

Fraser, Iowa: An historical case
of coal, company control, and absentee capital
by

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Signatures have been redacted for privacy

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In 1893, Hamilton Brown, President of the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, built a town for the purpose of mining coal. Located in central Iowa on the Des Moines River in Boone County, it was to be named Fraser, Iowa, after one of Brown's key investors, Norman D. Fraser. Fraser was a company town. Initially it had a company store, post office, 25 company houses, a boarding house, and a company office. The town reached its peak population in 1905 at 1,243 people. The town had a school of over 200 students, three main churches, three hotels, a restaurant, barber shop, stables, blacksmith, three grocery stores, a miners' hall, a pool hall, a number of taverns, and a park complete with a baseball diamond.

The town boomed and declined with the cyclic fortunes of the coal mines. The significant mines were played out by 1910, and the profitability of opening others was not attractive. By 1910, the population had dropped to 487 persons. This thesis will deal with Fraser, Iowa, for the years from 1893 to 1915.

The history of Fraser is a history of people building social institutions in the midst of what many would see as oppressive and transient conditions. It is a history of control over the miners and their families by the owners of the mines and the town, the control of those owners by outside interests, and of people building their own communal institutions independent of owners control. The economic base and external economic control of Fraser set parameters to its

development, but allowed communal forms of social organization to develop as well. However, once Fraser was no longer profitable to absentee capital, those parameters narrowed, bringing the demise of Fraser as both an economic operation and social community.

That communities have experienced some level of outside influence comes as no surprise. Theoretical perspectives have been developed to analyze the extent and nature of such external influence. In order to understand the social history of Fraser, this thesis utilizes community literature, coal-mining and company-town literature, and literature on center-periphery theory.

Roland Warren (1972) proposed that a great change distinguishes the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, communities experienced a predominance of horizontal or internal relationships. In the twentieth century, however, vertical or external relationships predominate community relations according to Warren (1972). Horizontal patterns are defined as structural and functional interactions within the community among units in that community. Vertical patterns refer to the same kinds of interactions between units within the community and units external to the community. Warren (1972) felt that this change led to a loss of autonomy and cohesion in twentieth century communities (Bernard, 1973).

This study of Fraser, Iowa, is a contradiction to Warren's findings. Fraser was a nineteenth century community where vertical ties were more prevalent from the beginning and horizontal ties developed

later in this context. How did Fraser residents establish horizontal ties within the vertical constraints presented by company ownership of the mines and town? One of the ways in which the local communal organizations developed control over their own life was to establish competing vertical ties to countervail the power vested in the company's external domination of the community. Fraser started with vertical ties being most significant and as horizontal and countervailing vertical ties became stronger, the company lost interest in Fraser. The town declined as a result and thus returned to the domination of it by outside interests. This is a case of vertical ties in the nineteenth century.

In contrast to Roland Warren (1972), the literature on company-towns and coal-mining company towns has shown a clear pattern of external control of such towns. This was true in the late nineteenth century as well as in the early twentieth century. In this literature, external control of company towns is the norm. This same literature gives evidence of the kinds of social institutions that typically developed in coal-mining company towns.

A third body of literature, the center-periphery theory, will be used in this thesis as a way to understand the external control of Fraser, Iowa. While center-periphery theory is generally used in a world systems perspective, it is also used as a way of analyzing relations within nations, both nations at the center and nations on the periphery. This thesis will argue that center-periphery theory is the

best way to understand the relations of dominance, whereby control was exercised over Fraser from a center, especially St. Paul, Minnesota. Contrary to Warren (1972), this structural feature of external ties that dominated life in Fraser was not a twentieth-century change, but was there from the inception of Fraser. The tenor of this thesis will be the predisposition to accept the center-periphery perspective as most illuminative of Fraser, Iowa, with a corresponding rejection of Warren's (1972) great change thesis. However, the case of Fraser will also present a view that moderates the usually completely negative image of life on the periphery. For all the imperialism at the center, life in the periphery developed in ways that gave expression to the creativity of the community in developing mechanisms to moderate its external control.

In order to conduct this study, historical methods and materials were necessarily employed. The most fruitful materials were documentary and archival. Interviews were used, but most people old enough to remember events between 1893 and 1915 were either dead or unable to recollect events accurately. For this reason, newspapers, county records, company correspondence, and old photographs were most helpful in reconstructing the past. A few articles, published in the Boone County Historical Society, contained history of coal mining in Boone County, and recollections of old residents about Fraser. The 1895 and 1905 Iowa State Census, and the 1900 and 1910 Federal Census all gave a quantity of data about Fraser residents on numerous social and

economic indicators. Since the town was built for mining and railroad interests, published guides to railroads and State Mine Inspector's Reports were also valuable in giving data on the operations in Fraser. Finally, on site visits were made to Fraser on numerous occasions.

What follows in this thesis is a social history and community study of a coal-mining and company town at the turn of the century. In order to best understand the sociology of such a community, Chapter Two will develop the theoretical perspective. Chapter Three will present the historical research methods used in reconstructing the story of Fraser. Chapter Four will give the economic reasons for the development of Fraser and establish the rationale for considering Fraser a town on the periphery. Here, the economic operation of Fraser and its external domination will be shown. Chapter Five will give the origins and composition of the population of Fraser, and show how the population of Fraser was a function of the economic base of Fraser. Chapter Six will document the organization of communal control over the non-economic aspects of the lives of Fraser residents. In the midst of external control over the economic institutions in Fraser, the residents began to build social organizations that gave them countervailing control over some of their own lives. Significantly, when Fraser residents began to gain some control over their own lives, the company lost interest in the town and Fraser went into permanent decline.

CHAPTER II. THEORY

This thesis is about the external control of a community and the effects of that control on its internal communal organization. Since external control of a community is clearly related to the external ties to that community, no such study could be done without reference to Roland Warren's (1972) work in community studies, a work which deals with external ties to a community. However, the literature on company-towns and coal-mining company-towns presents a significant contradiction to Warren's (1972) perspective. Finally, a theoretical perspective which was initially framed with external control in mind, center-periphery theory, is used as a way of understanding the way in which Fraser, Iowa was developed.

Horizontal and Vertical Linkages

Roland Warren (1972) studied the kinds of linkages that communities developed with other communities and other institutions. According to Jessie Bernard (1973), Warren updated Parson's (1951) terminology from social systems theory, building on the concepts inherent in internal and external relations of a community. In the place of internal and external relations, Warren substituted horizontal and vertical relations. Warren (1972) used the term horizontal patterns to speak of the structural and functional interactions within the community among units in that community. An example might be the pattern of relation-

ships between local churches, schools and businesses. He used the term vertical pattern to refer to the same kinds of interactions between units of the community and units external to the community. An example might be a local church's relationship to its denomination. Another example might be a local school's interactions with the federal government in terms of funding and regulations. More pertinent to this thesis would be the kind of vertical tie exhibited by a local business enterprise that is actually a part of a corporation with headquarters elsewhere.

Warren (1972) postulated a great change that occurred in this century. He did not find the prevalence of vertical linkages in the nineteenth century that he found in the twentieth century. Warren's great change thesis suggested that nineteenth century communities were characterized by horizontal linkages whereas vertical ties characterize twentieth-century communities. One can hear hints of Tonnies' Gemeinschaft giving way to Gesellschaft. Warren (1972) considered that the replacement of horizontal relations with a predominance of vertical relations led to a loss of community cohesion and autonomy (Bernard, 1973).

This study of Fraser, Iowa, presents a case of a community that is an example of a nineteenth century community that knew a predominance of vertical ties from its inception. Of interest to the present study is how residents built horizontal linkages within the constraints presented by the vertical linkages that predominated from the beginning of that community. The irony of this study, in contradiction to

Warren's (1972) great change thesis, is that the very time when horizontal linkages began to show themselves most viable was also the time when the vertical linkages were diminishing and this resulted in the decline of Fraser.

Actually, the vertical ties were nearly always the central feature of coal-mining company-towns. This is clear from company-town literature.

Company Town Literature

A review of company-town literature, and coal-mining company towns will show that their history is one of being dominated by external forces (Allen, 1966; Brandes, 1970; Corbin, 1981; Schweider, 1983). Not only were they founded for the sole purpose of the profit of absentee capitalists, but the pursuit of profit and thus control was extended into all facets of the workers' lives. The most common features of this control were at the workplace and the building of company stores and houses. By owning the workplace, stores, and houses, the company profited on the most basic elements of the workers' lives (Corbin, 1981). The company extracted profits through the workers' production and consumption, production in the workplace, and consumption in the stores and housing. In the most basic necessities of life, the company could extract continuous profits from the workers. This was the only reason for the towns and when this reason was no longer viable, neither were the towns.

But the company was often not satisfied to own the economic structures of the town. Often control was exercised in non-economic institutions as well. Companies often exercised some level of control over recreation, law, health care, education, and voluntary organizations such as churches and lodges (Corbin, 1981; Brandes, 1970). In the case of the latter voluntary organizations, some were indigenously organized, but partially influenced by company control.

Much of the interest in voluntary associations and recreation by the company owners was another way of controlling one of their most important costs, labor (Brandes, 1970). Labor organization was a constant threat to the owners. Ownership of the economic structures of the town as well as control of the non-economic institutions was strategic in controlling labor. In times of labor shortages, such as the time of the study of Fraser, European immigrants were brought to the coal-mining-company towns. When they organized, they were replaced with blacks from the South.

All of this, the ownership of all economic structures in the community, the control of non-economic institutions, and the concerted attempt to control labor were hallmarks of a company town and were direction functions of external control over a local community.

History of company towns

The term company town conjures up mixed images. For some, it brings to mind the worst of social control and exploitation of workers.

For others, it is the forerunner of modern industry's concern for the welfare of the worker.

The first major experiment of a company town was the town of New Lanark, in Lanarkshire, England. The cotton mills in New Lanark were purchased in 1791 by Robert Owen, a free-thinking social reformer. While the town was not a terrible place to live by the standards of industrial villages of its day, Owen intended to improve it. Not only did he make New Lanark a model of community life, it became legend.

Owen improved the houses and, mainly by his own personal influence, encouraged the people in habits of order, cleanliness, and thrift. He opened a store at which goods of sound quality could be bought at little more than cost price and at which the sale of alcoholic beverages was placed under strict supervision. His greatest success, however, was in the education of the young, to which he devoted special attention (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1982, Vol. 13:801).

One could also see strong elements of paternalism in his ordering of life for all within the community, but there was general agreement that life in New Lanark was good.

Owen had not only proved that one could improve the lot of the worker in an industrial community, but also that one could make a profit at it. That he did, and quite handsomely. Owen was able to guarantee his investors a five percent return (Encyclopedia Britannica:801) and amass a fortune of 60,000 pounds for himself. (Heilbroner, 1980:107). No doubt this was more impressive to many businessmen than improving living conditions for workers.

Soon Francis Cabot Lowell would pattern his cotton mill-town, Lowell, Massachusetts, on similar methods. He opened a series of

boarding houses for young women, as an incentive for them to come to work in his mills. He also funded libraries, schools and churches (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1982, Vol. 9:497).

Definition and meaning

There was a great deal of variation in the communities that were company towns. There was variation in the extent of company ownership as well as the degree to which the company controlled the lives of workers living in such towns. Some company towns were completely owned and controlled by the company, even to the point of having barbed wire fences around the perimeter and armed guards at the entrance (Corbin, 1981). However, most company towns were not owned and controlled to such an extreme. Company ownership of businesses, housing, and land seemed to be the norm for company towns.

Allen (1966:6) defined a company town as follows: "any community which is owned and controlled by a particular company." He would not include a single industry town in the definition if the company sold the land and encouraged private ownership of housing and businesses.

Allen (1966:5) also noted that the remoteness and nature of the particular industry determined the making of a company town. It was an economic necessity in isolated areas to provide housing and stores to get workers to locate there. Lots could not be sold if they may well lie over a resource that would later need to be extracted.

This view underestimates the fact that many company towns were built for the purpose of making a profit, not only on the workers'

labor, but also on their necessities for living. Equally important was the social control that owning workers' homes or engendering indebtedness of workers gave to the employer. Corbin (1981:9) showed that the desire for profit and social control were both important in the building of company towns:

The operators defended their building and use of the company town as a necessary instrument for supplying and housing the thousands of workers whom they imported to dig coal. The company town was also economical, and profit was the supreme goal of the coal operators. 'We are not running a Christian Endeavor Camp meeting or Sunday School,' an operator wrote his superintendent in 1896; 'never lose sight of the fact that the sole purpose of the organization is to make money for their stockholders and matters of conduct...that tend to produce a contradictory result should be promptly squelched with a heavy hand.' The existence of the company town made it relatively easy to squelch opposition with a heavy hand.

Brandes (1970:38) argued against the use of the term "company town" at all. In his view, the term tells us little since many industrial centers in the Northeast were filled with company owned housing, but were never referred to as "Company Towns." However, in the same context, he noted that "the degree of company ownership and control varied from place to place, in some places it was total, and in others it was nonexistent (Brandes, 1970:38)." It may be difficult to get complete agreement on the level of company ownership and control before a community can be called a company town. However, the term has meaning in the context of extensive company ownership of life's necessities, well as company control of secondary institutions.

The connotation of the term "company town" does not hold the same meaning for everyone. Brandes (1970:38) rejected it as mere invective, apparently unwarranted. Corbin's (1981) study of company towns in West Virginia's coal mining fields gives the impression that invective is deserved. Schwieder (1983:11), who studied coal mining in Iowa, concurs:

The typical American coal miner, like his British counterpart, lived in an isolated mining village in which the company controlled his life. Consequently, coal miners regarded company housing and company stores as the bane of their existence.

In Allen's (1966) view, the company was much more benign. Allen (1966:xi) attempted to "counteract the almost universal negative image which seems to exist..." relative to conditions in company towns.

External domination

Company towns in the coal mining industry were invariably started by external forces. Often, they were built to meet the needs of the railroads and industrial centers. Allen (1966:52) noted how that:

When the Union Pacific Railroad began to span the continent, the necessity of maintaining a permanent supply of coal led to the opening of mines in Wyoming and to the establishment of a number of company-owned towns.

Corbin (1981) found that the availability of coal in West Virginia was well-known, but had not been developed indigenously for over one-hundred years. In the 1880s, the railroads began to come into that state.

The state became a battleground for the railroad robber barons. Realizing potential profits, notables such as J.P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, E.H. Harriman, Collis P. Huntington, Henry H. Rodgers, Abram Hewitt, Peter Cooper, and John Camden all competed and connived to build the roads that would carry West Virginia coal... (Corbin, 1981:2).

Southern West Virginia had generally become the possession of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and London. By 1900 absentee landowners owned 90 percent of Mingo, Logan and Wayne counties and 60 percent of Boone and McDowell counties. By 1923 nonresidents of West Virginia owned more than half of the state and controlled four-fifths of its total value (Corbin 1981:4).

He also pointed out that 94 percent of the miners in West Virginia lived in company towns (Corbin, 1981:8). They were part of a region that Corbin (1981:1) refers to as an "economic colony."

Incorporation was unusual in company towns. According to Allen (1966:56, 120), this was because incorporation removed control from the company, and the control the company exercised kept incorporation from taking place.

Company towns were started in the coal mining regions, primarily to supply external needs of railroads and industry. They often declined and died because of mineral depletion or when those external demands were filled elsewhere. When railroads switched to diesel fuel and industry to natural gas and oil, many coal mining company towns died (Allen, 1966). Conversely, many coal-mining company towns had a short life-expectancy because the mines had short life expectancies. Schwieder (1983:32) stated that it was a rare coal seam that lasted more than twenty years and that in Iowa "...few mining operations

lasted longer than ten years." When the need that gave rise to these towns decreased, the towns died. Many coal mining company towns were boom and bust towns. They were externally conceived, born overnight, and died from forces beyond their control.

The community

Although company towns obviously had to have many things, such as houses and stores that were common to all communities, there were unique forces shaping their services and institutions. Allen (1966:80) found that while most of the later coal mining company towns were laid out along "...rectangular lines of survey and were characterized by wide streets and ample lots...", most did little to enhance beauty. "Lawns, trees, and other greenery were rare, and public parks were few (1966:83)."

Company store

One of the central features of most company towns was the company store (Brandes, 1970). Allen (1966:28) noted that it "...was once perhaps the most typical feature of the company town." Often, the company store was a separate entity from the company, but the board of directors or the chairman was often the same for both store and company. For example, the Colorado Supply Company was incorporated in

1888 to serve as the mercantile for the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, a coal and iron mining company (Allen, 1966).

Schwieder (1983:137) sensed that the company store in Iowa coal mining towns was an "economic grievance" to the miners. Brandes (1970:45) recorded the tremendous antipathy to the company stores in company towns reflected in the nicknames dubbed them such as: "'gip-me stores,' 'pluck-me stores,' 'gip-joints,' and 'robber-salaries.'" Brandes also noted that countless strikes from 1849 onward were attributed by miners in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal region to their grievances against the company store.

Brandes (1970:45) grouped the grievances against the company stores into four categories; 1) overpricing, 2) poor selection, 3) lack of competition, and 4) compulsion to shop there. Investigations done by coal mine operations in 1923 and by a government agency in 1934 both found company stores to be higher priced (by two to ten percent) than those independently owned (Brandes, 1970:45).

Allen (1966:135) also found prices slightly higher at company stores. He attributed the price differences to higher quality merchandise, shipping to remote locations, lack of competition, and costs of credit to customers (Allen, 1966:133-4).

Corbin (1981) quoted coal miners testifying to a U.S. Senate Committee that wage increases were meaningless because they were always immediately negated by a corresponding price hike at the company store. Schwieder (1983:137) noted that in Iowa coal-mining company towns, the

"miners were convinced that they paid more for their food, clothing, and mining supplies at the company store than if they traded elsewhere." She noted also that the general rule in one district in Iowa was that miners were required to purchase their blasting powder from the company store for an inflated price (Schwieder, 1983).

Most writers agreed that coercion was practiced to force workers to shop at the company store. How widespread it was is not known for sure (Schwieder, 1983; Brandes, 1970; Corbin, 1981; Allen, 1966). Probably the most effective kind of coercion was much more subtle, credit at the company store. Many miners could not survive from paycheck to paycheck on what they earned, especially in light of work stoppages, slowdowns, and seasonal layoffs (Brandes, 1970; Schwieder, 1983).

Whether or not company stores stocked quality merchandise is debated. Allen (1966:133) thought that the quality was generally as good or better than other stores, while Brandes (1970:46) felt that since company stores controlled competition, they were not required to stock quality items. It may well be difficult to generalize on this matter. There was lack of competition in general for the company store, but while this may have served the interests of the company store, the company did not always keep out competitors (Allen, 1966). It seems that the company was able to corner a better share of the market, even where it allowed competition, because of its almost un-

limited ability to absorb the credit needs of its workers (Schwieder, 1983).

Company housing

The reason for building company housing is often debated. The owners of company towns, especially in the coal mining industry, argued that building company houses was necessary in the absence of private developers. The tenuous nature of coal-mining employment precluded many miners from building their own home, and most could not have afforded to do so had they chosen to (Brandes, 1970). If the mine owners were to attract and hold workers, a place was needed for miners and their families to live. Company housing was also profitable. A little investment paid off quickly. Given the predictably short life-span of a mine and coal mining town, the owners built the houses as cheaply as possible. Schwieder (1983:163) noted:

In the late 1890's and early 1900's, a coal camp house could be built at a cost of about \$150. All sources indicate that the overwhelming majority of operators did little or nothing about maintenance or improvements. Therefore, at the prevailing rents -- houses rented at an average of \$8.00 per month -- an operator could expect to pay off the cost of a house within 18 months and the remainder of the time the house was rented, it represented, with the exception of taxes, almost pure profit. Following the abandonment of the mine, the operator usually sold off the houses for \$50.00 each. He incurred no expenses with these sales because each buyer was responsible for moving his house.

In a national survey (Brandes, 1970) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1916, it was found that over a five-year period, owners received an 8.3 percent return on their original investment through rent receipts.

A large company in Southern West Virginia found that when they sold their housing to the miners, in a move to win greater worker support, they lost \$422,894 profits in the following three years (Corbin, 1981). Actually, as Schwieder (1983) and Brandes (1970) found, housing and stores were one of the most consistent forms of profit for the owners. Brandes (1970:46) stated:

Even in slack times (and fluctuating economic conditions were characteristic of early twentieth-century American industries, particularly many which maintained company houses and stores, like bituminous coal mining), employers had an incentive to maintain full occupancy in company houses. For it was more desirable to have thirty men working short weeks with full occupancy than to have twenty men working full time with ten vacancies; rent receipts and store sales would both be higher.

