

Press motivations and changes
in patterns of coverage by *People's Daily*, 1949-1991:
A content analysis of a Chinese newspaper

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	1
Research Question	2
Selection of the People's Daily	3
Organization of the Study	4
CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	5
The Pre-Cultural Revolution Period (1949-1965)	5
The Cultural Revolution Period (1966-1976)	12
The Post-Cultural Revolution Period (since 1977)	20
CHAPTER III. LITERATURE REVIEW	25
General Systems Theory	25
Four Theories of the Press	26
Modification of the Four Theories of the Press	29
A Dynamic Theory of World Press Motivation	30
The Communication System in China	36
Related Studies	38
Hypotheses	47
CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY	51
Content Analysis	51
Population and Sampling	51
Variables for Analysis	52
Reliability	59
Data Analysis	60

	Page
CHAPTER V. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION	61
Findings	61
Summary of Tests	83
Discussion	86
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION	90
Conclusion	90
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research	96
BIBLIOGRAPHY	98
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	105
APPENDIX A. CODEBOOK	106
APPENDIX B. EXAMPLES OF FRONT-PAGE STORIES FROM THE PEOPLE'S DAILY	108

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1. Model of dynamic theory of world press motivation	32
Figure 2. Distribution of items by news orientations in three periods	91
Figure 3. Distribution of items by major subject matters in three periods	92
Figure 4. Shifts of press motivations in the Chinese press in three periods	94

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Results of test of coder reliability	60
Table 2. Distribution of number of news items in three periods	61
Table 3. Average space (square inch) per item by period	62
Table 4. Distribution of formats of items in three periods	63
Table 5. Distribution of subject matter in three periods	65
Table 6. Distribution of news items by survival orientation in three period	66
Table 7. One-way ANOVA of news items with survival orientation by period	67
Table 8. One-way ANOVA of news items with survival as the dominant orientation by period	67
Table 9. Distribution of survival-oriented news items in primary display in three period	68
Table 10. One-way ANOVA of survival-oriented news items in primary display by period	69
Table 11. Distribution of news items on military/national security in three period	69
Table 12. Total amount of space of news items on military/national security in three periods	70
Table 13. Distribution of news items by ideology orientation in three period	71
Table 14. One-way ANOVA of news items with ideology orientation by period	71

	Page
Table 15. One-way ANOVA of news items with ideology as the dominant orientation by period	72
Table 16. Distribution of ideology-oriented news items in primary display in three period	73
Table 17. One-way ANOVA of ideology-oriented news items in primary display by period	74
Table 18. Distribution of news items on politics/government in three period	74
Table 19. Total amount of space of news items on politics/government in three periods	75
Table 20. Distribution of news items by market orientation in three period	76
Table 21. One-way ANOVA of news items with market orientation by period	76
Table 22. One-way ANOVA of news items with market as the dominant orientation by period	77
Table 23. Distribution of market-oriented news items in primary display in three period	78
Table 24. One-way ANOVA of market-oriented news items in primary display by period	79
Table 25. Distribution of news items on economics/business and science/technology in three period	80
Table 26. Total amount of space of news items on economics/business and science/technology in three periods	80
Table 27. One-way ANOVA of news items written by Xinhua by period	81

	Page
Table 28. One-way ANOVA of news items by unofficial writers by period	82
Table 29. One-way ANOVA of domestic official sources used by <i>People's Daily</i> by period	83
Table 30. One-way ANOVA of unofficial sources used by <i>People's Daily</i> by period	83
Table 31. Summary of tests of hypotheses	84

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government have been attaching great importance to the development of mass communication. During the past four decades, China has established its own press theories and a press system with its own characteristics. Today the country enjoys a strong national and regional press with about 850 newspaper titles (*The Europa World Year Book 1992*). These papers, together with radio, television and other media, have been playing an important role in the world's most populous nation.

The development of the Chinese press, however, has not been smooth. In fact, it has undergone ups and downs ever since the founding of the People's Republic. As a subsystem in the society, the Chinese press is related and therefore affected by other subsystems, especially the political subsystem. In China, politics is usually shaped by the policies of the Chinese Communist Party (Hong and Cuthbert, 1991). The past four decades have seen many changes in China's politics. Among the most drastic changes were the launching of the so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 and the CCP's adoption of the policy of economic reform and opening to the outside world in the late 1970s. While affecting other aspects in the country, these changes have also affected the development of mass media.

Research Question

Although the Chinese press has received quite a bit of attention in the mass media research, many of the studies emphasized the characteristics of the PRC press as a communist communication model, rather than examine it as a dynamic institution. It was only in recent years that researchers began to focus on the changes within the Chinese press itself. Many of these studies, however, are confined to examining theoretically the relationship between media and politics in China and its impact on the structure and practice of the Chinese press. Only a few content analyses have been conducted regarding the changes in the Chinese press coverage, and nearly all of them were comparing the coverage during and after the Culture Revolution, leaving the first 17 years of the media practice unnoticed.

This study is designed to examine the news content of the *People's Daily* (or *Renmin Ribao* in Chinese), China's official and largest newspaper, in an attempt to reveal the overall coverage patterns of the Chinese press since 1949. By comparing the coverage before, during and after the Cultural Revolution, the study is intended to investigate whether changes occurred in patterns of coverage during different periods. Specific research questions include:

- 1) Are there any significant changes in news content of the *People's Daily* among the three periods?
- 2) If yes, what are these changes?
- 3) What are the motivations behind these changes?

4) What are the implications of these changes?

In order to answer these questions, the study makes specific comparisons in terms of information amount, news format, subject matter, news writer, news orientation, and news source.

Selection of the *People's Daily*

The selection of the *People's Daily* was based on the following reasons: 1) The *People's Daily* is ranked among the world's elite press (Merrill, 1968; Merrill and Fisher, 1980). The elite newspapers are read not only by the elite of the countries in which they are published, but also by those in other countries; 2) It is the most influential newspaper in China (Chang, 1989, p. 92). Being an official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, the paper not only voiced the official viewpoint of the Party and the government, but also set the tone for other media in the country. It has a broad and varied readership (Chang, 1989, p. 96); 3) It is the largest newspaper in China. Its circulation has reached 5 million copies per day (*The Europa World Year Book 1991*); 4) It is one of the several principal newspapers that existed when the PRC was founded and have not stopped publishing in the years thereafter; 5) The copies of the *People's Daily* (in microfilms or in hard copies) are available in the United States.

Founded on June 15, 1948, the *People's Daily* originally published four pages seven days a week, with occasional supplements devoted to a special subject. It expanded to eight pages per day after

1956, but cut back to six pages in 1963. From January 1980 to June 1981, it ran eight pages on Monday through Saturday, and four pages on Sunday. Since July 1981, the paper has been publishing eight pages per issue. The first page is usually devoted to editorials, commentaries, and major events, both domestic and international. The emphases of the other pages varied in different periods. The size of each page is about 15 inches by 22 3/4 inches.

Organization of the Study

The study is presented in six chapters. Chapter I deals with the research questions and the reasons for selecting the *People's Daily* as the study subject. Chapter II reviews the historical background of the People's Republic of China. Chapter III includes a review of press theories, and related studies on the characteristics and performance of the Chinese press. Research hypotheses for the study are thus derived based on the literature review. Chapter IV focuses on the research methods and Chapter V presents the findings and discussion of the study. Finally, Chapter VI states the conclusion of the study and suggestions for further investigations.

CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to understand and examine the media development in the People's Republic of China, it is necessary to review the socio-political situation in the country since 1949. Demarcated by the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, the past four decades can be divided into three major periods: the Pre-Cultural Revolution Period (1949-1965), the Cultural Revolution Period (1966-1976), and the post-Cultural Revolution Period (since 1977).

The Pre-Cultural Revolution Period (1949-1965)

When the Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949, the newly established government was facing great challenges both at home and abroad. After eight years of war against Japanese aggression and three years of civil war between the Kuomintang (the Nationalists) and the Communist Party, the Chinese economy was on the verge of bankruptcy. Meanwhile, the young republic was threatened by the Kuomintang's attempt to regain its power on the mainland and by the western countries' political and economic embargo against it. Under such circumstances, to consolidate its political power, to invigorate the economy and to strengthen national security became the overwhelming tasks for the Chinese Communist Party. In general, the 17 years prior to the Cultural Revolution were a

period of reconstruction and self-development.

As the first step to win its popularity, the PRC passed the Agrarian Reform Law in 1950, which initiated a three-year land reform. The reform ended the traditional gentry and redistributed land among the peasantry. The sustainment of the rural population, which constituted ninety percent of the total, had a profound effect on the society as well as on the economy. By the end of 1952, both industrial and agricultural outputs in China had surpassed the pre-1949 peaks and the economy was "fully recovered" (Hung, 1976, p. 12).

The success of the economic recovery was, however, almost completely offset by an unexpected event--the Korean War (1950-1953). In October 1950, MacArthur broke his promise not to cross the 38th parallel, and the U.S. forces soon pushed toward the Sino-Korean border. China felt a threat of direct military invasion. After its repeated warnings were ignored by the United States, China sent out its voluntary troops to Korea to "resist America, support Korea and defend China." The Chinese paid a high price for this military involvement. By the cease-fire of 1953, the total Chinese casualties were 360,000, excluding 20,000 people captured by the U.S. forces, and the Chinese troops had used 3 million tons of military materials and 250,000 tons of ammunition (Hao and Zhai, 1990).

Once the Korean War was over, the emphasis of the Chinese government work again switched to economic development. In 1953, the First Five-Year Plan was launched. The plan was intended for

quick industrialization through heavy industry development, rural collectivization, and exploitation of natural resources (Hsu, 1983, pp. 645-64).

Following the Soviet model, China attached more importance to heavy industry than light industry and to light industry than agriculture (Hung, 1976, p. 14). While industry was said to be the leading factor in the socialist economy, agriculture was described as its base. The Chinese leaders believed that "China could break out of its backwardness only through the transformation of the countryside" (Martin, 1980, p. 99). Therefore, they launched a campaign for rapid collectivization of agriculture. Through mutual-aid teams, lower co-operatives, and then higher co-operatives, collectivization proceeded step by step. By 1956, 95 percent of the peasant population was in collectives.

Despite the economic success at home, China was still trying to survive an unpeaceful external environment after the Korean War ended. After the Communist Party took control over the mainland, the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan and occupied numerous offshore islands. Some of these islands were used as a base for commando raids on the mainland and frequent bombardments on coastal villages and towns (Jiang, 1988, p. 150). The tension in the Taiwan Strait increased in the summer of 1958 when Chiang Kaishek announced an imminent invasion of the mainland. While one hundred thousand of Chiang's troops, more than one-fourth of his forces, moved onto the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), U.S. President

Eisenhower ordered the Seventh Fleet mobilized in the Taiwan Straits. The American press also reported that the U. S. government threatened to use nuclear weapons. The Chinese government reiterated its sovereign rights over Taiwan and demanded the U. S. troops to withdraw from the area. Meanwhile, it agreed to reopen the suspended ambassadorial talks to settle the Sino-American dispute over Taiwan. The Taiwan Strait crisis did not escalate to warfare, although the dispute was hard to settle.

Back on the mainland, smug about the success of the First Five-Year Plan, Mao Zedong, chairman of the CCP, and many other leaders became impatient for quick economic development. In 1958, the Chinese leadership adopted "the general line for socialist construction" and embarked upon a mass campaign known as "the Great Leap Forward." The aim of the campaign was to speed up the pace of economic progress and make China a major industrial power in a short time. A typical slogan at that time was "Catch up with England in fifteen years."

One big push during the Great Leap Forward was to increase native and local industries. An extreme example was the "backyard furnace." In answer to the call of the Communist Party, almost every household or group of households built and operated a furnace in the backyard, and the authorities really believed that the output of iron and steel increased as a result. It was later found that much of the iron and steel produced by the backyard furnace was substandard and not suitable for use as raw material for industry (Hung, 1976, p. 17).

Extreme efforts like this, in fact, resulted in a great waste in the country's resources.

In agriculture, private plots were abandoned, and collectives were amalgamated into "people's communes." The communes were responsible for production, education, health, and social services, and all construction work within the area. The payment system gave way to a free supply system, under which people were paid according to their needs rather than according to their work. In pushing for increased agricultural production, close planting and deep plowing without adequate fertilization tend to destroy the quality of the land.

Partly because of such damage to the natural environment, China suffered from droughts, floods, and associated plant diseases in the years that followed. Agricultural output dropped drastically in 1959 and 1960 and recovered only slightly in 1961 (cited in Hung, 1976, p. 19). By 1959 there was a serious shortage of food in many parts of China, and the country had to buy grain from foreign countries (Chang, 1989, p. 39).

China's industrial output also began to decline in mid-1960 and dropped more than 50 percent from 1960 to 1961 (cited in Hung, 1976, p. 20). In the summer of 1960, the Soviet Union withdrew its experts from China, repudiated all the contracts and discontinued supplying equipment and spare parts to China. As a result, many Chinese factories had to close down and projects under construction had to be cancelled. The Soviet Union even required that China repay its loan of 2.2 billion dollars, which includes, in addition to the

economic loans, the delivery of weapons and materials during the Korean War (Hung, 1976). "Considering both its agricultural and industrial production, China was at the bottom of a depression in 1961" (cited in Hung, 1976, p. 20).

The situation was even worsened by the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. Although China and India coexisted peacefully in the early 1950s, their border dispute remained unresolved. In 1959, Tibet, China's autonomous region bordering on India, flared into rebellion. This event, coupled by the deteriorating economic conditions in China and a worsening split in the Sino-Soviet relations, suggested to the Indians that China's confidence in handling problems on its southwest frontier was shakier (Segal, 1985). Towards the end of 1961, India formulated a "forward policy" in the border area to give substance to Indian territorial claims. Shooting incidents were reported in May 1962. In the following months, India launched two rounds of offensives against China, but were easily rebuffed by the Chinese army. In November, after teaching India "the final crushing part of its military lesson," China declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew its troops back to the Chinese side of the traditional boundary line.

