceptable for the manufacture of dried skim milk.
- c. Indicating to farmers the ways in which the amounts of skim milk fed to livestock might be reduced.

5. Even though steps are taken to get additional milk produced for products utilizing all of the milk solids, and greater amounts of non-fat milk solids are diverted into human consumption, there will still be shortages of some dairy products. Additional butter could be provided without increasing the total output of milk or decreasing the total production of other dairy products if the fat content of butter was lowered or if the butterfat content of such products as fluid milk, evaporated and condensed milk, dried whole milk, and cheese was reduced and the butterfat thus extracted was diverted into butter. Another alternative which could also be employed to minimize any adverse effects of these expected shortages upon the general level of nutrition and morale is the provision of additional quantities of acceptable low-cost alternative foods.

6. The provision of satisfactory alternative foods to make up for shortages of fluid milk, cheese, evaporated milk, and dried milk probably would prove extremely difficult. Although various combinations of foods are satisfactory as nutritional substitutes, few are likely to be highly acceptable

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in the diets of many consumers. Furnishing consumers with an alternative fat spread to make up for any shortage of butter may be less difficult. Although there are many fats which could be substituted for butter, the most generally acceptable fat spread now available is oleomargarine. The increasing reliance of our population upon such foods as bread, the complementarity with bread of fat spreads, and the possibility that consumers may prefer maintenance of the usual butterfat content in other dairy products rather than more butter are among the factors which bring up for critical re-examination the whole system of restrictions that have been placed upon the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine.

7. Equitable distribution of existing supplies of dairy products is necessary to maximizing both health and morale. Consumer rationing of butter, cheese, and evaporated milk in a group of foods including meats and fats and oils has been in effect for some time. Limitations on the quantities of fluid milk which might be sold have also been established in many of the larger cities. Such limitations have been invoked in many markets to divert milk away from fluid use and into manufactured dairy products. Unless all of the milk solids from the milk thus diverted are made available for human consumption, such limitations do not appear desirable.

8. Limiting fluid milk consumption by invoking limitations upon the sales of distributors is a procedure involving fewer administrative complexities than would point rationing. The general level of fluid milk consumption is relatively high in the areas where such limitations have been invoked. There have been few sizeable reductions in supplies to distribute among individual consumers.

However, if nationwide fluid milk rationing is undertaken or if large reductions in consumption are necessary in the areas where milk sales are now limited, rationing of milk in a manner similar to that by which meats, fats, and oils, and some other foods are rationed, is likely to prove most equitable. Fluid milk, fluid cream, and evaporated milk

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could, under such circumstances, constitute a group of foods to be rationed by points.

9. Some of the postwar implications of wartime developments in the dairy industry are listed in the final section.

I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

This pamphlet is an analysis of some alternative solutions to problems arising because, during the war period, the available supplies of milk and dairy products will be less than the demands. Because of their importance in the human diet, careful study is desirable to analyze how best to put production, distribution, and consumption of dairy products on a war footing.

Milk is recognized as one of man's most useful and satisfactory foods. The nutritional value of milk rests on several bases. Its proteins are of high quality; it contains relatively large amounts of calcium as well as several of the other minerals essential to health; and it is also a source of many of the vitamins—vitamin A, riboflavin, and thiamin being present in relatively large quantities. Milk also contains fat and carbohydrate. These nutritive characteristics have given dairy products a prominent place in the seven groups of basic foods recommended by the United States Department of Agriculture as foods which should be included daily in the diet for the maintenance of optimal health and vigor.¹ Nutritionists suggest that wherever feasible each child should consume at least one quart of milk and each adult one pint of milk daily.

The war has emphasized the need for milk and its products. It is believed that few other foods contribute as much to both human nutrition and civilian morale. Important changes have occurred during the last three years in both the consumption and production of dairy products. About one-fifth of the total milk products (in terms of whole milk equivalent)

¹The seven groups of basic foods, as recommended by the U. S. Department of Agriculture are: (1) green and yellow vegetables; (2) oranges, tomatoes, grapefruit; (3) potatoes and other vegetables and fruits; (4) milk and milk products; (5) meat, poultry, fish, or eggs; (6) bread, flour, and cereals; (7) butter and fortified oleomargarine.

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has been going to the military agencies, lend-lease, and other non-civilian uses. It seems very likely that UNNRA² will draw upon the United States for milk and milk products. Civilian demands for dairy products have increased, primarily because of a substantial increase in per capita income. Studies of consumption patterns indicate that average individual consumption of most dairy products varies directly with per capita income. Civilian incomes available for expenditure on consumers' goods aggregated about 40 per cent greater in 1943 than in 1941.³

To meet certain problems arising from shortages⁴ of dairy products, butter, cheese, and evaporated milk are being rationed to consumers. Sales of fluid milk and cream have been or are to be limited in many areas. Ice cream production has been curtailed, and the butterfat content of fluid cream has been limited to a maximum of 18 per cent. Special attempts are being made to maintain or expand the production of milk by such means as the payment of subsidies on milk and butterfat, deferment of farm workers from military service, and the provision of equipment and materials needed to increase the production of dried skim milk.

In spite of the various measures that have been adopted, shortages of dairy products are occurring frequently. There have been local shortages of fluid milk, particularly in industrial areas. Butter has not always been available to prospective buyers in consuming centers distant from the primary production areas. Many consumers have been unable to purchase cheddar and certain other types of cheese. Dried skim milk production has not kept pace with the demand. Total domestic milk production in 1943 was about 118 bil-

² United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Authority.

³ See *Survey of Current Business*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, December, 1943.

⁴ The term "shortage" as used in this analysis refers to the difference between the aggregate amounts of a commodity which consumers are willing to take from the market at given prices and the amounts which are available for them to purchase at these prices. Consequently, as prices to consumers are increased a "shortage" may become smaller (there being no change in supplies, consumers' incomes or other prices), since the amounts which consumers are willing to buy vary inversely with price.

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lion pounds.³ This is estimated to be approximately 18 per cent short of the total amount which would have been taken from the market at prices prevailing during the year.

Consumer demand for various dairy products probably will continue at least as great and possibly greater during 1944 than in 1943. Military needs are likely to be as large or larger in 1944 than they were in 1943. Lend-lease requirements, coupled with demands of UNRRA for feeding the peoples of occupied countries, probably will exceed the amounts taken for these purposes during the past year. The demand for dairy products in the aggregate—non-civilian requirements plus the amounts which civilian consumers probably will wish to purchase at established prices—will be about as indicated in table 1.

TABLE 1
EXPECTED SUPPLIES AND DEMANDS FOR VARIOUS DAIRY PRODUCTS, 1944

| Product | Expected Demand ^a (Millions of Lbs.) | Expected Supplies ^b (Millions of Lbs.) | Expected Deficit (Millions of Lbs.) |
|--|--|--|--|
| Fluid milk and cream (whole milk equivalent)..... | 57,000 | 53,000 | 4,000 |
| Butter..... | 2,600 | 2,000 | 600 |
| Cheese..... | 1,400 | 980 | 420 |
| Condensed and evaporated milk... | 4,000 | 3,300 | 700 |
| Ice cream..... | 7,000 | 5,000 | 2,000 |
| Dried whole milk..... | 130 | 130 | 0 |
| Dried skim milk..... | 1,100 | 525 | 575 |
| All milk and milk products (Whole milk equivalent)..... | 145,000 | 120,000 | 25,000 |

^a These estimates of demands for dairy products at expected ceiling prices have been prepared by the author and are based upon past consumption patterns of civilians and military personnel plus expected demands for feeding liberated countries and for lend-lease. Civilian demands are estimated from data on per capita consumption of various products by consumers in various income classes in 1935-36, adjustments having been made for changes in the amount and distribution of income available for expenditure on food.

^b Estimated from unpublished data prepared by the War Food Administration and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture.

³ Statistics on production of milk and of various dairy products used throughout this analysis are based on data furnished by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, and the War Food Administration.

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Official estimates indicate that milk production in 1944 for the nation as a whole probably will not exceed that of 1943 and may be about 4 billion pounds less than it was in 1942. (See table 2.) If this prediction is a reliable one, the difference between the estimated total demand for milk during 1944 and the amount which will be available to consumers

TABLE 2
MILK PRODUCTION ON FARMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1935-44

| Year | Total Production* (Billions of Pounds) | Production per Capita (Pounds) |
|----------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1944 (expected)..... | 115 | 841 |
| 1943..... | 118 | 872 |
| 1942..... | 119 | 888 |
| 1941..... | 115 | 867 |
| 1940..... | 111 | 844 |
| 1939..... | 109 | 836 |
| 1938..... | 107 | 827 |
| 1937..... | 103 | 802 |
| 1936..... | 103 | 807 |
| 1935..... | 101 | 796 |

* Data are compiled from *Agricultural Statistics*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1941, table 579; 1942, table 600; and *The Dairy Situation*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Sept., 1943.

will be about 30 billion pounds. (Refer to table 1.) The manner in which this deficit will be distributed among the various dairy products is extremely difficult to forecast, since it will depend primarily upon the various price and rationing policies which are followed.

Such policies are subject to change and cannot be accurately forecasted. However, it is likely that the gaps between expected demands and available supplies will be proportionately greatest for dried skim milk, cheese, ice cream, butter, and fluid cream (see table 1).

The magnitude of these prospective gaps between demands and supplies may appear to be disturbing. However, there are adjustments in production and consumption of milk and milk products which can minimize any adverse effects which such shortages may have upon the health or morale of consumers.

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Any effective program designed to cope with this problem will have numerous and intricate ramifications. The adjustments are national in scope. Milk production is not confined to a homogeneous area. Production conditions between farms are often quite diverse. Thousands of dairy farmers, processors, and distributors would be affected by any action program to stimulate given production and consumption patterns; their acceptance and cooperation are essential if the program is to succeed. Furthermore, consumers' interests must also be considered. These conditions render a simple analysis extremely difficult.

The following pages present an analysis of various alternative courses of action which might be taken to encourage the kinds of production and consumption which appear most desirable, given the framework within which the nation's economic organization is likely to function during the war.

II. WARTIME ADJUSTMENTS IN THE OUTPUT OF DAIRY PRODUCTS

Adjustments which could be made in the production of dairy products fall essentially into two categories: (1) increasing the production of milk for all uses, and (2) shifting the use of the milk that is produced. Adjustments of the first kind would make it possible to increase the output of one or more products without reducing the output of other products. Making better use of the milk that is produced, however, involves a reallocation of the total milk supply or its components in terms of the proportions which go into the various products.

A. Kinds of Adjustments Which Could Be Encouraged

1. Increasing Milk Production for All Uses

a. *The physical limits to wartime increases in milk production.* The quantity of milk produced in any given year is the product of the number of cows milked and the average amount which each cow produces. Thus, milk production may be increased by increasing the number of cows milked or the average annual production per cow. But there are rather definite physical limits to the increases which might be obtained in 1944 in either the number of cows milked or average production per cow.

Increasing the cow population is normally a relatively slow process. About two years usually elapse from the time the heifer calf is dropped until she begins to produce milk. A large percentage of the heifers is required to maintain the cow population--to replace cows eliminated from production. Consequently, in 1944 the steps that can be taken to increase the number of cows milked are limited primarily to measures which will bring into production cows which would otherwise not be milked. For example, herds could be

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less severely culled, thus maintaining some cows in production for a longer-than-normal period; or cows which are potentially lower-than-average producers and would otherwise be slaughtered, could be saved for milk production; or cows now being kept primarily for beef production could be milked. About 10 billion pounds of milk might be added to total production in 1944 if all cows able to produce 2,000 pounds or more a year, but which are not now in production, were milked.

By increasing the amounts of feed—particularly feed grains—fed to milk cows, production of milk might be increased as much as 25 per cent on some farms. Increases of this magnitude, however, would require very large increases in the grain consumption of dairy cows, and would not be possible on all farms even though the grain were available. An increase in milk production of 5 to 10 per cent (or 6 to 12 billion pounds) over 1943 is probably the maximum which could be expected from heavier feeding of existing cows.

b. *The desirability of attaining maximum milk output.* Through bringing more cows into production and feeding dairy cows at heavier rates, milk production could be increased considerably—possibly enough to satisfy expected demands for all dairy products in 1944.

Unlimited amounts of feed, labor, and materials, however, will not be available. Increased feed intake of cows would have to be primarily feed grains diverted from use by other kinds of livestock. Similarly, some of the additional labor that would be required to increase the output of dairy products is now being used in turning out other foods or war materials. An appraisal of the desirability of increasing milk production should take into consideration the relative efficiencies of producing given amounts of food nutrients by various alternative means. Comparisons should deal with (1) the relative efficiencies with which various kinds of livestock convert feed into food, and (2) the relative efficiencies with which various kinds of livestock convert labor into food.⁶

⁶ Some data relating to these comparisons are presented in tables 1-10 in the Appendix.