Schwieder (1983) noted that in the Iowa coal mining industry, the fact that owners could profit so greatly from houses and stores took a great deal of pressure off their need to be efficient and show profit ability on the mining end. In Iowa, the profitability was such on company houses that some companies coerced employees to live in company houses even when other housing sources were available (Schwieder:1983).

Attracting workers to mining towns and making profits was not the only rationale for building company houses. Company housing also gave owners a form of social control over the miners. This control could be both positive and negative. Positively, it was a kind of mild control that induced miners to come to company towns and through low rents kept some of the better workers there. They could not afford to leave. Negatively, the social control could be much more direct and ominous.

Evictions were a persistent threat should the worker displease the owner. Union activities were probably the easiest way to get evicted in some towns (Schwieder, 1983). One mine owner in West Virginia put the matter cogently:

'If we rent a miner a home, it is incidental to his employment, and if a miner would undertake to keep anyone at that home that was undesirable or against the interests of the company, we would have him leave or have the miner removed.'
(Corbin, 1981:9)

Eviction could be preceded by official notice with a modest time to find new lodgings, or it could be immediate and without notice (Corbin, 1981). Eviction or its threat kept the owners authority visible. Corbin (1981) notes the irony in the simple eviction notice sent to a number of fired miners, "I want my house." The miner lived in the house, but could not forget who owned it. In the case of a strike, the company house was ideally suited for use by the company, for by evicting the strikers, one also provided housing for the strikebreakers (Brandes, 1970).

What were company houses like? The answer to that question in general would be as diverse as the nation's geography and culture (Allen, 1966). However, within any given region and industry, uniformity would be the rule. There was not a great deal of variation in the style of company housing within a given town (Allen, 1966). The exception might be the housing for a superintendent (Allen, 1966:86). In coal mining communities, the company houses were almost uniformly

small wooden structures. Allen (1966:86) who generally presents a positive picture of owners treatment of workers, claimed:

If the truth were fully known it would probably be seen that coal companies provided only that which was essential to keep employees working, and that homes of the ordinary miner were very cheaply structured.

In a 1920s survey of coal company houses throughout the United States (Allen, 1966:87) it was found that:

...95 percent of the houses were constructed of wood. Over two-thirds were finished outside with weatherboard, usually nailed directly to the frame with no sheathing or, sometimes, with paper sheathing. Composition paper was used for two-thirds of the roofs. Foundations were generally of posts, and no cellars were included. Most houses, except the poorest 'shanties,' had porches. Inside finish consisted of wood sheathing for half the houses and plaster for an additional 38 percent.

Schwieder (1983:88) described the following typical Iowa town houses in a coal mining community, Highbridge, Iowa:

The houses are of the usual mining camp construction--shiplap nailed directly on studding, lathed, and plastered about 1/8 inch thick. The foundations are of brick, and in fairly good condition generally. A few foundations need some repairs. The houses are old, the shiplap has loosened, the window sills are loose, and the doors warped. Many of the roofs leak, the plastering is in bad shape, and the paper has come off in patches. Single flooring only is provided. Consequently, the houses are cold in winter, wet in spring, and not particularly inviting.

She also found evidence (1983:87) that the mine owners failed to maintain the houses so that "leaky roofs, broken windows, and sagging doors were commonplace," and miners lost motivation to personally care for their own home.

In the coal mining towns at the turn of the century, indoor plumbing was not common. A study done in 1916 (Allen, 1966) found that 1,214 company houses checked in Colorado and Wyoming, "none of them had inside toilets."

A national study in the 1920s of coal mining company houses (Allen, 1966:87) found that:

13.8 percent had running water, 2.4 percent had bathtubs, and 3 percent had flush toilets inside. A water system of some sort existed in only 49 percent of the communities.

If it is true that the coal mining companies constructed their homes as cheaply as possible, that they were cold in the winter, small, generally poorly maintained, and lacked indoor plumbing, were there incentives to live in such housing outside of coercion by company officials? Yes, there were three basic incentives to live in such housing: 1.) credit, 2.) some security, and 3.) low rent. Like the company store, the company houses were opened to miners who came to town penniless. Not only was credit extended initially upon coming to town, but it was also available during slowdowns or shutdowns in the mine. That of course accounted for the element of security. They would not lose their house simply because work was slow. Schwieder (1983:91) states that:

When the mines shut down for the summer months or when the miners could work only one or two days a week, families remained in their homes. Many women commented that regardless of the length of unemployment in the mine, operators did not evict the families nor did they raise the rent.

The cost of renting a company house has generally been quite low and was incentive to locate in the town and rent from the company. In the coal company towns in Colorado and Wyoming of 1916, "rent varied from \$5.00 to \$18.00 a month, with 78.5 percent renting at less than \$9.00." (Allen, 1966). In Iowa in 1919, "the monthly rent varied from \$8.00 for a four-room house to \$10.00 for a six-room house, although mining families found the larger houses in short supply (Schwieder, 1983:88)."

Company towns also made housing provisions for miners who were not married. All company towns had some kind of boarding house or motel, the primary purpose of which was to house single miners. This was usually provided with a restaurant or cafeteria (Allen, 1966:92).

Recreation

At the turn of the century, company-town owners were beginning to strongly encourage local participation in recreation (Brandes, 1970). Baseball was the sport of choice for company towns. Allen (1966:98) found that, "nearly every community had its baseball diamond, and competition with other towns in the vicinity ran high." Brandes (1970:77) saw in the proliferation of company-sponsored recreation a well chosen alternative to the "evils of leisure." Such activities were to the employer a welcome substitute for the saloon (Brandes, 1970). Clearly, the employer was interested in the hours the employee

spent off the job. Brandes (1970:76) captured the concern of the employer in the following:

The worker had some free time; the question was not whether he was going to use it, but how, and some of the ways were considerably more threatening to the welfare of the company than dancing. Just sitting around grumbling about the company was bad enough, but there was also the possibility of drinking, along with all its usual accompaniments, including brawling, being less efficient on the job, thieving and general troublemaking in the town, or even union organizing. It was also common to have at least one band in company towns.

The band would play at various social occasions, on holidays, at dances, and in parades. It was not unusual for them to participate in celebrations in neighboring communities (Allen, 1966). Good athletes and musicians received preferential treatment in hiring and sometimes preferential treatment on the job (Brandes, 1970). It is not clear how extensive this policy was, nor the degree to which it was practiced in the coal towns. However, Brandes (1970) does show some evidence of evidence of preferential treatment of mine musicians to the extent of causing resentment among other workers. Both baseball teams and bands were central to the yearly celebrations held on the fourth of July in many company towns. Often there was a company-sponsored picnic, a parade, field events throughout the day, and an evening dance (Brandes, 1970).

The fact that many companies were antagonistic to the saloons and dance halls did not keep such businesses out. Allen (1966:12) tells how "...saloons, dance halls, and gambling houses..." were "...forbidden in most genuine company towns..." in the West.

Corbin (1981:35) found something quite different in the West Virginia coal mining fields: "Saloons were numerous in both the commercial and company towns in the coal fields." Miners drank to celebrate every holiday and special event, such as weddings and birthdays. He also noted (1981:36) that many miners made their own alcohol:

Stills could be found throughout the company town, in miners' homes, in barns, and even in the coal mines where the miners often made liquor while they worked or during lunch break. The latter practice was so common that the chief of the West Virginia Department of Mines, concerned with the safety hazards that could result, issued a circular that ordered mine inspectors to check for stills in the mines and to report them to the police.

For many miners, making moonshine was a supplement to an otherwise meager income. This became all the more crucial during "slack runs and strikes" (Corbin, 1981:37). However, the mine owners were unanimous in their opposition to saloons which they viewed as detrimental to coal production (Corbin, 1981).

Law and medicine

Order in company towns was often maintained by a hired company policeman, who was deputized by the county (Allen, 1966). In the best of company towns, he probably operated much like a local constable, albeit in the best interests of his employer, the company. In the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, brutal policies led to insurrection in a number of camps. Employees charged them with using camp marshalls to "browbeat residents into submission to arbitrary policies." (Allen, 1966:63) Company marshalls were also used to combat union activities.

They used an armored car known as the "death special" (Brandes, 1970:2).

In West Virginia, company-town law enforcement probably reached its lowest level of corruption. The companies hired the notorious detectives from the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency to break strikes, infiltrate unions as spies, and protect the mining operations. They regularly used violence and murder to keep out the unions (Corbin 1981). In 1912, "The Baldwin-Felts guards built iron and concrete forts that they equipped with machine guns throughout the strike districts" (Corbin 1981:88). In the same year, they prepared a train called, "the Bull Moose Special,"

- with iron-plate siding and machine guns, and then at night, with its lights turned out, and with coal operator Quinn Martin and Kanawha County Sheriff Bonner Hill aboard, they drove the monster through the valleys, machine-gunning the
- people in the tent colonies on the sides of the hills (Corbin, 1981:88).

Brandes (1970:2) discovered company armies in coal regions:

In 1923 Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot estimated that police employed by coal and iron companies outnumbered state-employed police by twenty to one. The Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Company organized its force by rank--colonels, captains, sergeants, privates and so forth.

The degree to which such company hired law was given free reign probably was dependent on state and county attitudes toward law enforcement in the coal company towns. The fact that West Virginia was dominated by outside mining interests, these also controlling the state

legislature, probably made policies there more abusive than the typical mining company town.

It was common practice for companies to provide a doctor for workers and families in company towns. The charge to the worker was often one dollar per month (Allen, 1966; Brandes, 1970). By 1902, the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company had in every company camp, a doctor who not only treated patients but also lectured in schools on sanitation and inspected homes for health conditions (Allen, 1966).

However, a company doctor was not appreciated for the full range of his services. He was perceived, like other aspects of company town life, as an appendage of the company and the company's policy. For instance, some companies would not pay for health conditions supposed to be brought about through abuse or neglect, as in the case of drunkenness. In other cases, the doctor personally checked in the home of those who missed work to ascertain their condition. In either case, his decision could easily be perceived as company control over the life of the worker (Brandes, 1970).

There were the other abuses of medical practice, such as when doctors refused to treat striking miners or their families, or when doctors served as informants to the company, or when doctors were detectives (Corbin, 1981). Even with these abuses, however, it was a decided advantage in most cases to workers in such towns to have a licensed and qualified physician at a reasonable price (Corbin, 1981).

Education

Brandes (1970) chronicled the short time in company towns, between the erection of housing and the building of a school nearby. "Colorado Fuel and Iron, which owned thirty company towns, was a model of educational efficiency (1970:55)." That company provided large school buildings and helped purchase texts in bulk to save money for local schools. It even helped in recruitment of teachers (Brandes, 1970:55). A "typical practice was to construct a school building or partially to subsidize a teacher's salary" (Brandes, 1970:53).

Subsidizing education had important benefits. First, education had a socializing influence on the miners and their families. Not only was the school a place to Americanize the children of immigrants by teaching them English, they also learned the proper attitude toward the company from their teachers (Brandes, 1970). Of course, some complained that the teachers were hand-picked for their abilities to promote the company. Brandes (1970:57) tells of "one student who interviewed teachers in Appalachian coal towns found them 'usually very guarded in their statements and hesitant about making a decision on school matters until the operators are consulted.'"

The company executives often had a direct say in the day-to-day operation of the schools, even when the workers paid for operating the schools (Brandes, 1970). Teachers were dismissed for sympathizing with the United Mine Workers of America (Brandes, 1970). In short, the

schools along with other institutions in the company town served the purposes of the owners.

Voluntary associations: Churches and lodges

Churches The classic work on religion in company towns was done by Liston Pope (1942). Pope's (1942) study of Gaston County, North Carolina, covered the years from 1880 to 1940. It probed the social meaning of religion in a company town. Pope (1942) argued that religion in the mill towns made a valuable contribution to the employers in providing a disciplined work force. One way the churches did this was in prohibition work. Cotton mills needed a dependable work force that was neither drunk nor hung over. "Liquor was denounced as detrimental to industry as the 'greatest oppressor of the laboring man'" (Pope, 1942:28). The focus on prohibition kept other issues from rising to the surface. Pope (1942:28-9) explained:

The prohibition fight also had important consequences on the policies of the churches toward social questions. It taught them to explain poverty and other social ills in terms of drunkenness or personal shortcomings rather than in terms of industrial relations as such. It focused their attention on prohibition as a central social problem, and interest in prohibition legislation became a substitute for nearly all other types of social concern.

For the mills, the churches were providing better workers and citizens.

The managers felt church members were more dependable.

Managers agree...that church members are more stable (a high rate of labor turnover has been one of the most difficult problems the industry has faced) and more dependable (less

subject to tardiness or absence from work because of drunkenness, gambling, recuperation from debauches, etc.). They agree, further, that church members are more 'reasonable' making less trouble in the mill and in the community (Pope, 1942:29-30).

One person's "reasonable" is another's "docility."

Religion also provided benefits to the worker in the company town. Pope (1942:88) saw two benefits of mill religion for the worker, "the organization of life, and the transvaluation of life -- though this terminology, of course, is alien to him." The church in the mill village was a "community center." It was the focal point around which non-economic life in the village largely revolved" (Pope, 1942:89). As such, it provided a training ground for leaders and a place of belonging for others. Leaders learned to speak in the frequent "testimony meetings" and acquired organizational skills working on the many committees in the church (Pope, 1942:89). So Pope noted (1942:89) that life was transvaluated either through reassurance or escape.

By affirmation of values denied in the economic world, the church provides comfort and ultimate assurance; in its religious services it often affords escape temporarily from the economic and social situation in which workaday life must be spent. The difficulties of life for the mill worker in this world help to explain the noteworthy emphasis on otherworldliness in his churches. Most of the hymns and sermons in village churches point toward a more placid state and have little concern with mundane economic or social relations (Pope, 1942:89-90).

Pope (1942) also assessed the role of the revival meeting in the cotton mill town. A primary appeal of revivals was in providing an "emotional massage," for workers trapped in stultifying factory condi-

tions (Pope, 1942:90). This particular aspect of revivalism may have been less important in coal towns, where the miner did not think of himself as unskilled and doing monotonous work. However, other aspects of revivalism may have been common to coal towns and mill towns.

For instance, all aspects of the revival meeting were orchestrated to produce the "high emotional crisis of 'being saved'" (Pope, 1942:91). This regularized event was the bridge into church membership for a very transient population. Since the population was so transient in mill towns, Pope (1942:85) described the mill church as a "procession." Revival meetings provided the device whereby it could continuously take in new members; many of which would be gone in a short time to another town. Because of this, he stated, "at a given moment a mill church more nearly resembles a series of meetings than it does an established institution" (Pope, 1942:85).

Given the important place of churches in company towns, they could not be left to chance. Churches often came under the direct control of the company owners. In Pope's study (1942), he found it common for the land, building, and a monthly portion of the pastor's salary to be underwritten by the owners in nearly every mill town. Often, the pastor went to the mill to pick up that portion of his check from the mill owner (Pope, 1942). It was uncommon for a minister to be in favor of unions or criticize the company policies (Pope, 1942).

The literature on religion in company towns in general and on coal mining towns is similar to Pope's findings. A study (Brandes, 1970:70) of 12 representative coal companies in West Virginia in 1923 found that "in every single company town, the company had either built a church or offered use of a schoolhouse for religious meetings." Allen (1966) found similar situations in Wyoming, where the Union Pacific Coal Company donated land and material for the construction of a Methodist-Episcopal church in 1891. Coal operators were motivated in part to help in church building by what they perceived to be good business sense. Corbin (1981:148) quoted the West Virginia Coal Operators Association as saying:

"The coal companies are intensely interested in their communities and give every instance of developing the spiritual nature of their employees and their families. It is a good business proposition for any coal company to take an interest and to assist in the building up of religious and community activities."

The symbiotic relationship between churches and company functioned well for the company in good times and in bad. In both cases, it gave the company a degree of social control.

Some preachers openly preached against unions. Corbin (1981) gives examples of company preachers serving as labor agents to recruit blacks as strikebreakers. If preaching against unions proved ineffective, the company still had means of control at their disposal. Churches were boarded shut during strikes. If local preachers refused to join the anti-union cause, national preachers, such as Billy Sunday,

were all too willing to appear on the scene to preach the evils of unions (Corbin, 1981). Brandes (1970:73) tells of a preacher, the Reverend W. Gilbert Nowell:

pastor of the Fawcett Methodist Episcopal Church at Hill Station, Pennsylvania, a town owned by the Pittsburgh Coal Company. When Howell became pastor in 1926, he received the customary rent-free house and free coal with which to heat it. The following year a strike occurred, and while he did not speak from the pulpit, Nowell sympathized with the strikers and openly conversed with members of his congregation on their picket line. Hearing of this, the local mine superintendent called Nowell into his office and demanded that he remain entirely neutral. The pastor refused, saying, 'there is no neutrality in me, I am either one side or the other, and I am on the side of organized labor.' What followed was disputed-- Nowell claimed that he was given ten days to vacate his house, and the company denied that such short notice was given-- but the eviction itself was undisputed, and when Nowell made it public, the company threatened to fire any non-union parishoner who attended his services.

Allen (1966) found the charges of company control of religion to be exaggerated. However, he substantiated his claim from company publications which were produced for public relations purposes (Allen, 1966). It is reasonable to assume that much company control of religion remained passive until a crisis arose.

Lodges Another form of voluntary association found in the company town was the fraternal organization or lodge. While little has been written on the role these played in the company town, apparently they were encouraged by company officials (Corbin, 1981). They were often allowed to use company property, and some companies built lodges (Corbin, 1981). Corbin (1981:74) noted that they "...provided a 'moral uplift' (immorality, adultery, or drunkenness for example was

reason for expulsion)." Not only did the worker enjoy the company of his fellows, but lodge membership gave them economic benefits as well. Many coal miners could not obtain life insurance because of the hazards of the occupation. The benevolent societies provided for these needs (Corbin, 1981:74). While voluntary associations gave some meaning to the miners' lives outside the mines, most of their lives were circumscribed by their work.

Labor in the coal mining town

This thesis deals with life in a coal mining town in Iowa from 1893 to 1914. The situation in the coal mining industry at that time was constrained by a general shortage of labor and from 1893 to 1897, and was constrained by the economic depression of 1893.

European immigrants To sustain the labor needs of the growing mining industry in the late nineteenth century, mine owners looked to Europe. Corbin (1981:8) shows that in West Virginia, for instance, "In 1880 there were 924 European immigrant miners in the state; by 1910 there were 28,000." Schwieder (1983) noted the influx of British as well as Italian miners to southern Iowa. The British were especially noted for their experience with trade unions in England, experience which translated into action in this country.

The Depression of 1893 Schwieder (1983:131) showed how "...the Depression of 1893 forced the miners to concentrate on the basic issue

of survival." She also noted (1983:131) that miners in Iowa in 1895 took major pay cuts "from \$1.00 to either \$.75 or \$.80 per ton." In fact, "wage reductions constituted the major reason for strikes throughout the 1890's" (Schwieder, 1983:134). Schwieder (1983:134) documents the miner's inadequate wages:

Iowa miners shared this problem with miners everywhere. On April 20, 1891, the Journal editor reported that in Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Illinois, the miners' daily wage averaged well below \$2.00. In Pennsylvania, out of 1,763 coal miners canvassed, the majority earned less than \$1.50 per day. In Missouri, 74 percent of the miners had a daily income of less than \$1.50 per day. In Illinois, a special commission looking into the strike of 1889 reported that miners in the Spring Valley District averaged \$31.63 per month. In Iowa, a miner who recently emigrated from England wrote to the Journal that he earned \$1.75 a day, a wage that would not support his wife and five children. He added that he paid \$4.50 for his house rent along with \$.50 a month for water. These figures supported the national UMW official's view that throughout the country, coal miners earned less than a living wage.

Not only were wages inadequate, but miners were plagued by seasonal layoffs and slowdowns. Corbin (1981) noted that the lack of railroad cars was a continual problem in West Virginia, and miners lost as much as 50 percent of their workdays as a result. According to Schwieder (1983), non-industrial states like Iowa had work slowdowns during the summer when little coal was needed for home heating. This was compounded nationally by overproduction in general since the Civil War (Schwieder, 1983). She (Schwieder, 1983:23-4) found that, "Between 1890 and 1930, the most days averaged per year was in 1918 when the men averaged only 249 working days." As a result, Iowa miners often took

part-time work outside the mines (Schwieder, 1983). Hunting and gardening also became an important part of providing basic needs for mining families (Corbin, 1981).