The boundary crisis was thus cooled down, and the Chinese government could once again concentrate on domestic problems. Starting from 1962, China entered a period of recovery, which was characterized by "readjustment, consolidation, reinforcement, and improvement" (Hung, 1976, p. 23). During the recovery period, while Mao devoted himself to fundamental policy and ideological work, Liu

Shaoqi, state chairman (president), Zhou Enlai, premier, Chen Yun, vice-premier, and Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing), vice-premier, were in charge of working out concrete government policies and their implementation. They adopted a more pragmatic approach in their work. In the countryside, the ownership of most of the means of production reverted from the communes to the collectives, and the original payment system was restored. Once again, people were allowed to own private plots, which accounted for about five percent of the farmland in a given commune (Chow, 1984, p. 122). The "free market" for family-produced commodities, though of a limited scale, reappeared in villages.

The priority of industrial development was also changed to a certain extent. Since the "agriculture-first" strategy was formulated by the Party's ninth plenum in January 1961, China's industry shifted its emphasis to three basic areas: chemical fertilizers, agricultural machines, and electrification of irrigation--to promote agricultural development (Chow, 1984, p. 122; Hung, 1976, p. 23). Another change was the reorientation of industrial production towards satisfying consumer demands.

Owing to these fundamental adjustments, by 1963 China had recovered from the crisis since 1959. Both agricultural and industrial production returned to the level before the Great Leap Forward (Martin, 1980, p. 110).

The Cultural Revolution Period (1966-1976)

While economic recovery was achieved quite successfully, the ideological conflict among the Chinese leaders remained unsolved, or even heated up. Generally speaking, there were two factions in the Chinese Communist Party--the radicals (the ultra-leftists) and the moderates (Wang, 1982, p. 32). The radicals, led by Mao, stressed ideological purity and "politics in command." They emphasized class struggle and the political domination of all government work. The moderate faction, headed by Liu Shaoqi, regarded economic development as a priority and emphasized the important role of expertise, instead of political loyalty, in the development process.

The chief source of the conflict between Mao and Liu was their different views of class struggle (Chow, 1984, p. 126). While Liu ruled out the necessity of class struggle in China, Mao believed that class struggle still existed in a socialist country such as China.

As Liu and the other moderates gradually gained upper hand in the country, Mao was afraid that "the momentum of his revolution aimed at establishing a truly Communist society was slowing to a standstill" (Martin, 1980, p. 111) and that Liu's "revisionism" would take China onto the "capitalist road."

In order to put China back on his socialist road and to train millions of successors for the proletarian revolution, Mao instigated the Socialist Education Movement in 1963. It was first implemented in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under the direction of Lin Biao,

then minister of defense. Lin replaced former defense minister Peng Dehuai in 1959 when Peng was ousted by Mao for his disagreement on the radical economic policies during the "Great Leap Forward" campaign. As a strategy to get further confidence from Mao, Lin began to transform the PLA into a political force. In 1964, to unify ideological training, he had the PLA compile and publish *Quotations from Chairman Mao*--the famous "little red book." A cult of Mao was thus promoted and had become pervasive by 1965.

Despite the widespread of personality cult, Mao realized that the Socialist Education Movement was not as successful as he had expected (Bishop, 1989, p. 74; Martin, 1980, p. 113). In January 1965, for the first time, Mao claimed that China's main enemies were inside the Communist Party (Bishop, 1989, p. 74). He charged that "a new bourgeoisie had emerged in the Party and socialist institutions had fallen into its hands" (Chang, 1989, p. 42). In order to promote his ideology and restore his complete control over the country, Mao decided to purge those "capitalist roaders" in authority and their accomplices in the lower ranks. With the help of Lin Biao and other followers, Mao launched the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"--a nationwide mass movement intended to recapture power from the bourgeoisie.

The Cultural Revolution formally began on May 16, 1966, when the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a circular written by Mao. The circular called for the Cultural Revolution to pound at "the decadent ideological and cultural position still held by

the bourgeoisie and the remnants of feudalism" and to weed out "those representatives of the bourgeoisie who had sneaked into the Communist Party" (Martin, 1980, p. 114).

Mao's first target was the cultural and educational circles (Wang, 1982, p. 34). With the start of the Cultural Revolution, universities and schools throughout the country were closed. Many intellectuals, including university teachers, were denounced. Students released from their studies formed a new militant organization--the Red Guards. Their slogan was "Defend Mao Zedong"--"implying that Chairman Mao was being threatened by conspiratorial forces that were plotting to deprive him of all power" (Martin, 1980, p. 115). On August 18, 1966, Mao officially unleashed this new revolutionary force (Kitts, 1970).

The mass movement was at its height in 1966 and 1967. Many people who were regarded as "opponents" of Mao's revolutionary line were publicly paraded, denounced, beaten and persecuted (Wang, 1982). In the Party leadership, Liu Shaoqi, Mao's main rival, was branded by Mao in March 1967 as the "No.1 person in authority taking the capitalist road." He was expelled from the Party and from all posts both inside and outside the Party in October 1968 (*Peking Review*, 1968) and died in November 1969. Deng Xiaoping, general secretary of the Party, was labeled as the "No. 2 power-holder in the party taking the capitalist road." He was strongly criticized for his pragmatic view: "It makes no difference whether a cat is black or white. If it catches mice it is a good cat." Deng was purged in July 1967 and sent

to Jiangxi Province for labor reform (Fang, 1979, p. 47). Among the purged were also Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing, Luo Ruiqing, vice premier and chief of the General Staff of the PLA, Lu Dingyi, chief of the Central Propaganda Department, and Yang Shangkun, director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. With more and more prominent people losing their positions, the whole system of the country had been shaken from top to bottom.

During the early years of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards created havoc almost everywhere by destroying temples, churches and whatever else they considered "feudalist" or "bourgeois." Through house investigations, works of Western as well as traditional Chinese art and literature were hunted out and destroyed. Western-style clothes, haircuts and products were also prohibited. *Quotations from Chairman Mao* and collections of Mao's writings became the predominant publication in the country (Dutt and Dutt, 1970, pp. 48-55).

The Cultural Revolution soon went out of control when violent disturbances took place between different factions among the Red Guards and other revolutionary radicals. Many people were killed or wounded, property damaged, and the country's economy was adversely affected by disruption of production. In Beijing, Red Guards also laid siege to some foreign embassies. Such a turbulence was beyond Mao's expectation. In September 1967, Mao had to resort to the PLA troops to restore order (Chow, 1984, p. 129). Later, revolutionary committees--a new form of power consisting of soldiers,

leftist cadres, and the revolutionary masses--were set up all over the country.

By 1968, the country began to regain its composure. Most of the violent disturbances had calmed down. Posters had been cleared away. Schools had reopened. Yet, the entire educational system was greatly changed. School years were shortened, and more emphasis was placed on ideological education rather than regular basic curriculum. Admittance to college and universities largely depended on one's political attitude rather than on intellectual ability (Bishop, 1989).

Another reason for the cooling down of the Cultural Revolution turbulence was the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet troops' constant movements along the Sino-Soviet border caused the Chinese to prepare for invasion, and a military clash between the two countries along the Ussuri River in March 1969 made war seem inevitable (Bishop, 1989, p. 78).

The most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution came to an end in April 1969, when the Chinese Communist Party opened its ninth national congress. At the congress, Mao emphasized that "the Party should now be reestablished to its vanguard position" (Chow, 1984, p. 129). As a result of the Cultural Revolution and the perceived military threat, the ninth congress found increased military influence in personnel of the Party organization. About 40 percent of the new Central Committee were representatives from the People's Liberation Army, while about 30 were from revolutionary cadres, and the

remaining 30 from revolutionary masses (Bridgham, 1970, p. 16). More than 70 percent of the Eighth Central Committee, elected in 1956, had been replaced (Bishop, 1989, p. 78). The Party congress passed a new charter, in which Lin Biao was unprecedentedly designated as "Mao's successor."

In his report to the congress, Lin (1969, p. 23) proclaimed:

A great victory has been won in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. However, the revolution must continue. The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie by no means dies out with our seizure of power.

Lin's statement was not unreasonable. The conflict inside the Party did not cease with Liu Shaoqi's dismissal. Ironically, it was then that a struggle between Mao and Lin started. In March 1970, Mao decided to abolish the position of state chairman against Lin's wish (Bishop, 1989, p. 79). Later that year, Mao criticized Lin at the Party conference for his ambition for more political power. This development made Lin determined to solve his conflict with Mao by force. After an abortive coup, on September 13, 1971, Lin tried to flee to the Soviet Union, only to die in an aircraft crash in Mongolia. A few months later he was officially denounced as "a traitor, conspirator, and would-be assassin of Mao" (Martin, 1980, p. 118).

After the Lin Biao incident, the Communist Party sought to eliminate Lin's influence on the Chinese political life. Mao, with the assistance of Zhou Enlai, began to make adjustment on both external and internal fronts. In diplomatic terms, China moderated its policies

toward the West. In October 1971, the United Nations voted to turn the seat held by the Kuomintang in Taiwan to the People's Republic of China. With this breakthrough, China succeeded in returning to the international community. To further rid itself of its previous isolation, China normalized its relations with Japan in 1972. The most dramatic change, however, was the reconciliation of the Sino-U.S. relations following President Nixon's visit to China in the same year.

In the meantime, Mao remodeled part of his domestic politics. While the radicals still remained the majority in the Chinese leadership, Mao began to turn to some of the former moderate leaders for the country's development. The most conspicuous personnel change was the appointment of Deng Xiaoping in 1973 as vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and chief of the general staff of the army (Bown, 1977, p. 51). Deng was also named acting premier two years later when Premier Zhou was hospitalized with cancer.

Once in power, Deng again emphasized production and material welfare, as desired by the moderates. He emphasized the importance of science and technology, and resurrected some of the old policies, such as private ownership and material incentives (Wang, 1982, p. 42). In January 1975, the Party leadership called for the realization of China's modernization by the end of the century (Zhou, 1975, p. 23).

While Mao was not satisfied with Deng's performance to some extent, the Gang of Four, the nucleus of the radicals, felt that Deng's pragmatic policies and conduct constituted a great obstacle to their

advocation of continuing revolution and ideological purification. The Gang of Four, formed after the death of Lin Biao, included Jiang Qing, Mao's wife and member of the Politburo, Yao Wenyuan, member of the politburo of the CCP; Zhang Chunqiao, a standing member of the Politburo; and Wang Hongwen, vice-chairman of the Party. They rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution and were eager to seize the highest power of the country.

As a counterattack, the Gang of Four, with Mao's support, launched the ideological campaign "Criticize Lin Biao- Criticize Confucius." In the guise of criticizing Lin and the ancient Confucian philosophy, they actually directed their spearhead at Zhou Enlai and then Deng Xiaoping (Chang, 1989, p. 45; Bishop, 1989, p. 80).

After the death of Premier Zhou in January 1976, the conflicts between Deng and the Gang of Four became more intensified. During the Qing Ming festival (China's Memorial Day honoring the dead) in April, spontaneous mourning activities in honor of Zhou appeared on the Tiananmen Square, the center of Beijing. On April 5, the Gang of Four sent out men with clubs and other weapons to break up the mourning crowds, and 380 people were arrested (Bishop, 1989, p. 87). Two days later, the CCP politburo, upon Mao's instruction, announced the Tiananmen Square incident as "counter-revolutionary" and dismissed Deng from all his posts both inside and outside the Party. The official announcement charged that Deng was the planner behind the incident and denounced him as a "counter-revolutionary and right deviationist, arch unrepentant capitalist-roader in the Party" (*Peking*

Review, 1976). Yet, against the wishes of the Gang of Four, Mao appointed Hua Guofeng as premier and the first vice-chairman of the Party, thus officially making Hua as his successor.

Mao died on September 9, 1976. About a month later, with the help of Marshall Ye Jianying, Hua ordered the arrest of the members of the Gang of Four. The arrest marked the end of the Cultural Revolution. Hua was soon named chairman both of the Chinese Communist Party and of its Central Military Commission.

The Post-Cultural Revolution Period (since 1977)

After the arrest of the Gang of Four, the radicals were greatly weakened and the moderates gradually gained the dominant power in the Chinese leadership.

In July 1977, the CCP Central Committee restored Deng Xiaoping to his former posts (Pye, 1981). Under Deng's initiative, the Party embarked on a liberal process. The first development was to "unify the Party's thought," namely to "accept practice as the sole criterion of truth." This was in opposition to those "whateverists," led by Hua, who maintained that "whatever Mao has said ought to be done and whatever he has not said ought to be left alone" (Sullivan, 1980, p. 39). The struggle finally ended with the pragmatists' victory, and Deng gradually took over power from Hua.

December 1978 witnessed the opening of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, which "marked a

crucial turning point in Chinese history" (Chang, 1989, p. 45). The plenary session reversed many previous unjust verdicts, including the Peng Dehuai case in 1959 and the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1976. The Party also decided to adopt the policy of economic reform and opening to the outside world and to shift the focus of the Party and government work to economic construction. In 1979, the CCP leaders proclaimed that "class struggle is no longer the principal contradiction in our society; in waging it we must center around and serve the central task of socialist modernization" (Howkins, 1982, p. 16).

In September 1980, Zhao Ziyang, a strong supporter of the economic reforms, replaced Hua as premier at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress. In June 1981, Hua resigned as both chairman of the CCPCC and of its Military Commission. Hu Yaobang, another reformist, was elected as chairman of the CCPCC, and Deng Xiaoping as chairman of the Military Commission. Hu was later named the Party's general secretary, the center of the CCP leadership, when the title of party chairman was abolished.

Since 1979, many changes have been made in China's domestic and foreign policies. Individual economy was once again allowed and even encouraged as an "auxiliary socialist economy" that could co-exist with the system of state ownership and collective ownership (Yu, 1980). The responsibility system was adopted, first in agriculture and then in industry, to ensure that the producers have more autonomy and responsibility for planning and producing. The government also adopted various flexible measures to improve China's finance and

trade situation (Yao, 1982).

To speed up the four modernizations, China made efforts to develop and improve relations, especially economic and trade relations, with industrialized countries. One of the approaches adopted by the government was to encourage and attract foreign direct investment in China. This resulted in the establishment of many Sino-foreign joint ventures in the country and the appearance of more Western products on the Chinese market.

Another striking sign of change was that great importance was attached to the development of science and technology. Deng claimed in 1979 that "science and technology," not "politics," were the most important factors in China's construction and modernization (Chen, 1979). Intellectuals who were denounced during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated; many of the radical educational policies during the Cultural Revolution were discarded; college entrance examinations were restored; and preliminary knowledge again became the major subject taught in schools and universities. Since the late 1970s, China has sent many students and scholars to major Western countries, such as the United States, Japan, Britain, West Germany and France, to acquire modern sciences and technologies. All these policies have led to the rapid development of China's economy.