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As converters of feed into either total food energy or protein alone, dairy cows are highly efficient in comparison with other kinds of livestock. The efficiency of milk production is determined by the pattern of its utilization as human food. Dairy cows of average productivity or above whose output is consumed as whole milk rank highest in the efficiency of converting feed into protein and rank second only to hogs in converting feed into total food energy. Additional production of milk should be encouraged where humans can consume all of its essential ingredients.

If only the butterfat is used for human consumption and the skim milk is fed to hogs, the amount of *protein* made available for food from a given amount of feed is relatively low in comparison with that made available from some other kinds of livestock. The amount of *food energy* made available as food, however, is relatively large, falling below only that from hogs and that from dairy cows from which whole milk is utilized.⁷ From a purely economic point of view it does not seem wise in times of food shortages, such as now confront the nation, to encourage a marked increase in the production of milk, if fat is the only portion of the milk solids to be used as food. Additions to the present supply of animal fats can be produced at lower feed costs if the additional feed required is fed to some other kinds of animals, particularly to hogs. Or it may be advisable to shift more land from growing feed to the production of oil-bearing seeds. In many cases, an acre of land will produce more fat if used for growing oil seed crops than if used for growing feeds for livestock.⁸

⁷ See tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix.

⁸ Refer to appendix table 9 for some comparisons of fat yields per acre of land.

These comparisons of relative efficiencies (see appendix for more complete analysis) can be used in estimating the changes required to effect particular changes in production, if one is discussing production shifts which are not so large that they would alter the average yields. If the production changes would involve, for example, reducing to zero or doubling the output of one of the major Corn Belt crops or livestock products, these comparisons would be meaningless. However, when the proportionate increases or decreases in production are relatively small, such comparisons can aid in estimating the changes in output which will result from such shifts.

The desirability for making shifts in crop acreages must be evaluated not only from the standpoint of relative current yields, but one must also consider

(Continued on p. 15)

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The amounts of labor required to produce given amounts of food nutrients by various alternative means must also be considered in evaluating the desirability for producing more of one food or less of another. At least part of the labor used in producing such crops or kinds of livestock as are typical of the Corn Belt could be utilized in producing another of these kinds of crops or livestock.

As a converter of labor into protein, the average dairy cow is somewhat more efficient than any other kind of livestock. In terms of labor requirements per unit of food energy produced, dairy cows rank considerably below hogs. If the objective is minimum average labor requirements per unit of fat returned, then many plants (soybeans and flaxseed are examples) are more efficient sources than any of the animals.⁹

Care must be exercised in interpreting such comparisons of the relative efficiencies of kinds of livestock or crops, for these comparisons do not take into consideration costs of processing and marketing. Relative costs to consumers of nutrients secured from various alternative foods are dependent upon relative prices which consumers have to pay for these foods. Some comparisons of amounts of protein obtained from selected food sources are indicated in table 3.

It should be pointed out that efficiency in converting resources into food is but one of the determinants of the manner in which these resources should be used in maximizing their contribution to human welfare. Acceptability of the various foods in human dietaries must also be considered. People do not prefer to eat only foods which are "good for them." Food habits are exceedingly important in determining

(Footnote 8—continued)

future yields, i.e., the relative effects of various changes in crop acreages upon depletion or erosion of the soil. An increase in the acreage of soybeans accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the acreage of corn will not alter substantially the rate of soil depletion or erosion. An increase in the total acreage of intertilled crops, however, may speed depletion or erosion. In determining the extent to which the soil might economically be depleted or restored, one must compare the returns from such depletion with the costs of rebuilding the soil. Depletion of the soil during the war may be justifiable, considering the extent to which it may add to our effectiveness in winning the war and establishing a stable peace.

⁹ See Appendix, table 9.

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the acceptabilities and consequently the relative preferences for various foods. Civilian morale is closely related to the provision of foods which are most acceptable. Acceptability, however, is probably of more importance in determining the "best" allocation of resources during peace than in a period of war when the direction of production to maximize the war effort is of prime importance. In this section of the analysis relative acceptabilities of various foods are ignored. This factor will be considered in a subsequent section.

c. *How much should milk production be increased?* The preceding part of this analysis indicated that it would be desirable from a nutritive standpoint to encourage increases in milk production, providing all or most of the milk solids can be used as food.

Supplies of feed grains will be sufficient to permit expansion of milk production in 1944, if these feeds can be shifted from less efficient kinds of livestock. Little shift of grain to dairy cows, however, should be encouraged unless all or most of the ingredients in the additional milk are made available for human consumption.

If feed grains are to be used most efficiently by livestock in contributing to optimum human nutrition, they should be fed to the various kinds of livestock so that the production of needed food nutrients is at the maximum. This condition is achieved when the additional returns of these nutrients, resulting from feeding any kind of livestock an additional unit of grain, are just equal to the additional returns from feeding the same amount of grain to other kinds of livestock. For example, the output of food protein produced from a given amount of feed grain is maximized when feed is allocated so that the additional amount of protein (in the food product) produced from a pound of grain is the same regardless of the kind of livestock to which this grain is fed or the way in which the product is used.

In order to estimate accurately the extent to which milk production should be increased, one needs to know not only the relative rates of conversion of feed into food at various

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rates of feeding, but also the levels at which dairy cows are being fed. Although it is known that successive equal increments of feed bring successively smaller increments of milk, adequate information relative to the levels at which farmers are now feeding is not available. Consequently, one can only indicate the general limits within which increased milk production should be encouraged. An increase of from 5 to 10 per cent over 1943 production is considered to be the maximum physical increase possible in 1944 from feeding existing cows at heavier rates. A somewhat smaller increase—perhaps from 3 to 5 per cent—is probably economically desirable.

2. Improving the Pattern of Milk Utilization

Increasing milk production is but one of the adjustments which can be made on the production side. Another adjustment which is perhaps of greater importance is improving the pattern of utilization of the milk that is produced. This may be achieved by diverting milk from one dairy product to another or by shifting into food a larger proportion of the non-fat milk solids now being fed to livestock.

a. *By diverting milk from one dairy product to another.* Whether more or less milk should be directed into a particular dairy product depends upon several factors some of which are: the relative nutritive values of various dairy products, their relative acceptabilities as foods, and their patterns of consumption.

During peacetime relative acceptabilities of various dairy products are expressed in terms of relative prices which people are willing to pay for given quantities of these products. These consumer prices are reflected in the prices which manufacturers can afford to pay for milk to be used in a given product. However, since we are operating under wartime price controls, food preferences of consumers cannot be fully reflected in the price structure. Furthermore, these preferences cannot be fully considered in determining the most desirable production pattern, since attempting to fulfill them often conflicts with maximum war production.

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The consumption pattern of various dairy products is related to the nutritional well-being of various consumers. This pattern is related not only to the way in which the products are rationed, but also to the relative prices and preferences for various products and to the distribution of income. It seems very likely that only small changes in the amounts and kinds of food intakes would result from such alterations in the allocation of milk among the various products as could be attained under our given political and economic framework. Consumption patterns can be altered more effectively through rationing than by reallocation of the proportion of total milk production used in various products.

Some small rise in the national nutritional level might be possible by diverting some milk from one dairy product to another. However, we do not have sufficient information to determine accurately the "best" allocation of the milk that is produced. The most important gains can be attained by greater utilization as food of some of the milk solids now being fed to livestock.

b. *By increasing the total production of dried skim milk.* The total contribution to human nutrition of a given supply of milk could be increased to the extent that more separated milk, buttermilk, and whey may be made available directly as human food. Not all of it can be, of course. Some young animals must be fed milk. But at present considerable amounts of skim milk, buttermilk, and whey contribute much less to human nutrition as livestock feed than if they were consumed as food. It is easier to get more skim milk for human nutrition since its quantity is much greater than that of either whey or buttermilk. More than 35 billion pounds of skim milk were fed to livestock in 1943. Drying skim milk appears to be the most feasible method for making larger quantities of the non-fat solids available for food.

At prices now prevailing, dried skim milk provides essential nutrients, particularly proteins, at a much lower cost to consumers than do poultry, meat, fluid milk, or eggs. The

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costs to consumers of selected animal proteins are indicated in table 3.

Demands for dried skim milk have risen markedly during the war. In 1938 less than 300 million pounds were manufactured for human food.¹⁰ Dried skim milk had a small

TABLE 3
RELATIVE NET COSTS* OF PROTEIN PROVIDED TO CONSUMERS FROM SELECTED ANIMAL PRODUCTS

| Product | Price of Product ^b (Per Pound) | Approximate Price of Protein ^c (Per Pound) |
|-------------------|--|---|
| Dried skim milk | 19 cents ^e (25 cents) ^d | \$0.46 0.61 |
| Fluid milk | 15.2 cents (per quart) | 1.32 |
| Round steak | 41.8 cents | 2.30 |
| Pork chops | 37.6 cents | 2.57 |
| Roasting chickens | 44.7 cents | 2.75 |
| Lamb chops | 45.7 cents | 3.80 |
| Eggs | 63.9 cents (per doz.) | 3.83 |

* The fat in the foods other than fluid milk and eggs is valued at 18.8c per lb. (the current average retail value of lard). The butterfat in fluid milk is valued at 50c per lb., and the milk sugar at 6.8c per lb. (the current average retail price for sugar). The cost of the protein is thus the cost of the product minus the value of the fat and milk sugar. The other nutrients are assigned no value.

^b These are average prices for these foods in 56 cities as listed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for December 14, 1943. See *Monthly Labor Review*, U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Vol. 58, No. 2 (February, 1944), pp. 413-14.

^c Not listed at retail. This is the estimated retail price given current (February, 1944) prices at drying plants.

^d Approximate price at which dried skim milk might sell at retail if price at the drying plant was 20 cents per lb.

market, prices for the product were low, and creameries were able to pay farmers only a low price for skim milk. In 1943, production of dried skim milk was about 480 million pounds. Estimated over-all needs for dried skim milk for human food had risen to more than 1.1 billion pounds. Much of this estimated requirement was to have gone to lend-lease and to people in liberated countries. But more than one-half of it would have been used domestically—much of it in bread. The addition of dried skim milk to bread provides a means

¹⁰ *Agricultural Statistics*, 1940, table 580, page 436. U. S. Department of Agriculture.

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for distributing important nutrients widely among the population—even better than might be accomplished through increased consumption of fluid milk. Many nutrition workers have recommended improvement of diets by the addition of 6 per cent milk solids to bread. In January, 1943, the Food Distribution Administration issued an order that effective July 1, all bread containing milk should include not less than 3 per cent dried milk solids. The supply of dried skim milk available, however, was far from sufficient to permit enforcement of this ruling, and it was rescinded.

In spite of its efficiency as a food and the new demands for the product, the production of dried skim milk for human food was nearly one-fourth lower in 1943 than it was in 1942. Production in 1944 is expected to be about 525 million pounds, or about 10 per cent more than that of 1943. Some of the factors responsible for the lower production in 1943 were: (1) prices for dried skim milk were not sufficiently high to encourage farmers to sell whole milk rather than cream; (2) farmers were not fully aware of the possibilities for substituting in livestock rations other feeds for part of the skim milk which might have been diverted to human food; (3) many farmers were unable to get as much protein supplements as they wanted and held back their skim milk for livestock feed; and (4) less milk was available for drying than was expected because it was diverted for use as fluid milk.

c. *By diverting butterfat from other dairy products to butter.* One alternative procedure for obtaining additional quantities of butter without increasing total milk production or reducing the output of other dairy products is to lower the butterfat content of such dairy products as fluid milk, evaporated and condensed milk, dried whole milk, fluid cream, and cheese, and diverting the fat thus extracted into butter. In Germany during the war, the butterfat content of fluid milk has been lowered to 2.5 per cent.¹¹ The War Food Administration has issued an order limiting, as a wartime measure, the butterfat

¹¹ See Karl Brandt, "Fats and Oils in the War," *War-Peace Pamphlet No. 2*, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, June, 1943, page 15.

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content of fluid cream and ice cream. This butterfat conservation order has been in effect for more than a year. Consequently, many dairy products distributors and the War Food Administration have already had some experience in working with such a limitation order.

About 53 billion pounds (whole milk equivalent) of fluid milk and cream is expected to be consumed in the United States in 1944. Approximately 9.5 billion pounds of milk will be used to produce cheese, and more than 8 billion pounds of milk will be evaporated, condensed, or dried. Butterfat from all of this milk could not be diverted into butter. Since the butterfat content of fluid cream has already been reduced, it may not be feasible to encourage any further reduction. About one-fifth of the fluid milk and cream is consumed on farms. Butterfat from this milk would be difficult to divert into butter. Some of the fluid milk not consumed on farms is sold by producer-distributors who have inadequate facilities for standardizing the milk. Part of the butterfat from a maximum of 50 billion pounds of milk might be diverted into butter. If the butterfat content of 50 billion pounds of milk used in various dairy products including fluid milk, was reduced from about 4 per cent to 3 per cent, and this butterfat was diverted into butter, an additional 625 million pounds of butter could be manufactured.