If work conditions were too bad, the option of greener pastures was generally available for the miners. Corbin (1981) notes that for many miners in West Virginia, leaving was a form of protest when conditions got too harsh. Iowa miners moved often (Schwieder, 1983). But moving was not without costs. One cost was being without work while moving and getting settled (Corbin, 1981).

The Union

The miner's primary way of dealing with intolerable conditions, especially poor pay, was the union and the strike. The United Mine Workers of America operated with varying degrees of success in the Iowa Coal fields in the 1890s and early 1900s. The Depression of 1893, according to Schwieder (1983), was a major setback in union organizing and gaining concessions from coal operators in Iowa. Union organizing was reason enough to be evicted from one's home. Often, since the homes were owned by the mining company, they would not allow outsiders suspected of union sympathy into the homes with the miners. Often, miners would have to meet organizers on country roads to sign up for unions (Allen, 1966). Miners who succeeded in forming a union could expect to be evicted from company housing if they did strike (Allen, 1966; Corbin, 1981).

In the case of strikes in the 1890s, if the operator needed to keep up production, he would often use the weapon of importing black strikebreakers to take the place of union miners. Help wanted advertisements would be run in papers in the South (Foner and Lewis, 1979). Barnum (n.d., 19) found many companies used blacks and "... 'judicious mixtures' of Negroes, native whites, and foreign whites, ... playing one group against the other." Labor recruiters would be sent to bring in blacks by the trainload (Foner and Lewis, 1979).

The reception of blacks by whites was mixed. At times, whites would try to reason with the blacks, hoping they would return to their origins. At other times, they resorted to violence (Foner and Lewis, 1979). Often, the trains would have to be heavily guarded. It was not always clear whether the blacks were being guarded from violent whites or guarded to prevent their escape once they heard the real conditions under which they would be working (Foner and Lewis, 1979). Schwieder (1983) found that in 1895 most Iowa coal mining communities had some blacks but they were a small minority of the population. However, the tactic grew in popularity among operators and was used for over thirty years in the case of strikes in Iowa.

Corbin (1981) discovered that blacks were generally uninterested in the union in West Virginia. When compared to what they were used to in marginal subsistence farming, they may have experienced relative

gains by mining. Leola Nelson Bergmann (1966) in "The Negro in Iowa," estimated that "...a few thousand southern Negroes came into the Iowa coal fields during the eighties and nineties."

The practice of using blacks as strikebreakers hardly had a positive effect on race relations in the coal mining fields. Labor was a continuous problem for the owners through the 1890s and mechanization seemed like part of the solution. Schwieder (1983) noted that mining machines were in operation in a number of Iowa mines as early as 1895.

The review of company town literature clearly shows that external control, the most negative form of Warren's (1973) vertical linkages, was a vital element of company town life. Company towns were established for the purpose of profits for absentee capitalists, and control over economic and non-economic features of community life was maintained at all costs. While the community was profitable to external interests, it was viable. When it was no longer profitable, it began its inevitable decline as a community. All of this fits well into a perspective provided by center-periphery theory.

The Center and Periphery Theoretical Perspective

International level

Immanuel Wallerstein's (cf. Ritzer, 1983) world-systems theory was written about regional domination of peripheral areas by center areas.

The relationship that he described is analogous to what is being examined in this thesis. World-systems theory and its correlary, center-periphery theory, were developed about international relationships. Ritzer (1983:291) found that in Wallerstein's writings:

...the core geographical area dominates the world economy and exploits the rest of the system. The periphery consists of those areas that provide raw materials to the core and are heavily exploited by it.

This relationship of economic domination was one that produced what Wallerstein (Ritzer, 1983) called monoculture or undifferentiated, single-focus society. This thesis examines the domination of Fraser, Iowa by St. Paul, Minnesota. This was for the purpose of exploiting Fraser's coal. Thus, Fraser was a single-focus economy, centered in coal mining.

John Galtung (1980:261) examined the inequality in the world between nations and within nations "...in almost all aspects of human living conditions, including the power to decide over those living conditions....," noting that, "The world consists of center and periphery nations." In his analysis, there are relationships established between the center and the periphery based on a disharmony of interests that lead to a domination of the periphery by the center (1980). The interactions in the relationship are vertical and the structure of the relationship is feudal. The interaction is vertical because most of the interactions with the periphery are monopolized by the center so that there is little interaction between various peripheries (1980).

Fraser, Iowa was built and maintained in a disharmony of interests with

the town's owners in St. Paul. The power to decide over living conditions was held by those in St. Paul. There was more communication between Fraser and Lehigh, Iowa on the periphery than between Fraser, Iowa and St. Paul. Communication between the towns at the periphery was dominated by the center.

Daniel Chirot (1977) used the terms core societies and peripheral societies in much the same way that Wallerstein (1974) and Galtung (1980) use the terms center and periphery. Chirot (1977:3) defined core and peripheral societies as follows:

- 1) Core societies: economically diversified..., rich, powerful societies that are relatively independent of outside control.
- 2) Peripheral societies: economically overspecialized, relatively poor and weak societies that are subject to manipulation or direct control by the core powers.

Aundre Gunder Frank (1975) analyzed the same sort of phenomena with the terms metropole and periphery. He found that the development of the metropole led to the underdevelopment of the periphery. He saw this as a relationship of economic imperialism or colonialism. While capital at the center develops, labor at the periphery underdevelops.

David Harvey (1980) noted the importance of transportation (most notably steam) in the process of concentration of capital and dominance of the metropolis over the periphery. First, it was necessary for fast and efficient forms of transportation, such as railroads, to be developed before commodities, such as coal, could be easily and quickly controlled and transported to the metropolis.

Harvey (1980:314) notes that:

The capitalist mode of production promotes the production of cheap and rapid forms of communication and transportation in order that 'the direct product can be realized in distant markets in mass quantities' at the same time as new 'spheres of realization for labour, driven by capital' can be opened up.

Marx (cf. Harvey, 1980:315) referred to this process of dominion over great distances through improved transportation, as the "annihilation of space by time."

In Marx's (Harvey, 1980:316) understanding, there was a connection between circulation of capital, extending of credit, and maintaining control of others. Capital increased through circulation. When it did not circulate, it did not increase. Therefore, the domination that could not be completed through improved transportation could be completed through the use of credit.

Long distance trade, because it separates production and realization by a long time interval, may still be characterized by a long turnover period and lack of continuity in the employment of capital. This kind of trade...forms 'one of the material bases...one of the sources of the credit system.'

The credit system allows of a geographical extension of the market by establishing continuity where there was none before. The necessity to annihilate space by time can in part be compensated for by an emerging system of credit.

Instead of building Fraser from St. Paul, capital was loaned to an Iowa capitalist who was then indebted to St. Paul. In this way, Fraser was both profitable and amenable to the wishes of a capitalist in St. Paul. All of these theorists see the relationship between the center and periphery, as one in which the center, more developed and powerful,

dominates and extracts from the less developed periphery. In the process, the center continues to develop at the expense of the periphery, the periphery underdevelops, and the periphery becomes more dependent on the center. Harvey gives a Marxian analysis of this to show that the development of technology, specifically transportation, allowed for this trans-spacial domination. Harvey (1980) also made the connection between capital infusion into the periphery by allowing the center to increase its capital, all the while tightening its grip on the periphery through credit.

These analyses of center and periphery relationships in world systems perspective have much to offer in analyzing the relationships between the centers or metropolises of St. Paul, Minnesota, and Fraser, Iowa, and the metropole of Chicago and Fraser. It must be granted that these analyses were developed in world systems perspective, but the argument could be made that the same relations of imperialism or colonialism are operative on a more regional basis. In fact, some of the theorists take the further step of looking at center and periphery relations on a regional basis.

Intranational level

Galtung (1980:261) suggested that, "The world consists of center and periphery nations; and each nation, in turn has its centers and periphery." Centers in center nations, referred to as center-centers,

hold dominance over both the periphery in their own nation, and over periphery nations in other parts of the globe. Galtung (1980) stated that:

...the center in the Periphery only serves as a transmission belt (e.g. as commercial firms, trading companies) for value (e.g. raw materials) forwarded to the Center nation.

Thus, there is a compromise of the business class in the periphery nation for the profit of the capitalists in the center of the center nation. The points that hold salience here are that in both center and periphery nations, there are centers and peripheries. Secondly, in the peripheries, the business class are co-opted for the purposes of domination by the powerful interests at the center of the center. In Fraser, the local business class was co-opted for the profit of more powerful interests in St. Paul. Hamilton Browne's Boone Valley Coal and Railway, which built Fraser, was little more than a conduit of resources and profits to St. Paul. While Hamilton Browne ostensibly controlled Fraser for his own profits, he was also controlled from St. Paul.

Frank (1975) pointed out that the phenomenon of the metropole and the periphery could be found both on a global level between nations or or on a national level within a nation. This thesis will look at the latter type of metropole and periphery relationship within a nation in the relationship between St. Paul, Minnesota, and Fraser, Iowa. Although others have chronicled the history of exploitation in mining

regions (cf. Caudill, 1978), again Frank (1975) places this kind of exploitation within the context of the metropole and the periphery. Frank stated that in the periphery "...capital was extracted from land and mine not to be reinvested in domestic commerce or industry but to be used instead for the development of the metropole." This often leaves "ghost regions" when extractive industry leaves (Frank, 1975:31).. This thesis will argue by analogy that when extraction was complete or no longer profitable, towns like Fraser became ghost towns.

Most literature on center-periphery relationships focuses on the center of the center nation and its relationship with the center and periphery of the peripheral nation. This thesis is looking at just such a relationship within a center nation between the center and periphery in that nation. This thesis argues that St. Paul Minnesota, was a center in a center nation around which Fraser, Iowa, was a periphery. James J. Hill, a capitalist railroad builder from St. Paul, owned a number of properties in northern and central Iowa. Hill co-opted a business class operator from central Iowa, analogous to the periphery of the center nation, whose name was Hamilton Browne. Browne became the link between the periphery in the center nation, and the center in the center nation, represented by James J. Hill.

Like Wallerstein's analysis, the periphery here provided raw materials to the core and was exploited by the core. Thus, the building of Fraser produced what Wallerstein referred to as monoculture or undifferentiated, single-focus society. Fraser was built for the pur-

pose of profit from coal mining. It declined with the declining fortunes of coal mining. Fraser became a ghost town in a way that was analogous to Frank's ghost region when extraction was no longer profitable.

As Galtung (1980) pointed out, life on the periphery was characterized by a lowered standard of living that subsidized the wealth at the core, and the people at the periphery were unable to control their own decision making. It was at least the perception of many of the Fraser residents that their lives were lived in substandard conditions that subsidized the profits of the owners. The people tried repeatedly through the early years of the town to take control of decision making into their own hands. It was not until the coal resources were beginning to be depleted that the workers gained control over their own lives in Fraser. Thus, life for labor in Fraser remained underdeveloped while it developed for capital at the center (Frank, 1975).

Harvey (1980) already pointed out the connection between transportation and the domination of the periphery. It was precisely through the development of the railroad that St. Paul, Minnesota, dominated the newly built railroad and coal mine town, Fraser.

Harvey (1980) also saw the connection between the extension of credit and the domination of capital on the periphery by capital in the center. Fraser was built because James J. Hill of St. Paul, Minnesota, loaned the major funds to Hamilton Browne of Boone, Iowa. Through that loan, James J. Hill effectively controlled Browne and Fraser. Pre-

vious to building Fraser, the coal mining fields were owned by interests in St. Paul; specifically James Jerome Hill of the Great Northern Railroad. Why did Hill loan the money to a local operator, Hamilton Browne, to develop those coal fields when he had the power and money to develop them himself? It was because he maintained a more regular profit and control through loaning the funds to do so to the local operator, Hamilton Browne. If coal mining there proved unprofitable, he was not concerned, for he was investing capital for a fixed rate of return. And through extending credit to Browne, Hill controlled him as effectively as if Browne were employed by Hill. Fraser may have been too far from St. Paul for a direct and profitable trading relationship on a sustained basis. By extending credit to Brown, Hill could allow Browne as a local to carry on unequal terms of trade with the local population.

Hill profited through the payment of interest and the control he exercised over one portion of a coal mining region.

Since, Browne could not meet his payments, he was thus directly controlled by Hill. Hill was constantly allowing Browne extensions on his past-due accounts. Henry Bernstein (1979) sees this activity, which in the international sector is referred to as "debt servicing," falling squarely within the center and periphery form of domination.

Combined Literature Perspective

This thesis presents a case study of a community on the periphery. Whereas most center-periphery literature is about the relations between

center and periphery nations, this thesis looks at that sort of relation within a center nation. St. Paul is considered a center or in Frank's terms, a metropole. Fraser is considered a periphery.

The previously cited literature on company towns (Corbin, 1981) made clear that whole regions were owned by absentee capitalists. Nowhere was this more true than in the coal mining industry. This would suggest that for the understanding of coal mining and company towns in the late nineteenth century, the conclusions of Warren (1963) needs modification. Contrary to Warren (1972), in coal mining company towns, the vertical ties were the strongest from the beginning. The horizontal ties, if allowed to develop, came with in the context of vertical ties. Warren's (1972) distinction between horizontal and vertical linkages is still useful and will be used in this study.

The suggestion that vertical linkages developed first and were most powerful makes the center-periphery perspective a logical choice for understanding the town of Fraser, Iowa. Although the center-periphery literature was used to understand international relations, this thesis suggests that it is the best theoretical perspective from which to view the relations between the center and periphery within a center nation.

CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is a social-historical-community study of Fraser, Iowa, from 1893 to 1910. There is precedent to doing sociology as history. The founders of modern sociology, especially Weber (1981), used this method (Bailey, 1982). There is good reason to do sociology as history. Some things are best understood at a certain level of concretion (Nisbet, 1977), and historical study allows us to do a comparison over time (Bailey, 1982). This is the case in the study of Fraser, the evolution over time of external control and the indigenous response to it.

This thesis will use a case study of social history of a coal-mining company town at the end of the nineteenth century. Liston Pope's (1942) study of South Carolina cotton-mill company towns was a social history of religion in company towns. This thesis will be a social history and sociology of community, specifically a sociology of the external locus of control relative to a community, Fraser, Iowa.

The purpose of this thesis will be to reconstruct the history of Fraser. Important to that history will be the study of the external control of Fraser, the emergence of internal control in that context, and the return to external control with the decline of Fraser.

Much social research is synchronic, done at one point in time. This thesis will attempt to use synchronic as well as diachronic analysis, looking at a phenomenon through time. Many social relations

cannot be understood outside of a context which the reconstruction of the historical process gives. The building and decline of a coal-mining boom town is just such a phenomenon.

Robert Nisbet (1977:3) argued that much which is central to sociology, specifically such themes as "...community, masses, power, development, progress, conflict, egalitarianism, anomie, alienation, and disorganization...", themes related to the effects of industrialization and modernization need to be studied in a diachronic way. He refers to the work of the sociologist as painting a landscape of the "...social, economic, and political setting..." of an age (Nisbet, 1977:7).

...what Tocqueville and Marx, and then Toennies, Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel, give us in their greatest works, ranging from Democracy in America and Capital to Toennies on Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft or Simmel on Metropolis, compelling as any to be found among the greater novels or paintings of their age...(1977:7).

This thesis is also historical in that it contains traditions conversant with change theory about horizontal and vertical community relations, company-town literature, and center-periphery literature.

Documents and Interviews

Since the period of interest of this study is just beyond the reach of the memory of people alive who lived in Fraser, most of the data in this study were obtained through the study of documents.

Census data

Studying a census at one period of time allowed for studying a population on a number of social indicators at a specific historical

time. This thesis looks at four censuses over a twenty-year period from 1895 through 1910, charting both social indicators at specific times, but also looking at social change over that time period. By combining elements found in all four censuses, individuals found in Fraser through time could be followed, and generalizations could be made about geographic mobility. That proved to be important since geographic mobility was a key result of external control in Fraser. The study of social indicators from specific censuses and across four censuses allowed a description of the population. Many of the characteristics of that population, such as ethnicity, country of origin, mobility, housing status, employment status, age, and gender, were a result of the external control and external development of Fraser. Thus, the study of census data was crucial for gaging the effects of external control on the population of Fraser.

The State of Iowa conducted a census in 1895 and 1905. Taken with the Federal Censuses for 1900 and 1910, these give a census record of Fraser at five-year intervals from 1895 to 1910. The 1895, 1900, and 1910 censuses were all available on microfilm rolls.

The 1905 Iowa State Census was not available as a unit. It had to be completely reconstructed. All three of the other censuses were recorded from 30 to 50 entries per page, listing the town of Fraser separately from the rest of Boone County. The 1905 census was done on individual 3 X 5 cards. In 1905, these cards were not kept together as the town of Fraser, but were placed along with all names in Boone

County, by the first letter in the last name. A master list, containing only the names of all residents of Fraser was also compiled by the censustaker. It was referred to as the post office list. This list became the basis for reconstructing the 1905 census. By going through the microfilm of all the names in Boone County, the cards were located with the address of Fraser. The data from each card were then transferred to the appropriate line on the reconstructed census. Out of 1,243 names in 1905, 25 could not be located on individual cards. Of these, 10 individuals were found either in the 1900 or the 1910 census and their data were read into the 1905 census to fill in the gaps. This left only 1.2 percent of the 1905 names with no data.

The 1905 census cards had used pencil to cross out the categories of race and gender. This did not photograph well on the microfilm. Data on blacks in Fraser, showing which 1905 residents were black, was taken instead from the 1900 census. The fact that a small number of blacks remained in Fraser in 1905 was corroborated in the newspaper accounts of blacks leaving Fraser. A decision was made about the gender of each individual with the 1905 census on the basis of the first name. In cases where it was questionable, a judgement was made. Sometimes gender could be corroborated in the 1900 and 1910 census.

Figure 1 shows the data pertinent to this thesis that were given in each of the four censuses. For instance, religious preference was only listed in 1895. Home value was listed only in 1905. From home value in 1905 the status of home ownership or rental could be deduced.

	Household Size	Name	Relation	Race	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Place of Birth	Father's Place of Birth	Mother's Place of Birth	Year of Immi- gration	Occu- pation	Months Unem- ployed	Home Own/ Rent	Home Value	Religion
1895	X	X		X	X	X	X	County (Iowa) or foreign country	Foreign or native	Foreign or native		X				X
1900	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	U.S. state/ foreign country	U.S. state/ foreign country	U.S. state/ foreign country	X	X	X	X		
1905		X		X				U.S. state/ foreign country	U.S. state/ foreign country	U.S. state/ foreign country		X	X		X	
1910	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	U.S. state/ foreign country	U.S. state/ foreign country	U.S. state/ foreign country	X	X	X	X		

Figure 1. Fraser census data by year and category of information included.

If no home value was listed, it was assumed that the home was rented. The 1905 census did not clearly demarcate households like the other censuses did.

Ethnicity was compiled by looking at the birthplace of the residents or the parents. Even if the person was born in the United States, if one parent was foreign born, they were counted as ethnic. The 1895 Iowa State Census gave problems in deciding the ethnic background of the parents for two reasons. First, the information given on the parents was simply "F" for foreign and "N" for native. Another problem occurred in that the two columns carrying the information of "F" or "N" for the father and mother were located at the center crease in the census-taking book. When the book was microfilmed, many of these were lost in the crease. If the ethnicity of the parents was listed in their own place of birth, this was no problem. If it was not, for some residents, the information was lost. For this reason, data on ethnicity were not computed for 1895.

The 1895 Iowa State Census and the 1900 and 1910 Federal Census were all available on microfilm in the Iowa State University Library. The 1905 Iowa state census was available on microfilm at the State Historical Library in Des Moines, Iowa.

By making a card with each family or individual from each census, alphabetizing and comparing them, the names that were the same in each census could be extracted from the rest. In this way, a fifth census, those living in Fraser for more than one census, was constructed. It

was called a measure of residential stability/mobility. This census gave the name, age, sex, marital status, occupation, ethnicity, race, months unemployed, home ownership or rental status, and property value of those living in Fraser more than one census. This allowed for social indicators of who was more or less geographically mobile. It also allowed for the possibility of seeing individuals who changed marital status or occupational status over time. From this mobility measure, the number and percentage of persons living in Fraser for one, two, three, and four censuses were calculated. A scale was constructed where those living in Fraser for one census were highly mobile, and those living in Fraser for four censuses were highly stable.

Census information was also helpful in making sense out of newspaper reports. For instance, when lists of school board members or town officers were found in the newspapers, often their occupations could be found in the census. In this way, the census could provide social indicators for the newspaper data.