In politics, "democracy and legal systems" were advocated by the government. One of the remarkable changes was the abolition of lifelong tenure for Party and government leaders in 1985.

While these policies proved quite successful in the

modernization drive, China's advance toward a socialist market-oriented economy did not seem easy. Problems like economic dislocations and a big deficit occurred (Wang, 1982, p. 55). Therefore, the government had to spend three years "readjusting, reforming, rectifying, and raising standards" in order to seek the right way to carry out the economic reform (Hua, 1979, p. 1). Some of the foreign contracts had to be cancelled, and the work emphasis was shifted from building new enterprises to consolidating, reorganizing and utilizing the existing enterprises (Yao, 1982).

Another problem caused by the opening-up policy was the penetration of pornographic materials and Western bourgeois ideas. To ensure ideological purification, the CCP authority created an "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" Campaign in 1983-84. Nevertheless, the problem of "ideological liberalization" was far from being solved.

In Spring 1989, a nationwide student demonstration for "freedom and democracy" broke out in China. The movement gradually escalated to sit-downs and hunger strikes on the Tiananmen Square. It lasted for more than six weeks until it was quelled on June 3-4 as an "counterrevolutionary disturbance" (*People's Daily*, June 4, 1989, p. 1).

China's economy, which had been developing at a remarkably fast pace, suffered a setback after the incident as foreign businessmen suspended loans to China or cancelled their investment, fearing that China was going to close its door once again (Anderson et al, 1989; and Cheng, 1990). The Chinese leaders, however, repeatedly stressed the

continuity of the reform and open policy (Zhang, 1989). In July 1989, Jiang Zeming, the newly elected Party general secretary, reassured that China's overall policy of reform and opening to the outside world would never change; on the contrary, this reform and openness would be carried out even more effectively (*Beijing Review*, 1989). He called on leaders at all levels to "concentrate on economic construction." In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China's reform and opening-up project reiterated that economic development is vital to building socialism with Chinese characteristics and called for "bolder reforms and faster economic development" (*Beijing Review*, 1992).

CHAPTER III. LITERATURE REVIEW

General Systems Theory

According to the general systems theory, a system is "a complex of elements or components directly or indirectly related in a causal network, such that each component is related to at least some others in a more or less stable way within any particular period of time" (Buckley, 1967, p. 41). The interrelations between the various components may be "mutual or unidirectional, linear, non-linear or intermittent, and varying in degrees of causal efficacy or priority."

Smith (1987, p. 2) noted that the general systems theory "provides a basis for making predictions about complex causal relationships among elements of a social system." He suggested that social systems are "engaged in a dynamic process by which they continually change their structures to ever increasing levels of complexity" and that "subsystems within a larger social system both affect and are affected by each other" (Smith, 1987, p. 1). Measuring complex causal relationships among different subsystems requires extensive time-based data.

Many studies view the media as significant subsystems within the larger social systems of the community (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982; Lin, 1983). Merrill (1974, p. 23) pointed out that "a nation's press or media system is closely tied to the political system." Lin (1983, p. 1) described the relationship between the political system

and the media system as the "linkage between two social subsystems." This linkage directly influences the information availability to the media and the access to the media by a society.

In China, the press serves as the instrument of the Communist Party and the government. Because of this special relationship, the subsystem of media is closely related to the subsystem of politics, and is inevitably affected by any change in the political system.

Four Theories of the Press

In 1956, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm published their landmark book *Four Theories of the Press*, which "remains the major source and point of reference" for studies of world press systems (McQuail, 1987, p. 111). The three American authors categorized world press systems into four mutually exclusive theoretical types: the authoritarian, the libertarian, the social responsibility and the Soviet communist (Siebert et al., 1956).

The authoritarian theory

The authoritarian theory of the press represents the oldest form of press system. Under this theory, the press, as an institution, should be subordinate to established state authority. The chief purpose of the press is to support and advocate the policies of the government in order to maintain the status quo. Criticism of authority or official policies is prohibited. The theory justifies censorship and punishment on the press through laws and licenses (Siebert et al., 1956).

The libertarian theory

The libertarian theory is regarded as "the main legitimating principle" for mass media in "liberal democracies" (McQuail, 1987, p. 112). Most of its principles date from the Age of Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Under the libertarian doctrine, the press should be separated from official control, and publication should be free from prior censorship by a third party. The functions of the media are "to inform and to entertain", and to serve as a check on the government. This philosophy emphasizes the concepts of "free marketplace of ideas" and "self-righting process" (Siebert et al., 1956).

The social responsibility theory

The social responsibility theory of the press largely derived from the belief that "in some respects the free market had failed to fulfil the promise of press freedom and to deliver expected benefits to society" (McQuail, 1987, p. 116). The theory emphasizes press obligations to society, although the chief purpose and functions of the press under this philosophy are similar to those under the libertarian theory. According to the Commission on Freedom of the Press, a responsible press should meet five requirements: 1) The press should provide "a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning" (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 87); 2) it should serve as "a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism" (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 89); 3) it should project "a representative picture of the constituent groups in society" (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 91); 4) it is responsible for "the presentation and

clarification of the goals and values of the society" (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 91); and 5) the press should provide "full access to the day's intelligence" (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 91).

The Soviet communist theory

The Soviet communist theory is a typology representing press systems originated in the former Soviet Union and other communist countries. The principles of this theory derive from the basic postulates of Marxism and Leninism. The theory emphasizes the Marxist concept of "unity"--unity of the communist party, unity of the working class, and unity of choice among alternatives. The chief purpose of the press is to serve the interests of the party and the government, to promote social movements towards communism, and to minimize political conflict (Siebert et al., 1956). Schramm summarized the doctrine of the Soviet communist theory as follows (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 121):

1. Mass communications are used instrumentally--that is, as an instrument of the state and the Party.
2. They are closely integrated with other instruments of state power and Party influence.
3. They are used as instruments of unity within the state and the Party.
4. They are used as instruments of state and Party "revelation."
5. They are used almost exclusively as instruments of propaganda and agitation.
6. They are characterized by a strictly enforced responsibility.

For the last few decades, the Soviet communist theory has been consulted by a lot of researchers interested in the communist press. However, the recent drastic changes in many communist countries

indicate that this theory can no longer explain many of the press phenomena in those countries. For example, although China remains socialist, its media practice has undergone various changes since 1949. Even so, the Soviet communist theory is still an important reference for understanding China's media system, which was actually born of the Soviet model.

Modification of the Four Theories of the Press

In an attempt to reflect the developments in the world since 1956, William Hachten (1987) has modified the four theories of the press and classified world press systems into five categories. These categories, which he defined as "normative concepts", include: authoritarian, Western (including Siebert et al.'s libertarian and social responsibility theories), communist (i.e., the Soviet communist theory), revolutionary, and developmental. Revolutionary concept applies to underground media seeking to overthrow the government. Developmental concept applies to non-industrialized or non-communist nations. Hachten believed that "all press systems exist somewhere along a continuum from complete control (absolute authoritarianism) at one end to no controls (pure libertarianism) at the other" (Hachten, 1987, p. 16).

McQuail (1987) categorized the world media into six normative media theories. In addition to Siebert et al.'s four theories, McQuail suggested two more theories: development media theory and

democratic-participant media theory. Development media theory mainly applies to communication in the Third World or developing countries. It maintains that "media should accept and carry out positive development tasks in line with nationally established policy" (McQuail, 1987, p. 121). Democratic-participant media theory mainly applies to the "developed liberal societies." The essence of this theory lies with its emphasis on the needs, interests and aspirations of the active "receiver" in the society. As McQuail (1987, p. 123) stated, "individual citizens and minority groups have rights of access to media and rights to be served by media according to their own determination of need."

A major contribution of Hachten and McQuail is that they have created a conceptual framework that accommodates press systems in developing countries (Schillinger, 1989, p. 3). This framework may serve as a clue to studying media practice in China, the largest developing nation in the world.

A Dynamic Theory of World Press Motivation

As stated above, *Four Theories of the Press* has been directing academic inquiry into world press systems for more than 30 years. Nevertheless, such classical typologies do not seem very effective in explaining the ever-changing press behaviors in the world today. As Schillinger (1989, p. 1) points out, "Four Theories proposes a static model" and "the authors do not suggest how a press system might

evolve into or deviate from its designated type." She argues that press theories should not merely answer the question "What type is it?", but also explain "Why?" and "What motivates it?" (Schillinger 1989). She also suggests that the book, first published in 1956, is strongly influenced by post-war anti-communist attitudes and the McCarthy Era in the United States. As an alternative, Schillinger proposed a world theory and accompanying model that addresses the dynamic and interactive nature of the world's press systems.

Schillinger stated three premises of a dynamic world press theory: 1) Press behavior and values are determined and identified by primary motives. The same primary motives are shared by the people, the government, and other national institutions; 2) Nations and their press systems subscribe to three primary vocabularies of motive--survival, ideology, and market, one of which predominates at any given time; and 3) Nations and their press systems vacillate continually from one prevailing primary motive in the direction of one or both of the other two (Schillinger, 1989).

In Schillinger's paper, the three "primary motives" are identified as major determinants of world press behavior and values. Schillinger believes that these motives are "hierarchically ordered", with survival being the first and most fundamental motive of all nations. "Nations whose existence is subject to acute military challenge by foreign foes or whose leadership is threatened by domestic rivals give priority to this motive. Similarly, national survival may be challenged by economic backwardness or decline, frequently attributed to foreign

exploitation" (Schillinger, 1989, p. 7). Yet, when survival is not threatened, either of the other motives--ideology and market--assumes priority. According to Schillinger, no national press system is driven by a single primary motive; rather, every system exhibits characteristics of at least two and frequently all three primary motives.

In order to illustrate the dynamic and interactive nature of different national press systems, Schillinger (1989) proposed a triangular model for conceptualizing the three "primary motives." As shown in Figure 1, the three points represent survival, ideology and market respectively. Governments and press systems move along and within the perimeter of the triangle, based on their prevailing motive and secondary motive(s). A dot representing the press behavior of a certain country may be located at various distances from the three points.




Figure 1. Model of dynamic theory of world press motivation (Schillinger, 1989, p. 12)

Although world press systems are driven by different motives, Schillinger supports Altschul's view that press systems in today's world share many characteristics (Altschul, 1984). Based on Altschul's summary, Schillinger emphasized the following commonalities (Schillinger, 1989, p. 13):

1. All nations profess a belief in free expression, although free expression is defined in different ways;
2. The press' first allegiance is to those who finance the press;
3. All press systems are utilized to support the prevailing national motive, i.e., the status quo;
4. The function of the press is to provide "news," in order to inform, educate, and persuade the public within the boundaries set by the prevailing motive vocabulary.

Schillinger characterized survival-, ideology-, and market-motivated press systems by means of six variables. These variables are: What is news?; ownership and financing; mass media control; local and small media control; attitudes toward entertainment, art, and advertising; and attitude toward foreign news and journalists. She defined the characteristics of the three types of press systems as follows:

Survival-motivated characteristics

The motive of the press system is to build, preserve, and defend the nation and government. The press is government's partner and must be utilized to rally support for the leadership and strengthen the resolve and morale of the people. News is information, either domestic or foreign in origin, that does not undermine the survival or

development of the state and the government. The media may be owned or financed either privately or by state, or by the two together. Pre- and post-censorship may be exercised by the state toward national media, while little effort is exerted to control or proscribe local press activity. Entertainment, art and advertising are generally viewed as irrelevant to the primary survival values. The government controls entry and access of foreign journalists. More restrictions are imposed on news going out than on news about other countries coming in (Schillinger, 1989).

Ideology-motivated characteristics

The motive of the press system is to build, preserve, and defend the ideology. The press is the servant and illuminator of the ideology. The media must be utilized to popularize the ideology, demonstrate its application to everyday life, and support ideological leaders and their political agents. News is information that supports and reifies the ideology and educates the citizenry on its tenets. The press is state owned, controlled, and financed. Both national and local media are subject to censorship and control by the state. Entertainment, art and advertising are scrutinized for ideological correctness and foreign sources are usually banned. The government controls entry and access of foreign journalists. The same restrictions are imposed on news going out as news coming in (Schillinger, 1989).

Market-motivated characteristics

The motive of the press system is to protect, maintain, and encourage free-market economic activity. The press produces a

marketable commodity and serves as a check on government. News is any timely information, either domestic or foreign in origin, that can be marketed profitably to the public. This includes information that helps those engaged in market activities function more effectively, information that tracks the activity of government or government leaders, and information that emphasizes the unusual. The press is privately-owned and dependent upon advertising and corporate revenues and sales. The market and media owners exert primary control over content of national media in response to advertising revenues, audience preference, and their own judgment. The government does not attempt to control local media activity. All forms of entertainment, art and advertising are permitted, but selection is based on predicted marketability and profitability. Access of foreign journalists are generally non-restricted, except for expulsion and other government security measures (Schillinger, 1989).

Schillinger's most important contribution to the mass communication discipline is that she has proposed an analytical tool that at least purports to be value/ideology neutral and that is not time-bound or historically determinist (Schillinger, 1989, p. 28). Her model helps to explain why press coverage can change dramatically even when the basic "Four Theories" category has not changed.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore what other underlying factors, apart from the political system suggested by the Four Theories, can shape the content of a press system. The study is designed to investigate the Chinese press coverage since 1949 using

Schillinger's dynamic model of world press motivation. It attempts to test quantitatively whether her predictive factors--"press motivations" of survival, ideology and market--were present in China, and to what extent these themes affected the actual patterns of the Chinese press coverage.

The Communication System in China

At its early stage, the press under the Chinese Communist Party simply followed the Soviet pattern (Shieh, 1951; Davison, 1965; Merrill, Bryan and Alisky, 1970; Lu, 1979/1980; Bishop, 1989). While maintaining most of the Soviet characteristics, the CCP has also developed some of its own communication theories through years of practice. The central doctrine of these theories can be summarized as "a strong Party spirit" (Chang, 1989, p. 27).

From its beginning the CCP paid great attention to the role of news media in its revolutionary cause. In a speech to the editorial staff of the *Shanxi-Suiyuan Daily* in 1948, Mao Zedong, chairman of the CCP, clearly stated the role and functions of the Party's press. He said, "Our policy must be made known not only to the leaders and to the cadres but also to the broad masses.... The role and power of the newspapers consists in their ability to bring the Party program, the party line, the Party's general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work before the masses in the quickest and most extensive way" (Mao, 1965, vol. 4, p. 241).