The effect of such a change on the acceptability of the products to the consumer is difficult to estimate. All consumers may not prefer to have more butter if this means less butterfat in some other dairy products. Where such changes have occurred in fluid cream and ice cream, however, few serious objections have been registered.

Difficulties to invoking this procedure may be posed by the various state and federal laws establishing minimum butterfat contents for some products. These would have to be set aside during the war or new laws would need to be enacted. Since the butterfat content of some dairy products, particularly fluid milk, has been a competitive selling point, distributors may be reluctant to reduce the percentage of butter-

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fat in their products. Such resistance would be greatest in markets where all distributors could not, because of the inadequacy of their facilities, reduce the amount of butterfat in the milk which they distribute. Some dairy breed associations have used as an important selling point the high fat content of the milk from cows of their breeds. Where different products compete to some extent with each other, as do evaporated milk and fluid milk, reductions in the fat contents of both products would probably be desirable in order to prevent giving one product an additional competitive advantage.

One means for encouraging fluid milk distributors to accept this diversion of butterfat from fluid milk to butter would be to reduce the price ceilings on fluid milk by a smaller amount than the returns from the sale of the butterfat. Whether such a means should be employed is in part dependent upon the adequacy of existing margins, and upon consumers' acceptance of this procedure.

Butter supplies' also could be increased by reducing the fat content of butter. This is essentially the result of the use of butter extenders in households. The possibility for employing this procedure as well as diverting butterfat from other products to butter makes somewhat more complicated the determination of the most desirable of alternative procedures for increasing butter output from a given total supply of milk. Manufacturers and distributors of various dairy products may sanction the general procedure only if reductions are made in the fat contents of all of the products where such reductions are feasible.

B. Means for Encouraging Desirable Adjustments

The means for suitable and practical adjustments in milk production and utilization are of two types: measures which seem to be desirable if there is to be encouragement of an appropriate production pattern, and the measures which are needed to improve the utilization of the milk which is produced.

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1. *Measures Needed to Encourage the Desired Production Pattern*

Increased production of milk to be used as fluid milk or in products utilizing all of the essential milk solids is desirable from a nutritional standpoint. If these alterations in the milk production pattern are to be encouraged, the incentives prompting farmers to produce milk from which all of the milk solids are to be directly consumed in food should be made more attractive. Three such possible factors which should be analyzed are increased prices for milk, the subsidizing of milk production, and modification of sanitary standards.

a. *Prices for milk.* One of the most direct and impersonal means for encouraging the direction of more feed and labor into the production of more milk is to increase prices for milk relative to the prices of the other products which could be produced from the feed and labor. The price pattern for livestock products should be established so as to encourage the output of milk for fluid use or for use in products which jointly or separately make available for human consumption all the milk solids. And the price relationships among dairy products should induce farmers now selling only cream to shift to selling whole milk wherever this shift is feasible.¹²

¹² The relationship of the price of one product to that of another is the important element in determining the way in which resources are allocated among the various alternative lines of production. Thus, maladjustments in price relationships may be corrected either by increasing the prices of the products whose prices are too low or by decreasing those prices that are too high.

In the butter areas the spread between butterfat and whole milk prices is too low to encourage a marked shift to whole milk sales. Whole milk prices are somewhat low relative to the prices of most other animal products, particularly hogs. Increasing whole milk prices would establish a better balance between whole milk and butterfat and between whole milk and other livestock products. The increase which would be desirable in order to establish the best balance between whole milk and other livestock products is probably too small to bring about a large enough differential between returns from selling whole milk and returns from selling cream—because of the relatively low spread between current prices for these two products.

If whole milk prices in the west north central states were \$3.25 per cwt.—a price about 35 cents per cwt. above the average dealers' buying prices in October, 1943—and butterfat was about 52 cents per pound (the average for October, 1943), farmers selling whole milk would receive \$1.29 per cwt. (FOB country station) more if they sold whole milk of 3.8 per cent butterfat than they would receive if they sold only the cream. This would mean an average differential of

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Farmers might also be effectively induced to shift to selling whole milk if they are assured that the market will be supported during the war and early postwar period.

Although the pattern of relative prices is an effective guide to production, there are rather distinct limits to the way in which prices can be altered within the present political and economic framework. It is generally acknowledged that few, if any, prices can be reduced, because of political pressures and because of certain minimums imposed in establishing price ceilings. For example, the Second Price Control Act (October, 1942) established the minimum level of a ceiling on virtually any farm product at 100 per cent of parity. Price ceilings on farm products must also take into consideration the increases in costs of production which have occurred since January, 1941. On the other hand, the various "hold-the-line" orders which have been given to OPA by Congress and by the administration, combined with the way in which prices tend to be bound together, make difficult altering relative prices by increasing any price. For example, if one farm price ceiling is increased, this increase may raise the parity prices of other farm products and necessitate an upward revision in their ceilings. Furthermore, an increase in the price of such a commodity as milk would result in an increase in the cost of living and open the way for increased wages.

The significance of this situation—few prices can be reduced because of political pressures and legislatively and administratively established parities, and few prices can be increased because of the repercussions upon other prices and the conse-

(Footnote 12—Continued)

\$1.16 per cwt. at the farm. In order to increase the differential, either milk prices could be increased or butterfat prices reduced. Assuming that farmers are feeding their dairy cows at the most profitable levels and that they adjust their operations as milk prices change, an increase in whole milk prices of more than 50 cents per cwt. probably would encourage farmers to go too far (in terms of the alternative food returns which could be secured if the feed concentrates were fed to hogs to be marketed at 210 pounds), toward increased feeding of cows now being milked or those which could be economically shifted into production. Consequently, a greater increase in milk prices would be undesirable. Some reduction in butterfat prices probably would not discourage butter production in the areas where the resources have no more effective alternative uses, and would enable the differential to be widened.

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quent breaking of the line against inflation—should not be underestimated. It means that unless the parity principles are abandoned or the line is allowed to be broken, the price pattern cannot be as effectively used to direct production as it could be in peacetime. It means that we may have to rely more upon other incentives in order to alter the pattern of production to more nearly meet our changing needs.

b. *Subsidizing milk production.* Paying subsidies to producers, like changing the pattern of relative prices, is a means for altering the production pattern. For example, paying to farmers a 50-cent subsidy on each hundred pounds of milk sold would offer to milk producers approximately the same incentive to increase their production of milk as would be offered by an increase in milk prices of 50 cents per cwt. When it is not expedient to alter the price pattern in order to induce shifts in production, subsidies may be used to supplement prices in bringing about the desired kinds of production. In some situations shifts in production might be achieved with smaller transfers of income if subsidies were used to encourage these shifts than if relative prices were changed. For example, changes in production may be feasible only in certain areas. The payment of subsidies may be restricted to such areas.

Nearly all of the subsidies which were granted during 1943 in connection with the production and processing of food have been to help maintain retail price ceilings. Because of its probable repercussion upon other prices and particularly upon wages, the puncturing of a few retail price ceilings may endanger the entire price control program. By granting to producers or processors a subsidy, rather than allowing them increased prices for their products, retail prices may be kept from advancing even though farm returns to producers are raised to cover increased production costs.

In several cities subsidies were paid to milk distributors for a short period during the winter of 1942-43 in order to enable them to pay higher prices to farmers without advancing the prices charged to consumers and at the same time maintaining distribution margins. These subsidies aroused much

criticism and were discontinued early in 1943. Since December 1, 1942, the Commodity Credit Corporation has been supplying funds for the payment of a subsidy of $3\frac{3}{4}$ cents per pound of cheese to the manufacturers. Beginning on July 1, 1943, butter prices were reduced through a subsidy of 5 cents per pound paid to creameries. Butterfat prices were not changed as a result of this procedure. Currently, subsidies are being paid to farmers selling either whole milk or cream. Rates of payment as of January, 1944, varied from 35 to 50 cents per hundred pounds of whole milk and from 5 to 6 cents per pound of butterfat sold, depending upon the area in which the producer was located. The rates of payment are generally lowest in the north central states where feed costs have advanced the least.

Although this subsidy program now in effect has many commendable features, payment of a subsidy when only the butterfat goes into human consumption does not seem warranted from an economic standpoint. It is desirable, nutritionally, to encourage increases in milk production so that insofar as practicable the milk solids from the increased production are directed into human consumption. If the subsidy is to increase significantly the yield of milk used in its entirety, subsidy payments should contribute to making markedly larger farmers' returns where whole milk is sold than where only butterfat is marketed. For the most part, an increased return for butterfat would not be necessary to maintain its production in areas where the feed fed to dairy cows cannot be fed to hogs or poultry or where the labor and land have no more important alternative uses.

An expansion in milk supplies suitable in quality for fluid milk, evaporated milk, cheese, or dried skim milk probably will require some changes in milk production methods in butter-producing areas. Although a high price for whole milk, relative to the returns from cream, will be necessary to induce farmers to shift to selling whole milk, a more rapid shift might be accomplished if payments to farmers also were made to encourage equipping their farms for improved han-

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dling of their milk. This might be of particular importance to farmers in the Corn Belt where sizeable outlays for alterations in equipment may be required on some farms. Payments need not be offered to farmers already producing acceptable whole milk, and the payments might be non-recurring. They might be offered for a certain period of time, for once the necessary changes in production methods and facilities have been secured, further incentives of this nature will not be needed.

c. *Modification of sanitary standards.*¹³ The various sanitary standards and codes established for milk are of importance not only because of their effect upon net returns to farmers and consequently upon the volume of milk production, but also because of their influence upon the way in which milk is utilized. Whether additional milk can be directed into products making use of all or most of the milk solids depends to some extent upon the sanitary standards which are established for fluid milk and the standards required by various plants for milk used in the production of dairy products.

Milk is very perishable and requires special care in its production, processing, and distribution to minimize deterioration of the various foods made from it. Dairy cattle, like other farm animals, are subject to certain diseases. Milk must also be handled by individuals subject to diseases. Consequently, it is obvious that for the protection of health and for the maintenance of satisfactory quality, there must be adequate provisions—perhaps both penalties and premiums—to insure the production of acceptable milk.

In order to adequately protect health, these provisions must include herd inspection and reasonable inspection and approval of the premises upon which milk is produced. Provisions to safeguard health should apply to all milk for food, whether it is to be consumed as fluid milk or as any of the foods made from it.

¹³ The term standards as discussed here refers to standards relating to prevention of the spread of disease as well as to the control of "quality" as it relates to the taste and keeping qualities of the product.

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Whether milk is satisfactory from the standpoint of quality, exclusive of the disease aspects, depends upon the way in which the milk is used. This aspect of the acceptability of milk probably can be determined largely by minimum requirements for numbers of bacteria, acidity, foreign matter, and odors in the milk—requirements which may vary with the way in which the milk is to be used.

There are two principal aspects of existing sanitary codes relating to fluid milk which warrant re-examination during the present emergency. If certain items in existing codes are not essential to the protection of health or the maintenance of quality, and if these provisions impede the diversion of a larger proportion of the total milk solids into human consumption, they should be eliminated. Re-examination should be focused upon the lack of uniformity of standards, and upon provisions of little significance in safeguarding health which at the same time make difficult the entry of new producers into a given fluid milk market.

Many urban ordinances and state regulations establishing standards for fluid milk production and distribution have been formulated by local or state agencies at times when the shifting of supplies was considered to be of relatively little importance. Although these diverse standards may be adequate for the protection of consumers' health, their lack of uniformity—and particularly the lack of inter-acceptance of inspection and certification—makes the interchange of milk supplies between milk sheds difficult. The local shortages of fluid milk which have arisen during the war have brought this condition to the foreground and have led to some modifications of these restrictions. It has been necessary to ship milk for greater distances. Distributors have been confronted with the problems created by differences in sanitary codes. There has been some tendency toward unification of standards to facilitate necessary shifts of milk from one milk shed to another. For example, there has been increased adoption of the U. S. Public Health Service Standard Ordinance. Further unification, however, if the uniform standards adopted can be

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reasonably met by producers and are at the same time adequate in protecting health, would be desirable in order to make less difficult supplementing milk supplies in one market with supplies from other areas.

Undoubtedly in some instances requirements have been inserted into sanitary codes deliberately to restrict entry of new producers into a market. Such special items frequently have no direct relationship to the protection of the consumer's health.¹⁴ In order to assure adequate milk at reasonable cost to consumers, careful study needs constantly to be given to the reduction of costs of milk production. Items in sanitary codes causing unnecessary expense to milk producers should be eliminated. Care needs always to be used to see that the standards are, on the one hand, adequate to protect consumers' health and, on the other, to hold costs of production to a minimum.