County newspapers

Newspapers published in Boone County carried weekly columns on Fraser, beginning with its planning stages in 1892. Over 1,500 pages of newspaper were obtained by photocopying them at the Boone County Courthouse. These carried columns on Fraser or specific events that made the news in another part of the paper. Within this collection there was about a 25 percent redundancy rate since often one newspaper

would print the same news about Fraser as another. Sometimes the redundancy was verbatim.

The Boone County Republican, The Boone County Democrat, The Boone News, The Boone News Republican, The Boone Weekly News, and the Ogden Reporter were all useful sources of Fraser history. An exhaustive search of the Boone County newspapers was made for the years 1892 through 1914. This was done in the summer of 1983.

The newspapers highlighted all the major events surrounding Fraser's history. They also gave a running, although incomplete, account of the mundane. They listed births, marriages, visits to and from Fraser, many of the people who moved to and from Fraser, and other items of minutiae of interest to those living in Fraser. Social and recreational functions were both advertised and reported on with regularity. When there was major labor unrest, both sides in the confrontation would argue their case in the papers.

The newspapers were crucial for filling in the human elements in what would have been raw census data. The newspapers allowed for looking at the census data that appeared every five years as a part of a continuing process. When blacks appeared as a sizeable proportion of the population in 1900, and were nearly absent again in 1905, the newspapers gave the detailed accounts of how and why blacks were brought to Fraser and why they were nearly all gone by 1905.

The newspapers gave valuable running accounts of the effects of external control on Fraser. Most important in this category were the

problems associated with labor unrest. The newspapers gave detailed accounts of how labor disputes arose, how strikes were dealt with by the company, the bringing of blacks to Fraser, the response of whites, the failure of some strikes and the success of others. Both miners and company officials took great pains to argue their cases in the newspapers.

The newspapers also gave detailed information and running accounts of communal organization life in Fraser. Some of this communal organization was with the help of the company and some was an expression of local initiative. In the newspapers were descriptions and dates relative to the development of communal infrastructure such as the school, churches, businesses, bridges, park, railroad, power plant, and the miner's hall. There were detailed accounts of the fraternal organizations, recreational activities, and entertainment. There were accounts of community crises such as disease epidemics, major mine shutdowns, killings, accidents, and how the community dealt with such crises. Without the newspaper accounts, there would be no interpretative element in the raw data from the census accounts.

Published historical materials

Other published historical materials were also helpful, although quite limited. Goldthwaite's (1914) History of Boone County, contained an insightful page on Fraser. The Boone County Historical Society (1976) published two articles on Fraser by Nayse Daugherty in their Trail

Tales, as well as an article on coal mining in Boone County. The State Mine Inspector's Reports, from 1895 to 1910 provided information on the specific mining statistics in Fraser. Poor's Manual of Railroads (1895-1912) gave useful information about the railroad that owned Fraser, its boards of directors, its value, trackage, rolling stock and engines, as well as changes in ownership.

Institutional publications

Institutional records, published and unpublished, were collected from both churches and the school. All three main churches and some of their leaders were found in published denominational sources. The Iowa Baptist State Convention Annual Minutes (1898-1908) gave some statistical records of the Fraser Baptist Church, as part of the Iowa Baptist Association (colored). The Primitive Methodist, Record and Messenger, and later called Primitive Methodist Journal, gave information on the founder of the Primitive Methodist Church in Fraser. The Western Christian Alliance, published by the Gospel Tabernacle in Boone, gave information on the founder, Charles Crawford, of their satellite congregation in Fraser. Lois Crawford also recently published a book on the life of her father, Papa and I (1981), that contained information on Fraser. The family history of William Morris, founder of the Primitive Methodist Church in Fraser, included geneologies and numerous written and published accounts of his life. The Primitive Methodist Church, still functioning, gave access to all its Sunday School records and Ladies Aid Society Records, and church business meeting records.

The County allowed duplication of the school records from Fraser, including lists of school board members, teachers and students, as well as treasurers reports. These included salaries for teachers, janitors, and board members.

These institutional records gave the opportunity to reconstruct the organization of the local communal organizations such as education and religion. They provided both personal biographical information on key figures as well as data on such things as size of meetings or organizations, and interpretations of the founders. They also allowed comparative data on the financing of these institutions unavailable elsewhere. Since these records were often kept for purely institutional use, they were sometimes more reliable than some of the newspaper accounts which were sometimes produced for public relations purposes.

County records

County records in the recorder's office were also quite useful. Approximately 100 deeds gave early property transactions, property values, locations of residences and businesses, and length of time between sale and resale. These combined with a map of Fraser from 1896, showing the buildings at that time, allowed some reconstruction of the infrastructure of the town. The same office contained numerous Articles of Incorporation both for corporations, social and religious organizations. These gave the names of the original officers in the corporation or organization, the purpose of the entity, and other

information. The Articles of Incorporation for the town of Fraser listed 112 workers and their occupations, the first town officers and the conflict surrounding the decision to incorporate. The same source yielded numerous contracts, sales agreements, mortgages, releases, satisfactions, and mining rights agreements. Most of these contained information unavailable from other sources. Without these county records, the value of land, the price of mineral rights, the degree to which external owners dominated land purchases and mining rights, the classes of people interested in starting specific communal organizations, and the factual comparison between the owner's projected profits and real earnings would have been impossible. They provided a non-biased comparison with newspaper accounts and information provided in company correspondence.

James J. Hill papers

As this thesis argues, Fraser was intimately tied to the interests of James Jerome Hill, railroad builder from St. Paul, Minnesota and his papers provided a rich source of historical information. The James J. Hill Reference Library in St. Paul, Minnesota, contains an archives known as the James J. Hill Papers. Found in these archives were correspondence between Hamilton Browne and James J. Hill specifically related to Browne's building of Fraser. These told of financial plans, the decision to build the town, corporate relationships, labor

disputes, decisions to recruit black strikebreakers and a strategy for such recruitment, the infrastructure and housing stock owned by the company, mining procedures, and profitability, all of which were important to the study.

This correspondence between Hill and Browne provided an insider's view of the company and the way in which Hill controlled Browne. They also provided a view of the way in which Browne intended to continue control of Fraser. By comparing much of the information contained in the letters by dates, with that found in the newspapers and county records, a composite reconstruction of events, as well as company motives and interpretations, was possible. There were notable occasions where the company presentation in the newspapers was markedly different than that found in the private correspondence.

Photographs

Nearly 100 photographs gave a more intimate face both to persons and structures in Fraser, as well as panoramic views of the town and scenery. They compensated for a number of missing details from the other data.

Sometimes buildings could be identified in photographs. A comparison of various store, hotel, and community buildings gave insight into the level of domination of the community by the company. For instance, visually the company store dominated the main street. The photographs also gave a great deal of visual information on such things as building composition, exterior, and comparative location. These compared

with a map of Fraser for 1896, gave some indication of the way the town would have looked to those living there. Comparing land records with these gave some indication of locations, style and construction of company housing. By comparing early and later photographs, a sense of the development of the community could be appreciated.

Personal interviews

Finally, interviews with eight older residents of Fraser gave a personal and living witness to the experience of those who chose to stay with Fraser for years after this study. Nearly all of them were too young to remember the events that are central to this study. Some could no longer remember events of their own youth, but some had recollections of their parents conversations of earlier days in Fraser. The interviews were gathered by traveling to Fraser and Boone. Each person interviewed suggested someone else who may have further information.

The data from the various sources were as never self-explanatory and sometimes contradictory. In the case of contradictions, newspaper accounts took precedence over the memory of individuals. The individuals were quite young when the events in this study took place. Often two or three sources would be used to confirm or explain each other. Newspapers were especially helpful in clarifying two or three different accounts of the same event. The newspapers and censuses were especially helpful in casting light on each other.

When there were disagreements among sources, a process of triangulation (Bailey, 1982), or using a number of sources together, was useful. Often judgements had to be made as to the best interpretation if there were apparent contradictions. By immersing oneself in the data at any stage, new sources of data surfaced. For instance, reading newspaper accounts of various institutions or events led to searching county records to corroborate those events. Often after researching newspaper and county records, more intelligent questions could be addressed to interviewees with the result that more information was obtained. This is comparable to the process of snowballing which is (Bailey, 1982) used in observational research and community studies.

CHAPTER IV.
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF FRASER AS AN ECONOMIC OPERATION

The Center and the Periphery

The town of Fraser, Iowa, did not indigenously develop. It did not develop as a trade center or as a transportation and distribution hub. It did not develop out of a need for a post office, church, or school, to serve a farming region.

In the late nineteenth century, the forces of industrialism were being felt in Iowa. The industrial revolution had created an ever growing need for fuel and coal was the primary fuel for that time. Fraser was built to supply that coal. The coal was primarily for metropolitan use and for transportation needs between metropolises. Built to extract coal, the primary purpose of Fraser was to make a profit for its owners.

This chapter will show that the town of Fraser was developed and controlled by external interests. That external control was exhibited on two levels. Fraser was ultimately controlled by interests in the center, St. Paul, Minnesota. James J. Hill, the original owner of the coal fields where Fraser was built, held notes on the mining operation in and railroad built to Fraser from St. Paul. As Harvey (1980) pointed out, often the center is able to control the periphery through the extension of credit and the resultant debt servicing when the periphery cannot make the payments. In this way, Hill controlled

Browne who was unable to keep up with his payments from the beginning. The first part of this chapter develops the relationship between Hill and Browne, which led to the building of Fraser and Hill's control of Browne.

Hamilton Browne was the link between the periphery and the center, functioning for the interests of the center. In the local economy, everything from employment in the mines, housing, and store was structured for the profit of the company. Inevitably, the miners' lives were largely controlled by Browne and, in turn, Hill. All major economic areas of life were involved. Browne profited on the miners in their production or labor and on their consumption in housing and goods in the company store. In this way, external economic control was a central feature of Fraser and the miners' experience in Fraser. External economic control was the reason for founding Fraser and was structured into its basic existence from the beginning.

This external control constituted a vertical tie of the very sort that Warren (1972) considered the artifact of twentieth-century communities. Indeed, it was a striking example of the control of a peripheral area for extraction of minerals by a center, much as the analysis of Frank (1975) delineated. That external domination led to a dissimilarity of interests between the center, St. Paul, Minnesota, and the periphery, Fraser, Iowa. As Galtung (1980) noted, this was what led to the necessity of the center controlling the periphery. Fraser was controlled so that the dissimilar interests could be maintained both by

the center, James J. Hill, as well as the link to the center, Hamilton Browne.

Hamilton Browne and James Jerome Hill

Fraser was built by the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company in the fall of 1893, by the corporation's President, Hamilton Browne. Browne's coal mining interest led him to form ties with James J. Hill.

James Jerome Hill One of the most powerful American capitalists of the late nineteenth century was James Jerome Hill. He was called "America's foremost railroad builder" (Grant, 1982:373). David Mountfield called him, "...the last great empire builder" (1979:159). He was "...best remembered for turning the woebegone St. Paul and Pacific Railroad into the giant, efficient, and enormously profitable Great Northern System" (Grant, 1982 :373).

Hill's interest in Iowa was for coal. By 1876, he had "...been for many years the leading fuel merchant in St. Paul" (Nute, n.d:10). He was planning a takeover of the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, and may well have anticipated coal needs for railroad use (Nute:n.d.). In time, he would own two Iowa railroads; the Sioux City and Northern, and the Mason City and Fort Dodge Railroad (Grant, 1982). The latter served the two Iowa towns of Coalville and Lehigh in Webster County, where Hill held coal mining interests (Grant, 1982). Hill invested in a number of properties in central Iowa in search of coal. These were located in both Boone and Webster Counties (Grant, 1982). In his

coal mining interests in Iowa, Hill was closely allied with an Iowa native, Hamilton Browne.

Hamilton Browne Hamilton Browne's father, John Browne, was a Federal Land Commissioner. He also worked as an agent for the River Lands Company, a land speculation company owned by E.C. Litchfield, of London and New York (Nute, n.d.: Martin, 1976). One of the Litchfields, E. Darwin Litchfield, formed a corporation with Hill for railroading in Minnesota (Nute, n.d.). It was in this way that John Browne's son, Hamilton Browne, came to be close friends with James Hill.

In 1878, Hamilton Browne and Hill joined others in forming the Iowa Coal Land and Mineral Prospecting Company. Hamilton Browne became Hill's key Iowa operative (Nute, n.d.:8). By 1877, Browne was running a coal mining operation near Ft. Dodge, Iowa, for Hill (Martin:1976). Since Hill's Iowa Properties were close to St. Paul and Hill's railroad interests, Hill hoped to develop them into a reliable and cost effective source of coal. This also led Hill into his involvement in railroading in Iowa, so he could transport his own coal (Martin, 1976).

Hill did not have the time to devote to direct oversight of the Iowa Properties and he apparently trusted Browne a great deal. Grace Nute states that Hill:

not only backed Browne financially, but also got his most important friends, such as Richard B. Angus, Lord Mount Stephen, John S. Kennedy, D. Willis James, and Samuel Thorne, to invest heavily in some or all of the Browne companies (Nute, n.d.:8-9).

Hill owned Iowa Properties referred to as Lehigh, Clyde, Pilot Mound, and Coal Valley which he incorporated into the Clyde Coal Company some time around 1884 (Nute, n.d.:11-12). Martin (1976:233) notes that:

He invited just about everyone to join in opening more mines, including George Stephen and he lent some money to Browne, and to E.N. Saunders, his former partner in the fuel business, so that they could pay for their shares of the stock. By 1884 he valued his own holding in Iowa coal properties at \$400,000.

It is the coal fields known as the Pilot Mound fields that are the subject of this study. The town that was built in the Pilot Mound coal fields was Fraser, Iowa.

Decision to develop the Pilot Mound Coal Fields

Initially, James Hill had intended to sell his portion of the Iowa Properties now held in the Clyde Coal Company. Apparently, he had gained very little profit in their earlier mining efforts on that property. Hill had instructed Browne to sell the Clyde property as early as 1891 (Browne to Hill, Aug. 22, 1892). Browne complained that all the buyers who had been interested were apprehensive since Hill wanted to sell all the properties. Potential buyers thought that it must mean there was something wrong with those properties. Browne suggested that Hill could retain half interest in the properties until they could be made profitable at which time he could easily sell the final half. Hill was unwilling (Browne to Hill, July 15, 1892). He was putting pressure on Hamilton Browne to get the property sold so Browne could repay Hill what Hill had advanced Browne thus far in the

project. Browne was unable to make his obligations to Hill at this point and, as had always been the case, was dependent on Hill for a way to get out of his trouble (Browne to Hill, Aug. 20, 1892). In 1892, he repeatedly asked Hill to allow him to develop the Pilot Mound Fields and interests at Lehigh. While Hill developed Lehigh himself, where he already had railroad ownership, he made it possible for Browne to develop the Pilot Mound Fields.

In December 1892, Hill agreed to allow Browne to purchase the 1,140 acres in the Pilot Mound fields and the mining equipment from Hill's unprofitable Coal Valley mine in Webster County. Browne would have to come up with between \$35,000 and \$50,000 for the down payment on the purchase price of \$140,000 (Browne to Stephen, Dec. 19, 1892; Browne to Hill, Dec. 19, 1892). For this purpose, Browne would form a corporation to raise the needed down payment. Hill would not be a part of this corporation directly. Browne had already assured him, however, that Hill could choose several of the officers in the company and they would retain Oscar M. Carpenter who was the former superintendent of the Clyde Coal Company under Hill and Browne (Browne to Hill, July 15, 1892). Hill could sell the Pilot Mound Fields and continue to control them. Essentially, Hill and Browne had a holding company. This arrangement allowed Hill to maintain control of Browne's company by holding security in that company. The fact that Hill did maintain control is more than confirmed by Browne's continual correspondence to Hill following that purchase (Nute, n.d.). Browne made few decisions

before or after his forming a corporation without Hill's express approval. If Browne did make a decision that Hill perceived as adverse to his own interests, Browne was immediately confronted with the matter and made quick amends. Browne kept up his almost daily correspondence with Hill until 1901 when Hill sold the remainder of the Iowa Properties to his "...long-time friend and colleague, A. B. Stickney, head of the Chicago Great Western Railway" (Grant, 1982:374).

On February 23, 1893, Hill and Browne signed an agreement whereby Hill agreed to sell Browne 1,140 acres in the Pilot Mound Coal Fields for \$140,000 (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway to Minneapolis Trust Co., Nov. 15, 1893, Browne to Hill, Feb. 8, 1893), or \$123 per acre. Browne would later claim, in a moment of anger, that he paid over twice what these fields were worth. It was the highest price by far he paid for land, indeed twice what he paid for some mining land (Browne to Toomey, Dec. 16, 1898). The mortgage was not signed until November 15, 1893, so Browne would have enough time to make the necessary improvements on the property.

The agreement was that Browne would take the \$35,000 to \$50,000 he could raise for a down-payment and put it into improvements on the Pilot Mound Fields and townsite of Fraser, all of which would be secured in the mortgage (Browne to Hill, Dec. 19, 1892). The mortgage was held by the Minneapolis Trust Company of which Samuel Hill, James J. Hill's son-in-law, was president (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to Minneapolis Trust Co., Nov. 11, 1893; Martin, 1976).

Significantly, Browne continued his correspondence, not with Samuel Hill or the Minneapolis Trust Company, but with James J. Hill. The terms of the mortgage allowed foreclosure of the property and all its improvements in the Pilot Mound Fields, in case of thirty days failure to pay off bonds when due. Foreclosure of those properties and improvements would have been foreclosure of essentially all of the holdings of the Boone Valley Coal and Railroad Company.

Not only did the mortgage allow for foreclosure, but it allowed for the Minneapolis Trust Company to appoint someone to run the holdings of the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, and use the rents and profits to pay off the indebtedness until such time as a sale could take place (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to Minneapolis Trust Co., Nov. 11, 1893). Significantly, Hamilton Browne was not able to meet the terms of the mortgage, and wrote to Hill on numerous occasions asking for protection from foreclosure (Browne to Hill, April 12, 1894; May 7, 1894; July 20, 1894; Oct. 20, 1894; Oct. 23, 1894; Browne to Stephen, May 13, 1894; May 14, 1894; May 17, 1894; Browne to Ward, Mar. 3, 1895; Browne to Healion, July 22, 1895; Oct. 5, 1895; July 1, 1897; Browne to Toomey, Feb. 24, 1898; Dec. 16, 1898). This must have been a tremendous card in Hill's hand. Browne had also purchased from Hill another part of the Clyde properties, known as the Milford Fields and was in arrears on payments for this purchase from time to time (Browne to Stephen, Feb. 10, 1894). Browne was at Hill's disposal. It seems that foreclosure was seriously threatened by Hill's

attorneys in 1898 (Browne to Toomey, Dec. 16, 1898; Toomey to Browne, Aug. 23, 1899). It may have been averted when Browne borrowed \$40,000 to catch up on payments and make improvements in the company, from the Illinois Trust and Savings Bank (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to Illinois Trust and Savings Co., Dec. 1, 1898).

The Local Economy on the Periphery

The Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company and the early economic operation of Fraser

Mining As soon as Hamilton Browne had signed his initial agreement with James Hill for the development of the Pilot Mound Fields, he began to solidify complete control of mining interests in the rest of the surrounding area. At the same time, the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company was incorporated. To raise the needed down-payment for the purchase of the Pilot Mound Fields from Hill, Browne needed between \$35,000 and \$50,000 to be put into improvements on the property.

Browne initially intended to come up with \$50,000. He had contacted D. R. Fraser and Norman D. Fraser, of the firm; Fraser and Chalmers, machinery manufacturers in Chicago, who agreed to \$20,000 (Boone County Republican, Oct. 31, 1894; Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). William Messervey, President of the First National Bank of Ft. Dodge, agreed to \$5,000 (Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). Herman A.

Uhl agreed to \$5,000 (Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). J. H. Strong and F. M. Gage agreed to jointly contribute \$5,000 (Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). Hamilton and Mary Browne would each contribute \$5,000 (Browne to Stephen, Je. 15, 1893). This would give D. R. Fraser 4/10ths control and Hamilton and Mary Brown 2/10ths control. As it turned out, Uhl, Strong and Gage backed out, and D. R. Fraser picked up their shares to hold 6/10ths control (Boone to Hill, Oct. 31, 1893; D. R. and N. D. Fraser to Hill, Nov. 14, 1893). Browne had \$45,000 of the expected \$50,000 (Articles of Incorporation, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Corporation, Feb. 16, 1893).