After the People's Republic was proclaimed in October 1949, the Chinese Communist Party soon began to organize all communication media, traditional and modern, for the purpose of building up socialism. In the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the first and foremost function of the mass media is to "serve as an instrument for the attainment of the government's aims" (Chu, 1984). To do so, the press must become the Party's "loyal eyes, ears and tongues" and be responsible for guiding the public on the socialist road. As Mao stressed, the Chinese press had four basic tasks: to propagate the policies of the Party, to educate the masses, to organize the masses, and to mobilize the masses (Lu, 1979/80, pp. 45-46).

Despite various changes in the CCP's policies during the last four decades, the nature of journalism as an instrument of the Party has never been changed. In 1985, the Party general secretary, Hu Yaobang, said that the most fundamental of the basic requirements for the Chinese Party press is to take a clear stand, to uphold the basic viewpoints of Marxism and the Party's policies, and to adopt pragmatic methods of seeking truth from facts (Chang, 1989, p. 57). He said several times that "no matter how many reforms are introduced, the nature of the Party's journalism cannot be changed" (Chang, 1989, p. 56). Recently, Jiang Zemin, current general secretary of the CCP, remarked that journalistic work is an integral component of the Party's cause and that "upholding the principle of Party spirit requires news propaganda to maintain political unity with the Party Central Committee" (Bishop, 1990).

Under such a philosophy, the media in China are exclusively controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and are integrated with other instruments of state power and Party influence. Barnett (1978) described the communication system in China as a "highly centralized and national system", in which "the content of communications emanating from the center, and disseminated through the Party-controlled system, tends to be highly focused, not diffuse." Because of this special characteristic of the Chinese communication system, changes in the content and tone of the press often reflect changes in the Party policies, or the principal preoccupations of the leadership (Chu, 1984).

Related Studies

Although the nature of the Chinese press has never changed for the last four decades, the practice of the Chinese press has not remained the same. Influenced by the political changes, or specifically changes in policies of the Chinese Communist Party, China's media since 1949 have undergone three different periods of development (Starck and Xu, 1988; Lu, 1990):

1. The pre-Cultural Revolution period (1949-1965)

The period of 1949-1965 saw China entering the stage of building socialism. Starck and Xu (1988) described these 17 years, from the journalistic point of view, as "a time of consolidation of media and tightening control by the Party."

After the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party confiscated all the former Kuomintang newspapers, and closed or reorganized privately-owned or foreign newspapers (Houn, 1956; Yu, 1988). Meanwhile, the new government developed an extensive mass communication network, which was under the absolute leadership and supervision of the Communist Party (Yu, 1988). In the 1952-54 period China reported 776 newspapers, and by 1958 the total circulation of all newspapers was 15 million copies per issue, or about five times more than the 3 million for 1955 (Chang, 1989, p. 31). In the Party press system, all the important media--including China's official wire service Xinhua News Agency, the Party's official newspaper *People's Daily*, the Central People's Broadcasting Station, and the provincial newspapers, radio and television--delivered essentially the same official message (Chu, 1979, p. 59). The Party also maintained that important news and documents should be released to the press only by the Department of Propaganda under the Party's Central Committee or by the Xinhua News Agency (Houn, 1956). This remains the basic communication structure even today.

During the pre-Cultural Revolution period, the primary purpose of communication was to publicize Party policies and direct people toward the socialist cause (Starck and Xu, 1988). As said by Lu Dingyi, then director of the Department of Propaganda, "the press is an instrument of class struggle... (one of the) weapons used by the proletarian class to overthrow capitalism and to build up socialism"

(Yu, 1964, pp. 103-104). Houn (1956) noted that the Chinese press in the 1950s carried on four specific tasks: 1) Propaganda work. The press devoted large portions of space to the publication of "lectures," official documents and other pronouncements elucidating Communist theories, the Communist Party Line, and the policies of the government. 2) Agitation work. The most important agitation work done by the newspapers during this period was in connection with the "Resist-America and Support-Korea" Campaign and the acceleration of production. 3) A medium of public information. The press also contained a large amount of straight information on public affairs. 4) An instrument of public control. The press performed this function "primarily by being a medium for official and popular criticism of the course of the development of the Chinese society and its component parts."

While maintaining that mass media should serve as mouthpieces of the Party, the CCP emphasized the quality of news reporting. It stressed that news reporting must be truthful. To attract readers, newspapers and Party leaders also paid attention to the style of writing. Liu Shaoqi advocated that Xinhua should learn from not only Tass but also Western news agencies and that the media should publish bad as well as good news (Mulligan, 1986, pp. 62-63). He once said, "Bourgeois newspapers let their reports become interesting; so why can't we make more interesting news?" (Chang, 1989, p. 34). This resulted in changes in news presentation, more attractive pages, and shorter and more informative articles.

In early 1956, Mao Zedong launched the Hundred Flowers movement, which encouraged freedom of independent thinking, of debate, and of creative work. The name of the movement came from Mao's statement, "Let a hundred flowers blossom and let a hundred schools of thoughts contend." As a result, a journalistic reform was advocated among the Chinese journalists. On 1 July 1956, the format of the *People's Daily* was changed with the declaration that the *People's Daily* was a "public weapon and property of the people" and that "all newspapers are the organs of speech of the society and can have free discussions" (Wang, 1976). News stories concerning social problems and criticism of certain government policies began to appear in newspapers or on radios. This flourishing of free expression was short-lived, however, as "rightist" journalists were removed from their posts in the "Anti-Rightist Campaign" in the following year.

In a recent study, Lu (1990, p. 24) suggested that from 1949 to 1965, the motivation of the Chinese press can be categorized as being survival-dominated. Since the national goal was to ensure the survival of a socialist country, the media were the government's partners in strengthening the resolve and morals of the Chinese people. This can be best illustrated by the following criteria Mao outlined for mass media in China (Mao, 1977, p. 412):

- 1) Words and deeds should help to unite, and not divide, the people of all our nationalities.
- 2) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction.

- 3) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship.
- 4) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic centralism.
- 5) They should help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party.
- 6) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to international socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world.

2. The Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976)

The second period--1966-1976--saw the tumult of the Cultural Revolution, which threw the whole country into confusion and crisis. These ten years were "a period of intense and almost continual power struggle, in which the mass media played essential roles" (Yu, 1979, p. 48). Starck and Xu (1988) described this period as "perhaps the 'dark age' of the Chinese journalism history."

The purpose of the Cultural Revolution, as Mao defined, was "to settle the question of 'who will win' in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" (Lin, 1977). As early as in 1962, Mao observed: "In order to overthrow a political regime, it is always necessary to prepare public opinion and carry out work in the ideological field in advance. This is true of the revolutionary class; it is also true of the counter-revolutionary class" (*People's Daily*, February 16, 1967). During the Cultural Revolution, in order to get rid of Liu Shaoqi's influence in the Chinese media, Mao launched a full-scale battle on the ideological front. In June 1966, Mao and Lin Biao followers first took control of the Xinhua News Agency and the *People's Daily*, and by 1967 they had succeeded in seizing control of all the mass media in China (Mulligan, 1986, pp. 66-68).

Both national and local newspapers were affected by the Cultural Revolution. Many newspapers were purged, reorganized or suspended from publication by the radicals (Mulligan, 1986, pp. 67-68). In fact, the Cultural Revolution led to the biggest shakeup ever in the Party's propaganda organization and an almost complete change in leadership in the Department of Propaganda and its subordinate communication organs (Yu, 1979, p. 51). The *People's Daily*, for instance, changed leadership several times.

Nevertheless, significant changes in the communication system seemed to be more in substance than in structure (Yu, 1979, p. 51). Since a specific purpose of the Cultural Revolution was "to establish the ascendancy of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong)'s Thought" (*Red Flag*, 1967), mass media were utilized as important tools in a full-scale propaganda war and in a nationwide chorus of deifying Mao (Yu, 1979; Chang, 1989).

Lu (1990, p. 24) suggested that the motivation of the Chinese press was ideology-dominated during the Cultural Revolution, when all national activities, such as class struggles and political campaigns, were designed to educate the masses along the socialist road and the Party lines. In those days, ideological propaganda, rather than news, became the dominant theme in the press. According to statistics obtained by the Department of Journalism of the People's University, news, which accounted for about 60% of all the newspaper space before the Cultural Revolution, dropped to 40%, and sometimes even 30% during the Cultural Revolution (Lu, 1979/1980). In examining

the *People's Daily* issues, Chu (1979, p. 71) found that throughout the Cultural Revolution period, the upper right corner of the front page was exclusively reserved for a daily display of Mao's quotations, always framed in a box. Besides, articles in the *People's Daily* were accentuated by Mao's sayings, set in boldface type (Yu, 1979; Chu, 1979). As Starck and Xu (1988) indicated, the Chinese press in the Cultural Revolution years was characterized by Party monopoly and single-minded expressions of opinion, and local media tended to parrot the Central Party organ. Supporters of the Cultural Revolution believed that the media should not try to please public taste because public taste would presumably reflect bourgeois desires until the classless society appeared (Hoffer and Rayburn, 1977).

In the days when the media were in the hands of the Lin Biao clique and the Gang of Four, the theory that news must be truthful was discredited, and the fallacy that facts should follow the interests of political line became the guiding principle (Chang, 1989). News coverage became an instrument with which the Lin Biao clique and the "Gang of Four" tried to seize Party and state power. Ignoring or distorting facts, they fostered a kind of writing style characterized by falsification, exaggeration and empty talk (Chang, 1989; Starck and Xu 1988).

3. The post-Cultural Revolution period (since 1977)

Shortly after the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, China entered the era of economic reform and opening to the outside world. Owing to the changes in the Chinese Communist Party's policies, the Chinese

press has undergone great development during the post-Cultural Revolution Period. In fact, half of China's current newspapers have been established since 1980 (Chen et al, 1986, p. 4).

In his recent study, Lu (1990, p. 24) suggested that during the post-Cultural Revolution the motivation of the Chinese press was survival-dominated; yet in Schillinger's model, the dot representing press performance fell somewhere between survival and market, indicating a combination of market and survival motivations in the period. Lu noticed that the current Chinese press have many market-motivated characteristics, such as increased audience awareness, increased outspokenness in the domestic press, the legalization of privately owned media, the appearance of paid advertising, and less restraint on foreign-media broadcasts into and out of the country.

Since the focus of the Party and government work has shifted from class struggle to socialist modernization, mass media are no longer regarded as pure tools of class struggle, power struggle or political education, but rather, as multi-purpose instruments (Hong, 1991). Robinson (1991) noted that as the immediate goal is to use mass media to bring about a higher standard of living through increased productivity, the political goal is now on the back burner. Although political reporting remains one of the major news topics after the Cultural Revolution, the emphasis is more on political issues and the policies of the current government than on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, as was the case during the Cultural Revolution (Mulligan, 1986, p. 319). Accuracy in news reporting has

been restressed by the Party (Mulligan, 1986, p. 101).

Terrell (1984) stated that the main purpose of the current Chinese press is to serve the nation's "four modernizations." Since the Party decided in 1978 to shift its work focus to modernization, which centered on economic construction, coverage of economic news became prominent in China's media (Chang, 1989). The *People's Daily*, for instance, accordingly increased its coverage of economic news. In January 1980, of the 29 news stories given primary display on the first page, 21 were economic reports, while in January 1979, only 3 economic stories occupied the same place. Of the total 312 stories appearing on the front page, 173 were economic reports (Chang, 1989, pp. 45-46). Today, apart from economic news appearing on the first page, the second page is entirely devoted to the coverage of domestic economy. Chang (1989, p. 46) also noticed that reports in other fields, including politics, science, education, and art, also focused to a large extent on economic coverage.

During the post-Cultural Revolution period, the Chinese Communist Party and the government have allowed--within limits--increased diversity and pluralism, and have permitted a greater circulation of information and ideas (Barnett, 1986, p. 50). Chu (1986) noted that "not only is news writing being improved, media content is now more varied." While media institutions increased rapidly, growing varieties in form and content of information were found to gear to different needs (Chen, 1991).

As Hong and Cuthbert (1991, p.154) indicate, changes in the

Chinese media since 1978 showed that the media "have entered a new period of their history" and "have experienced a revolution which is different from any other changes in the past."

Hypotheses

Based on the above literature review as well as the historical review of the People's Republic of China, this study will test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. The coverage of the *People's Daily* was more survival-motivated in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution periods.

H1a. The *People's Daily* had more news items with survival as the dominant orientation on its front page in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H1b. The *People's Daily* had more news items containing survival-oriented information on its front page in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H1c. The *People's Daily* gave more primary display to news items containing survival-oriented information in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H1d. The *People's Daily* gave more front-page coverage to military/national security, in terms of number and size of items, in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H1d is posed on the assumption that military/national security will receive more coverage if the press is more survival-motivated.

Hypothesis 2. The coverage of the *People's Daily* was more ideology-motivated in the Cultural Revolution period than in the pre-Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution periods.

H2a. The *People's Daily* had more news items with ideology as the dominant orientation on its front page in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H2b. The *People's Daily* had more news items containing ideology-oriented information on its front page in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H2c. The *People's Daily* gave more primary display to news items containing ideology-oriented information in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H2d. The *People's Daily* gave more front-page coverage to politics/government, in terms of number and size of items, in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H2d is posed on the assumption that politics/government will receive more coverage if the press is more ideology-motivated.

Hypothesis 3. The coverage of the *People's Daily* was more market-motivated in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the pre-Cultural Revolution and Cultural Revolution periods.

H3a. The *People's Daily* had more news items with market as the dominant orientation on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H3b. The *People's Daily* had more news items containing market-motivated information on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H3c. The *People's Daily* gave more primary display to news items containing market-oriented information in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H3d. The *People's Daily* gave more front-page coverage to economics/business and science/technology in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H3e. The *People's Daily* carried fewer news items by Xinhua and more items by unofficial writers on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H3f. The *People's Daily* used fewer domestic official sources but more unofficial sources in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

H3d is posed on the assumption that economics/business and science/technology will receive more coverage if the press is more market-motivated. H3e and H3f are concerned with news writers and news sources. Since both survival-motivated press and ideology-motivated press are characterized by government control to a certain extent, it is expected that the Chinese press before and during the Cultural Revolution would carry more news items written by China's official news agency Xinhua and use more domestic official sources. As the press has become more market-motivated, the readers are likely to find more news items written by unofficial writers and more

information provided by unofficial sources. H3e and H3f are hence posed to be tested.

CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY

Content Analysis

Since the study is to examine the content of a Chinese newspaper's coverage, content analysis seems to be the most appropriate method to employ. Berelson (1952, p.18) defines content analysis as "a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."

Holsti (1969) presents three conditions under which content analysis is an especially appropriate research method: 1) cases in which data accessibility is a problem and in which an investigator's data are limited to documentary evidence; 2) cases in which the subject's own language is crucial to the investigation; and 3) cases in which the volume of material to be examined exceeds the investigator's ability to undertake the research by himself or herself. Since all these conditions apply to the case under the proposed study, it is proper to employ content analysis as the research method.

Population and Sampling

The population of the study included all the issues of the *People's Daily* published between October 1, 1949 and December 31, 1991. Since it is impossible to examine all those issues within a limited time period, samples were randomly drawn for the study

purpose. First, three years were randomly selected from each of the three study periods, since the purpose of the study was to compare the *People's Daily* coverage in three different periods. The nine years selected included three years in the pre-Cultural Revolution period (1952, 1957, and 1962), three years in the Cultural Revolution period (1968, 1971, and 1974), and three years in the post-Cultural Revolution period (1983, 1988, and 1991).

Then issues were randomly selected from those nine years. As Stempel III (1952, pp. 333-334) suggested, a random sample of 12 editions per year produces reliable and valid estimates of media content. Therefore, a random sample of 12 issues were selected from each of the nine years, resulting in a total sample size of 108 issues. Since the *People's Daily* had different pages in the three periods, and since front pages reflect the general trend of a newspaper's coverage, only the items appearing on the front pages were used for analysis.

Variables for Analysis

For research purpose, each news item was coded and evaluated for the following variables:

1. Date of publication
2. Size of item

This variable concerns the space occupied by each item.

Since the *People's Daily* does not have standard columns or rows, this variable was measured in square inches. The space of the

headlines, subheads, bylines, texts, and the accompanying pictorial items (photographs or illustrations) were all converted into square inches for measurement.

3. News format

This variable concerns the format in which each news item is presented.

The categories include:

- 1) straight news: a straight-forward account of an event.
- 2) feature: a background story or an analysis of an event.
- 3) editorial/commentary: items presenting the opinion or attitude of the newspaper.
- 4) official document/speech: items issued by the government or officials.
- 5) essay: subjective or entertaining articles written by people other than reporters or officials.
- 6) letter to the editor: readers' letters to the newspaper which reflect their opinions about an event or issue.
- 7) independent photograph/map/chart.

4. News writer

This variable concerns the writer of the news item.

The categories include:

- 1) Xinhua News Agency
- 2) *People's Daily* staff
- 3) other domestic official writer: Chinese official news organs other than Xinhua and the *People's Daily*, and government officials.

- 4) domestic unofficial writer
- 5) foreign news writer
- 6) unknown

5. Subject matter

This variable concerns the most salient theme of each item.

A total of 14 subject-matter categories were developed for analysis. They are:

- 1) politics/government

This category includes news on the Chinese government policies, governmental announcements, political issues and political activities.

- 2) economy/business

This category includes news on activities in industry, agriculture, production, trade, finance, marketing, banking, investment, commerce and tourism.

- 3) science/technology

This category includes news on inventions or development in science and technology.

- 4) military/national security

This category includes news on military activities, such as wars, military investment, weapon invention, arms sales and other efforts from China to strengthen its armed forces and national security.

- 5) culture/art

This category includes news on activities or events in publication, arts, and entertainment.

- 6) education

This category includes news on schools, colleges, universities, adult education, vocational training, promotion of literacy, and activities of educational organizations.

7) social development

This category includes news on social issues, such as family planning, environmental problems, military-civilian relations, welfare services, and activities of various social organizations.

8) judicial/crime

This category includes news on legal doctrines, acts of crimes, arrests, trials, sentences, judicial procedures, and judicial facilities.

9) health/hygiene/medicine

This category includes news on disease, food and nutrition, sanitation, health information, public health centers and hospitals.

10) sports

This category includes news on sports and athletes.

11) Sino-foreign relations

This category includes news on relations between China and other countries.

12) international affairs

This category includes news on events or issues in foreign countries.

13) accident/disaster

This category includes news on accidents and natural disasters.

14) miscellaneous

This category includes news on weather, oddity and obituary.

6. News source

This variable concerns the source that provides the original information in the news item.

The categories include:

1) domestic official source: officials and official agencies of the Chinese government.

2) domestic unofficial source: private or individual sources, or sources from an unofficial organizations in China.

3) foreign official source: officials or official agencies from a foreign government.

4) foreign unofficial source: Private or individual sources from a foreign country.

7. Prominence of news display

This variable concerns the place where a news item was presented.

The categories include: 1) primary display; and 2) non-primary display.

8. News orientation

This variable concerns the orientation conveyed in the news item. The appearance of a certain orientation is driven and reflects the primary motive of the press.

The categories include: survival orientation, ideology orientation, and market orientation.

1) survival orientation: An item is considered survival oriented if it contains information that is intended to build, preserve, and

defend the nation and the government, or information that does not undermine the survival or development of the state, the government, or the morale of loyal citizens. Specific elements used in this study include:

a. warnings of, preparations for and fighting against military challenge by foreign enemies, such as military invasions, border conflicts, economic exploitation, and attempt to overthrow the PRC government;

b. warnings, preparation or action concerning threats by domestic rivals to overthrow the PRC government;

c. emphasis on the rightfulness and strength of the existing government: Only the government can ensure survival;

d. advocacy of national unity, citizens' loyalty to the government and social cohesion;

e. other dangers that threaten the existence of the nation.

2) ideology orientation: An item is considered ideology oriented if it contains information that is intended to build, preserve, and defend a certain ideology. Specific elements used in this study include:

a. propagation of the doctrines and benefits of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought;

b. propagation of the Chinese Communist Party's basic line and ideological principles, e.g. the Four Fundamental Principles.

c. support for ideological leaders and the Chinese Communist Party;

d. criticism and demonstrations of failures of other ideologies, e.g. capitalism or revisionism;

e. advocacy of political/ideological campaigns, e.g. Learning from Lei Feng Campaign and the "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" Campaign.

3) market orientation: An item is considered market oriented if it contains information that is intended to protect, maintain, and encourage free-market economic activity, information that helps those engaged in market activities function more effectively, or information that can be marketed profitably to the public (Schillinger, 1987, p. 17). While this definition was basically derived from Schillinger's model of dynamic press theory, some modifications were made so that it could be better applied to the situation in China. Specific elements used in this study include:

a. general economy, particular industries, and agriculture;

b. business, commerce, trade, finance, market and investment, tourism;

c. science and technology;

d. management, efficiency, and profitability;

e. money resources, prices, cost, and transportation

f. labor relations, wages, consumer issues, and living standard.

The news orientation variable was measured on a three-point scale marked by 0, 1 and 2. For each of the three orientations, an item was coded as "0" if that orientation did not appear, or as "1" if it appeared but was not dominant, or as "2" if it appeared as the dominant orientation.

Reliability

As Wimmer and Dominick (1987) suggested, a intercoder reliability check is necessary to ensure that different people measuring the same material should come to similar conclusions.

Before the actual coding procedure started, the author conducted a pretest. Fifteen news items--five from Period I, four from Period II and six from Period III--were selected and were independently coded by the researcher and two Chinese graduate students from Iowa State University. The results, not including ID number, date, item size and display, were analyzed with the following formula proposed by Holsti (1969):

$$\text{Reliability} = 2M / (N_1 + N_2)$$

where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree and N_1 and N_2 refer to the total number of coding decisions by the first and the second coders respectively.

A final check showed an 89% agreement between Coder 1 (the researcher) and Coder 2, a 91% agreement between Coder 1 and Coder 3, and an 84% agreement between Coder 2 and Coder 3. The degree of agreement regarding specific variables is shown in Table 1. While most of the reliability coefficients are high enough, two extreme low scores (.80 and .73) occurred in the category of news format. This was

Table 1. Results of test of coder reliability

	News Format	News Writer	Subject Matter	News Orientation	News Source
Coder 1 & Coder 2	.80	1.00	.93	.84	.92
Coder 1 & Coder 3	.93	.87	.93	.87	.92
Coder 2 & Coder 3	.73	.87	.87	.89	.85

probably due to the fact that many items in the Cultural Revolution period were written in a propaganda style rather than journalistic style, and were therefore difficult for the coders to judge.

Based on the results of the reliability test, the categorization system developed was accepted.

Data Analysis

Each item was coded on the coding sheet. The data were then processed by computer using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. Frequency and contingency tables were developed to show the overall picture of the cases. Statistical tests employed included Chi-square tests and one-way analyses of variance, since the hypotheses predicted differences among three time periods. All results were evaluated at a significance level of 0.05.

CHAPTER V. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Findings

Number of news items

In all, 935 news items from the *People's Daily* were examined in the study. As shown in Table 2, there were 351 items in the pre-Cultural Revolution period, 131 in the Cultural Revolution period, and 453 in the post-Cultural Revolution period. The *People's Daily* had much fewer items in the second period since its coverage then was often filled with long political or theoretical articles.

Item length

Table 3 indicates that the three periods differed significantly in terms of item length. While the average space occupied by an item was more or less the same for Period I (24.4617 square inches) and

Table 2. Distribution of number of news items in three periods

Period	Number	Percent
Period I	351	37.5
Period II	131	14.0
Period III	453	48.4
Total	935	100.0
$X^2 = 173.59935$	$df = 2$	$p < .005$

Table 3. Average space (square inch) per item by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value	Prob.
Period I	351	24.4617 ^a	1.2739	105.7403	.0000
Period II	131	65.4858 ^b	4.5235		
Period III	453	20.8339 ^a	1.3703		

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

Period III (20.8339 square inches), the figure was more than doubled for Period II (65.4858 square inches).

Format of item

Items were analyzed for seven categories of format: straight news, features, editorial/commentary, document/speech, essay, letter to the editors, and photograph/map/chart.

Table 4 shows that in all the three periods straight news was the dominant news format, accounting for 64.2% of the total items (64.4% for Period I, 43.5% for Period II, and 70% for Period III). The second most common format was feature story, which accounted for 15.4% of the total items (13.1% for Period I, 36.6% for Period II, and 11% for Period III). The other five formats only comprised a relatively small portion of the total items in each of the three periods.

Results also indicate certain differences in terms of news format among the three periods. As illustrated in Table 4, the format used by

Table 4. Distribution of formats of items in three periods

Format	Period I		Period II		Period III		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Straight news	226	64.4	57	43.5	317	70.0	600	64.2
Feature	46	13.1	48	36.6	50	11.0	144	15.4
Editorial/commentary	24	6.8	8	6.1	17	3.8	49	5.2
Document/speech	23	6.6	7	5.3	14	3.1	44	4.7
Essay	6	1.7	4	3.1	29	6.4	39	4.2
Letter to editor	1	.3	0	0.0	1	.2	2	.2
Photo/map/chart	25	7.1	7	5.3	25	5.5	57	6.1
Total	351	37.5	131	14.0	453	48.4	935	100.0

$$X^2 = 77.02754^a \quad df=12 \quad p=.00000$$

^aX² was calculated after omitting the category "letter to editor" due to small cell size.

the *People's Daily* was more diversified in Period I and Period III than in Period II. In Period II, no letter to the editors was found in the paper. Although straight news was the most common format in all the three periods, it was used more frequently in Period III (70%) and Period I (64.4%) than in Period II (43.5%). On the contrary, more features were found in Period II (36.6%) than in Period I (13.1%) and Period III (11%). Editorials and commentaries decreased from 6.8% in Period I and 6.1% in Period II to 3.8% in Period III, and official documents and speeches dropped from 6.6% in Period I and 5.3% in Period II to 3.1% in Period III. Essays increased constantly from 1.7%

in Period I to 3.1% in Period II and to 6.4% in Period III, while photographs, maps and charts decreased from 7.1% in Period I to 5.3% in Period II and 5.5% in Period III.

Subject matter

The items were analyzed for 14 categories of subject matter: 1) politics/government, 2) economy/business, 3) science/technology, 4) military/national security, 5) culture/art, 6) education, 7) social development, 8) judicial/crime, 9) health/hygiene/medicine, 10) sports, 11) Sino-foreign relations, 12) international affairs, 13) accident/disaster, and 14) miscellaneous.

The findings suggest that the subject matter emphasis in the *People's Daily* differed during the three periods (see Table 5). In the pre-Cultural Revolution period, the most common subjects were, in descending order, economy/business (25.9%), politics/government (19.9%), Sino-foreign relations (18.5%), and military/national security (16.0). In the Cultural Revolution period, the most common subjects were, in descending order, politics/government (48.1%) and Sino-foreign relations (32.8%). In the post-Cultural Revolution period, the most common subjects were, in descending order, economy/business (41.1%), politics/government (17.7%), and Sino-foreign relations (10.6%). Of the three periods, the *People's Daily* was most diversified in subject matter in Period III, and least diversified in Period II. While all the 14 subjects were covered in Period III, only nine received coverage in Period II and four of them had only one story.

Table 5. Distribution of subject matter in three periods

Subject Matter	Period I		Period II		Period III		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Politics/government	70	19.9	63	48.1	80	17.7	213	22.8
Economy/business	91	25.9	9	6.9	186	41.1	286	30.6
Science/technology	3	.9	1	.8	29	6.4	33	3.5
Military/security	56	16.0	1	.8	5	1.1	62	6.6
Culture/art	15	4.3	1	.8	20	4.4	36	3.9
Education	6	1.7	6	4.6	14	3.1	26	2.8
Social development	8	2.3	0	0.0	20	4.4	28	3.0
Judicial/crime	4	1.1	0	0.0	25	5.5	29	3.1
Health/hygiene/medicine	5	1.4	1	.8	2	.4	8	.9
Sports	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	.7	3	.3
Sino-foreign relations	65	18.5	43	32.8	48	10.6	156	16.7
International affairs	20	5.7	6	4.6	7	1.5	33	3.5
Accident/disaster	2	.6	0	0.0	10	2.2	12	1.3
Miscellaneous	6	1.7	0	0.0	4	.9	10	1.1
Total	351	37.5	131	14.0	453	48.4	935	100.0

In Period I, sports was the only subject that did not receive any coverage.