To maintain reasonable sanitation, routine tests and inspection of cows and production facilities are necessary and should be made periodically. They are and should be required by sanitary codes. Care should be used, however, to see that the requirements for equipment and the care of the dairy herd are germane to the production of acceptable milk. If not, the requirements should be reformulated. Particularly it is necessary to insist that inspection fees should be reasonable, and all producers willing to pay the fee should be granted inspection. There should be no development of trade barriers to interfere with the free movement and sale of fluid milk and dairy products. Many cities and states will not accept inspections made by any other than their own agencies. Provision should be made for recognition by all agencies of in-

¹⁴ Consult, for example, G. R. Taylor, *et al.*, *Barriers to Internal Trade in Farm Products*, Special Report to the Secretary of Agriculture, 1939.

Margaret G. Reid, *Food for People*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1943, Chap. 24, pp. 477-79.

I. W. Silverman, *et al.*, "Control by Licensing Other Entry into the Market," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Spring, 1941.

Consumers' Guide, March, 1941, page 12.

Sale and Distribution of Milk Products, Connecticut and Philadelphia Milk Sheds, 74th. Congress, 1st Session, House Document 152, 1935, page 90.

F. V. Waugh, "Interstate Trade Barriers: A Proposal," *The Agricultural Situation*, February, 1941.

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spectations and examinations properly made by other accredited agencies.

2. *Measures Needed to Encourage Improved Utilization of the Milk Produced*

As was indicated previously in this study, the most important step which can be taken toward improving the utilization of the milk produced is to direct into human consumption as much as is feasible of the non-fat milk solids that would otherwise be fed to livestock. Some of the measures which might be taken to encourage such diversion are: (1) increased prices for dried skim milk, (2) the reduction in the amount of skim milk used as a feed for livestock, and (3) provision of adequate facilities for drying skim milk. These measures are analyzed in the following discussion.

a. *Increased prices for dried skim milk.* One step which would markedly contribute toward making additional non-fat milk solids available for human consumption would be to increase the prices paid to farmers for milk to be converted into dried skim milk. This is necessary to induce farmers to produce milk suitable for drying and to encourage the sale of whole milk rather than cream. With the present difficulties in securing protein feeds, many farmers are placing a value on the skim milk as animal feed higher than the returns from its sale. Furthermore, additional care and facilities may be required on some farms if whole milk acceptable for use in dried skim milk is produced. Farmers will need to be compensated for the additional costs incurred.

The solution to this pricing problem, however, is not as simple as merely increasing the prices for dried skim milk. It is the differential between returns from selling whole milk and returns from selling cream that induces farmers to sell one product or the other. This differential could be widened by increasing dried skim milk prices and holding butterfat prices constant, or by reducing butterfat prices and holding dried skim milk prices constant. If dried skim milk prices were increased and there were no changes in the prices of other

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dairy products competing with butter plus dried skim milk for the whole milk, considerable diversion of milk away from evaporated milk and cheese plants would probably occur. Consequently, the prices for evaporated milk, cheese, and perhaps fluid milk would have to be increased in order to prevent such diversion, or butterfat prices would have to be decreased. The Federal Government has, however, committed itself to a policy of maintaining butterfat prices at about prevailing levels, and to "holding the line" against advances in food prices. Thus, dried skim milk prices are narrowly straight-jacketed.

b. *Reduction of skim milk as a feed for livestock.* Separated milk is an important component of livestock rations—particularly those of calves, pigs, and poultry. Getting more of the non-fat milk solids into human consumption will mean that less skim milk will be available for livestock feeding. This is of special significance in the north central states where the bulk of the increase in dried skim milk production is likely to be secured. In order to induce farmers who rely almost entirely upon skim milk as a feed for young animals to sell whole milk rather than cream, not only should the differential in the returns from selling these two products be widened, but these farmers might also be shown ways of substituting other feeds for part of their skim milk.

It should be recognized that it would be impractical to divert into human consumption all the skim milk which is now fed to livestock. If, during the war, one-quarter to one-third of the amount of skim milk usually fed to livestock in peacetime were dried for food, the estimated demands for dried skim milk could be satisfied.¹⁵ This is perhaps the most

¹⁵ Estimates of dried skim milk production depend upon the assumptions which are made regarding relative prices for the various dairy products, the concentration of production, and the numerous other factors affecting the supply of milk available for drying. The estimate of one-quarter to one-third of the skim milk now fed to livestock (the equivalent of from 900 million to 1.3 billion pounds of dried skim milk) as being feasibly diverted into human food during the war disregards all of these factors except the density of milk production. It is based on the assumption that drying facilities are installed and operated in counties where at least one million pounds of butterfat were delivered by farmers as cream in the year 1939. This limits the major area where production would be increased to Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and scattered sections in some of the other north central states.

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that can be expected, even though necessary changes in the price-pattern are accomplished. If a shift of this magnitude were realized, a large volume of separated milk still would be available as livestock feed.

c. *Provision of facilities for increased production of dried skim milk.* Although in 1943 there was no widespread overloading of existing facilities for drying separated milk, additional facilities would be necessary if dried skim milk production were increased to 1.1 billion pounds in 1944. To some extent existing facilities could be more fully utilized. It might be possible to move driers and other equipment necessary to dry skim milk from areas where milk supplies are such that the equipment is only partially utilized to areas where supplies are large enough to permit fuller operation. Facilities for drying skim milk have been given high priorities in the allocation of strategic materials.

In addition to the equipment required to conduct drying operations, there is also the problem of providing equipment for transporting the milk from farms to creameries or other drying establishments. Additional milk cans would be needed. However, whether additional trucks to haul the milk would be necessary depends upon the way in which the collection problem is handled. It is very likely that, with reorganization of the collection of milk and cream to eliminate duplication of service and assure capacity loads for each truck now in service, few additional trucks would be required.¹⁵

¹⁵ Adequate presentation of the problem of reorganizing milk and cream collection would require more detailed analysis than can be presented here. Some studies, however, have been made indicating the extent to which there is duplication in service and the economies which might be effected by reorganization. For example, see:

Transportation of New Hampshire Milk, Bul. 325, June, 1940; II. *Reorganization of Truck Routes*, Alan MacLeod, N. H. Agr. Exp. Sta., Univ. of N. H., Durham, N. H.

Efficiency of Milk Marketing in Connecticut: 2. The Transportation of Milk, Bul. 328, D. O. Hammerberg and W. G. Sullivan; 3. *Economics of the Assembly of Milk*, R. G. Bressler, Jr., and D. O. Hammerberg, Bul. 239, Feb., 1942, Storrs Agr. Exp. Sta., U. of Conn., Storrs, Conn.

Cooperative Reorganization of Milk and Cream Hauling, Louis F. Herrmann, Paul E. Quintus, Wm. C. Welden, Misc. Report No. 53 (mimeo.), May, 1942, Coop. Res. and Service Division, F.C.A., Washington, D. C.

Possible Savings in the Assembly of Milk: A study of County Hauling in Northern Vermont, Alan MacLeod, W. E. Carpenter, and J. A. Hitchcock, B.A.E., U.S.D.A., New England Research Council on Marketing and Food Supply and Vt. Agr. Exp. Sta. cooperating, Washington, D. C., Nov., 1942.

III. WARTIME ADJUSTMENTS IN CONSUMPTION OF DAIRY PRODUCTS

Even though milk production is expanded in 1944, thereby increasing the supply of total milk solids, and additional non-fat milk solids are diverted from livestock into human consumption, there still will be sizeable gaps between the available supplies of some dairy products and the amounts which consumers would be willing to purchase at expected prices. The effects of such shortages can be partially minimized by adjustments in distribution and consumption. Among these adjustments is the provision of alternative foods and the establishment of means for equitably distributing the supplies that are available.

A. *Other Foods as Alternatives for Dairy Products*

Temporary civilian food shortages make it impossible for consumers to maintain some of their customary peacetime food habits. Reductions in the available amounts of a number of commodities, inevitable in a nation at war, tend to lower civilian morale. Rationing is a means for sharing these reductions. If, in addition to rationing, alternative goods are made available, consumer morale may be maintained at a higher level than it would be if no such alternatives were provided. Obviously, these alternatives should not require more resources for their production than would be required to produce the original goods.

1. *Alternatives for Milk and Cheese*

No other single food can adequately replace milk in the national dietary. Few consumers, with the exception of infants, however, depend upon milk as their sole food. The average diet consists of a variety of foods. Among the aggregate of foods ordinarily consumed are numerous partial alternatives for milk. When consumed in proper combinations these may compensate for a reduction in the intake of milk. How-

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ever, the inclusion of milk more than any other single food will improve the nutritional quality of the average diet.

As has already been noted, milk contains high quality proteins, fat, vitamins, and minerals that are of special significance in the diet. In view of possible decreases in the supply of milk and other whole milk products, it becomes important to consider foods that may serve as alternatives for them. Eggs, poultry, fish, soybean flour, vegetable soybeans, dried yeast, oatmeal, and the cereal embryos are sources of good quality protein. Peanuts, dried peas, and beans, if used in conjunction with other proteins, may make contributions toward balancing the protein portion of the wartime dietary. The proteins of milk, however, are not only of importance in themselves but are extremely effective in supplementing the proteins of cereals and legumes.

In general, American diets which include no milk furnish inadequate amounts of calcium and riboflavin and may often be deficient in protein. There is no other single food which will supply calcium as generously and in as equally utilizable form as milk. This is one of the reasons for curtailing supplies of milk for children only as a last emergency measure.

The riboflavin needs of the human being can be met by diets containing no milk. The average American consumer is not likely to make the necessary dietary changes, however, when milk is not available. Among the foods that are rich sources of riboflavin are glandular tissues such as liver, kidney, heart, and tongue; whole grain cereals, lima beans, and soybeans; and eggs, poultry, and fish. Supplies of all of these foods cannot be easily expanded. Whenever possible, however, increased use of these foods will help to compensate for any shortage of riboflavin. These foods and fresh fruits and vegetables are also good sources of thiamin. They may be used to help make up deficiencies in thiamin resulting from small reductions in the quantity of milk in the diet.

The above examples indicate some of the kinds of replacements which may be made in diets in order to compensate for reductions in the intake of milk or whole milk products.

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Any broad recommendation designed to cope with shortages of a particular group of foods should take into consideration food habits and food preferences as well as nutritive values. For example, when milk is not available, many consumers may shift to coffee, tea, or soft drinks. These beverages obviously cannot be classified as satisfactory nutritive alternates for milk.

Where evaporated milk and dried skim milk are used in cooking, the provision of acceptable alternatives might prove somewhat easier. Satisfactory substitutes for cheese are likely to be difficult to provide, when one considers relative nutritional values as well as food habits.

Thus, with few exceptions it is impossible to provide single foods in practical quantities which will serve as nutritionally suitable alternatives for fluid milk, evaporated and condensed milk, dried milk products, and cheese. As has been indicated, however, partial substitutes are available which, when properly combined, will minimize the adverse effects of shortages of these dairy products during the war.

2. *Alternatives for Butter*

Supplies of butter for civilian consumption in 1944 are expected to be about 12 pounds per capita as compared to the average yearly amount of 17 pounds consumed during the period 1935-39. Butter is of nutritional importance chiefly as a source of food energy, fatty acids, and vitamin A. Whether fats in general have other functions in the diet beyond the provision of calories and the essential fatty acids is not entirely clear at the present time. In view of our relatively large average per-capita fat intake,¹⁷ however, the reduction in fat consumption due solely to this reduction in butter supplies is likely to have little adverse effect upon the health of most American consumers.

¹⁷ Average annual per-capita fat consumption in the United States in 1943 is estimated to have been approximately 110 pounds. This includes the "invisible" (fats in meats, fish, milk, vegetables, etc.) as well as the "visible" (fats in such foods as lard, butter, vegetable compounds, margarine, etc.) consumption.

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In many diets butter is an important source of vitamin A. With an average annual butter consumption of 17 pounds per capita, about one-eighth of the average requirement for vitamin A is supplied by butter. A reduction in the average per capita butter consumption of 5 pounds per year would represent a reduction of approximately only 4 per cent in average vitamin A intake, even though there were no compensating increase in the consumption of other foods containing vitamin A.¹⁸ The Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics of the Agricultural Research Administration estimates that the average daily intake of vitamin A in 1942 was 6,300 International units per capita.¹⁹ This is about 25 per cent in excess of the average requirement. Consequently, it seems unlikely that average vitamin A intake will fall below the average recommended allowance, even though butter consumption is reduced.

It seems highly probable that the reduction in butter supplies will have few adverse effects upon human health, if there are no other changes in consumption. Consequently, from a purely nutritive standpoint no alternative fat spreads would need to be made available, if every consumer obtained the average butter ration together with average quantities of other foods containing fats and vitamin A.