While he was obtaining subscribers for his new corporation, Browne also was in the process of obtaining control of mining rights in the area. Earlier, a mine had already been in operation on the Zunkel family property (BCR., Sept. 13, 1893). Browne made agreements with both A. W. and Margaret Zunkel in the summer of 1893 to lease and purchase mining rights for that mine on 260 acres of land, as well as purchase five acres of surface land (Agreement, A. W. Zunkel and Browne, Aug. 21, 1893; Margaret Zunkel to Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co., Jl. 1, 1893). He also purchased 29 acres from Henry Ehlers, and five acres from John Peterson (Henry Ehlers to Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co., Jl. 2, 1893; John Peterson and Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co., Aug. 29, 1893).

His purchase of mineral rights cost him between \$40 and \$100 per acre. If he purchased all he agreed to in this particular mine, the

Zunkel mine, he would have spent nearly \$6,500 for the mining rights and land to begin mining. This mine was about one-half mile north of Fraser on the opposite side of the Des Moines River. Hamilton Browne's land purchased from James J. Hill, the Pilot Mound Fields, was directly to the west of Fraser across the river. A mine was opened here in late 1893 also. It was to these two mines that the first railroad spur was built in 1893. It was a three-mile spur to the Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad, running between Dayton and Ogden, Iowa. At Dayton, the Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad connected with the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, to whom Hamilton Browne expected to sell most of the coal from the Fraser mines (Browne to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892; Poor's Manual of Railroads, 1895, #28:1374).

Browne also bought half interest in the Mineral Ridge Coal Company, which owned 1,300 acres on the east or Fraser side of the Des Moines River to the north of Fraser (BCR, Sept. 13, 1893). Most of this would not be mined until much later.

Since the initial mines would be the old Zunkel mine and the newly opened mine on the land directly across the Des Moines River from Fraser, the miners would have to cross the river to go to work.

By late September, 1893, Browne was laying track on his three miles of railroad from his two mines to the Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad (Browne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893). He was getting the track from the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, with the intention of paying for it in coal (Browne to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892). He had sunk the

shaft for the first mine and had purchased the Zunkel mine and was nearing readiness to produce coal (Browne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893). He had purchased the machinery for the #1 mine; the stationary steam engine, boiler, and topworks for about \$4,000 from the Clyde Coal Company mine at Coalville in Webster County; now closed by Hill (Browne to Hill, Apr. 23, 1894). He was more than pleased with both #1 and #2 mines. By April of 1894, he planned to begin digging on #3, just to the south of #1. Number 3 mine proved to be excellent, with a seam of 3'8" in thickness (Browne to Stephen, Feb. 10, 1894).

Building a company town While the opening of mines in a remote place, or relatively remote place by nineteenth-century standards, necessitated providing some kind of housing and stores. The typical pattern in company towns was to structure that necessity into a profitable virtue. In every way the economic structuring of the company town was intended to bring profit to the owner.

Hamilton Browne fully intended to profit on all aspects of the miners' economic existence. In housing, it mattered little whether the miner chose to build or rent. Hamilton Browne stood to profit handsomely either way, through property sales or through house rents. If Browne sold the property, he maintained mining rights so that what was most valuable, the coal, stayed in his control. If the miner did choose to buy, they were less capable of protest by strike or geographical relocation. If they had a house in the community, they were more strongly tied to the community. If they chose to rent a

company house, Browne profited on their rent and could evict them if they became unionized or struck. By building a company store that dominated the business sector and buying out the competition, he profited on the consumption needs of the miners and their families. If other businesses wished, they could purchase land and build in Fraser. Business lots were especially profitable to Browne at their higher prices. If the business was a failure, Browne had profited on the sale of land to a failed competitor. If the business was a success, Browne bought out the competition. By maintaining control over the business sector through the company store, Browne could assure himself of profiting on the miners' necessities. Thus, building the company town was a necessity for which the owner could be thankful.

The townsite Having secured the mining rights that he needed, Hamilton Browne had a partial section of land in the southwest corner of Dodge Township, Boone County, platted into town lots for a town to be known as Fraser, in September, 1893 (Goldthwaite, n.d.). He purchased the platted land from C.J.A. Erickson (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to C.J.A. Erickson, Sept. 21, 1893). Erickson was an early resident of Boone County, who had made some of his money on a general merchandise store in Dodge Township at Mineral Ridge and later in a store in Boone, Iowa. He was one of the organizers of the First National Bank in Boone and also an Iowa State Senator (Goldthwaite, n.d.). Browne had earlier planned on building Fraser on land owned by Hill in the Pilot Mound Fields (Browne

to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892; Jl. 22, 1895). It may be that Erickson was planning to start another store and sell town lots to miners, and Browne bought out his first competition. Such an explanation may answer the question of why Browne built Fraser across the river from the mines.

The original plat for Fraser had 70 blocks, the northern 35 blocks having ten lots to the block and the southern 35 blocks having 12 lots to the block (Boone County Platte Book, 1896). Given the irregularity of some blocks, due to river frontage, there was a total of 683 lots. The uppermost two tiers of blocks were on the flat topside of the bluff to the Des Moines River Valley. The next tier of blocks descended steeply to meet the main street of the town, Bruce Street, on the fourth and relatively flat tier running through the center of Fraser. From there, the land dropped to the flood plain. All along the River, the lower tier on the west and the lower three tiers of blocks on the south lay on a flood plain. Flooding would be a perennial concern in the spring when the ice broke loose.

A slight creek ran through the eastern part of the town. Like most of the valley along the Des Moines River, Fraser had many beautiful, if somewhat scrubby, trees. Given its proximity to the River and its wooded hillside, the town was much more pleasant than many of the Iowa coal camps (cf. Schwieder, 1983).

In 1897, an additional 144 acres was purchased from C.J.A. Erickson. It had been platted as the First Addition to Fraser (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to C.J.A. Erickson, Aug. 2, 1897). The First Addition had 30 blocks and 119 lots. Many of the lots were nearly as large as full blocks in the original plat.

The town was laid out on a rectangular grid running north and south. It had a large main street, Bruce Street, running east and west. It also had a large road running along the flood plain called River Road.

Browne purchased the original townsite of Fraser from C.J.A. Erickson for \$8,443 (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to C.J.A. Erickson, Sept. 21, 1893). The townsite was nearly 200 acres, and the purchase included approximately 144 additional unplatted acres. The First Addition to Fraser of nearly 120 acres was purchased for \$2,065 (Mortgage, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to C.J.A. Erickson, Aug. 2, 1897). By subtracting the 144 unplatted acres of the original purchase from Erickson, from the total of 344 acres which Browne purchased for \$8,443, it is apparent that the original townsite accounted for 58% of that purchase or a cost of \$4,897. Browne told Hill that he expected to sell the town lots for \$50,000, a sum that would have meant roughly a 900% profit (Browne to Hill, Jl. 15, 1892). It was not clear how many years he expected to take to sell all the lots. If Browne would have sold his 683 original lots at an average of \$73.21 each, he would have realized his \$50,000.

Browne did not quickly sell all the town lots. Given his cash flow problem, it is unclear why he did not. Unless he had a change of strategy, it is apparent that people, most generally miners, could not afford to buy town lots. From 1893 through 1901, the Boone County plat records show that Browne sold \$18,336 in property in the townsite of Fraser. This was inclusive of lots sold in the First Addition to Fraser from 1897 through 1901. This addition included approximately 117 lots. Of these, 92 were in the original plat of Fraser. In every case, he sold the property but reserved the mineral rights for himself. The \$18,336 included \$2,205 for 25 lots out of 119 lots in the First Addition to Fraser. This more than covered the amount of \$2,065 which Browne paid Erickson for the First Addition.

The balance of the \$18,336 which Browne sold from 1893 through 1901, or \$16,131, was paid for 92 lots in the original plat. However, this figure is somewhat inflated since many of the lots had buildings on them when Browne sold them. The buildings accounted for about \$5,600 of this amount, leaving \$10,531 as the amount Browne received for the lots during this time. Of this, \$5,730 was for business lots, which generally sold for \$300 each, and \$4,801 was for residential lots that generally sold for about \$50 to \$75 each. So Browne was able to sell \$10,531 worth of town lots in the original plat of Fraser which was shown above to have cost him \$4,897, showing at least 100% profit by the end of 1901. However, this is still a bit inflated, since

William Messervey, one of the major shareholders in the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, had purchased 20 residential lots for \$2,000, and the Fraser Supply Company; a company composed of officers in the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, had purchased three business lots for \$900. Subtracting these figures would bring the amount that Browne had received from outside sources for lots in the original plat of Fraser to \$7,631 by the end of 1901, on an initial investment for that land of \$4,897. He still had 591 of his 683 lots left to sell. He had sold only 13.5% of the original plat by this time.

While it appears that Browne did not realize the profit he had anticipated on the sale of town lots, he did maintain some cash flow through such sales, and he did realize a sizeable return on his investment as early as 1901.

Apparently, it was not too difficult to attract initial business entrepreneurs. In the final three months of 1893, when Browne first built Fraser, he was able to sell more than 11 business lots and three residential lots for a total of \$3,680. These were sold to at least 12 different business persons. But Browne also wanted to profit on retailing. He would build a company store.

The company store From the time of his first negotiations with James J. Hill regarding the purchase of the Pilot Mound Fields, Browne intended to build a company store in Fraser. He told Hill that "...the houses and store are good for at least \$10,000 annually..." (Browne to Hill, J1. 15, 1892). The structure for the company store

was completed by early November 1893 (Browne to Hill, Oct. 31, 1893; Photograph of Fraser, Iowa, Oct. 14, 1893). Browne had the store insured for \$600 value (Browne to Hill, April 23, 1894). There are no records to show the value of the initial inventory.

From the beginning, Hamilton Browne allowed others to purchase land to build stores and other businesses. This may well have been related to his early cash flow problems. He needed to sell as many of the town lots as possible. But Browne was also quick to buy out his competition if they did not leave by choice. In October 1895, M.P. Peterson opened a grocery store in Fraser, after previously showing some success in that business at Mineral Ridge (BCR, Oct. 16, 1895). Peterson left Fraser within five months saying that "...business was somewhat dull at Fraser" (BCR, March 4, 1896). Another competitor, C.E. Bailey had built a store on the same block as the company store in March 1894 (Boone Co. Plat Records). This store was originally a hardware and grocery store. In April 1896, Bailey sold his grocery supplies to the company store and remained selling hardware only (BCD, April 24, 1896).

Both of these cases were part of a concerted effort on the part of the company to make the company store a profitable venture. However, they first had to overcome an Iowa law that forbade coal companies to own company stores (Grant, 1982). Browne got around the law by having a separate corporation, The Fraser Supply Company, organized November 20, 1895 (Articles of Incorporation, Fraser Supply Co.). But

the Fraser Supply Company had three of the corporate owners of the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company, Hamilton Browne, Norman D. Fraser, and William Messervey, as its board of directors (Art. of Inc.; Grant, 1982).

It is doubtful that the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company ever directly coerced the miners to trade there. However, in 1897, striking miners charged that the Fraser Supply Company had stamped out all competition, a situation they found incomprehensible for a town so large as Fraser (BCD, J1. 16, 1897). Browne replied to the charge by saying that the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company did not own the Fraser Supply Store and that:

"...no employee of the company is required or has ever been asked to trade at the Fraser Supply Store; that less than one-half of the employees do their trading at that store: that the prices asked for goods at the Fraser Supply Store are as low as prices at Boone for the same quality of supplies; that the Company in no way opposes any one wishing to operate a store of any kind at Fraser" (BCD, J1. 16, 1897).

It was true that others did supply miners' needs. Every payday the town would fill with peddlers (BCD, Feb. 19, 1897). It was probably only the law that prevented Browne from requiring his employees in the mines to purchase at the company store. He was not above requiring others who worked for him to be paid from the company store. In 1897, Browne informed Hill of what he was having to pay suppliers for mine timbers and props. He went on to say:

We have been able to buy all the props we need at the Jan. price and very many at the present price, and always payable in goods at the store. If you could make an arrangement at

Lehigh to get your props payable in goods, of course, it would be a big lift for the store (Browne to Hill, May 20, 1897).

Browne used coupons in place of scrip, which was illegal, as early as 1895 (Nute, n.d.). Scrip was being used in 1907 immediately after Browne sold the railroad to the Fort Dodge, Des Moines, and Southern Railway (BCR, Dec. 5, 1907). This had the predictable effect of driving a competing grocery business out of town (BCR, Dec. 5, 1907). The company store provided the dually profitable role of limiting the workers consuming choices and eliminating the competition. In November 1898, the Fraser Supply Company purchased the store from the Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company. It was now a large building of approximately 75 ft. by 120 ft., having three lots of land. They purchased it for \$4,600 (Deed, Nov. 1, 1898). If the three lots of land were worth about \$900 total, we can assume that the store building and inventory must have been valued at about \$3,700.

Company Housing Hamilton Browne had initially intended to build 50 company houses (BCR, Sept, 13, 1893). He must have found housing to be a worthwhile investment, for he and his associates had nearly 100 houses by 1905. When he first built Fraser in October 1893, he put up 25 company houses. They were wood frame construction built on a foundation of eight or ten strategically placed large stones (Photograph, Ferrari interview). Mary Sebring, whose parents lived in the company housing in Fraser at the turn of the century, recalls their telling of snow blowing through the walls and seeing earth through the

warped floorboards. She tells that some were built on such a steep grade that the front part of the house was placed on stilts (Sebring interview). They were cheaply constructed. Browne was required by his investors to purchase fire insurance for these 25 houses. He found this nearly impossible to do, given their cheap construction (Browne to Hill, Feb. 2, 1894). When he was able to find an insurer, he insured the 25 houses for a total value of \$3,750, or \$150 per house (Browne to Hill, April 23, 1894). Again the insurance was annulled in 1895 (Browne to Hill, Feb. 12, 1895).

In 1896, William Messervey, one of Browne's investors, purchased 20 lots for \$2,000, twice the going rate (Warranty Deed, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to W.D. Messervey, Apr. 16, 1896). Messervey had 20 houses moved on to these lots in April (BCD, Apr. 10, 1896). The location was the lowest flood plain in Fraser. Did they choose to locate company housing here because there was little hope of selling these lots to those wishing to build private housing?

From 1897 to 1899, a large contingent of blacks was brought to Fraser as strikebreakers. Hamilton Browne informed Hill that he was constructing a number of houses for the black miners that he was bringing in (Browne to Healion, Sept. 19, 1897). Apparently, these houses were built in the southeast part of the original plat of Fraser (BCD, Feb. 3, 1899; BCD, April 21, 1899). This was also a flood plain.

The next major contingent of company houses was built in 1903 after Browne had sold the company to the Newton and Northwestern Railroad Company. They built 40 houses and had them moved to Fraser (BCD, Apr. 17, 1903). It was a time of Fraser's largest growth. By 1905, it would be difficult to find a place to rent in Fraser (BCD, Mar. 6, 1905).

Expectations and realities It is difficult to know for sure what Hamilton Browne expected to make in his new enterprise, given the limitations of historical documents. The same is true in the matter of knowing how much coal he really produced and at what price. Still, there is a fair collection of documents that help to reconstruct what seems a meaningful part of the Fraser story; the profitability of mining for Hamilton Browne.

In trying to sell the idea of opening up the Pilot Mound Fields to James Hill in 1892, Hamilton Browne told him that he had talked to officials of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad and that they would take 200,000 tons annually from him (Browne to Hill, J1,15, 1892). In conversation with his superintendent, Mr. Carpenter, he fully expected to be able to profit on this by \$.40 per ton. Out of this \$.40 per ton he would have paid for the land at \$.10 per ton in royalties (Browne to Hill, J1. 15, 1892). That would have left him \$20,000 invested in the company and \$60,000 profit yearly. Those projections may have well been exaggerated when one remembers that his investors only produced \$45,000 to make the down-payment on the company. A \$60,000 annual re-

turn on an investment of \$45,000 would be 133 percent annual return. This is not to infer that the Fraser mines were unproductive. They were not productive as quickly as Browne had anticipated, but they were productive. Together with Brown's Milford Fields, they were producing 1/3 of the coal for Boone County in 1905, the county's total production being nearly 422,000 tons (State Mine Inspection, Biennial Report, 1905). However, productivity of the mines were based on more than one factor. It could be restricted by poor markets and by labor difficulties. It was inhibited by both in the mid-1890s.

Browne had no sooner signed the papers to buy the Pilot Mound Fields when he found himself in the economic depression of 1893. He lost three of his initial investors and found that the remaining investors had little cash and had to sign notes for most of the money (Browne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893). This set him back in his first year because he could not build his railroad or open his mines until he had funds for improvements. His mines had only opened when his first major installment on his loan came due and he was unable to pay on time (Browne to Hill, Sept. 30, 1893; Oct. 31, 1893). The Depression, would have other effects besides restricting the money supply. It affected the market for coal and the price of labor.

In the years from 1893 to 1903, the mines in Boone County worked an average of 199 days per year (Madsen, 1980). This ranged from 150 days in 1897 to 225 days in 1899. The labor contracts came up for

negotiation in April (Browne to Hill, Apr. 12, 1894) and the railroad contracts were negotiated in May. The interests of the railroads and the miners were in conflict at that time of year.

In May of 1894, Browne received his first contract with the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad for the Boone Valley Coal and Railway mines at Fraser (Browne to Stephen, May 17, 1894). In that month, the miners also went on strike (Browne to Stephen, May 7, 1894). His contract called for delivery of between 525 and 975 tons of coal daily (Browne to Hill, J1. 20, 1894). Given an average of 199 workdays for the year, he might have expected to deliver between 105,000 tons of coal and 194,000 tons for the year following. The expectation would have been greater if we calculated on the basis of possible workdays, rather than the average. In the 12 months from May, 1894, to April, 1895, they produced 33,116 tons of lump coal (Browne to Hill, Pilot Mound Field, 1895). Browne's calculations noted that Fraser usually produced an additional 11% lower grade "steam coal" besides their lump coal (Browne to Healion, Oct. 30, 1896). Thus, we might assume that they produced 36,759 total tons of coal for the contract year. This was 18.4 percent of Brown's expected 200,000 tons per year. Figure 2 shows the production of lump coal for the 17 months from the opening of the mines in December 1893, until April 1895, inclusive (Browne to Hill, Pilot Mound Fields, 1895). In the highest month, they produced only 3,876 tons of lump coal. In their worst month, May 1894, they produced only 360 tons as the result of a strike. The average of those

shows the production of lump coal for the 17 months from the opening of the mines in December 1893, until April 1895, inclusive (Browne to Hill, Pilot Mound Fields, 1895). In the highest month, they produced only 3,876 tons of lump coal. In their worst month, May 1894, they produced only 360 tons as the result of a strike. The average of those 17 months was 2,328 tons per month. Even adjusting this upward 11 percent for steam coal, it was only 15.5 percent of Browne's expected monthly production of 16,666 tons, or 200,000 tons annually.

In the years that followed, production and profits, while probably improving steadily, were still dismally below his earlier projections. Browne complained that in 1894 he had been forced to take a \$.20 per ton cut in his projection of \$.40 per ton profit, losing one-half of his profits. In June of 1895, he wrote Hill, "I do not know yet whether our men went to work at Fraser this A.M. or not" (Browne to Healion, Je. 17, 1895). In October, they began a three-month work slowdown to four days per week, in sympathy to other striking miners in the region (Browne to Healion, Oct. 5, 1895). In April, 1896, he noted that they were only shipping 14 cars of coal from Fraser daily, half of what they should be. They only shipped 4,288 tons for April (Browne to Healion, Apr. 18, 1896; Browne to Clyde Coal Co., May 7, 1896). The next month the new railroad contract cut their previous year's contract in half (Browne to Hill, May 7, 1896). In the fall, the men were idle about one-fourth of the time (Browne to Healion, Dec. 6, 1896). Browne was delivering coal to rail connections in Ogden for \$1.60 per ton. He




Figure 2. Boone Valley Coal and Railway lump coal production figure

noted that it had cost him \$1.30 in the car at Fraser, and that allowing \$.10 to \$.15 to transport it to Ogden, he was only making \$.15 to \$.20 per ton (Browne to Healion, Dec. 6, 1896). At contract renewal time in May, he would see the worst strike in Fraser's history. The men would be out for five months (Browne to Healion, Apr. 8, 1897). A year later in December 1897, he was shipping a large tonnage of 400 tons daily, but noted that he could sell 800 tons (Browne to Healion, Dec. 5, 1897). In January of 1898, he sold almost no coal because the weather was so warm that people were not buying coal for domestic purposes (Browne to Toomey, Feb. 24, 1898). Again in August 1899, the miners struck (Browne to Toomey, Sept. 22, 1899). It was not until late 1899 that prices had risen to a fairly profitable rate of \$2.25 per ton (Browne to Toomey, Dec. 30, 1899). From 1893 to 1899, Hamilton Browne had been behind on most of his payments. It was in December 1898 that Hill's attorneys counseled him to seriously consider foreclosure (Browne to Toomey, Dec. 16, 1898). Hamilton Browne refinanced the company through other sources and paid his debt to Hill. The fact that Browne had failed to meet his obligations to Hill for so long was not a sign that Browne did not profit on Fraser. It simply meant that it took longer to do so.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the shape of the external control of Fraser, that gave rise to building and controlling the economic life of Fraser has been described. In the process, the fact of external control, an example of what Warren (1972) would see as horizontal ties, was apparent in Fraser from its inception. It was external economic interests that were the very reason for the existence of Fraser. Contrary to Warren (1972), the vertical ties were the dominant factor in Fraser from the beginning.