Test of hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. The coverage of the *People's Daily* was more survival-motivated in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution periods.

H1a. The *People's Daily* had more news items containing survival-oriented information on its front page in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 6 shows that the *People's Daily* had significantly more news items containing survival-oriented information in Period I (43.3%) than in Period II (15.2%) and Period III (7.9%). As indicated in Table 7, the mean in Period I is significantly greater than the means in both Period II and Period III. Hypothesis 1a is thus supported.

H1b. The *People's Daily* had more news items with survival as the dominant orientation on its front page in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

The findings indicate that the *People's Daily* had significantly more news items with survival as the dominant orientation in Period I than in the other two periods. As shown in Table 6, survival appeared

Table 6. Distribution of news items by survival orientation in three period

Period	Not appeared		Appeared, but not dominant		Dominant		Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Period I	199	56.7	62	17.7	90	25.6	351	37.5	
Period II	111	84.7	18	13.7	2	1.5	131	14.0	
Period III	417	92.1	30	6.6	6	1.3	453	48.4	
Total	727	77.8	110	11.8	98	10.5	935	100.0	
$X^2 = 176.97293$		df= 4		p=.00000					

as the dominant orientation in 90 items (25.6%) in Period I, but only in two items (1.5%) in Period II and in six items (1.3%) in Period III. Table 8 shows that the mean in Period I is significantly greater than the means in both Period II and Period III. Hypothesis 1b is thus supported.

Table 7. One-way ANOVA of news items with survival orientation by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	.6895 ^a	.0456	105.6904
Period II	131	.1679 ^b	.0362	
Period III	453	.0927 ^b	.0156	
Total	935	.3273	.0215	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

Table 8. One-way ANOVA of news items with survival as the dominant orientation by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	1.2564 ^a	.0233	80.4474
Period II	131	1.0153 ^b	.0108	
Period III	453	1.0132 ^b	.0054	
Total	935	1.1048	.0100	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

H1c. The *People's Daily* gave more primary display to news items containing survival-oriented information in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 9 shows that more news items in primary display contained survival-oriented information in Period I (61.1%) than in Period II (22.2%) and Period III (8.3%). As indicated in Table 10, the mean in Period I is significantly greater than the means in both Period II and Period III. Hypothesis 1c is thus supported.

H1d. The *People's Daily* gave more front-page coverage to military/national security, in terms of number and size of items, in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 9. Distribution of survival-oriented news items in primary display in three period

Period	Not appeared		Appeared, but not dominant		Dominant		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period I	14	38.9	12	33.3	10	27.8	36	33.3
Period II	28	77.8	7	19.4	1	2.8	36	33.3
Period III	33	91.7	3	8.3	0	0.0	36	33.3
Total	75	69.4	22	20.4	11	10.2	108	100.0
X ² = 29.85091		df= 4		p=.00001				

Table 11 indicates that the *People's Daily* had significantly more items on military/national security in Period I than in the other two periods ($X^2= 78.91808$, $p=.00000$). While 16.0% (56) of the total items in Period I concerned military/national security, only 0.8% (one) in Period II and 1.1% (five) in Period III were on the same subject. As

Table 10. One-way ANOVA of survival-oriented news items in primary display by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	36	.8889 ^a	.1367	19.4968
Period II	36	.2500 ^b	.0833	
Period III	36	.0833 ^b	.0467	
Total	108	.4074	.0645	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p<.05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

Table 11. Distribution of news items on military/national security in three period

Period	Military/Security		Others		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period I	56	16.0	295	84.0	351	37.5
Period II	1	.8	130	99.2	131	14.0
Period III	5	1.1	448	98.9	453	48.4
Total	62	6.6	873	93.4	935	100.0
$X^2= 78.91808$	df= 2		$p=.00000$			

shown in Table 12, the paper also devoted more space to the coverage of military/national security in Period I than in the other two periods. The total amount of space devoted to the subject was 1345.42 square inches in Period I, but dropped to 76.50 square inches in Period II and 66.11 square inches in Period III. This difference is significant, since the p-value is smaller than the significant level of .05. Hypothesis 1d is thus supported.

Hypothesis 2. The coverage of the *People's Daily* was more ideology-motivated in the Cultural Revolution period than in the pre-Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution periods.

H2a. The *People's Daily* had more news items containing ideology-oriented information on its front page in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 12. Total amount of space of news items on military/national security in three periods

Period	Observed Frequency		Expected Frequency	
	Square Inch	%	Square Inch	%
Period I	1345.42	90.4	496.01	33.3
Period II	76.50	5.1	496.01	33.3
Period III	66.11	4.4	496.01	33.3
Total	1488.03	100.0	1488.03	100.0
$X^2 = 2182.0124$	df = 2	p < .005		

Table 13 shows that the *People's Daily* had significantly more news items containing ideology-oriented information in Period II (67.2%) than in Period I (18.8%) and Period III (12.5%). As indicated in Table 14, the mean in Period II is significantly greater than the

Table 13. Distribution of news items by ideology orientation in three period

Period	Not appeared		Appeared, but not dominant		Dominant		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period I	285	81.2	49	14.0	17	4.8	351	37.5
Period II	43	32.8	20	15.3	68	51.9	131	14.0
Period III	396	87.4	45	9.9	12	2.6	453	48.4
Total	724	77.4	114	12.2	97	10.4	935	100.0
$X^2 = 298.19120$		df = 4	p = .00000					

Table 14. One-way ANOVA of news items with ideology orientation by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	.2365 ^a	.0282	186.4195
Period II	131	1.1908 ^b	.0790	
Period III	453	.1523 ^a	.0201	
Total	935	.3294	.0214	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

means in both Period I and Period III. Hypothesis 2a is thus supported.

H2b. The *People's Daily* had more news items with ideology as the dominant orientation on its front page in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

The findings indicate that the *People's Daily* had significantly more news items with ideology as the dominant orientation in Period II than in the other two periods. As shown in Table 13, ideology appeared as the dominant orientation in 68 items (51.9%) in Period II, but only in 17 items (4.8%) in Period I and in 12 items (2.6%) in Period III. Table 15 shows that the mean in Period II is significantly greater than the means in both Period I and Period III. Hypothesis 2b is thus supported.

Table 15. One-way ANOVA of news items with ideology as the dominant orientation by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	1.0484 ^a	.0115	202.9547
Period II	131	1.5191 ^b	.0438	
Period III	453	1.0265 ^a	.0076	
Total	935	1.1037	.0100	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

H2c. The *People's Daily* gave more primary display to news items containing ideology-oriented information in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 16 shows that more news items in primary display contained ideology-oriented information in Period II (91.6%) than in Period I (47.2%) and Period III (30.6%). As indicated in Table 17, the mean in Period II is significantly greater than the means in both Period I and Period III. Hypothesis 2c is thus supported.

H2d. The *People's Daily* gave more front-page coverage to politics/government, in terms of number and size of items, in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 16. Distribution of ideology-oriented news items in primary display in three period

Period	Not appeared		Appeared, but not dominant		Dominant		Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Period I	19	52.8	14	38.9	3	8.3	36	33.3	
Period II	3	8.3	7	19.4	26	72.2	36	33.3	
Period III	25	69.4	9	25.0	2	5.6	36	33.3	
Total	47	43.5	30	27.8	31	28.7	108	100.0	
$X^2 = 54.78806$		df = 4		p = .00000					

Table 18 indicates that the *People's Daily* had significantly more items on politics/government in Period II than in the other two periods ($X^2= 56.06728$, $p=.00000$). While 48.1% (63) of the total items in Period II concerned politics/government, only 19.9% (70) in Period I and 17.7% (80) in Period III were on the same subject. As shown in

Table 17. One-way ANOVA of ideology-oriented news items in primary display by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	36	.5556 ^a	.1087	43.1760
Period II	36	1.6389 ^b	.1066	
Period III	36	.3611 ^a	.0988	
Total	108	.8519	.0809	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p<.05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

Table 18. Distribution of news items on politics/government in three period

Period	Politics/government		Others		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period I	70	19.9	281	80.1	351	37.5
Period II	63	48.1	68	51.9	131	14.0
Period III	80	17.7	373	82.3	453	48.4
Total	213	22.8	722	77.2	935	100.0
$X^2= 56.06728$	df= 2					$p=.00000$

Table 19, the paper also devoted more space to the coverage of politics/government in Period II than in the other two periods. The total amount of space devoted to the subject was 4986.04 square inches in Period II, but only 2309.86 square inches in Period I and 1873.22 square inches in Period III. This difference is significant, since the p-value is smaller than the significant level of .05. Hypothesis 2d is thus supported.

Hypothesis 3. The coverage of the *People's Daily* was more market-motivated in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the pre-Cultural Revolution and Cultural Revolution periods.

H3a. The *People's Daily* had more news items containing market-motivated information on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 19. Total amount of space of news items on politics/government in three periods

Period	Observed Frequency		Expected Frequency	
	Square Inch	%	Square Inch	%
Period I	2309.86	25.2	3056.37	33.3
Period II	4986.04	54.4	3056.37	33.3
Period III	1873.22	20.4	3056.37	33.3
Total	9169.12	100.0	9169.12	100.0
$X^2=1836.0352$ $df= 2$ $p< .005$				

Table 20 shows that the *People's Daily* had significantly more news items containing market-oriented information in Period III (57.4%) than in Period I (30.5%) and Period II (22.9%). As indicated in Table 21, the mean in Period III is significantly greater than the

Table 20. Distribution of news items by market orientation in three period

Period	Not appeared		Appeared, but not dominant		Dominant		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period I	244	69.5	32	9.1	75	21.4	351	37.5
Period II	101	77.1	21	16.0	9	6.9	131	14.0
Period III	193	42.6	50	11.0	210	46.4	453	48.4
Total	538	57.5	103	11.0	294	31.4	935	100.0
$X^2 = 107.69382$		df = 4	p = .00000					

Table 21. One-way ANOVA of news items with market orientation by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	.5185 ^a	.0440	56.3949
Period II	131	.2977 ^b	.0516	
Period III	453	1.0375 ^c	.0443	
Total	935	.7390	.0297	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

means in both Period I and Period II. Hypothesis 3a is thus supported.

Table 21 also suggests that there were significantly more items containing market-oriented information in Period I than in Period I, the mean in Period I is significantly greater than that in Period II.

H3b. The *People's Daily* had more news items with market as the dominant orientation on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

The findings indicate that the *People's Daily* had significantly more news items with market as the dominant orientation in Period III than in the other two periods. As shown in Table 20, market appeared as the dominant orientation in 210 items (46.4%) in Period III, but only in 75 items (21.4%) in Period I and in 9 items (6.9%) in Period II. Table 22 shows that the mean in Period III is significantly

Table 22. One-way ANOVA of news items with market as the dominant orientation by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	1.2137 ^a	.0219	55.7891
Period II	131	1.0687 ^b	.0222	
Period III	453	1.4636 ^c	.0235	
Total	935	1.3144	.0152	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

greater than the means in both Period I and Period II. Hypothesis 3b is thus supported.

Table 22 also suggests that there were significantly more news items with market as the dominant orientation in Period I than in Period II, since the mean in Period I is significantly greater than that in Period II.

H3c. The *People's Daily* gave more primary display to news items containing market-oriented information in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 23 shows that more news items in primary display contained market-oriented information in Period III (77.8%) than in Period I (36.1%) and Period II (41.6%). As indicated in Table 24, the mean in Period III is significantly greater than the means in both Period I and Period II. Hypothesis 3c is thus supported.

Table 23. Distribution of market-oriented news items in primary display in three period

Period	Not appeared		Appeared, but not dominant		Dominant		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period I	23	63.9	5	13.9	8	22.2	36	33.3
Period II	21	58.3	12	33.3	3	8.3	36	33.3
Period III	8	22.2	6	16.7	22	61.1	36	33.3
Total	52	48.1	23	21.3	33	30.6	108	100.0
$X^2 = 29.02934$		df = 4	p = .00001					

Table 24. One-way ANOVA of market-oriented news items in primary display by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	36	.5833 ^a	.1402	14.1663
Period II	36	.5000 ^a	.1091	
Period III	36	1.3889 ^b	.1396	
Total	108	.8241	.0841	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

H3d. The *People's Daily* gave more front-page coverage to economics/business and science/technology in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

Table 25 indicates that the *People's Daily* had significantly more items on economics/business and science/technology in Period III than in the other two periods ($X^2 = 85.16867$, $p = .00000$). While 47.5% (215) of the total items in Period III concerned economics/business and science/technology, only 26.8% (94) in Period I and 7.6% (10) in Period II were on the same subject. As shown in Table 26, the paper also devoted more space to the coverage of economics/business and science/technology in Period III than in the other two periods. The total amount of space devoted to the subject was 4645.83 square inches in Period III, but 2051.55 square inches in Period I and only 654.03 square inches in Period II. This difference is significant, since

the p-value is smaller than the significant level of .05. Hypothesis 3d is thus supported.

Tables 25 and 26 also suggest that there were significantly more items on economics/business and science/technology in Period I than in Period II.

Table 25. Distribution of news items on economics/business and science/technology in three period

Period	Economics/Science		Others		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Period I	94	26.8	257	73.2	351	37.5
Period II	10	7.6	121	92.4	131	14.0
Period III	215	47.5	238	52.5	453	48.4
Total	319	34.1	616	65.9	935	100.0
$X^2 = 85.16867$ $df = 2$ $p = .00000$						

Table 26. Total amount of space of news items on economics/business and science/technology in three periods

Period	Observed Frequency		Expected Frequency	
	Square Inch	%	Square Inch	%
Period I	2051.55	27.9	2450.47	33.3
Period II	654.03	8.9	2450.47	33.3
Period III	4645.83	63.2	2450.47	33.3
Total	7351.41	100.0	7351.41	100.0
$X^2 = 3348.7204$ $df = 2$ $p < .005$				

H3e. The *People's Daily* carried fewer news items by Xinhua and more items by unofficial writers on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

As indicated in Table 27, the *People's Daily* carried significantly fewer items written by Xinhua in Period III than in the other two periods. The means in both Period I and Period II are significantly greater than the mean in Period III. Table 28 shows that significantly more items were produced by unofficial writers in Period III than in the other two periods, since the mean in Period III is significantly greater than the means in both Period I and Period II. Hypothesis 3e is thus supported.