Fat spreads, however, are complementary with bread. Since consumers may be urged to increase their cereal consumption in view of some reductions in supplies of animal products, and since bread is the main form in which Americans

¹⁸ The average daily allowance for vitamin A recommended by the National Research Council is 5,000 International units, an annual allowance of 1,825,000 International units. Assuming an annual butter consumption of 17 lbs. (the average per capita consumption for the years 1935-39), a consumer's intake of vitamin A from butter would be 229,500 International units with a vitamin A content of butter averaging 13,500 units—a figure suggested by recent assays. Thus, of the total annual vitamin A allowance, butter would supply about 12.5 per cent. The expected supplies of butter for civilians in 1944 will be about 70 per cent of the average yearly supplies for 1935-39. If there were no compensating increases in the consumption of other foods, this would mean a reduction of 4 per cent in vitamin A intake, assuming each consumer's intake was equal to the recommended daily allowance.

¹⁹ See Raymond P. Christenson, *Using Resources to Meet Food Needs*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, May, 1943, table 2, page 10.

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consume cereals, maintaining or increasing our supplies of fat spreads takes on added importance. Furthermore, butter was mentioned most frequently among those commodities whose shortages were most noticed by consumers interviewed in a recent survey.²⁹

Important alternative courses of action which might be pursued in adjusting to the expected butter shortage are: (1) the production of additional milk the butterfat from which can be used in butter, (2) reduction in the fat content of butter and or diversion of butterfat from other dairy products into butter, and (3) the provision of alternative fats or spreads for bread to supplement supplies of butter. These alternative courses of action are not mutually exclusive. All might be pursued simultaneously. The desirability for employing any of them depends upon their relative costs and the extent to which they meet consumers' preferences. It has been pointed out in a previous section that, from a nutritive standpoint, it is not desirable—given our limited resources and the alternative ways in which they might be employed—to produce enough additional milk to provide sufficient butterfat to satisfy all demands for butter. Whether butterfat should be diverted from other dairy products to butter depends upon relative consumer preferences for additional butter, for dairy products containing the usual amounts of butterfat, and for foods which could be used as alternatives for butter, and upon the legal and administrative difficulties encountered in distributing the incidence of such diversion. This procedure is relatively inexpensive in terms of the amounts of additional resources required to put it into operation. However, making alternatives for butter more readily available would probably reduce the extent to which butterfat would have to be diverted

²⁹ A survey recently conducted under the supervision of George Gallup, Elmo Roper, Crosley Inc., and research men of Harvard Business School, Princeton University, Life Magazine, Columbia University, the Office of Survey Standards, and the Bureau of the Budget indicates that butter was most frequently mentioned by interviewees in response to the question, "What are some of the shortages that have bothered you most?" A total of 4,935 interviews were made. Butter was mentioned by about 9.9 per cent of the interviewees. Refer to *Indices*, the Research Division, Meredith Publishing Co., Des Moines, Iowa, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Jan., 15, 1944) page 9.

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from other products into butter in order to reasonably satisfy consumers' demands for spreads for bread.

There are a number of acceptable replacements for butter as it is used in cooking. Only a few fats, however, are used as spreads for bread. Among these are oleomargarine, vegetable shortening, lard, salad oil, peanut butter, and cream cheese. The non-fat spreads for bread are primarily limited to jams, jellies, etc. These are used both as an alternative to butter and in conjunction with it. Butter extenders are also a means for adding to the supplies for spreads for bread.

The production of some of these spreads has increased during the war, while the amounts of others available to civilians have been reduced. Although data are not complete on the extent to which these various foods are actually used as alternatives for butter, available data indicate that oleomargarine is the most widely used and probably the most acceptable by consumers as a replacement for butter. Consumption of oleomargarine for the United States is expected to be between 2 and 2½ pounds per capita more in 1944 than it was on the average in the years 1939-42. Consequently, it is of importance to consider the effects which increased use of oleomargarine as a food would have upon the welfare of consumers and butter producers, if consumers are given more opportunity to obtain it.

Since demands for butter (at expected prices during the war) are high relative to available supplies, the provision of additional oleomargarine is very unlikely to affect butter prices and returns to butter producers.²¹

Where butter and oleomargarine are both available to consumers, some individuals will consume only butter, others will consume both butter and oleomargarine, and others will use only oleomargarine. It was indicated previously that there would probably be no impairment of health if no other fats were made available to compensate for the reduction in average per capita butter supplies provided available quanti-

²¹ Some factors in the effect on the postwar butter market of removal of the impediments to oleomargarine consumption are discussed in section IV.

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ties of butter and other foods were equitably distributed among consumers. It is of interest, however, to consider the effect upon the health of those consumers in whose diets butter might be replaced by oleomargarine.

The minimum legal standard for the fat content of butter and oleomargarine is 80 per cent by weight. Recent assays indicate that the average vitamin A content of butter is about 13,500 units.²² Fortified oleomargarine is legally required to contain a minimum of 9,000 International units of vitamin A per pound. Approximately 90 per cent of all oleomargarine sold domestically is fortified. Unfortified oleomargarines contain insignificant amounts of vitamin A.

The relative nutritive merits of butter and fortified oleomargarine as presented in the literature by scientists who have investigated this subject have been reviewed recently in a pamphlet published by the National Research Council. The excerpt below from this publication summarizes information on the subject:²³

"The present available scientific evidence indicates that when fortified margarine is used in place of butter as a source of fat in a mixed diet, no nutritional differences can be observed. Although important differences can be demonstrated between different fats in special experimental diets, these differences are unimportant when a customary mixed diet is used. The above statement can be made in respect to fortified margarine and it should be emphasized that all margarine should be fortified."

The findings of an earlier report prepared by the Council on Foods and Nutrition of the American Medical Association are in substantial agreement with this conclusion.²⁴

Although fortified oleomargarine is nutritious and acceptable by many consumers as a spread, there are several kinds of trade barriers to its use. One-half of the states have

²² The state experiment stations in cooperation with the U. S. Department of Agriculture are developing improved procedures for analyzing the vitamin A content of butter. Results from these assays are as yet preliminary, but are indicative of the final results which may be expected.

²³ *A Report on Margarine*, Report of the Food and Nutrition Board, National Research Council, Reprint and Circular Series, No. 118, August, 1943, p. 18.

²⁴ Council on Foods and Nutrition, American Medical Association, "The Comparative Nutritional Value of Butter and Oleomargarine," *The Journal of the American Medical Association*, Aug. 22, 1942, vol. 119, pp. 1425-1427.

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enacted excise taxes on oleomargarine, these taxes ranging from 5 to 15 cents per pound on the uncolored product.²⁵ Thirteen states have imposed license fees on retailers of oleomargarine; wholesalers of oleomargarine pay license fees in thirteen states. Twenty-nine states prohibit the sale of colored oleomargarine.²⁶ There is a federal tax of 10 cents per pound on colored oleomargarine. A federal tax of $\frac{1}{4}$ cent per pound is levied against uncolored oleomargarine, but this tax is so small as to have little effect upon consumption of the product. Some of these barriers—particularly the higher license fees—have the effect of keeping oleomargarine off the market in certain sections of the country. Some of these restrictions increase the prices which consumers have to pay for oleomargarine. If the excise taxes were removed during the war, OPA could immediately reduce the price ceilings on oleomargarine by at least the full amount of the tax. If no adjustments were made in the price ceilings, prices would probably be reduced very little from their present level, since the demand for the product at existing prices is relatively great. Removal of these taxes during peacetime would probably result in somewhat lower prices to consumers, higher profits to oleomargarine manufacturers, and perhaps higher returns to the producers of the raw materials than would occur if the taxes were maintained.

The federal laws were originally adopted to aid in identifying oleomargarine and preventing its fraudulent sale as butter. State oleomargarine legislation has been aimed not so much at preventing fraud and misrepresentation as providing protection for particular competing products.

The fact that butter has long been the most widely used

²⁵ State taxes on oleomargarine do not in all cases apply equally to all kinds of the product. The excise taxes of fifteen states are levied only on certain types of oleomargarine, the taxes of nine states applying to all oleomargarines. For example, in some states a tax is levied on oleomargarines containing less than a specified minimum of fats of animal origin; in some states the taxes apply to oleomargarines containing imported vegetable oils.

²⁶ Refer to Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, *Barriers to Internal Trade in Farm Products*, Bureau of Agricultural Econ., U. S. Department of Agriculture, Special Report, 1939, pp. 17-30, and to National Research Council, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-17.

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fat spread in the United States and that it is yellow in color is a factor encouraging manufacturers of oleomargarine to try to color their product yellow. Consumers and producers have a "right" to demand that products be clearly identified and that there are adequate safeguards against misrepresentation. Similarity in the taste and appearance of butter and oleomargarine presents opportunity for misrepresentation. Taxes and other similar devices, however, are not the sole nor the best means for enforcing identification. The relatively heavier taxation and frequent outright prohibition of the sale of colored oleomargarine cannot be justified on grounds of preserving the identity of the product.²⁷ As is true with any food product, misrepresentation can be controlled by labelling requirements coupled with state and federal inspection of the conditions of manufacture and distribution, enforced through a technique such as licensing. This applies to distribution by licensed public eating places as well as by manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers, although enforcing identification in such establishments as restaurants is obviously more costly than inspection of the manufacture of the product.

B. Rationing of Dairy Products

In order to attain more equitable distribution of available supplies of butter and cheese, consumer rationing of these foods was inaugurated early in 1943. Evaporated milk was later added to the list of rationed dairy products. These dairy foods have been included in a group along with meats and edible fats and oils, which is being rationed by points. This procedure has been criticized on the basis that meats and such edible fats and oils as vegetable shortenings are not closely

²⁷ There has also been a special federal tax of \$50 per year levied on each manufacturer of renovated or process butter, and a tax of $\frac{1}{4}$ cent is levied on each pound of this product. About 0.15 per cent of the total butter output in 1940 was process butter. The taxes affect its sale and consumption in a manner similar to the way in which oleomargarine taxes have affected the sale and consumption of oleomargarine. If renovated butter differs from other butter, the problem—like that of oleomargarine—is one of identifying the product so that it can be properly distinguished by consumers.

The issue of whether costs of inspection should be covered by license fees (if any) is not discussed. Total receipts from licenses might be higher than, lower than, or equal to the costs of inspection, depending upon the criteria established for distributing income.

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related to butter and cheese, and that including all of these foods in the same group causes consumers considerable inconvenience in allocating their ration points.

It is true that including many different food items in a group of rationed foods does cause consumers some inconvenience in deciding how to allocate their ration points. But this is the same sort of inconvenience that is caused in the allocation of an individual's income among various items which he might purchase—the same sort of inconvenience arising from making any decision where, from a large number of alternatives, only a few may be selected. The more numerous and more varied the items in a group of rationed commodities, the greater is the opportunity for consumers to obtain maximum satisfaction in the allocation of their ration points. When the satisfaction of consumers is to be considered in evaluating various rationing procedures, placing dairy products in a group of foods including meat is to be commended.

The War Food Administration placed limitations on sales of fluid milk and cream in many of the larger cities late in 1943. In most of these cities, any distributor's monthly sales of fluid milk are limited to not more than the aggregate amount sold during June, 1943, and his total monthly sales of cream cannot exceed 75 per cent of his sales during June. These limitations may be altered by the War Food Administration as supplies change. There are also similar restrictions on the distribution of cottage cheese and some other by-products of fluid milk and cream. Individual consumers are not limited in their purchases, except insofar as restrictions are invoked by distributors. Consumer rationing of fluid milk consequently rests with milk distributors.

The primary purpose of limitations on sales of fluid milk is to make available more milk for use in manufactured dairy products. It is estimated that restrictions on sales of fluid milk will make available during 1944 about 10 per cent less fluid milk, 9 per cent more creamery butter, 14 per cent more cheese, 20 per cent more evaporated milk, 7 per cent more dried whole milk, and 34 per cent more dried skim

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milk than would be available in the absence of such restrictions.²⁸

Wide variations in individuals' requirements for milk make equitable fluid milk rationing difficult. Children require more milk than do adults, and there may be considerable variation in adult requirements. Nursing mothers, for example, require more milk than the average adult. Many consumers had insufficient quantities of milk in June, 1943. Although urban fluid milk and cream consumption in 1943 exceeded that of 1942 by about 11 per cent, it does not seem likely that the increase was proportionately greatest among consumers whose intake of milk was already nutritionally sufficient. Limitations on milk sales resulting from physical shortages would probably be necessary in some areas even though there was no intent to make more milk available for other products. Where physical shortages do not exist, however, limitations on sales of fluid milk seem inadvisable from a nutritive standpoint, unless the additional milk that is made available for other dairy products goes into foods whose distribution among the population adds more to health than would the fluid milk. For example, unless all of the skim milk can be dried or other-

²⁸ Expected production of some dairy products in 1944 with and without restrictions on sales of fluid milk is indicated in the following table taken from *The Dairy Situation*, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1943, p. 10:

| Product | With Fluid Milk Sales Restricted (Millions of Pounds) | Without Fluid Milk Sales Restricted (Millions of Pounds) |
|--|---|--|
| Fluid milk and cream in urban areas..... | 40,565 | 45,500 |
| Creamery butter..... | 1,715 | 1,575 |
| American cheese..... | 700 | 615 |
| Evaporated milk..... | 2,865 | 2,400 |
| Dried whole milk..... | 150 | 140 |
| Dried skim milk..... | 470 | 350 |

These estimates indicate that of the milk solids diverted from fluid milk into other products, slightly less than three-fifths is expected to be redirected into human consumption. This results from the fact that only about one-third of the non-fat milk solids from the milk directed into butter will be recovered for human consumption in the form of dried skim milk.