For this reason, this chapter has been developed to show that the building of Fraser was an example of the phenomenon described in center and periphery theory. Interests at the center, James J. Hill of St. Paul, Minnesota, controlled the smaller capital interests, Hamilton Browne, the owner of Fraser, Iowa. Hill controlled Browne through debt servicing on the credit given Browne to build Fraser. Browne controlled Fraser on the local level for profits on the miner's production in labor as well as consumption in housing and goods in the company store. While Browne was unable to meet his credit obligations on time, he still profited greatly from the mines, houses, and stores in Fraser. It took him longer than expected, but he ultimately paid off Hill and made good for himself. In all economic facets of community life, Fraser was built for the profits of the center and controlled in the interests of the center. It was a community on the periphery.

This chapter has delineated the economic structures of that community life. The next chapter will develop the shape of the population in Fraser that was a result of the external control of that community. The population of Fraser developed as a result of the external forces that built Fraser for mining coal and controlled that population in many respects.

CHAPTER V. THE SHAPE OF AN EXTERNALLY CONTROLLED POPULATION

Since Fraser was built in 1893 for the interests of investors from St. Paul and Chicago, it is not surprising that the population of Fraser would reflect this external control. The population of Fraser was recruited, and the composition of this population and its geographic mobility were related to external control.

This chapter will look at the character of the Fraser population over time as a result of the external development and control of that community. If one views Fraser as a system with population inputs and population outputs, a few suggestions concerning the effects of external control on a population would be in order.

The population inputs were not local but distant. More accurately, much of the population came most recently from nearby Fraser before coming to Fraser. Almost half of the population had recent European ethnic roots, and in 1900, over one-fifth of the population were blacks.

When the white workers organized for better wages, black strikebreakers from the South were recruited. This chapter deals with that process, the labor disputes that preceded it, and the results of recruiting strikebreakers.

Labor unrest and poor living conditions also led to a specific population output. The mobility of the Fraser population was extreme. This was orchestrated by the owners. Workers who had few long-range

ties to a community would often leave when work conditions were unbearable, rather than unionize. Blacks were used as strikebreakers when convenient and nearly as quickly discarded when their task of union-breaking was done. In the process, the whole population, whites and blacks, made major turnovers.

The gender and age composition of Fraser reflected that the community was dominated by one occupation, coal mining. The industry needed young adult males. Workers with families were also advantageous to the owners since they would rent company houses and buy goods in greater quantity at the company store.

The housing conditions in Fraser appear to have changed over time. They were much more crowded in the earliest years. This was confirmed in the fact that taking boarders and boardinghouses were common in the first two censuses, 1895 and 1900, but these completely disappeared by 1910.

The availability of housing had greatly increased by 1910. The rate of private home ownership also greatly increased by 1910. This corresponded with what appears to have been a policy by the company to begin dumping houses by 1910, in an effort to get rid of its houses before the coal was depleted. Significantly, blacks were recruited for a specific purpose, strikebreaking, and they almost never owned homes. No blacks owned a home in 1900.

The occupational structure of the town was overwhelmingly weighted towards coal mining. Even those in the retail business and service

sector of the economy were most likely to be employed by the coal company. Women were first employed in taking in boarders. This provided both financial help and a place for single men to live in the initial housing shortage. When women no longer took in boarders, because of increased housing, they began to appear in other occupations.

Throughout this chapter, the effects of external development and control of this community will be seen. This will provide a fleshed-out view of life on the periphery.

Origins of the Population

Fraser was built in Dodge Township, and it would be reasonable to ask if the Fraser population was recruited from that township. It was not. The 1890 Federal Census was destroyed in a fire. A search of the 1885 State Census shows that only two families living in the Township then were later residents of Fraser. One continued to be a farming family with mining as a supplementary occupation. The Fraser population did not originate in Dodge Township. The population was brought in to mine coal.

U.S. state and regional origins

Not all of the population of Fraser were European immigrants. Nearly all of Fraser's population was brought in from a source external to the township, but not necessarily foreigners. For the years 1900, and 1905, between 39.9 percent and 54.0 percent of the population were not European immigrants, nor children of immigrant parents.

The composite population for the three census periods from 1900 through 1910, shows 51.8 percent of the Fraser population were neither European immigrants nor children of immigrant parents (Table 8).

It has been demonstrated that the population of Fraser was brought in from sources external to the township and that around 50 percent of these were not European immigrants. These came to Fraser from other places in the United States including Iowa. The origin of this population, including blacks, will be analyzed.

In 1900, 634 or 83.8 percent were born in the United States, even though 39.9 percent were European ethnics and their children. This means that a number of Europeans were born in the United States before coming to Fraser. The 386 persons born in Iowa in 1900 comprised 60.9 percent of the 684 persons born in the United States (Table 2). These 386 persons constituted 51.0 percent of all Fraser residents in 1900. Of those born in the United States, exclusive of those born in Iowa, three factors are most highly correlated with the states from which the Fraser population was drawn: 1) contiguity, 2) coal mining regions, and 3) black racial origins. States bordering Iowa, states with large coal mining populations, and southern states with large black populations accounted for the place of birth of 86.7 percent of the Fraser residents in 1900.

Table 3 shows the birthplace of all the Fraser population born in the United States in 1900, exclusive of Iowa. The largest grouping

(27.0%) came from two states contiguous to Iowa which had large coal mining populations: Illinois (14.5%), and Missouri (12.5%). Another 12.1 percent originated in Indiana. Of those from Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana, over half (55 out of 97, or 56.7%) were black. The blacks were recruited in 1897 in Illinois and Missouri. A contingent of those born outside Iowa, but in the United States, came from Ohio (4.8%), and Pennsylvania (9.3%). These were all white persons. All but three persons from the southern and eastern states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama were black. Eighty-three people, or 33.5 percent of those born in the United States outside Iowa in 1900, were from these states, including, 53 persons came from the coal-producing states of West Virginia (11.3%), Kentucky (7.3%), and Tennessee (2.8%); while 30 persons came from states less important to coal mining such as North Carolina (5.2%), Georgia (2.0%), and Alabama (4.8%).

In 1900, of all those persons born in the United States, 74.4 percent were white and 25.7 percent were black (Table 2). However, counting only those born in Iowa, only 3.6 percent of them were black. Blacks were a recruited population. When one excludes those Iowa-born, where whites completely dominate, another interesting phenomenon appears; blacks are a clear majority. Only 39.9 percent of those born in states outside of Iowa were white, and 60.0 percent were black

(Table 3). To summarize, whites completely predominated those born in Iowa and a majority of those recruited from outside Iowa were black.

In 1905, (Table 4, Table 5), 78.7 percent of the population of Fraser were born in the United States which is quite close to the 83.8 percent born in the United States in 1900. Of those born in the United States in 1905, 74.9 percent were born in Iowa (Table 4), which is substantially higher than the same group in 1900 (60.0%). Blacks accounted for a majority of those born outside Iowa in 1900. In 1905, the category of those born in Iowa increased since most blacks, born outside of Iowa, were now gone. In 1905, 33.5 percent of those born in the States outside Iowa were from the two contiguous states of Missouri (9.4%), and Illinois (18.0%), as well as the nearby state of Indiana (6.1%); all three of which were coal producing states (Table 5). The states of Pennsylvania (17.1%), and Ohio (6.1%) were the origin of 23.2 percent of those born in states outside Iowa states (Table 5); a substantial increase in the percentage of Fraser population from these states. Only a small part of the 1905 population originated in the southern and eastern states where most of the blacks had come from in the 1900 census. The main difference between the states of origin in 1900 and 1905 was that since nearly all the blacks had left Fraser by 1905, there was little representation from the states in the south and east, and a greater percentage born in Iowa in 1905.

Recent Origins The evidence suggests that Fraser was only one stop on a continuous pilgrimage for many residents. One measure of where people have been in recent years is to look at where their children were born. Of course, this will give a quite limited answer. It cannot answer the question of where those without children lived before coming to Fraser. It also suffers as a measure by overrepresenting families that are both prolific and in their primary childbearing years. Nevertheless, it gives one measure of where people were living previous to coming to Fraser.

Table 6 shows the birthplace of children from 0 to 14 years old in 1895. Of all 228 children, whose birthplace is listed, the largest grouping (41.6%) were born in Boone County, the county in which Fraser was located. The second largest group (20.6%) were born in Webster County, just to the north.

James J. Hill and Hamilton Browne controlled extensive mining operations in both counties. Hill owned mines in Coalville and Lehigh in Webster County. Browne and Hill owned mines in Boone County at Centerville, Incline, Milford, Angus, as well as Fraser. It looks as if most people did not come to Fraser directly from distant regions. Most of them had lived somewhere else in Boone County before coming to Fraser. It appears that the largest groups of people coming to Fraser were miners already employed in Hill and Browne mines in Boone and Webster Counties, since 66.7 percent of all people in 1895 (with children) came most recently from Boone or Webster Counties. Besides

these people, another 16.2 percent of those with children lived in counties directly contiguous to Boone County before coming to Fraser.

The 1900 Federal Census did not list birthplace by counties, but by state. The first census to record blacks living in Fraser was in 1900. Out of 298 children under 15 years old, only 46 (15.4%) were born outside of Iowa. This again argues that generally, people were not moving long distances to come directly to Fraser. The one exception to this was the coming of blacks to Fraser. Of the 46 children born outside Iowa in the 1900 Census, 34 were black. Only one black child was born in Iowa.

The newspapers also gave a record of moves to and from Fraser, although it is surely incomplete. There is no way to quantify these listings since they are not in discrete categories. A specific newspaper-citation may list one person moving from Boone, or fifty coming from Missouri in the case of blacks. However, leaving out the large recruitment of blacks which is discussed below, a generalization can be made. Most of those recorded in the newspapers as moving to Fraser between the years 1896 and 1905 came from other coal mining towns such as Boone, Angus, Mystic, Summit, Lehigh, Ogden, Milford, Incline, Moingona, Centerville, and Logansport. Moves were generally occupationally proscribed, to and from other coal mining camps. Quite a number of moves to Fraser in this time were also listed as returnees. There appears to be something of a circular movement of population in and out of Fraser as well as other mining camps.

How and Why Recruits Were Brought to Fraser

Little is known about how the whites came to Fraser. The most distinctive feature of the coming of southern blacks to Fraser was that more than any other group, they were a totally recruited population. Only the Russians, of whom a large group was recruited as strikebreakers in 1899, show similarities in this regard. Still, many of the Russians came before the recruitment of 1899. If it could be argued that all of Fraser was in some sense a recruited population, then a distinction would have to be made in both the degree and the style of recruitment of the blacks.

The blacks were recruited for one purpose, strikebreaking. Hamilton Browne first contemplated bringing blacks to his various mining fields in 1895, but concluded that if he brought blacks to his Milford fields, located between Fraser and Boone, the miners at Fraser would stage a sympathy strike (Browne to Healion, Nov. 23, 1895). Browne fully intended to bring in blacks as strikebreakers, but he could not jeopardize shutting down both Milford and Fraser at the same time. The situation was all the more critical since Browne had not yet proven his ability to make his payments to James Hill (Browne to Healion, Nov. 23, 1895). He dared not risk a production shutdown yet.

In 1897, the time for strikebreaking seemed right to Browne. Hill's operator in Lehigh, in Webster County to the north, had already recruited blacks to work his mines (Browne to Healion, Aug. 23, 1897).

Browne wrote to Hill to notify him that he intended to give the miners at Fraser "...a thrashing they will never forget" (Browne to Healion, Apr. 8, 1897). By that, he meant that his sole purpose for bringing in blacks was to teach the whites a lesson.

It is just possible that the high rate of labor turnover that Browne experienced at Fraser was not taken by him to be an indictment of his treatment of the miners. It may well have been orchestrated in part to preclude solidarity that could come from longevity. He wrote to Hill that his bringing blacks to Fraser would deal with the labor problems. "I think we will never have any decent treatment in this field until we bring in a lot of new blood..." (Browne to Healion, Sept. 9, 1897).

Browne inquired of Hill to find out who the preacher was who had recruited blacks for Lehigh, Iowa (Browne to Healion, Aug. 23, 1897). It was P. T. Strange of Muchakinock, Iowa (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 1897). Browne's strategy was to bring in enough black miners to form a majority of the work force, so that labor agitators, who were continuously travelling through the camps, would have little effect at organizing the men (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 1897). Browne was perturbed at Hill's operative in Lehigh for not complying with Browne's expressed wish that Lehigh also adopt the policy of maintaining a majority of blacks. In the letter, one gets the sense that blacks were not always easy to convince to come; when they did come, they were equally difficult to convince to stay.

"...the colored miners were taken to Lehigh to insure avoidance of work suspensions, and strikes, and so long as they were there in sufficient numbers to comprise a strong majority of the men in our employ there could be but little chance or probability of the labor agitators in the district getting our men into trouble but as I understand it the negroes have gradually left until there are but few of them there, and at the same time white miners have been taken on until the mine is now under the control of white men and among them a number of professional agitators, several of them being men who helped to originate our trouble at Fraser and who left Fraser and went to Lehigh to create a disturbance there. As an increased force of miners was needed at the Lehigh mine it would have been a good precaution to have this increased force made up mainly by bringing in colored miners so as to keep that element largely in the majority but it seems the contrary has been done and, worse than all that is the fact that, men have got in there whose business it was to bring on the trouble which I now understand has developed" (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 1897).

It may be that the reason why black miners moved on as quickly as they came was the constant threat of violence they faced. In the above letter, Browne told Hill that he had just received word that the Lehigh miners had struck.

"...since writing the above I have had a phone message from Lehigh stating that the miners there all struck and demanded a dollar except the colored miners. I understand the colored miners refuse to strike. I hope this is so and that they will be so encouraged by you and Mr. Sullivan that they will have the courage to stand the attack which will undoubtedly be made on them to get them out to make the strike complete. The action of the colored miners only confirms what I have said above" (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 1897).

Browne gave indication of the difficulty of recruiting black workers when there was a strike and threatened violence.

"The few colored miners you have if they stand firm will serve as a rallying point and will enable you to more easily get additional colored miners to go there" (Browne to Healion, Sept. 1, 1897).

Browne was able to recruit black miners to Fraser, but it was not without difficulty. He hired both the preacher, P. T. Strange, and Mr. French, an agent from the Thiels Detective Agency, to recruit blacks for him. Mr. French was to go to Illinois and P.T. Strange to Missouri. If they could not find recruits there, Mr. French would try Kentucky and West Virginia. Mr. French thought that he would have to employ four guards on the train coming back to Fraser, and possibly ten guards upon arrival in Fraser in the case of threatened violence by the white miners (Browne to Healion, Sept. 7, 1897). Apparently, the dangers necessitating guards on the train trip to Fraser could be diverse. Browne was candid to Hill that the guards were necessary not only to avoid "...interference by outsiders..." but also the eventuality that some black miners might change their mind and desert (Browne to Healion, Sept. 7, 1897). While blacks, had a high degree of geographic mobility, that must never be confused with freedom.

Browne had success in gathering a group of blacks in both Springfield, Illinois, and in Brevier, Missouri, (Browne to Healion, Sept. 19, 1897). About 180 blacks arrived by train in late September, 1897, from Missouri and Illinois. Of these, between 100 and 125 were men and began mining coal (BCR, Sept, 30, 1897; BCR, Oct. 14, 1897). It was claimed by a white miner who was looking for public sympathy

for married white miners who were losing their jobs, that these were mostly unmarried black men (BCR, Sept. 30, 1897). The figures given, 125 miners out of 180 blacks coming would lend credence to the claim that most were unmarried. Only 55 out of 180 persons were wives or children. As soon as the blacks came, the white union men tried to meet with them and convince them of their grievances. They even brought a black union miner from Boone to argue their case. But the Company kept the whites away from the blacks with armed guards (BCR, Sept, 30, 1897; BCR, Oct. 14, 1897). The white miners also claimed that on arriving in Fraser, the black miners were exhorted by a preacher to obedience to the company.

"...the night after they came, one of their number made a speech in which he advised the colored man to keep away from the white, to go to work, to obey their bosses, to save their money and above all to be sure to do as the company asked them to do..." (BCR, Sept, 30, 1897).

The white miners appealed to the black miners,

"...do not be ridden to death by your priests or ministers. Do not let them deceive you with their sophistry and have you rob your fellow men.... Any man who will cover himself over with a cloak of religion and tell you it is your duty to work and not listen to any other will surely receive his reward for thus trying to lead astray men who trust in him." (BCR, Sept, 30, 1897).

The reference was obviously to P. T. Strange, the preacher and labor recruiter, who Browne had hired to bring the blacks to Fraser.

The white miners were using the newspapers to gain public support as well as "begging" for food and supplies for those who were still

striking. There were only thirty-five whites left on strike (BCR, Sept, 30, 1897). They claimed that they had been:

"...shoved out of our homes, out of our work and away from our families and let such companies as these bring into our community the off scourings of the country..." (BCR, Sept. 30, 1897).

Apparently, the company had evicted the white strikers to make room for the blacks.

Whether it was the white miners' antipathy, or the company's disinterest in the blacks once it had achieved its goal of teaching the white miners a lesson, nearly all of the blacks in Fraser left within six months of their coming. The columnist in the Boone County Republican reported that, "Colored people are very few in our town [Fraser] now and still are leaving us" (BCR, Feb. 24, 1898). The next week the same column stated that; "Everyone has a smile on their face at Fraser, as they believe confidence has been restored once more" (BCR, Mar. 3, 1898). The strike was over and the blacks had played their part and left on schedule. They were recruited to Fraser as a group and left as a group. Apparently, most had gone to surrounding towns.

Within the month, they began returning from nearby towns to Fraser (BCR, Mar, 31, 1898). In April, a large contingent of blacks came to Fraser from Lehigh (BCR, Apr. 7, 1898). It may be that those who left Fraser took work with the related employer in Lehigh and in other places still controlled by James Hill. By mid-April, there were 190 blacks in

Fraser again. Forty-five of them had been recruited from Texas (BCR, Apr. 14, 1898).

The issue causing the strike in the spring of 1897 was the company's rollback of wages to \$.65 per ton, which was below wages at other places in the region. Through bringing in black miners, the company had succeeded in getting the new contract signed at that rate for 1898. By 1899, more white miners were leaving with the third failure to get a raise from \$.65 per ton. In July, most of the whites had left Fraser. The paper told the story:

"The white miners at Fraser are leaving here rapidly. Over thirty have left since trouble commenced and what are left intend moving as soon as possible as they claim they cannot make wages at \$.65 per ton and they claim they are going where they pay the district price, but we are very sorry to see them go as it is impossible to find a better class of citizens then we had in Fraser" (BCR, July 7, 1899).

By the end of July, there were only 40 white miners left in Fraser. Over 100 white miners had left town, many of them homeowners (BCR, July 27, 1899). It was claimed that the company had recently brought in 50 more black miners from all over the south, many also coming from the prison mines at Leavenworth, Kansas (BCR, July 27, 1899).

Even though the whites were now in the clear minority in Fraser, they were not without reinforcements and not above intimidating the blacks. Over 200 white men came up to Fraser from Milford to have a "talk" with the black miners (BCR, July 27, 1899). The blacks responded by forming a 23-man militia, fully armed with Winchester rifles and pistols. They patrolled and target practiced in town to the great annoyance and alarm of the whites (BCR, July 27, 1899). Another 42

blacks were recruited from Kentucky (BCD, July 28, 1899). It was also at this time that Russian miners were recruited to come to Fraser (BCD, July 28, 1899).