Table 27. One-way ANOVA of news items written by Xinhua by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	.7550 ^a	.0230	35.3444
Period II	131	.8397 ^a	.0322	
Period III	453	.5320 ^b	.0235	
Total	935	.6588	.0155	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

Table 28. One-way ANOVA of news items by unofficial writers by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	.0057 ^a	.0040	26.0596
Period II	131	.0153 ^a	.0108	
Period III	453	.1192 ^b	.0152	
Total	935	.0620	.0079	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

H3f. The *People's Daily* used fewer domestic official sources but more unofficial sources (both domestic and foreign) in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.

The results indicate a significant difference between Period I and Period II, and between Period II and Period III, but not between Period I and Period III. As shown in Table 29, only the mean in Period II is significantly greater than that in Period III, while the means in Period I and Period III are not significantly different. Therefore, the *People's Daily* used significantly fewer domestic official sources in Period III than in Period II, but not than in Period I.

The results also suggest that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the *People's Daily* used more unofficial sources in Period III than in the other two periods. As shown in Table 30, the three means are not significantly different. Hence, only a small part of Hypothesis 3f is supported, and most parts of it are not supported.

Table 29. One-way ANOVA of domestic official sources used by *People's Daily* by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	.3504 ^a	.0438	16.1737
Period II	131	.8168 ^b	.0918	
Period III	453	.4592 ^a	.0328	
Total	935	.4684	.0267	

^aMeans coded with different letters differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

Table 30. One-way ANOVA of unofficial sources used by *People's Daily* by period

Period	(n=)	Mean ^a	Standard Error	F value
Period I	351	.3875 ^a	.0718	2.2045
Period II	131	.5038 ^a	.1242	
Period III	453	.2759 ^a	.0436	
Total	935	.3497	.0384	

^aMeans coded with a same letter do not differ significantly at the $p < .05$ level, based on a Scheffe test.

Summary of Tests

Three major hypotheses were tested in the study by means of 14 sub-hypotheses. The results are summarized as shown in Table 31.

Table 31. Summary of tests of hypotheses

Hypotheses	Results
H1. The coverage of the <i>People's Daily</i> was more survival-motivated in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution periods.	Supported
H1a. The <i>People's Daily</i> had more news items containing survival-oriented information on its front page in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H1b. The <i>People's Daily</i> had more news items with survival as the dominant orientation on its front page in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H1c. The <i>People's Daily</i> gave more primary display to news items containing survival-oriented information in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H1d. The <i>People's Daily</i> gave more front-page coverage to military/national security, in terms of number and size of items, in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H2. The coverage of the <i>People's Daily</i> was more ideology-motivated in the Cultural Revolution period than in the pre-Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution periods.	Supported
H2a. The <i>People's Daily</i> had more news items containing ideology-oriented information on its front page in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported

Table 31 (continued)

H2b.	The <i>People's Daily</i> had more news items with ideology as the dominant orientation on its front page in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H2c.	The <i>People's Daily</i> gave more primary display to news items containing ideology-oriented information in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H2d.	The <i>People's Daily</i> gave more front-page coverage to politics/government, in terms of number and size of items, in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H3.	The coverage of the <i>People's Daily</i> was more market-motivated in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the pre-Cultural Revolution and Cultural Revolution periods.	Partially supported
H3a.	The <i>People's Daily</i> had more news items containing market-motivated information on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H3b.	The <i>People's Daily</i> had more news items with market as the dominant orientation on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H3c.	The <i>People's Daily</i> gave more primary display to news items containing market-oriented information in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported

Table 31 (continued)

H3d. The <i>People's Daily</i> gave more front-page coverage to economics/business and science/technology in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H3e. The <i>People's Daily</i> carried fewer news items by Xinhua and more items by unofficial writers on its front page in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Supported
H3f. The <i>People's Daily</i> used fewer domestic official sources but more unofficial sources (both domestic and foreign) in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods.	Not fully supported

Discussion

The study compared the *People's Daily's* coverage in three different periods--the pre-Cultural Revolution period, the Cultural Revolution period, and the post-Cultural Revolution period. The findings suggest that significant differences did exist among the three periods.

In regard to the amount of information, the total number of news items in the *People's Daily* dropped significantly from Period I to Period II. In Period III, however, news items increased significantly compared to Period II, and there were even more items than in Period I. This was mainly because in Period II the *People's Daily* was devoted to long political or theoretical articles emphasizing ideological

doctrines. After the Cultural Revolution, informativeness, journalistic style and short articles were emphasized in the Chinese press. The results indicate that the *People's Daily* was least informative in Period II and most informative in Period III.

The analysis of subject matters also suggest that the *People's Daily* was least informative in Period II and most informative in Period III. While all the 14 subjects were covered in Period III and 13 of them covered in Period I, only nine received coverage in Period II with a dominant emphasis on politics/government. This was a reflection of the fact that the Chinese press in Period II gave first priority to propagating ideological principles rather than reporting newsworthy events.

The results of the study also indicated a trend that the *People's Daily* tend to be more diversified in its coverage in recent years. Apart from the coverage of more subjects, Period III also witnessed more formats, and more items by writers other than official Xinhua News Agency. This suggests that the *People's Daily* has become more reader-oriented in catering to different needs in Period III than ever before.

The findings supported Hypothesis 1 that the coverage of the *People's Daily* was more survival-motivated in the pre-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods. In Period I, there were more items containing survival-oriented information, and more primary display was given to survival-oriented items. In terms of subject matter, military/national security received more coverage in

Period I than in the other two periods. The results were quite rational considering that the newly established People's Republic was facing more challenges threatening its survival in Period I than in the years after that.

The findings also supported Hypothesis 2 that the coverage of the *People's Daily* was more ideology-motivated in the Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods. In Period II, there were more items containing ideology-oriented information, and more primary display was given to ideology-oriented items. In terms of subject matter, politics/government received more coverage in Period II than in the other two periods. It was reasonable that the *People's Daily* was more ideology-motivated in Period II since the Cultural Revolution was a political campaign aimed at ideological purification.

The findings supported most parts of Hypothesis 3 that the coverage of the *People's Daily* was more market-motivated in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods. In Period III, there were more items containing market-oriented information, and more primary display was given to market-oriented items. In terms of subject matter, economics/business and science/technology received more coverage in Period III than in the other two periods. This was in accord with the fact that the primary goal of China in the current period is to promote its economic development and make the country more prosperous. Besides, there were fewer items written by Xinhua, but more items written by unofficial writers--an indication of less government control over the

press.

Nevertheless, the results did not support most parts of Hypothesis 3f that the *People's Daily* used fewer domestic official sources but more unofficial sources (both domestic and foreign) in the post-Cultural Revolution period than in the other two periods. The fact that there was little decrease in official source use and no increase in unofficial source use shows that the *People's Daily* is still basically conveying the official voice. This may be explained as an indication that while it is gradually becoming market-motivated, the *People's Daily* still maintains some characteristics of a survival- or ideology-motivated press. It is also possible that the use of news sources is not a very good indicator of news orientation or press motivation. This needs to be further tested.

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION

Conclusion

This study was designed to examine the news content of the *People's Daily* since 1949. The purpose of the study was to investigate whether changes occurred in the coverage patterns of the *People's Daily* during the past four decades and what motivated those changes. Three test periods were identified: Period I--the pre-Cultural Revolution period (1949-1965), Period II--the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976), and Period III--the post-Cultural Revolution period (since 1977).

The findings of the study suggest that significant changes did occur in the coverage patterns of the *People's Daily* as a result of changes in press motivations in China. During the pre-Cultural Revolution period, the coverage of the *People's Daily* was basically survival-motivated. Since the existence of the PRC was greatly threatened by various challenges in its early years, survival motives are shared as the primary motives by the press as well as the government and the people. As a result, the press coverage in this period contained more survival-oriented items and hence more items on military/national security, compared with the other two periods (see Figures 2 and 3). This was a period when the government had strong control over the press by means of its official news agency. While strongly survival-motivated, the coverage of the *People's Daily*




Figure 2. Distribution of items by news orientations in three periods




Figure 3. Distribution of items by major subject matters in three periods

also exhibited some characteristics of an ideology-motivated press and of a market-motivated press (see Figures 2 and 3). This was because promoting Marxism-Leninism and socialism and developing the national economy were also among the most important goals of the country in its early years.

As the CCP authority gradually became more consolidated and the country became stronger, survival was no longer the most fundamental motive in the Chinese press and therefore less survival-oriented information was likely to be found in the *People's Daily* coverage in Periods II and III. When the entire nation was mobilized into the unprecedented ideological campaign--the Cultural Revolution, ideology replaced survival as the primary motive in the Chinese press. Ideology-oriented news items and political reporting accordingly became predominant in the *People's Daily* coverage (see Figures 2 and 3). In this period, newspapers were under strict government supervision and control. Ideological propaganda was carried out at the expense of newsworthy information and audience interests. While ideology was the predominant press motivation, the *People's Daily* also contained some, though not much, survival- and market- oriented information (see Figures 2 and 3).

After the Cultural Revolution, however, the *People's Daily* has been moving from an ideology-motivated press towards a market-motivated press. Market-oriented items and reports on economics and science/technology increased significantly in the third period (see Figures 2 and 3). Press coverage has become more diversified in

terms of subject matter, news format, and news writer. The shift of press motivation from ideology to market was a reflection of the change in the CCP's work emphasis, i.e. from political struggle to economic construction. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the *People's Daily* still demonstrates some characteristics of an ideology-motivated press and survival-motivated press, since the authorities insist on the maintenance of socialism and the CCP's leadership and since the government is still facing threats from its rivals internally and externally.

Based on the analysis of the *People's Daily*, shifts in the Chinese press system over the past 42 years can be graphically illustrated on the motive triangle (Figure 4). The three different periods were respectively represented by the three dots within the triangle.




Figure 4. Shifts of press motivations in the Chinese press in three periods

The findings of this study support Schillinger's proposition that press values and behavior are determined by primary motives shared by the people, the government, and other national institutions (Schillinger, 1989). And a press system can be motivated at once by more than one primary motivation, with one of them predominant. As shown in the study, the changes in patterns of coverage of the *People's Daily* were caused by and reflected the changes in the Chinese Communist Party's policies, the nation's objectives and the society's directions.

The study also suggests that press systems are not static. Instead, they are "dynamic, engaged in a state of perpetual flux," as suggested by Schillinger (1989). Although the role of the Chinese press as an instrument of the Party and the government has remained unchanged, significant changes did occur in the press coverage pattern in the past four decades. The direction in which a press system changes is usually determined by the primary motives of that press. Yet, in a highly government-controlled press system such as the *People's Daily*, press motivation may be most influenced by government policies. Without changes in the Chinese government policies, changes in China's press motivation and behavior in the past four decades would hardly have been possible. Therefore, the evolution of the Chinese press depends largely on the future policies of the Party and the government.

Another important implication of this study is that press motivations are not necessarily related to the political or economic

system of a country. The results of the study show that different press motivations were identified in the *People's Daily* coverage, although China has remained a socialist country led by the Chinese Communist Party since 1949. This indicates that press systems in different countries--no matter whether they are socialist or capitalist, or developing or developed--can sometimes be driven by the same press motivation. The traditional press typology based on political or economic classifications may no longer be applicable to the present changing world, especially after the changes in many former Communist countries in the early 1990s. Therefore, traditional models have to be updated and new theories need to be developed to guide mass communication research.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This study was conducted to examine changes in patterns of coverage in the Chinese Press. Because of the time limit, and because many newspapers published in China are not available in the United States, this study only analyzed the *People's Daily*, the most influential newspaper in China. This may limit the generalizability of the study. Future studies should investigate more newspapers, including both national and local papers. Besides, this study only examined the front pages of the *People's Daily*. More pages may be included in further research so as to determine if similar changes occurred in the coverage pattern.

This study was a general analysis of all the items carried on the front pages of the *People's Daily*. It would be interesting and helpful to choose a specific topic, e.g. political reporting, economic news, or international news, for analysis in order to see if the coverage of a specific topic was also affected by changes in press motivation.

Although most of the hypotheses were supported in the study, the results can only be applied to the Chinese press. It would be very valuable if similar studies are conducted to identify how press motivations affect press behaviors in other countries. The research method used in this study could be applied. In addition, it is also recommended that the coverage of other media, such as television and radio, be studied in this respect.

Finally, since the dynamic theory of world press motivation is relatively new, not much content analysis has been done to study differences in media coverage caused by different press motivations. Further research is needed to determine if the concept of three primary motives is valid, reliable and testable in studying world press systems.