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wise directly made available for human consumption, a reduction in fluid milk consumption in order to make available more butter is not warranted from a nutritional standpoint.

The success of any rationing procedure depends partly upon the way in which rationing distributes the goods among the population and the simplicity of the administrative procedure. The level of milk consumption is relatively high in the areas where limitations have been placed upon dealers' sales of milk. No serious reductions have to be distributed among the population. The administration of such limitations is relatively simple as compared to point rationing.

If nationwide rationing of fluid milk or drastic cuts in the consumption of fluid milk in many areas is considered desirable, however, point rationing rather than rationing by dealers seems advisable. Giving sellers the responsibility for determining individual rations has not proven very successful where this type of rationing has been applied to other commodities, particularly when the level of available supplies has been markedly reduced. Fluid milk, cream, and evaporated milk could be included in a group of foods which could be rather easily rationed under the point system. Special procedures could be established to minimize the collection and accounting of points.

IV. SOME POSTWAR IMPLICATIONS OF WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DAIRY INDUSTRY

Developments which are made during the war both within the dairy industry and independently of it are likely to be of importance in the postwar dairy picture. This section is not an analysis of these developments. It is merely an attempt to list some of the more important ones and to point out some of their possible implications.

The Postwar Market for Dried Skim Milk. As has been pointed out previously in this analysis, the demand for dried skim milk has increased sharply during the war. Because of its high food value per pound and its storability, a large proportion of the dried non-fat milk solids produced thus far during the war has gone to our armed forces and to lend-lease. If supplies had been sufficient, however, it is likely that domestic consumption would have increased markedly, particularly if milk solids were used in bread.

Forecasts of actual quantities of dried skim milk which will be consumed and the prices which will prevail in the years after the war can be little more than guesses. Approximately 270 million pounds of dried skim milk were manufactured for human food in 1939. Most of this was used domestically, largely by confectioners, bakers, ice cream manufacturers, and in the preparation of various commercial products. Although wartime demands (including domestic requirements for the fortification of bread) have been nearly four times as large as this prewar figure, there is little likelihood that demands in the period following reconstruction will approximate wartime requirements. Many countries other than the United States can supply large volumes of dried skim milk. Although dried skim milk is a relatively inexpensive source of animal proteins and other important nutrients, many of these nutrients may be provided at even lower costs

from such foods as soybeans, on a long run basis. Soybean flour may be widely used as a means of improving the nutritive quality of such foods as bread. These factors should be kept in mind in estimating the postwar dried skim milk market.

Removal of taxes and license fees on the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine. One cannot estimate with any accuracy the probability that restrictions on the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine will be relaxed. Some of the general implications to the dairy industry of such a development, however, may be of interest.

To the extent that butter and oleomargarine may replace each other and that prices for oleomargarine are lower with the removal of restrictions than they would be if taxes, license fees, and other impediments were maintained, removal of the restrictions might mean a somewhat lower short-run level of returns to butterfat than would otherwise prevail. How much lower butter prices would be is difficult to estimate. Consumers generally prefer butter to oleomargarine and butter would probably continue to command a substantial premium.

The restrictions to the sale and manufacture of oleomargarine are important to dairymen, since such restrictions influence their incomes. And viewed in isolation, the restrictions on oleomargarine are of relatively little significance to the general public. However, the ramifications of using such a procedure to influence incomes are of much greater significance than the immediate effects upon the price of butter and other dairy products. Such restrictions interfere with organizing our economy in a manner which will enable maximum production from our limited resources. Extension of this principle to other fields would tie the economy in knots and make its proper functioning impossible. The long-run effect of attempting through artificial price maintenance to influence the distribution of incomes may be a drastically smaller total income to distribute. Each group trying to get a larger share of the national income through such restrictions may find that although its share is larger, its absolute quantity

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may be smaller than would be obtained in an economy in which such restrictions were absent. Furthermore, even in the short-run, retaliatory action against not only butter but other dairy products is encouraged by the restrictions imposed on oleomargarine.

Wartime changes in technology. Some improvements in technology may improve markets for dairy products. On the other hand, some technological improvements may encourage the use of other items to replace dairy products. For example, improvements in the drying of whole milk and skim milk help to make these products more acceptable. Increased use of vegetable proteins in industrial processes, however, may reduce the market for such products as casein.

Improvements in technology will prove of most significance to the dairy industry if the application of technology is given greater opportunity than it has been granted in the past. Some legally established specifications for the compositions of dairy products impede the application of improved techniques to making these products more acceptable. A re-examination of these specifications toward making them more flexible may be desirable both from the standpoint of consumers and producers of dairy products.

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APPENDIX

Data relating to the efficiencies with which various kinds of livestock convert feed into food are not readily available. This is the situation particularly when one considers average rates of conversion of the different kinds of livestock as well as the variation in rates arising out of differences in productivity and differences in the way in which the livestock product is ultimately consumed as food. Appendix tables 1-8 represent an attempt to provide a rough basis for such comparisons.

These comparisons should not be accepted as the final word on the subject. Several limitations must be imposed in interpreting them. First of all, when one compares the amounts of food nutrients produced by various kinds of livestock from a given quantity of feed, it must be assumed that at least part of the feed can be used by any of the kinds of livestock included in the comparison. Hogs and poultry can utilize only limited quantities of roughages. However, since the total digestible nutrients provided by roughages can be substituted in the rations of dairy cattle, beef, or sheep for total digestible nutrients furnished from concentrate feeds, such comparisons are valid for relatively small changes in the output of the various kinds of livestock.

A second limitation arises from the fact that livestock products are a composite of a number of nutrients. In comparing only relative returns of one nutrient, the other nutrients produced jointly are implicitly valued at zero.

The rates of conversion are based on average nutritive compositions of various livestock products and upon estimated rates of conversion of feed into these products. It should be remembered that there is some variability in the compositions of the products and considerable variability in the rates of conversion. Furthermore, since the population of feeding rates

is not known, the values used are estimates and are subject to errors.

In spite of these limitations, the assembling of these data in their present form would appear to be more satisfactory than other available data for indicating relative resource costs of providing given amounts of protein and carbohydrate equivalent for human consumption from various kinds of livestock, considering varying levels of productivity as well as variations in the way in which the product is used.

In converting various feeds to the common denominator of total digestible nutrients, it was assumed that each pound of corn contains approximately 0.8 pound of total digestible nutrients, a pound of oats contains 0.7 pound of digestible nutrients, each pound of other feed concentrates contain about 0.75 pound of total digestible nutrients, a pound of silage contains approximately 0.15 pound of total digestible nutrients, and a pound of hay contains about 0.5 pound of total digestible nutrients. There is, of course, variability in the percentages of total digestible nutrients contained in different samples of the same general kind of feeds.

Feed supplied from pasture has been omitted in these comparisons, primarily because of the difficulties involved in comparing different kinds of pasture. This omission increases somewhat the estimated relative efficiencies of roughage consuming animals as compared to other animals.

APPENDIX

RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF VARIOUS KINDS OF LIVESTOCK IN CONVERTING FEED INTO EDIBLE PROTEIN^a

| Kind of Animal | Level of Productivity | Use of Product | Average Lbs. of Protein in the Food Product From 100 Lbs. of Total Digestible Nutrients Consumed |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Dairy cow | 8,000 lbs. milk per year | whole milk products ^b | 6.0 |
| Dairy cow | 6,000 lbs. milk per year | whole milk products | 5.3 |
| Chickens | live weight 2 lbs. | meat | 4.1 |
| Dairy cow | 4,000 lbs. milk per year | whole milk products | 3.9 |
| Chickens | live weight 3 lbs. | meat | 3.8 |
| Chickens | 13½ doz. eggs per hen per yr. | eggs | 3.8 |
| Chickens | live weight 4 lbs. | meat | 3.4 |
| Chickens | 10 doz. eggs per hen per yr. | eggs | 3.3 |
| Chickens | live weight 5 lbs. | meat | 3.1 |
| Chickens | live weight 6 lbs. | meat | 2.8 |
| Chickens | 8 doz. eggs per hen per yr. | eggs | 2.7 |
| Hogs | live weight 160 lbs. | meat | 2.4 |
| Hogs | live weight 190 lbs. | meat | 2.2 |
| Hogs | live weight 210 lbs. | meat | 2.1 |
| Hogs | live weight 230 lbs. | meat | 2.1 |
| Hogs | live weight 250 lbs. | meat | 2.0 |
| Hogs | live weight 310 lbs. | meat | 1.9 |
| Beef calves | weight incr. from 400 to 800 lbs. | meat | 1.6 |
| Dairy cow | 8,000 lbs. milk per year | butter, skim fed to hogs | 1.5 |
| Dairy cow | 6,000 lbs. milk per year | butter, skim fed to hogs | 1.2 |
| Beef yearlings | wt. incr. from 650 to 1,000 lbs. | meat | 1.1 |
| Dairy cow | 4,000 lbs. milk per year | butter, skim fed to hogs | 1.1 |
| Beef, 2 yr. old | wt. incr. from 850 to 1,100 lbs. | meat | 1.0 |
| Lambs | wt. incr. from 60 to 90 lbs. | meat | 0.9 |
| | | meat | 0.8 |

^a Based on returns of animal products as summarized in farm records and feeding experiments. (See Appendix tables 3-8.)

The comparisons in this table consider only relative protein returns, thus evaluating the other nutrients produced jointly with the protein at zero.

^b For milk, butter, and eggs, these returns include all meat produced as a joint product. Feed consumption includes maintenance and replacement.

^c Protein returns from cows producing milk for use in cheese will be about five-sixths of the returns from equivalent cows producing milk for use in whole milk products.

APPENDIX

TABLE 2
RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF VARIOUS KINDS OF LIVESTOCK IN CONVERTING FEED INTO FOOD ENERGY*

| Kind of Animal | Level of Productivity or Weight Marketed | Use of Product | Average Lbs. of Carbohydrate Equivalent in the Food Produced From 100 Lbs. of Total Digestible Nutrients Consumed ^b |
|----------------------|--|----------------------------------|--|
| Hogs..... | live weight 310 lbs. | meat | 29.6 |
| Hogs..... | live weight 250 lbs. | meat | 29.5 |
| Hogs..... | live weight 230 lbs. | meat | 29.0 |
| Dairy cow..... | 8,000 lbs. milk per year | whole milk products ^c | 28.6 |
| Hogs..... | live weight 210 lbs. | meat | 28.2 |
| Hogs..... | live weight 190 lbs. | meat | 27.0 |
| Dairy cow..... | 8,000 lbs. milk per year | butter, skim fed to hogs | 25.2 |
| Dairy cow..... | 6,000 lbs. milk per year | whole milk products | 24.8 |
| Hogs..... | live weight 160 lbs. | meat | 24.6 |
| Dairy cow..... | 6,000 lbs. milk per year | butter, skim fed to hogs | 22.1 |
| Dairy cow..... | 4,000 lbs. milk per year | whole milk products | 18.2 |
| Dairy cow..... | 4,000 lbs. milk per year | butter, skim fed to hogs | 16.0 |
| Chickens..... | 13½ doz. eggs per hen per yr. | eggs | 11.3 |
| Beef yearling..... | wt. incr. from 650 to 1,000 lbs. | meat | 11.0 |
| Beef, 2-yr. old..... | wt. incr. from 850 to 1,100 lbs. | meat | 11.0 |
| Beef calves..... | wt. incr. from 400 to 800 lbs. | meat | 10.6 |
| Chickens..... | 10 doz. eggs per hen per yr. | eggs | 9.8 |
| Chickens..... | live weight 3 lbs. | meat | 8.5 |
| Chickens..... | 8 doz. eggs per hen per yr. | eggs | 8.0 |
| Lambs..... | wt. incr. from 60 to 90 lbs. | meat | 8.0 |
| Chickens..... | live weight 4 lbs. | meat | 7.8 |
| Chickens..... | live weight 2 lbs. | meat | 7.4 |
| Chickens..... | live weight 5 lbs. | meat | 7.4 |
| Chickens..... | live weight 6 lbs. | meat | 6.7 |

- Same bases for calculation as table 1 (See Appendix tables 3-8). The comparisons in this table consider only relative returns of food energy, thus evaluating the other nutrients produced jointly with food energy at zero.
- For milk, butter, and eggs these returns include all meat produced as a joint product. Food consumption includes maintenance and replacement.
- When foods or feeds are ingested they yield energy in addition to furnishing essential nutrients. The number of units of energy produced depends largely upon the relative amounts of the feed nutrients (protein, carbohydrate, and fat) in each feedstuff. Equal units of weight of protein and carbohydrate produce essentially equal amounts of energy, those of fat 2.25 times as much.
- Energy returns from cows producing milk for use in cheese will be about four-fifths of the returns from equivalent cows producing milk used in whole milk products.