When one looks at the origin of the blacks that came to Fraser on the basis of their birthplace, the largest group (17.2%) originated in Virginia (Table 7, U.S. Federal Census, 1900: no distinction between East and West Virginia). The second largest group originated in Missouri (16.0%). An equal portion came from Kentucky and Illinois (10.4%) each. Only 8.6 percent originated in Iowa, and two of these or 1.2 percent, were children born in Iowa after their parents came to mine coal.

It is clear that the blacks were recruited specifically for strikebreaking. Their tenure as a population group was less than six years. With the exception of one family which stayed beyond this period, no blacks owned homes. The company may have had a policy against selling to blacks. As a recruited population, specifically for strikebreaking, blacks were unique in being treated as a group rather than as individuals. They came as a group and left as a group. In Fraser, life on the periphery was one where the external controls were structured to keep labor from organizing. To accomplish this, tactics such as using disenfranchised ethnic and racial groups against other workers often were used (Barnum, n.d.)

The blacks who came to Fraser were recruited in groups and left in groups. In 1900, there were 163 blacks in Fraser, where there had been

none in 1895. By 1905, the number had decreased to 29, and by 1910, there were only 13 blacks left in Fraser.

Population Composition

Ethnic population

From the beginning, Fraser had a large immigrant population (Table 8). Counting all those with one parent born outside the United States, in 1900, 39.9 percent of Fraser's population was immigrant population. In 1905, 51.0 percent were immigrant and in 1910, 54.0 percent of the population was immigrant. Taking the composite of all four censuses, 48.2 percent was immigrant population (Table 8).

Various European ethnic groups were represented in the early years of Fraser's existence (Table 8). The 1900, 1905 and 1910 census showed 20.1 (152 persons) to 26.9 (131 persons) percent of the Fraser population was from the British Isles (English, Welsh, Irish, and Scottish). The Scandinavians (Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian) comprised 11.1 (54 persons) to 12.2 (152 persons) percent of the population. Slavic groups such as the Hungarians, Bohemians, Austrians, and Lithuanians contributed .5 (4 persons) to 3.9 (19 persons) percent of Fraser's population. Although a small percentage in 1910, the Slavic population had grown a great deal from 1900. Russian immigrants were present in the 1900 (1.7% or 13 persons) and 1905 (3.5% or 44 persons) census and absent in the 1910 census. The Italians were represented by .3 (2 persons) percent in 1900, and 6.2 (30 persons) percent in 1910. Other

groups of immigrants such as Canadians, French, and Swiss were represented in small numbers (1.4% overall).

Gender composition

The gender composition of the Fraser population was greatly influenced by the fact that coal mining was a male occupation, and the population was both recruited and immigrant. The four censuses used from 1895 through 1910, show major categories of the adult population where males outnumber females by as much as twice (Tables 11, 12, 13, 14).

In the four censuses, there were a number of cells in the age categories between 20 and 64, the age where most coal miners would be found, with a much higher percentage of men than women. Taking the total of men and women in the ages of 20-64 years in 1895, the men were 67.2 percent, and the women 32.8 percent. In 1900, the men were 61.7 percent whereas the women were 38.3 percent. In 1905, the men were 59.0 percent, whereas the women were 41.0 percent. In 1910, the men were 56.4 percent whereas the women were 43.6 percent. The men greatly outnumbered the women because the town was built completely on a male occupational structure.

Age composition

It is possible to generalize about the age composition of Fraser over four censuses in the following ways. The population decreased in nearly a uniform manner with each age category (Figure 3). Over a third of the population were children (0-14 years), the blacks having a

somewhat smaller percentage of children. Nearly two-thirds of the population were adults between 15 and 64 years of age.

In 1895, 36.7 percent of the population were children (0-14 years of age), in 1900, 37.5 percent were children, in 1905, 36.6 percent were children, and in 1910, 41.3 percent were children. The 1910 population was composed of a greater percentage of persons in families than the other censuses. The 1910 census showed no unrelated boarders, and no boarders lived in a motel.

The blacks, who were mainly in Fraser for the 1900 census, had a lower percentage of children (29.1%, 0-14 years old) than the general population for any census. Whites in 1900 had 39.7 percent children. This may be explained by the fact that blacks were recruited from much further away, and those families with children were much less likely to risk coming to Fraser, especially under threat of violence as was the case in 1897 and 1899.

The adults in Fraser (15-64 years) comprised between 55.6 (1910) and 61.1 (1895) percent. Blacks were overrepresented in adults. In 1900, 58.9 percent of whites were adults and 68.1 percent of blacks were adults. Again, this is explained by the fact that they were recruited under the threat of violence.

The age group from 65 years and above was .8 (1900) to 2.7 (1910) percent of the population in the four censuses. The blacks had a much lower percentage of older population (.6%). This can be explained by

the fact that they were recruited from further away, whereas more whites grew old as coal miners living in the region of central Iowa.

In summary, the population was distributed with about one-third children and about two-thirds adults. Blacks, being recruited, were overrepresented in adults and underrepresented in children. A small percentage of the population in each case was older.

House and family composition

Size of households The size of households in Fraser in these early years was at least partially a function of the ability of the company and the community to provide increases in housing stock to keep up with the population recruitment. In the early years, households were much larger than in the later years. In 1895, the community was less than two years old, and there was probably something of a housing shortage. By 1910, the community had seen a serious decline in population, and there was plenty of housing stock.

For the purpose of this discussion, the following estimates of company owned housing will be used and are based on newspaper reports and property records (see Chap. 4, above). In 1895, the company owned 25 houses; by 1900, they owned 55 houses and by 1910, they had owned 100 houses. However, it appears that the company must have sold or moved many of its houses out of Fraser between 1905 and 1910, since only 67 households were rented in 1910.

These figures may be conservative. For instance, while figuring the company ownership of homes at 55 in 1895, the census showed that 98

homes were rented. It may be that the company owned more rentals than evidence found in newspaper reports. Probably, many who had built homes in Fraser and had left town in the labor troubles of 1897 and 1899 were still renting their houses to others. Taking the above estimates of company housing ownership; in 1895, 25 of 98 households (25.5%) lived in company housing; in 1900, 55 of 155 households (35.5%) lived in company households.

The size of the average household decreased from 1895 to 1900 (Table 17). In 1895, the average household had 6.0 persons living in it; in 1900, 4.8 persons, and in 1910, 4.6 persons per average household (Table 17). This decrease is accounted for in the increase in available housing stock.

Conditions for most people were crowded in 1895. In that year, 53.6 percent of the population lived in houses of seven or more persons, and 18.3 percent of the population lived in houses of ten or more persons (Table 17). By 1900, the percentage living in households of seven or more had dropped to 37.8 percent, and the percentage of those living in households of ten or more had decreased to 7.1 percent. In 1910, the percentage living in households of seven or more stayed relatively the same (34.3%); while the percentage of those living in households of more than ten persons decreased to 2.3 percent. The category of households of four to six persons grew with each new census. In 1895, 31.6 percent; 39.4 percent in 1900, and 48.7 percent in 1910 lived in these moderate sized households (4.6 persons).

Housing conditions improved dramatically over time in Fraser, as measured by the decreasing number of persons living in each household (Table 17).

Since blacks only lived in Fraser as a large group in the time measured by the 1900 census, their relative household conditions over time cannot be assessed. They can only be compared with all households for 1900. Housing conditions as measured by the number of people per household were relatively better for blacks than whites. This, however, must be qualified so that it is understood that this says nothing of the actual quality of the building in which they lived or the relative size of such buildings. In all probability, the blacks lived in lower quality homes, since all of them lived in company housing in 1900. But they did enjoy better household conditions in the sense that they had less persons living in each household. In 1900, there were an average of 5.0 persons per white household and 4.1 persons per black household. While 26.7 percent of whites lived in households of seven or more persons, only 21.4 percent of blacks lived in such large households. This difference can be accounted for by the fact that blacks in 1900 had a much greater percentage of small families than whites. This again is probably a function of the fact that not many blacks with large families would travel the long distance to Fraser under fear of violence upon arrival.

In summary, it can be noted that housing conditions, measured by the number of persons living in one household, improved over time as more houses were built. It can also be stated that the size of black households was somewhat smaller, probably a function of the reluctance of blacks with large families to come to Fraser.

Households with boarders Dorothy Schwieder, in Black Diamonds (1983) makes the connection between the housing of boarders and economic necessity in the coal mining towns of Iowa at the turn of the century. The fact that in Fraser there was a decrease in both the percentage of households with boarders and the percentage of boarders per household may indicate an improvement in the economic and living conditions of people in Fraser. It should not be forgotten, however, that the number of boarders per household may also have been a function of available household space in comparison to the recruited population at the time. As time passed, there was more housing stock in Fraser, and by 1910, the population had greatly decreased.

In 1895, 36.0 percent of all households had unrelated boarders (Table 18). By 1900, 20.0 percent of all households had unrelated boarders, and by 1910, no households had unrelated boarders (see Table 18). The findings are similar when one examines the number of boarders in each census. In 1895, 21.1 percent of the population were unrelated boarders. In 1900, 9.5 percent of the population were unrelated boarders, and in 1910, none of the population were unrelated boarders.

Later censuses show a decrease in boarders. Two boarding houses operating in 1895 and 1900 were closed in 1910. It appears that the major contributor to the decrease in boarders was the greater availability of housing stock due to the population decline. Thus, there was a decline in demand for housing for boarders. It is likely that the two boarding houses would have operated as long as it was profitable. In 1895, the Donahues and the Meyers both operated boarding houses. In 1895, 4.9 percent and in 1900, 2.6 percent of the population lived as boarders in these two boarding houses. Both were closed in 1910.

Blacks lived in somewhat smaller households than whites, but had a greater percentage of households with boarders. Counting the two exclusively white boarding houses as white households (Table 18); 12.1 percent of all white households had boarders in 1900. Excluding the two boarding houses, 10.5 percent of all white households had boarders in 1900 (Table 19). Forty-three point six percent of households had boarders. White homeowner's hesitancy to rent to black strikebreakers led to a housing shortage for blacks possibly, and thus, a greater percentage of black households had boarders. Five point three percent of whites were boarders, counting those in boarding houses, whereas 18.5 percent of blacks were boarders in 1900.

There were two boarding houses or hotels, as they were sometimes called: The Donahue Hotel and the Meyers Hotel. In 1895, the Donahue Hotel had 23 persons, including the Donahue family, and the Meyers Hotel had 19 persons including the Meyers family. In the 1895 census, two other homes were distinguished from the hotels or boarding houses because they were headed by miners rather than "hotel proprietors." The Walker home had 17 persons including the Walker family, and the Linqvist home had 16 persons including their family. Together, the two hotels and two large households housed 75 persons, or 11.9 percent of the population in 1895.

In 1900, only the two hotels remained. The Donahues housed 17 persons and the Meyers housed 13 persons, or a total of 4.0 percent of the population. In 1910, the hotels did not show up in the census. By 1910, housing became more available.

Family size In two censuses where data was available, 1895 and 1900, the average family size was between 5.0 persons and 4.4 persons respectively (see Table 20) In 1900, the black family averaged fully one person smaller (3.4 persons) than the average white family (4.4 persons) (see Table 21). This correlated well with the finding that black population in Fraser had fewer children than the white population in 1900. Again this may be attributable to the recruiting of blacks over long distances under threat of violence from Fraser whites. Blacks with children may have been less inclined to come to Fraser.

Home ownership Given the tremendous geographic mobility of the Fraser population, the percentage of the population that owned homes is surprising. In 1900, 35.6 percent of the households were owned and 64.6 percent were rented. By 1910, 64.5 percent were owned and 35.5 percent were rented (Table 22). There had been a dramatic increase in home ownership. It may well be that by 1910, the company was even beginning to divest itself of its company houses, selling them to employees before it was recognized that the coal was being worked out. Significantly, in 1900, while 47.8 percent of whites owned homes, none of the blacks owned a home. While employment was open to blacks in Fraser, it appears that home ownership was not.

While home ownership could be a sign of control of one's life, it could also be a painful reminder of the more significant control exercised by the mine owners. For those who owned homes were concerned about losing their investment in the case of labor trouble. In 1899, during one of the major strikes where a large force of black miners was recruited to Fraser, one of the fears of white miners was that they would lose their investment in their homes. They suggested that the value of homes dropped disproportionately in such times. In a newspaper report (BCR, July 27, 1899), the miners expressed such fears:

...the larger part of the white men owned their own homes and have left their families until they could arrange to send for them. It is claimed that all the money invested in these

homes will be a clear loss to their owners. One man declared that not ten cents on the dollar will be realized today on any home owned by a white miner in Fraser.

There may have also been the implicit racial issue in the article, implying that the drop in the value of property was not just the result of labor strikes, but of flooding the town with blacks. Even though many miners owned their homes, the external control of Fraser by the mine owners controlled even this part of their lives. In one sense, they felt they were little better off than those who could be evicted from company houses in the case of a labor strike. The fact that the blacks were only brought in for the purpose of temporary replacement may well be further evidenced by the fact that none of them owned homes.

Occupational composition

A one-occupational class town Fraser was nearly a one-occupational class town, composed of coal miners. In 1895, 74.4 percent; in 1905, 72.2 percent; and in 1910, 59.1 percent of the workers were employed in the mines (see Table 23). It may be that the fluctuation in the level of percentages employed in the mines was a reflection of how many mines were open at the census time and the level of production.

Another typical feature of boom towns and company towns is apparent in the fluctuations of percentages of mining population and the fluctuation of population. The two censuses in which the mining

population was greatest (1895, 74.4%; 1905, 72.2%) were also two periods of rapid population expansion. In 1895, the town had grown from nonexistence in 1893 to 630 persons. In 1905, the town reached its maximum population of 1,243 persons, a 64.2 percent growth over 1900. In both cases, the service and business sector of the economy had lagged behind in ability to service such a large population increase and thus was underrepresented in terms of employment. This was only exacerbated by the company's intention to control the business economy of Fraser through a company store, and antagonism to competition.

Retail and service business, and professional class Business owners, managers, and professionals were generally a small percentage of Fraser's population. Professionals ranged from 1.9 percent to 4.3 percent of the employed population in the various censuses. Retail and service business owners were 3.7 percent and 3.6 percent in three of the censuses. In 1905, they were only .8 percent of the employed population. Nearly the same number of businesses served about twice the population in 1905.

In the two censuses where there was the greatest population growth, 1895 and 1905, the service and business sector failed to grow with the population. In 1895, the business and service sector was 4.7 percent, and in 1905, only 3.0 percent of those employed. In the years where the population had stabilized or declined (1900, 1910), the business and service sector was a greater percentage of those employed.

In 1900 and 1910, 9.1 percent of the employed were in the service and business sector. Thus, in the retail and service sector of the labor force, the number of employees remained stable, even with major population increases. This reflects the fact that the service sector was not demand sensitive. It was externally controlled. At least half of those so employed in retail, service and business, in each census, were employed by the company store. It could be estimated that from 2.0 percent to 5.0 percent of those employed in any census were employed in privately owned businesses. Company domination was clearly predominant in this sector of the economy as well. Maintaining a monopoly on business and service was crucial to the profitability of a company store. Maintaining such a monopoly in a situation where service and business far undersupplied the public's demand could prove even more profitable for the company store.

Support occupational groups

Farming Some farmers, living on the site where Fraser was built, would become a part of the community. Some farmers would mine coal, and some miners would quit mining for farming. Examples of both can be found in both census and newspaper reports as well as personal interviews. The largest representation of farm occupations was found in 1895 where 10.2 percent of the workers were farmers. In 1900 and 1910, 5.3 percent and 5.5 percent of the workers were farm related. As the population boomed in 1905, it was mainly in coal mining, and the farming sector did not grow proportionately.

Artisans The sector of the employed population involved in skilled artisan work ranged from 3.4 percent to 5.5 percent of those employed. There were 12 occupations listed in this category, eight of which were found only in two or less censuses.

Railroad The railroad, owned by the coal mining company, hired from 1.1 percent to 3.2 percent of those employed. Most of this time it was used only for shipping services. It was electrified with a power plant in Fraser in 1905 under the new ownership of the Newton and Northwestern Railroad then owned by Homer Loring of New York (Boone Weekly News, June 7, 1906; July 19, 1906). It then operated regular passenger service to Ft. Dodge, Boone, Ames, and Des Moines.

Unskilled labor Although not appearing in the 1895 census, unskilled labor accounted for 14.4 percent of the workers in 1900, 14.6 percent in 1905, and only 3.7 percent in 1910. There was a greater demand for labor in the earlier period while the infrastructure of the town especially housing was being built and while the population was booming.

Diversification By 1910, decisions had been made so that Fraser would never again be a growing coal mining town. Some of the mines were playing out, and coal was being mined more efficiently from other locations. Along with the declining coal industry in Fraser came some diversification in the industrial base. In the 1910 census, for the first time, 8.5 percent of the workers worked in industrial work besides coal mining. This included 5.5 percent who worked at the

electric power plant, and 3.0 percent working at a tile factory, building drainage tiles.

In summary, Fraser's economy was dominated by the coal mining occupation. Other sectors of the economy were also owned and operated by the owners of the coal mines. It was not until coal mining began to seriously decline that diversification of the economy took place, a diversification that accounts for the fact that Fraser after 1914 was not completely dismantled and moved to another location. There were few businesses not owned by the company. There was little of a professional or business class.

Female labor A great number of Fraser households took in boarders. This was one way of supplementing a miner's income. In this way, a great deal of female labor in the early economy was masked.

In 1895, when 36.0 percent of all households had boarders; in 1900, when 20.0 percent of all households had boarders, those households represented undocumented female labor. It is significant that in these two censuses, the only censuses where taking in boarders was a predominant practice, female labor is seen in the visible economy as, 1.4 percent of all workers in 1895, and 3.2 percent of all workers in 1900.

In the 1905 census, it is impossible to tell how many have housed boarders, if any. In that year only, one hotel or boarding house out of at least three was still in operation. In 1910, there were no

unrelated boarders in the census. In the 1905 and 1910 censuses, female labor appears in the visible economy (Table 24). In 1905, 9.9 percent of all workers were female, and 13.9 percent of all women at least 15 years old were employed. In 1910, 8.7 percent of them were employed. When women were no longer taking in boarders, they appeared in the visible economy. Their primary occupational class was that of the domestic servant. In 1905, 69.6 percent of the female labor were household servants. In 1905, 15.2 percent of employed women were teachers. In 1910, there were three women bookkeepers, or 27.3 percent of the eleven employed women.

Women were a part of the economy from the beginning in Fraser, but only became a visible part when taking in boarders was no longer essential. Women would never be a central part of the visible economy since coal mining at that time was a male occupation and it dominated the economy.

Coal miners' wages Actual records of wages paid to the miners in Fraser are almost non-existent. However, Hamilton Browne submitted his version of miners' wages to the Boone County Democrat (July 16, 1897) for the previous 12 months. He noted that they were on the basis of 253 days work. The average miner made \$524.00 that year or \$44.00 per month. It is not surprising that the figures supplied by the State Mine Inspector a year later were markedly lower. The miners in the County averaged \$346.00 for 1898, or \$29.00 per month (BCR, Oct. 13, 1898). The official figures released for the County in 1901, were

\$422.00 or \$35.00 per month (State Mine Inspectors Report, 1901:93).

It appears that Hamilton Browne's figures may have been somewhat inflated. When the United Mine Workers were effective in organizing Fraser in 1899, they struck and effected a \$.10 per ton raise in wages (BCR, Oct. 12, 1899; Nov. 9, 1899).

School district wages The wages offered by the school district provide an interesting comparison to coal miners' wages. Although it was a small part of the economy, it provides the only remaining record of wages outside the coal industry. These wages were also important as a representation of some of the employment open to women. Two of the elected school board members received a yearly salary of \$20.00 per year in 1897. The salary was increased to \$25.00 per year in 1903. In 1900, three teachers received a monthly salary of \$30.00 for nine months, or \$270.00 for the year. The principal was paid \$50.00 per month. Some teachers received a raise to \$35.00 per month in 1903, and \$40.00 per month in 1904, and the principal's salary was increased to \$60.00 per month. The school regularly employed a janitor. The monthly salary for the janitor in 1897 was \$12.00 which was raised to \$18.00 per month in 1902. In 1904, with the school enlarged, this salary was increased to \$38.00 per month. While the school principal in the early years was a man, the teachers were women. The earliest janitors were women.

The employed sector of the economy By figuring the percentage of the population employed, what part of the economy remained economically dependent, can be deduced. Table 25 looks at the four censuses from this perspective. From as little as 24.8 percent of the population to as much as 37.6 percent of the population were employed at one given time. A more significant way to look at this question, is to ask what percentage of those at least 15 years old were employed. In 1895, 53.9 percent were employed; in 1900, 39.7 percent were employed; in 1905, 59.3 percent were employed, and 1910, 57.3 percent were employed. The year with the highest rate of employment, 1905, is also the year in which women appear most visibly in the economy.