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APPENDIX A. CODEBOOK

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Value/Description</u>	<u>Column</u>
Item number	— — —	1-3
Year of edition	— —	4-5
Month of edition	— —	6-7
Date of edition	— —	8-9
Period	1 = pre-Cultural Revolution period 2 = Cultural Revolution period 3 = post-Cultural Revolution period	10
Primary Display	1 = yes 0 = no	11
Size of Item	— — — — — square inches	12-17
News format	1 = straight news 2 = feature 3 = editorial/commentary 4 = official document/speech 5 = article/essay 6 = letter to the editor/officials 7 = independent photograph/map/chart	18
News writer		19-24
1. Xinhua News Agency	1 = yes 0 = no	19
2. <i>People's Daily</i> staff	1 = yes 0 = no	20
3. other domestic official writer	1 = yes 0 = no	21
4. domestic unofficial writer	1 = yes 0 = no	22
5. foreign news writer	1 = yes 0 = no	23
6. unknown	1 = yes 0 = no	24

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Value/Description</u>	<u>Column</u>
Topic	01 = politics/government 02 = economy/business 03 = science/technology 04 = military/defense/national security 05 = culture/entertainment 06 = education 07 = social development 08 = judicial/crime 09 = health/hygiene/medicine 10 = sports 11 = Sino-foreign relations 12 = international affairs 13 = accident/disaster 14 = miscellaneous	25-26
News orientation	0 1 2 survival-oriented 0 1 2 ideology-oriented 0 1 2 market-oriented	27-29 27 28 29
(0=none; 1=appeared, but not dominant; 2=dominant)		
News source	— — number of domestic official source — — number of domestic unofficial source — — number of foreign official source — — number of foreign unofficial source	30-29 30-31 32-33 34-35 36-37

**APPENDIX B. EXAMPLES OF FRONT-PAGE STORIES
FROM THE PEOPLE'S DAILY**

★美國侵略者強迫「甄別」巨濟島我被俘人員，證實美方破壞日內瓦公約。

★中共中央中南局指示各級黨委，認真挑選、培養和大胆提拔幹部，並積極領導發展新黨員的工作。

★華北全區幹部展開學習黨史運動。

★中央農林部李書城部長就農業愛國增產競賽運動發表談話。(以上十版)

★林區：一條人民鐵路的誕生。(二版)

★白朗：我要歌頌她們。(三版)

★西歐各國人民、印度輿論反對美國侵略者濫炸鴨綠江發電廠的挑釁行動。

★志願軍節約糧食四十萬斤，贈送平壤市人民。(以上四版)

人民日報

我們偉大的祖國

第一四九號 今日共四版 電話號碼：(010)293322 地址：北京前門外大街

美國侵略者強迫「甄別」巨濟島我被俘人員 證實美方破壞日內瓦公約

朝中人民絕不能容忍美方扣留我俘的行動

【新華社開城二十九日電】本報特約記者報導：美國第八軍區指揮官威爾遜將軍，於六月二十四日，在巨濟島對被俘人員進行「甄別」，此舉嚴重違反日內瓦公約。美方在甄別中，對被俘人員進行威脅、利誘，企圖分化我俘，破壞我俘的團結。朝中人民對此表示極大憤慨，並表示將採取一切必要措施，維護我俘的合法權益。

據悉，美方在甄別中，將被俘人員分為「甄別」和「不甄別」兩類。對於「甄別」人員，美方將給予優厚待遇，並企圖使其脫離我俘的組織。對於「不甄別」人員，美方則採取嚴厲措施，甚至威脅其生命財產安全。此種做法，完全違反了日內瓦公約中關於被俘人員應受人道待遇的規定。

朝中人民對此表示強烈譴責，並呼籲國際社會關注此事。同時，朝中人民也呼籲我俘保持冷靜，堅守陣地，不為敵人的利誘所動。我俘應團結一致，共同維護祖國的尊嚴和利益。

荆江分洪總指揮部在沙市舉行慶功大會

隆重獎勵分法工程中所有的有功人員

【本報訊】據新華社沙市二十七日專電：荆江分洪總指揮部，於六月二十五日在沙市舉行慶功大會，隆重獎勵在分洪工程中有功人員。大會由總指揮部副指揮部長主持，參加人員包括各級幹部、工程技術人員、工人和民工代表等。

大會上，總指揮部副指揮部長發表講話，充分肯定了分洪工程所取得的巨大成就。他指出，分洪工程的勝利，是黨委正確領導的結果，是廣大幹部、工人和民工辛勤勞動的結果。他要求全體人員繼續發揚奮鬥精神，為國家的建設事業做出更大的貢獻。

大會還表彰了許多有功人員，並發給了獎狀和獎金。這些有功人員在分洪工程中，克服重重困難，為工程的順利進行做出了重要貢獻。他們的辛勤工作和無私奉獻，得到了全場人員的熱烈掌聲。

要保以湖都 對人民有利

首都發電廠全體職工 向毛主席祝賀中國共產黨延辰

【本報訊】據新華社北京二十七日專電：首都發電廠全體職工，於六月二十五日舉行祝賀大會，向毛主席祝賀中國共產黨延辰。大會上，職工們紛紛發言，表達了對毛主席的崇敬之情，並表示將繼續努力，為國家的電力事業做出貢獻。

職工們表示，中國共產黨的延辰，是全國人民的心願，也是全國人民的幸福。他們將繼續團結一致，為實現祖國的繁榮富強而努力奮鬥。

朝中部隊六月二十五日擊退敵軍多次進犯

【新華社開城二十九日電】在六月二十五日，朝中部隊在戰場上取得重大勝利，擊退敵軍多次進犯。敵軍在朝中部隊的英勇打擊下，傷亡慘重，遺棄大量武器彈藥。朝中部隊士氣高昂，戰鬥力不斷增強。

據悉，敵軍在二十五日發動了多次進攻，企圖突破朝中部隊的防線。然而，朝中部隊憑藉堅強的防禦和果斷的進攻，一次次將敵軍擊退。敵軍在進攻中，損失了數百名官兵，並遺棄了大批物資。

朝中部隊的勝利，是朝中人民軍人英勇奮鬥的結果，也是朝中人民堅強後方的支持。此役進一步鞏固了朝中部隊的防禦體系，為後續的戰鬥奠定了堅實的基礎。

華北全區幹部展開學習黨史運動

【本報訊】據新華社北平專電：華北全區幹部，自六月二十五日起，展開學習黨史運動。此次運動旨在加強幹部對黨史的了解，提高黨員的覺悟性，增強黨的團結和戰鬥力。

據悉，此次學習運動將在全區範圍內展開，包括各級黨委、政府機關、學校和工廠等。學習內容包括黨的歷史、黨的理論和黨的方針政策等。通過學習，幹部將進一步明確黨的歷史使命，堅定信心，為實現祖國的繁榮富強而努力奮鬥。

成渝鐵路「七一」通車實況

【新華社重慶二十九日電】成渝鐵路，於六月二十七日正式通車。此次通車，標誌著成渝鐵路全線貫通，為四川的經濟發展和交通運輸提供了重要保障。

據悉，成渝鐵路全線長四百七十四公里，其中重慶至成都段長三百零九公里。此次通車的列車，將為四川的物資運輸和人員往來提供便利。成渝鐵路的通車，將進一步促進四川的經濟發展，加強四川與全國各地的聯繫。

中共中央中南局指示各級黨委 認真挑選培養和大胆提拔幹部

並積極領導發展新黨員的工作

【本報訊】據新華社北京專電：中共中央中南局，於六月二十五日發出指示，要求各級黨委認真挑選、培養和大胆提拔幹部，並積極領導發展新黨員的工作。指示指出，幹部是黨的骨幹，是黨的事業的領導者。黨委必須重視幹部工作，認真挑選優秀人才，加強培養，並根據實際需要，大胆提拔優秀幹部。

指示還要求黨委積極領導發展新黨員的工作。黨委應深入基層，廣泛發動，吸收優秀青年入黨，不斷壯大黨的隊伍。同時，黨委還應加強對黨員的教育和管理，提高黨員的素質，保持黨的先進性和純潔性。

人民日報

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学习班，是法，很多问在学习班得

毛泽东

用毛泽东思想之「矢」

去射实际斗争之「的」

天津红桥区工业五片支左部队，针对群众的活思想，帮助革命群众举办各种类型的毛泽东思想学习班，中心突出，目的明确，解决问题深透，大大加速了落实毛主席最新指示的步伐

新华社天津二十六日电 在天津市红桥区工业五片执行支左任务的人民解放军，针对各工厂无产阶级文化大革命运动发展的不同情况和群众的活思想，有的放矢地帮助革命群众举办各种类型的毛泽东思想学习班，落实毛主席的最新指示。这样做，学习班中心突出，目的明确，力量集中，时间短，见效快，解决问题深透。学习班越办越好。他们的实践再一次证明，毛主席关于“办学习班，是个好办法，很多问题可以在学习班中得到解决”的教导，无比英明正确。

红桥区工业五片共有六十四个工厂。在这个片执行支左任务的人民解放军，响应林彪副主席去年国庆节传达的毛主席大办学习班的伟大号召，在去年国庆节以后两个多月的时间里，以集中学习的方式，帮助各工厂无产阶级革命派办了四期毛泽东思想学习班，对于促进革命大联合和革命三结合起了很大作用。四期学习班办完以后，全片大部分工厂实现了革命大联合，有一半工厂实现了革命三结合。从第四期学习班结束以后，随着革命形势的发展，各厂的运动出现了不平衡的情况，革命职工对毛泽东思想学习班提出了不同的要求。根据这种情况，支左部队经过调查研究，又帮助各厂的无产阶级革命派针对不同问题，分门别类办各种类型的毛泽东思想学习班，他们以全面落实毛主席的最新指示，夺取无产阶级文化大革命全面胜利为总目标，按照各厂的不同情况，分类安排，先后开办了五种类型的毛泽东思想学习班。尚未实现革命大联合的单位，开办了以围剿资产阶级、小资产阶级派性为主要内容的促进革命大联合的学习班，已经实现革命大联合的单位，开办了以解决半部问题为主要内容的促进革命三结合的学习班，已经建立革命委员会的单位，开办了以实现思想革命化为主要内容的巩固革命三结合的学习班，革命三结合比较巩固的单位，开办了为整顿党的组织，加强党的建设培训骨干的学习班，另外还开办了以克服畏难情绪为内容的抓革命促生产的学习班。各种类型的学习班，以毛主席的最新指示为纲，用毛泽东思想之“矢”，去射实际斗争之“的”。片上办，厂里也办，上下呼应，互相促进，一个一个地解决问题。

实践证明，这样办学习班有如下好处：

一、目的明确，中心突出，可以上下结合，互相促进，集中力量打歼灭战。这个片的六十四个工厂中，到二月初仍有十四个厂没有实现革命大联合，主要原因是资产阶级、小资产阶级派性作怪，片上和这些厂就举办了围剿派性，促进革命大联合的学习班。天津羽毛加工厂两派群众组织的头头对立情绪很严重，支左部队和革命工人就把两派头头请到片上举办的促进革命大联合的学习班学习，同时支左部队又帮助这个厂开办了业余学习班。两个学习班都以围剿派性为中心，一起召开声讨派性誓师大会，然后分头学习，斗私批修，互通情况，彼此促进，因此使两派的头头迅速克服了派性，消除了隔阂，共同为革命大联合作出了新贡献。片上抓住这个活样板，组织他们到未联合的单位去现身说法，亮私斗私，既巩固了这个厂的革命大联合，又教育了广大革命群众。这十四个厂经过办学习班围剿派性，都已实现了革命大联合。

二、问题集中，暴露矛盾具体深刻，便于抓住带有共性的活思想，短兵相接，有的放矢地用毛泽东思想去解决问题。这个片许多工厂的领导干部都是由老工人

席教导我们：“办学习班，是个好办法，很多问题可以在办学习班怎样才能立竿见影；上海许多基层单位的经

了上海钢铁八厂、上海砂钢片厂、上海袜厂、上海

自多做自我批评，增进新老干部团结

方律委：

革命派夺权以后，一度天天忙于事务，许多问题没有很

们：“我们党如果没有广大的新干部同老干部一致合作，

的思想情况不同，我们确定了不同的学习内容。新干部

的要求他们着重学习《湖南农民运动考察报告》，结合谈

111 人民日報

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辛未年十月十七
北京地区天气预报

白天 晴

风向 偏北

风力 三、四级

夜间 晴

风向 偏北

风力 一、二级

温度 最高 10℃

最低 -3℃

人民日报社出版

立足

兰化

本报兰州11月21日专
者张述圣报道：“一五”期
成的我国第一个石油化工
基地——兰州石油化学工
司，依靠技术改造、科
步，再现青春，雄风不
年。

这个为我国石化工
展做出巨大贡献的特大
化企业，近年来已有 65
装置超期服役，85%的装
国内处于一般或落后水平
这种不利的情况下，兰化
造了令人瞩目的经济效益
统计，1985年至1990年累
成工业总产值 45.36 亿元
现利税 11.8 亿元，平均有
4.6%和 16.5% 的速度递增
全国同行业处于先进水平
年 1 至 9 月，累计完成工业
值 10.17 亿元，实现利税
亿元，分别比去年同期
3.4% 和 9.23%。

在技术改造上，集中
的财力、物力，采用和引
收国内外先进技术，从节
耗、环境保护、质量安全
面实施重点技术改进措施
多项，完成乙烯、苯胺、
等 20 个重点技术改造项

新华
陈毛弟、
在这里会
在会会长
学工业第
李鹏
欢迎。他
领域有很
油化工是
点，中日
合作前景
发展，为
善的投资
业界参加
竹林
中抽出时
代表团表
交流、互
域的关系
会见
菊、国家
总公司总
长何精英

李鹏会见日本客人

欢迎日本企业界参加浦东开发

江苏大灾之年创奇迹 粮食棉花夺得好收成

据新华社南京 11 月 21 日电 (记者周振
丰) 我国洪涝“重灾区”的江苏省传出令人振
奋的喜讯：大灾之年粮棉生产夺得令人意料
的好收成，创下了抗灾减灾史上的奇迹。


“七月一片汪洋，十月稻谷翻浪，十一月
售棉果粮。”这句顺口溜集中反映了灾后江苏
农村的丰收图景。据近日省统计局透露，1991
年江苏皮棉总产量预计可达 932 万担，与去年
持平或略增，单产超去年。粮食总产预计仍然
可以达到 299 亿公斤，比原来预计的要少减 10
亿公斤左右。淮北的徐州、连云港两市及淮
阴、盐城两市的部分县(市)普遍比去年增
产。整个粮棉生产形势比预料的要好得多。

江苏大灾之年好收成来之不易，看起来

出乎意料，但又在情理之中。除自然因素外，社
会主义制度优越和集体经济强大是战胜今年洪
灾的两个重要“法宝”。

建国 40 多年来的江苏水利建设工程，在抗
洪中发挥了重大作用，使灾害的程度大为减
轻。在突击排涝的同时，省委、省政府又及时
在全省作出抗灾复产的部署。在各地的支援
下，全省紧急从外地调入 1000 多万公斤水稻
种，75 万公斤玉米种以及其他种子，有力地支
持了灾区的改种和补种，使被洪水淹过的农田
90% 以上补种了庄稼。

集体经济，特别是乡镇企业，为灾后复产
提供了大量的物力和财力。集体经济在整个抗
灾复产中挑了“大梁”。



整体研究水平和成果均达国际先进水平

长绒棉新种质系育成

我国优质专用棉育种中获重大突破

新华社北京 11 月 21 日
(通讯员才杰、记者李京)
北京农业大学经过 17 年
的选育，选育出一批中长绒棉
长绒棉新种质系，并提出
配套的丰产技术措施。这
是我国优质专用棉育种工
作取得的重大突破。

我国棉纺工业需要一定
数量的中长绒棉和长绒棉。
我国只有新疆生长少量海
棉(中长绒和长绒)。70
年代初，北京农业大学在黄