TABLE 3
DATA RELATING TO EFFICIENCY OF HOGS AS CONVERTERS OF FEED INTO EDIBLE PROTEIN AND CARBOHYDRATE EQUIVALENT

| Live Wt. (Lbs.) | Composition of Animal (Lbs. in Food per 100 Lbs. Live Wt.) ^a | | Total Feed Requirements (Incl. Sow Req.) ^d | Nutrients Produced ^b (Edible Product) | | Average Protein Produced per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | Average Lbs. CHO Equivalent Produced per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | Additional Lbs. Prot. Produced per 100 Lbs. Additional T.D.N. | Additional Lbs. CHO Equivalent Produced per 100 Lbs. Additional T.D.N. |
|-----------------|---|------|---|--|-----------------------|--|--|---|--|
| | Protein | Fat | | Protein (Lbs.) | CHO Equivalent (Lbs.) | | | | |
| 40 | 8.70 | 9.0 | 190 | 5.0 | 30.5 | 2.6 | 16.1 | | |
| 80 | 8.20 | 16.0 | 302 | 8.1 | 54.3 | 2.7 | 18.0 | 2.8 | 21.2 |
| 120 | 7.80 | 23.0 | 426 | 10.9 | 90.4 | 2.8 | 21.2 | 2.3 | 29.1 |
| 160 | 7.30 | 29.6 | 558 | 13.2 | 137.1 | 2.4 | 24.6 | 1.8 | 35.4 |
| 190 | 7.00 | 34.5 | 666 | 14.8 | 179.6 | 2.2 | 27.0 | 1.5 | 39.4 |
| 210 | 6.80 | 37.0 | 739 | 15.8 | 208.1 | 2.1 | 28.2 | 1.3 | 39.0 |
| 230 | 6.55 | 39.0 | 814 | 16.6 | 235.8 | 2.0 | 29.0 | 1.0 | 36.9 |
| 250 | 6.30 | 40.5 | 913.1 | 17.3 | 262.4 | 1.9 | 29.5 | 0.9 | 35.0 |
| 270 | 6.05 | 41.7 | 970 | 17.9 | 288.6 | 1.8 | 29.8 | 0.7 | 32.8 |
| 290 | 5.80 | 42.7 | 1,051 | 18.4 | 314.4 | 1.7 | 29.9 | 0.6 | 31.8 |
| 310 | 5.55 | 43.0 | 1,135 | 18.7 | 336.0 | 1.6 | 29.6 | 0.4 | 25.7 |

^a Based on data presented in *Proximate Composition of American Food Materials*, U.S.D.A. Circular No. 549; *Food and Life*, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1939, p. 458; and unpublished data from Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture. Official yields were assumed to add 0.55 lbs. of protein per 100 pounds live weight (at all weights). Yields have been directly calculated for weights of 190 lbs., 230 lbs., and 270 lbs., and have been interpolated for the other weights.

^b 1 lb. protein = 1 lb. CHO equivalent; 1 lb. fat = 2.25 lbs. CHO equivalent.

^c Based on data from Robert Menze, *Applications of the Law of Diminishing Returns to the Production of Hogs*, unpublished Master's Thesis, Iowa State College, 1941, page 81.

^d Requirements for the sow are estimated from John H. Sitterley, *Feed Consumed by Livestock*, Ohio State University, Extension Bul. No. 203, page 46. These requirements for one year were as follows:

| | Lbs. | T.D.N. |
|-------------------------|-------|--------|
| Corn..... | 1,466 | 1,173 |
| Oats..... | 203 | 142 |
| Other concentrates..... | 57 | 45 |
| Supplement..... | 114 | 86 |

Total..... 1,446

It was assumed that the sow was fed for 8 months and that there were 6 pigs in the litter. Hence, sow requirements = 1,446 X 2/3 X 1/6 = 160 lbs. T.D.N. per pig

^e It was assumed that the sow gained 135 lbs. or 22 lbs. per pig. Composition of this gain was assumed to be 7 per cent protein and 35 per cent fat. If the composition of the sow gain was assumed to be 5 per cent protein and .15 per cent fat, the average return for a 230 lb. hog would be 2.0 lbs. protein and 29.5 lbs. carbohydrate equivalent per 100 lbs. of T.D.N.

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TABLE 4
DATA RELATING TO EFFICIENCY OF BEEF CATTLE AS CONVERTERS OF FEED INTO
EDIBLE PROTEIN AND CARBOHYDRATE EQUIVALENT

| Live Weight (Lbs.) | Composition of Animal (Lbs. in Food per 100 Lbs. Live Wt.) ^a | | | Nutrients Produced by Animal (Lbs.) | | Total Digestible Nutrients Required ^c | Lbs. Pork Produced ^d | Total Nutrients Produced (Edible Product) | | Average Lbs. Nutrients Produced per 100 Lbs. Total Digestible Nutrients in the Feed | | | |
|--------------------|---|------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|-------------------------|---------|-------------------------|
| | Protein | Fat | CHO Equivalent ^b | Protein (Lbs.) | CHO Equiv. (Lbs.) ^b | | | Protein | CHO Equiv. (Lbs.) ^b | Protein | CHO Equiv. ^b | Protein | CHO Equiv. ^b |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Calves | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 400..... | 9.0 | 6.0 | 22.5 | 32.8 | 212 | 2520 | 60 | 36.7 | 268 | 1.5 | 10.6 | | |
| 800..... | 8.6 | 13.0 | 37.8 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Yearlings | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 650..... | 8.8 | 7.3 | 25.2 | 25.8 | 234 | 2730 | 70 | 30.4 | 300 | 1.1 | 11.0 | | |
| 1000..... | 8.3 | 14.0 | 39.8 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2-yr. olds | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 850..... | 8.6 | 8.5 | 27.7 | 16.0 | 226 | 2250 | 62 | 20.0 | 247 | 0.9 | 11.0 | | |
| 1100..... | 8.1 | 15.0 | 41.9 | | | | | | | | | | |

^a Based on data presented in Chatfield and Adams, *Proximate Composition of American Food Materials*, U.S.D.A., Cir. No. 549. It was assumed that feeder calves would have the same composition as common cattle, yearling feeders the same composition as high common, and 2-year-olds the composition of low medium slaughter cattle. The slaughter grade was considered to be good with an adjustment for weight. If cattle were fed to choice grade by feeding longer, protein returns would have been reduced appreciably, while energy returns would increase. If cattle were fed to lighter weights and to medium grade, protein returns would be higher and energy returns lower. It should be noted that the composition of the animal is subject to considerable variation.

^b Protein is given a weight of one; fat a weight of 2.25.

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* There is considerable variation in the feed requirements, exclusive of pasture, for gains on the different weights of feeder cattle. The figures used here are largely based on publications by the U.S.D.A. and state colleges. A study of more than 100,000 cattle for the years 1919-23 indicated the following relationships in feed requirement per cwt. of gain for the three classifications of feeder cattle used in the table.

| | Feed Units of Concentrates | Feed Units of Dry Roughage | Feed Units of Silage | Total Feed Units | T.D.N. |
|------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------|--------|
| Calves..... | 682 | 110 | 65 | 857 | 725 |
| Yearlings..... | 691 | 138 | 173 | 1,002 | 880 |
| 2-year-olds..... | 841 | 151 | 168 | 1,160 | 1,015 |

(Source: R. H. Wilcox, et al., *Costs and Methods of Raising Beef Cattle in the Corn Belt, 1919-23*, U.S.D.A., Tech. Bul. No. 23, page 45.)

R. D. Jennings estimates that in addition to the usual supplies of roughages it requires the following quantities of concentrates for 100 lbs. of gain: calves, 575; yearlings, 685; and 2-year-olds, 750 lbs. If the roughages, except pasture, are added to these figures, the following approximate amounts of total digestible nutrients are required: calves, 670; yearlings, 790; 2-year-olds, 880. (R. D. Jennings, *Feed Consumption by Livestock 1910-41*, U.S.D.A., Cir. No. 670, pp. 56-57.)

A summary of 75 feeding trials at Corn Belt experiment stations indicates the following requirements (total digestible nutrients) for 100 lbs. of gain: calves, 540; yearlings, 650; and 2-year-olds, 780. (John H. Sitterly, *Feed Consumed by Livestock*, Ohio State College, Extension Bul. 203, p. 13.) A comparable series of studies reported by Morrison indicates the following requirements: 510, 665, and 735. It is to be anticipated that feed requirements would be lower under experimental than farm conditions. Two reasons are more important, farm records are usually based on purchase weights and sale weights, while the experimental results are usually on the basis of weights at the feed lot. This factor alone increases feed costs under farm conditions by 10 to 20 per cent as the feeder cattle will shrink from 3 to 7 per cent and the finished cattle from 2 to 6 per cent.

The feed requirements in total digestible nutrients used in this table per 100 lbs. gain are: calves, 630; yearlings, 780; 2-year-olds, 900. These are approximately 15 per cent higher than the experimental results and about 15 to 20 per cent less than extensive study of farm feeding requirements referred to above. The requirements are similar to those calculated from the data presented by Jennings.

^d Based on the assumption that on the average 21 lbs. of gain are produced by hogs following grain-fed cattle per 100 lbs. of gain by the cattle. Calves produce less (15 lbs.), yearlings about the average (20 lbs.), and 2-year-olds more than the average (25 lbs.) Hog composition was on the basis of 230 lbs. at time of marketing.

TABLE 5
DATA PERTAINING TO EFFICIENCY OF CHICKENS (FOR MEAT) AS CONVERTERS OF FEED INTO
EDIBLE PROTEIN AND CARBOHYDRATE EQUIVALENT

| Live Weight (Lbs.) | Composition of Animal (Lbs. in Food per 100 Lbs. Live Wt.) ^a | | Total Lbs. T.D.N. Required ^b | Average Lbs. Protein Returned per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | Average Lbs. CHO Equivalent ^b per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | Additional Lbs. Protein Returned per 100 Lbs. Additional T.D.N. | Additional Lbs. CHO Equivalent ^b Returned per 100 Lbs. Additional T.D.N. |
|--------------------|---|-----|---|---|--|---|---|
| | Protein | Fat | | | | | |
| 2..... | 9.8 | 3.5 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 7.4 | 3.6 | 10.5 |
| 3..... | 10.6 | 5.8 | 8.4 | 3.8 | 8.5 | 2.8 | 6.4 |
| 4..... | 10.8 | 6.3 | 12.8 | 3.4 | 7.8 | 2.4 | 4.6 |
| 5..... | 11.1 | 6.9 | 18.0 | 3.1 | 7.4 | 1.8 | 3.1 |
| 6..... | 11.1 | 6.9 | 24.0 | 2.8 | 6.7 | | |

^a Based on data presented in *Proximate Composition of American Food Materials*, U.S.D.A., Cir. No. 549.

^b 1 lb. protein = 1 lb. CHO equivalent; 1 lb. fat = 2.25 lbs. CHO equivalent.

^c Feed requirements are based on data presented in *The U. S. Egg and Poultry Magazine* by Annin and Halpin, University of Wisconsin, Nov., 1938, page 692, and Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin No. 434, page 24. Losses due to death are given consideration in the feed requirements.

TABLE 6
DATA PERTAINING TO EFFICIENCY OF CHICKENS (PRODUCING EGGS) AS CONVERTERS OF FEED
INTO EDIBLE PROTEIN AND CARBOHYDRATE EQUIVALENT

| Level of Annual Production (Dozen) | Composition of Product ^a (Lbs. in Feed per 100 Lbs. Marketable Product) | | Lbs. T.D.N. Required ^b | Average Lbs. Protein Returned From Eggs per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | Average Lbs. CHO Equivalent ^b Returned From Eggs per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | Av. Lbs. Protein Returned From Eggs and Meat per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. ^c | Av. Lbs. CHO Equivalent ^b Returned From Eggs and Meat per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. ^c |
|------------------------------------|--|------|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | Protein | Fat | | | | | |
| 13 ¹ 2..... | 11.4 | 10.2 | 68.4 | 3.4 | 10.4 | 3.8 | 11.3 |
| 10..... | 11.4 | 10.2 | 59.6 | 2.9 | 8.8 | 3.3 | 9.8 |
| 8..... | 11.4 | 10.2 | 59.6 | 2.3 | 7.0 | 2.7 | 8.0 |

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^a From *Proximate Composition of American Food Materials*, U.S.D.A., Circular No. 549.
^b 1 lb. protein = 1 lb. CHO equivalent; 1 lb. fat = 2.25 lbs. CHO equivalent.
^c Based on data presented by John H. Sitterley, *Feed Consumed by Livestock*, Ohio State University, Extension Bul. No. 203. The requirements were as follows:

162 eggs per hen (flock of 100 hens):

| | I.lbs. | T.D.N. | | I.lbs. | T.D.N. |
|------------|--------|--------|------------|--------|--------|
| Corn..... | 2,448 | 1,958 | Corn..... | 2,055 | 1,644 |
| Wheat..... | 1,273 | 1,018 | Wheat..... | 1,042 | 834 |
| Oats..... | 712 | 498 | Oats..... | 387 | 271 |
| Mash..... | 4,211 | 3,369 | Mash..... | 4,016 | 3,213 |
| | | 6,843 | | | 5,962 |

These figures include maintenance of the flock at 100 hens. It was assumed that hens producing 8 doz. eggs per year consumed the same amount of feed as did hens producing 120 eggs per year.

^a Supplementary meat yields are computed as follows:

- (a) Mortality rate of flock = 21 per cent per year.
- (b) Average weight of birds = 5 lbs.
- (c) Of 100 hens in flock at beginning of year, 66 are replaced by the end of the year.
- (d) Hence, 45 birds are edible.
- (e) Meat yield = $45 \times 5 = 225$ lbs. meat or 25.0 lbs. protein and 60.0 lbs. CHO equivalent from 100-hen flock.
- (f) Hence, supplementary meat yield is 0.4 lbs. protein and 0.9 lbs. fat per 100 lbs. T.D.N. in high producing flocks, and 0.42 lbs. protein and 1.0 lbs. fat per 100 lbs. T.D.N. in low and medium flocks.

TABLE 7
DATA RELATING TO EFFICIENCY OF DAIRY COWS AS CONVERTERS OF FEED INTO
EDIBLE PROTEIN AND CARBOHYDRATE EQUIVALENT

| Annual Production (Lbs.) Milk | Composition of Food (Lbs. Nutrient per 100 Lbs. Milk) ^a | | | T.D.N. Consumed | | Nutrients Produced (in Milk) | | Nutrients Produced Including Supplementary (Edible Product) | | Av. CHO Equivalent ^b Produced per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | | |
|---|--|-----|------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| | Protein | Fat | CHO ^b | Current Production Including Cow Maintenance ^c | Replacement of Herd ^d | Total | Protein (Lbs.) | CHO Equivalent ^b (Lbs.) | Meat and Milk Proteins (Lbs.) ^e | | Meat and Milk CHO Equivalent ^b (Lbs.) | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Av. Protein Produced per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. |
| Milk used in whole milk products: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4,000... | 3.5 | 3.9 | 17.2 | 3,480 | 597 | 4,077 | 140 | 688 | 161 | 741 | 3.9 | 18.2 |
| 6,000... | 3.5 | 3.9 | 17.2 | 3,780 | 597 | 4,377 | 210 | 1,032 | 231 | 1,085 | 5.3 | 24.8 |
| 8,000... | 3.5 | 3.9 | 17.2 | 4,400 | 597 | 4,997 | 280 | 1,376 | 301 | 1,429 | 6.0 | 28.6 |
| Milk used in Butter, skim milk fed to hogs: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4,000... | 1.56 lb. b.f. | 3.9 | 8.8 | 3,480 | 597 | 4,077 | | 351 | 40 ^f | 653 | 1.0 | 16.0 |
| 6,000... | 2.34 lb. b.f. | 3.9 | 8.8 | 3,780 | 597 | 4,377 | | 526 | 50 | 964 | 1.1 | 22.1 |
| 8,000... | 3.12 lb. b.f. | 3.9 | 8.8 | 4,400 | 597 | 4,997 | | 702 | 59 | 1,261 | 1.2 | 25.2 |

^a Based on data presented in *Proximate Composition of American Food Materials*, U.S.D.A., Cir. No. 549.

^b 1 lb. protein = 1 lb. CHO equivalent; 1 lb. fat = 2.25 lbs. CHO equivalent.

^c These feed requirements were estimated from linear regression fitted to the following data obtained from John H. Sitterley, *Food Consumed by Livestock*, Ohio State University Extension Bul. No. 203, page 31. The requirements given for one year at different levels of milk production (in total pounds per cow) are as follows:

Annual Milk Production per Cow

| Kind of Feed | 4,048 Lbs. | | 5,600 Lbs. | | 6,664 Lbs. | | 7,761 Lbs. | | 8,626 Lbs. | | 10,101 Lbs. | |
|--------------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | Feed | T.D.N. | Feed | T.D.N. | Feed | T.D.N. | Feed | T.D.N. | Feed | T.D.N. | Feed | T.D.N. |
| Silage..... | 5,100 | 765 | 5,400 | 810 | 5,300 | 795 | 5,400 | 810 | 5,500 | 825 | 5,500 | 825 |
| Hay..... | 2,500 | 1,250 | 2,280 | 1,140 | 2,300 | 1,150 | 2,560 | 1,280 | 2,410 | 1,205 | 2,460 | 1,230 |
| Stover..... | 360 | 180 | 350 | 175 | 420 | 210 | 390 | 195 | 350 | 175 | 270 | 135 |
| Concentrates | 1,660 | 1,328 | 2,040 | 1,632 | 2,180 | 1,744 | 2,660 | 2,128 | 2,920 | 2,336 | 3,370 | 2,696 |
| Total..... | | 3,523 | | 3,757 | | 3,899 | | 4,413 | | 4,541 | | 4,886 |

^a A replacement rate of 21.6 per cent is used. This is derived by taking the total number of dairy heifers 1 to 2 years old as a percentage of the total number of milk cows over 2 years old. Total digestible nutrient requirements for the heifer up to 24 months are estimated from John H. Sitterley, *Feed Consumed by Livestock*, Ohio State University, Extension Bul. No. 703, page 38, as being 2,765. These requirements are slightly lower than those given in Henry B. Morrison, *Feeds and Feeding*, 20th Edition, page 616.

^b It was assumed that the dairy cow herd produces 100 lbs. of dressed beef carcass (common grade) and 32 lbs. of dressed veal carcass annually per milk cow. This is equivalent to 21 lbs. protein and 53 lbs. CHIO equivalent.

^c In addition to the beef and veal produced by the dairy cow, a further correction is made for the value of skim milk used in hog feeding. 100 lbs. skim milk or buttermilk is equivalent to 30 lbs. corn or 24 lbs. T.D.N., although in cases of protein-deficient rations, the value is higher. It is assumed that the hogs will be sold at 210 lbs. The protein and CHIO equivalent added was derived as follows:

| Level of Milk Production Lbs. | Skim Milk and Buttermilk Produced Lbs. | T.D.N. Lbs. | Protein Lbs. | CHIO Equivalent Lbs. |
|-------------------------------|--|-------------|--------------|----------------------|
| 4,000..... | 3,800 | 892 | 19 | 249 |
| 6,000..... | 5,700 | 1,368 | 29 | 385 |
| 8,000..... | 7,600 | 1,824 | 38 | 506 |

TABLE 8
DATA RELATING TO EFFICIENCY OF LAMBS AS CONVERTERS OF FEED INTO
EDIBLE PROTEIN AND CARBOHYDRATE EQUIVALENT*

| Live Weight (Lbs.) | Composition of Animal (Lbs. Edible Nutrient per 100 Lbs. Live Wt.) ^b | | Nutrients Produced (Edible Product) | | T.D.N. Required for Gain ^c | Lbs. Protein per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. | Lbs. CHO Equivalent per 100 Lbs. T.D.N. |
|--------------------|---|------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| | Protein | Fat | Protein (Lbs.) | CHO Equivalent (Lbs.) ^d | | | |
| 60..... | 6.1 | 8.2 | 1.0 | 11.0 | 135 | 0.8 | 8.0 |
| 90..... | 5.2 | 17.7 | | | | | |

* It is assumed that lambs are put on feed at 60 lbs. and sold at 90 lbs.

^b Based on data presented in *Proximate Composition of American Food Materials*, U.S.D.A., Cir. No. 549.

^c Requirements estimated from data presented by R. D. Jennings, *op. cit.*, p. 56. Requirements given per 100 lbs. gain are as follows:

| | Feed Units | Lbs. T.D.N. |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|
| Concentrates..... | 336 | 288 |
| Roughage..... | 160 | 128 |
| Total..... | | 416 |

^d 1 lb. protein = 1 lb. CHO equivalent; 1 lb. fat = 2.25 lb. CHO equivalent.

TABLE 9
PER ACRE FAT YIELDS FROM DAIRY COWS, SOYBEANS, AND HOGS IN
FOUR CORN BELT STATES^a

| Source of Fat ^b | Returns per Acre of Land | |
|----------------------------|---|---|
| | Direct Fat Returns From Crop or Livestock ^c (Lbs.) | Total Fat Returns (Including Yield From By-product Feeds) ^d (Lbs.) |
| Dairy cows (butterfat) | 87 ^e | 130 ^h |
| Soybeans..... | 180 ^f | 317 ⁱ |
| Hogs..... | 218 ^g | 222 ^j |

^a Throughout this analysis the terms "fats" and "oils" have been utilized as if they were interchangeable. "Fats" differ from "oils" merely in their solidity or liquidity at various temperatures - or in the degree to which they are saturated with hydrogen. The various fats differ further, however, in the degree to which they contain certain elements soluble in fat.

The comparisons in this table consider only relative returns of fat and ignore the other nutrients produced jointly with the fat. Thus these comparisons are strictly valid only on the assumption that the commodity is produced solely for the fat.

^b Flaxseed is also grown fairly extensively in the north central states, although a relatively small proportion of the total output of linseed oil is converted into food products for domestic consumption. On the basis of average yields for the United States for the period 1937-41, an acre of flaxseed yielded an average of 178 lbs. of fat, excluding the indirect fat returns from feeding the oil meal to hogs. If these indirect returns are also considered, the total fat yield averaged 248 lbs. per acre.

^c Based on average yields in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio for the 5 years, 1937-41.

^d Total fat returns include the fat obtained directly from the crop or livestock and the fat returned if the by-product feeds are fed to hogs.

^e Assumes a cow producing 6,000 lbs. of 3.9 per cent milk or 234 lbs. of butterfat annually. Ration assumed was based on data in table 7, and included 5,400 lbs. silage, 2,200 lbs. hay, 2,100 lbs. concentrates, plus 16 per cent additional for herd maintenance. The production of these feeds (which excluded pasture) required 2.7 acres of land.

^f Average yield of 20 bu. per acre. Soybeans average 15 per cent extractable fat.

^g Assumes hog is marketed at 230 lbs. live weight. Feed requirements include maintenance of the sow. Fat returns also include those of the sow. Total feed consumption was based on data presented in table 3 and was assumed to be 950 lbs. of corn and 70 lbs. of soybean oil meal. This feed would require 0.44 acres of land, exclusive of pasture.

^h It was assumed that the skim milk by-product of the butterfat would produce 38 lbs. of fat if fed to hogs. An additional 5 lbs. of fat is produced from the average of 100 lbs. of common beef carcass and 32 lbs. of veal produced annually.

ⁱ 20 bushels of soybeans yields 960 lbs. of soybean oil meal. When fed to hogs this would return 137 lbs. of fat, assuming a pound of soybean oil meal is equivalent to 1.75 lbs. of corn. (See R. D. Jennings, *Feed Consumption by Livestock, 1910-14*, U.S.D.A., Circular No. 670, table 8).

^j Assumes 3 lbs. of tankage is yielded from a 230-lb. hog. When fed to hogs a pound of tankage was assumed equivalent to 2 lbs. of corn. (See Jennings, *ibid.*)

TABLE 10
 AVERAGE YIELD OF FOOD ENERGY AND PROTEINS PER 100 HOURS OF LABOR
 FROM SPECIFIED LIVESTOCK AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS^a

| Livestock or Livestock Products | Energy Value (1,000 Calories) | Protein (Lbs.) |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| Whole milk..... | 791 | 89 |
| Butter ^b | 425 | 1 |
| Pork and lard..... | 1618 | 58 |
| All beef cattle..... | 310 | 45 |
| Fattening steers..... | 289 | 42 |
| Fattening lambs..... | 521 | 58 |
| Chicken enterprise..... | 317 | 61 |

^a These data are from Raymond P. Christensen, *Using Resources to Meet Food Needs*, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A., May, 1943, mimeographed, page 30, table 12. They do not include in either set of comparisons the products produced jointly with the food energy and the protein. Furthermore, by-product yields are not considered.

^b The returns from feeding the skim milk to livestock are not included in these comparisons. If this is considered, the protein returns from butter production are approximately one-fifth of those from whole milk, assuming the cow produces 6,000 lbs. of milk annually. The energy returns will be about $\frac{3}{4}$ those of whole milk. If the skim milk is used for human consumption, the returns from butter plus skim milk are equivalent to those from whole milk.