It was to the company's advantage to have a high percentage of the population employed at a given time, especially in coal mining. Since most of the coal miners were paid by piecework, employing more did not necessarily increase labor costs. A common complaint among miners was the tendency of the coal company to overcrowd the mines, which had the paradoxical effect of bringing individual wages down, but assuring company houses and stores were used to full capacity. This may well be what is seen in the 1905 census. In that year, the highest percentage of the population was employed, the highest percentage of those employed were working in the mines, and the total population was at its highest. In 1906, the United Mine Workers Journal ran a warning to miners to stay away from Fraser because the mines were overcrowded (BWN, March 15, 1906). Although there may have been a situational

context of a temporary nature for this warning, it seems to confirm what was found in the census data for 1905.

Number of paid workers per households In 1900 and 1910, two censuses which contain the needed data, 41.4 percent and 40.4 percent of all households had more than one paid worker (Table 22). Thus, nearly 60 percent of all households could survive with only one paid worker. In 1900, 20.4 percent and in 1910, 25.0 percent of all households had two paid workers. Those households with three or more workers comprised 21.0 percent of all households in 1900 and 15.4 percent in 1910. It appears that economic necessity played at least a part in the choice of over 40 percent of all households to have more than one worker.

The experience of blacks in Fraser was different from that of whites. In 1900, whereas 66.0 percent of white households had only one worker, only 46.2 percent of black households had one worker (see Tables 26 and 27). Of white households, 15.6 percent had two workers, while 35.9 percent of black households had two workers. They had nearly the same percentage of households with three or more workers (Whites, 18.4%, Blacks, 18.0%). Why black households had more workers per household than whites may be accounted for by the fact that blacks had less assets when coming to Fraser, and thus had to share more households to be able to make ends meet. Blacks had more boarders than whites. There may also be the intervening variable of blacks sharing housing to a greater degree since they came in smaller families or as

singles. It is possible that the company provided less housing for the blacks and they were required to share housing with other workers.

Number of workers per household and home ownership Having more workers in a household did correlate slightly with the likelihood of home ownership, except in the case of blacks. One can only assume there must have been a company policy against selling homes to blacks, blacks did not want to build or buy their own homes, or they could not afford to do so. No blacks owned homes even though they had higher rates of households with more than one worker. However, in the case of white households, there was a greater likelihood of home ownership if one had more than one worker per household. Table 22 shows the status of home ownership and home rental by the number of workers per home. It is not controlled for blacks, none of which owned homes, who will thus all appear in the rental column. In 1900, 61.2 percent of all renters had only one worker per home, while 51.9 percent of all owners had only one worker per home. This means that renters were about ten percent more likely to have only one worker per household. A much greater percentage of homeowners had three or more workers in their home (27.9%) than did renters (12.3%). Homeowners were much more likely to have multiple worker households.

Forty percent of whites with one worker in the home owned a home, while 60.0 percent of whites with only one worker in the home rented a home (Table 28). Of whites with three or more workers in the home,

71.4 percent owned their own homes and 28.6 percent rented homes. More workers in a home gave an economic advantage that could be translated into home ownership.

Predictably, in Fraser many of the multi-worker households were composed of a number of coal miners. As Schwieder pointed out (1983), often a father would take a young son into the mines and would receive extra coal cars, and could increase his production even with a youth. It is to the age of coal miners that the study now turns.

Age classification of coal miners Coal mining was an occupation of young adult men (Table 29). Less than 5.0 percent of miners in any census were 55 years old. The majority of miners were always between 20 and 39 years of age. In 1895, 71.6 percent, and in the later three census, between 58.3 and 60.3 percent were in this age group. Between 24.6 and 28.2 percent of miners in the four censuses were in the age group of 40 years and older. Only in 1900 and 1905 were teen-age miners under 15 years old used. In 1900, 5.8 percent of the miners were under 15 years old. In 1895, only 3.1 percent of the miners were under 20 years old. In 1900, 15.3 percent; in 1905, 16.1 percent, and in 1910, 11.2 percent were under 20 years old.

Extra-local Interactions

Newspapers gave a brief mention of travels people made to other communities. These were either on business or to visit friends and relations. While a business trip tended to be one day, visits to friends and relatives were often longer. The overwhelming majority of visits both to Fraser (100 or 15.0%) and from Fraser (196 or 29.5%) were interactions with Boone. As would be expected, more interactions with Boone would be visits from Fraser, since Boone was a population center with a much greater comparative shopping district than Fraser. Visits to and from Boone accounted for 44.5 percent of all interactions with other communities recorded in the newspapers between 1896 and 1905. Another 146 interactions (or 22.0%) were with other coal mining communities within a day's travel by wagon (Angus, Lehigh, Ogden, Incline, Moingona, and Logansport). Non-coal-mining population centers (Pilot Mound, Ft. Dodge, and Des Moines) accounted for 63 interactions or 9.5 percent. In summary, of 665 interactions over a ten-year period (1896-1905), the majority were with the closest large neighboring community, Boone, and the second largest group of interactions were with other coal mining communities within a day's travel.

Leaving Fraser

If one chooses to study Fraser diachronically, one sees a changing community over time. Institutions come at different times, and some

leave rather quickly. More dramatic, however, is the impression that comes from looking at population longevity. There was almost none.

Extremely mobile population

Fraser might be described as a sieve or a revolving door rather than a community. The one thing that remains constant over four censuses from 1895 to 1910 was the coal company. The population were sojourners.

Those coming to Fraser generally came from nearby coal mining towns or contiguous counties. The blacks were the exception, being recruited in groups from the South and other coal mining regions. Table 31 shows the number of state moves by families with children, measured by the childrens' birthplace. In 1900, of 127 families with children, only 11.0 percent had lived in more than two states as a family. In fact, 42.5 percent had never lived outside of Iowa and 46.5 percent had only lived in one other state before coming to Iowa. This fails to measure moves within Iowa, which apparently were at a much higher rate.

A much more sensitive measure of Fraser's population mobility was found in the censuses, by comparing the individuals who remained in each consecutive census over four censuses or twenty years. This is limited as a measure since some people moved to and from Fraser between censuses. Those who did show up in the census tracts, however, showed an extremely high rate of mobility. Table 32 shows this measure of geographic mobility through the four consecutive censuses: 1895, 1900,

1905, and 1910. The first column shows all those who lived in Fraser during only one of the four censuses. The second column shows those who lived in Fraser during two of the four censuses, the third during three censuses, and the fourth in all four censuses. Adding all four censuses together gives a sum of 3,117 persons living in Fraser. Some were overcounted because they lived in Fraser for two or more censuses. Adjusting for those overcounted, the actual number of persons ever persons ever living in Fraser during the four consecutive censuses was 2,444 persons. This is considered the total population of Fraser for the diachronic study of mobility.

It can now be seen that 1,979 persons, or 81.0 percent of this overall population lived in Fraser for only one census or not more than five years. Another 282 persons, or 11.5 percent lived in Fraser for between six and eleven years; while only 158 persons, or 6.5 percent lived in Fraser for between 11 and 16 years, and only 25 persons, or 1.0 percent of the population lived in Fraser for at least 20 years. In summary, the population of Fraser was extremely mobile.

Some 58 persons who were listed as somewhat stable and moderately stable, by virtue of their longevity through two or three censuses, could be categorized as returnees. They left Fraser and came back. They were 13.2 percent of those who lived in Fraser for two or three censuses (see categories 2b, 2c, 2e, 3c and 3d). These probably left during labor disputes and returned at a more favorable time. Although they are counted as part of the stable population of Fraser, they are

really a mark of the mobility or instability of Fraser's population. If we count these persons as very mobile, along with all those who only lived in Fraser for only one census, the total is 2,037 very mobile persons, or 83.3 percent of the total population.

Locations of movement from Fraser Newspapers also gave a record of people leaving Fraser to live in other towns. Like those who came, many moved to other coal mining camps in Boone and Webster counties. Many of these were going back to camps where they had lived earlier. This points to a circularity of movement between the coal mining camps and communities in this part of Iowa. The people were highly mobile, but appear to be restricted in the distance they could move. Ironically, if mobility was one way the worker voted against intolerable work conditions, they probably could not go far enough to encounter markedly different working conditions; and their continuous movement probably hampered effective solidarity in forcing wage and work condition improvements from the employer.

Major precipitators of extreme mobility

It is not surprising that overall conditions in coal mining towns led to major population turnover. Two factors became major accelerators of mobility of large blocks of population at several crucial points in the period between 1895 and 1910. Two such factors were labor strikes and the outbreak of an epidemic.

Strikes and strikebreaking Strikes were a common phenomenon in the 1890s, partly as a result of the economic conditions related to the Depression of 1893. There were five strikes between 1894 and 1899 in Fraser. In 1894, there was a strike at contract negotiation time in May (Browne to Stephens, May 7, 1894). In 1895, there was a work slowdown to four days per week for three months, in sympathy with other striking miners in the region (Browne to Healion, Oct. 5, 1895). Again, about a year later, there was a work slow-down. However, the major strikes took place in 1897 and 1899. In both cases, Hamilton Browne introduced black miners as strikebreakers.

The Strike of 1897 Hamilton Browne had intended to use blacks as strikebreakers as early as 1895 (Browne to Healion, Nov. 23, 1895). When it appeared in April of 1897 that the miners were planning to strike at contract negotiation time, Browne began to make plans to counter their measures. He wrote to Hill:

I am afraid that we are going to have trouble with the men at Fraser this Spring. Prosperity does not seem to agree with them. They have become so overbearing and troublemaking that forbearance has ceased to be possible and I am being urged by my associates to bring matters to a focus with them. However, I am endeavoring to stave it off if possible but do not feel very hopeful of doing it. In case we engage in a tussle I cannot say how many weeks or months it will last, but do know it will not terminate until I have given them a thrashing which they will never forget (Browne to Healion, Apr. 8, 1897).

It was a showdown in which neither side was initially willing to give in. Browne held three cards that ultimately spelled a winning combination; 1) Hill would allow his late payments when he could not

meet his expenses, 2) he could obtain black strikebreakers, and 3) he could purchase mining machines to reduce his demand for labor.

The mines closed in mid-May. There was disagreement as to whether it was a strike or lockout. The miners refused to take the pay scale offered by Browne so he locked them out until they agreed (Browne to Healion, May 20, 1897; May 25, 1897; BCD, May 28, 1897). The miners had been working under a contract for \$.90 per ton. As the new contract came open for negotiations, all the miners in the region were being forced to take \$.80 per ton. Browne's miners in Milford had so agreed (BCD, May 28, 1897).

However, Browne was making a different offer to his Fraser miners only a few miles away from Milford. He claimed that Fraser coal was Milford. He claimed that Fraser coal was overlaid with "bone coal", a variety that fragmented and was only useful to fire steam engines. The Fraser miners were previously paid nothing for shoveling the "bone coal" into the cars. Browne proposed to pay the miners \$.20 a ton to shovel out the "bone coal" and \$.80 a ton to mine the good coal. He was concerned that they might try to put "bone coal" in with the good coal. He figured that there was one ton of "bone coal" for every three tons of good coal. He proposed to pay them \$.65 for all coal mined; figured on the basis of three tons at \$.80 and one ton at \$.20, all divided by four. He argued that this was giving them a \$.05 per ton raise, while assuring himself that the coal was correctly separated (BCD, May 28, 1897).

The miners claimed that he was not taking into account the fact that coal had to be mined whether it was "bone coal" or good coal, and that his plan assumed that they would normally mine the "bone coal" for nothing (BCD, July 16, 1897). In reality, there was a problem with miners either not mining the "bone coal" or mixing it in with the other coal. It is not clear if Browne was on the level with his calculations. In a letter to Hill months previously (Browne to Healion, Oct. 30, 1897), Browne had discussed Hill's concern about how much "steam coal" Hill was getting at the operation in Lehigh. They were discussing the same size and use of coal. Browne told Hill that:

...at Fraser, where we mine on "Long Wall" system, we produce about one ton of steam coal to eight tons of lump coal. While at Milford where we mine on the "Room and Pillar" system we produce about one ton of steam coal to four tons of lump coal....

I should think that mining by machine would make more steam coal than mining by hand would.... If you suspect that you are not getting as much steam coal from the mine as you should I suggest you inquire whether the miners are sending the steam coal out from the mine or shoveling it to one side, and allowing it to accumulate in the mine. It often happens that miners find it less trouble for them to leave the fine coal (for which they are to get no pay) in the mine instead of expending the labor necessary to shovel it into the pit cars, which they they consider is solely to the benefit of the Co. and at the expense of their labor.

Browne used different figures to explain to Hill and to the newspapers how much steam coal was mined in proportion to lump coal at Fraser. If he paid the miners \$.20 per ton for steam coal and \$.80 per ton for lump coal on the basis of the figures he had given to Hill regarding the proportion of coal at Fraser, the pay would have averaged \$.73 per

ton rather than the \$.65 he proposed to the miners. Browne knew, as he stated in his letter, that the miners felt cheated by having to load the steam coal, and they often refused to bother with it. He also knew that the change in technology to mining machines would produce more of the steam coal and he had to find a way to get the miners to get all the coal out of the mines even though they would get paid no more or even less.

When Browne brought in the black miners in late September, quite a number of white miners left Fraser. They claimed they were pushed out of their homes to make room for the blacks (BCD, Sept. 24, 1897; BCR, Sept. 30, 1897). There were only 30 to 35 of the Fraser union miners left, and apparently many of them had left Fraser (BCR, Sept. 30, 1897). Before the blacks arrived in Fraer, some whites had started back to work in the mines. They were met with nightly harrassment in the form of wives and children of the strikers serenading them on pots and pans and calling them names as they walked home.

There were also cases of rock throwing to the point that the Boone County Depty Sheriff came out to stop the disturbance. His assistant was pelted with a rock when he arrived with him (BCD, Sept. 17, 1897; BCR, Oct. 7, 1897). There was a perceived threat to the equipment at the mines so that Deputy Sheriff Bowman and the mine superintendent, Oscar Carpenter, began staying the night at the mine to stand guard (BCD, Sept. 24, 1897). When the blacks were brought in, they were guarded and provided weapons, and the whites were disallowed from

meeting with them (Browne to Healion, Sept. 7, 1897; BCR, Oct. 14, 1897).

There was no violence at that time. Most of the whites left Fraser, and work resumed in the mines. By February 1898, Browne had at least 12 mining machines in operation, said to replace four workers each (BCR, Feb. 3, 1898; BCR, Oct. 14, 1897). This, coupled with the normal slack in demand for coal in early Spring, together with the fact that Browne had broken the union, may have led to a temporary decline in need for black strikebreakers. Most of them were leaving Fraser by February (BCR, Feb. 10, 1898; BCR, Feb. 24, 1898).

We can see how this particular strike in 1897 led to the move of over 100 white miners from Fraser and their replacement by nearly 200 black miners and only to see the blacks leave within six months to be replaced by whites. The high mobility engendered by the strike and its result was what Hamilton Browne wanted. It undercut solidarity and union activity. Browne had commented to Hill during the strike that he thought they would "...never have any decent treatment in this field until we bring in a lot of new blood" (Browne to Healion, Sept. 9, 1897). There was evidence that Browne fired some white miners who had intended to keep working for him, when he brought in more black miners (BCR, Oct. 6, 1898). It may have been part of his strategy to keep a majority of blacks in Fraser mines (Browne to Healion, Sept. 9, 1897).

No sooner had the blacks left Fraser in February, 1898, than they began to be replaced by more blacks in March (BCR, Mar. 31, 1898). By now the level of violence was escalating. It was due to racial antagonism and the conditions of strikebreaking on one hand and to the fact that people were carrying weapons on the other. In March, a poker game involving both blacks and whites ended in a black man winning the jackpot and a white man claiming fraud. The black man hit the white man in the head with a rock, leaving him unconscious. He escaped from whites into a neighboring building where a black man was a barber. A crowd gathered and was going to burn them out. The black man they looking for escaped out the back door, and the other pleaded for mercy and the crowd dispersed (BCR, Mar. 17, 1898).

The Strike of 1899 In June 1898, J.F. Reams of Beacon, Iowa, and president of the United Mine Workers of America, came to Fraser and organized a union there (BCD, June 23, 1899). It should be remembered that some of the strikes in the past were union related, but that the union was broken in 1897, and that there was to a large degree a new population in Fraser in 1899. Now the union was organized again. The company wasted no time firing all those who had joined the union, about 110 whites and 15 blacks (BCR, June 15, 1899). The union held a meeting and voted that those union workers who had not been fired would not work until the rest had been reinstated and the union recognized

(BCD, June 23, 1899). As a result, the weight bosses, engineers, fireman and pit bosses also stopped work (BCD, June 23, 1899).

A number of blacks continued to work but quickly stopped work too, claiming that it got too "lonesome" in the mines (BCR, June 15, 1899). It appears that they feared for their safety and called a work stoppage until they could make plans to assure their own safety. In less than two months, most of the white miners had left town, even though most of them were homeowners (BCR, July 237, 1899).

In July, a force of over 200 white miners from Logansport and Milford came to Fraser to "talk" with the black miners who continued to work in the mines (BCR, July 27, 1899). The blacks refused to meet with them on several occasions because they felt the whites had come in such a large contingent to intimidate the blacks. Instead, the blacks formed a militia of 23 men with pistols and Winchester rifles, setting up target practice in town and practicing marches on the streets. The whites complained of bullets constantly "...whistling through the streets..." (BCR, July 27, 1899). There was fear of a race riot if any white were shot (BCR, July 27, 1899). The company also brought in Russian miners at this time (BCD, July 28, 1899).

During July and August, on two separate occasions, blacks got into fights with blacks and shot each other (BCD, July 7, 1899; BCR, Aug. 17, 1899). Although nobody was killed, it illustrates the fact that they were wearing arms in public. The Boone County Republican correspondent found some humor in the situation at Fraser:

In the peaceable and quiet town of Fraser, the modern city of brotherly love, night before last a dance was held, a part of the program being a cake walk. Two of the colored bells took the floor to take part in the walk and one sable brother stated that they could not be allowed to participate without partners. Another quiet gentleman with a razor up his sleeve allowed they could, and to convince the part of the first part that his word went, pulled his gun and blazed away at the offending brother, unfortunately missing him. Whether the ladies secured partners for the remainder of the walk or went it alone this paper is not advised however everything is quiet and peaceable up there (BCR, Aug. 17, 1899).

It was, however, not only blacks who were armed and involved in shooting each other. In September, a white "scab" worker from Tennessee shot a white union man, who had accosted him in the street in front of the hotel where he was staying (BCR, Sept. 21, 1899). The man who shot the union miner, together with his brothers, immediately took refuge in a building from the gathering crowd, who were talking about lynching them. When the Deput Sheriff arrived and promised them protection, they surrendered. Everyone was armed with pistols and stated that, "...they were aware that trouble might arise at any time and all went armed in order to protect themselves" (BCR, Sept, 21, 1899).

Early in October the company agreed to compromise with the union workers, giving them a raise to \$.75 per ton and recognizing the Union (BCR, Oct. 12, 1899). All workers who had gone elsewhere to find work were encouraged to return to Fraser.

It seemed that major strikes and labor violence were over for a few years. The next trouble came in 1901. In that year, a black man shot and killed a white man in the middle of an argument at a shed used for a saloon (BN, Aug. 29, 1901). The incident was short lived since the black man, Thomas Gibson, was quickly apprehended, tried, and put in prison (BN, Sept. 5, 1901; BWN, Sept. 26, 1901).

In 1904, a more serious incident occurred in which a black man, James Price, fatally shot Thomas Albright, a white miner (Ogden Reporter, Nov, 24, 1904). Now the black population was in a clear minority in Fraser, with less than 50 blacks and 1,200 whites. The whites charged that the blacks had hidden Price after the shooting until he could escape undetected from town. The Ogden Reporter noted that:

Race war is feared as a consequence of the shooting at Fraser last Saturday evening, in which James Price, a negro miner, shot and fatally wounded Thomas Albright, a white companion....

Most of the men carry revolvers and if an affray was once started, it would probably be a bloody conflict... (Ogden Reporter, Nov. 24, 1904).

After searching in vain for the murderer, the white miners held a meeting in which they decided to stop work in the mines with the black miners. There were only 15 black workers left and they were also members of the union (BWN, Nov. 24, 1904). Price was apparently never found, and the workers returned to work. The situation passed. In 1905, there were only 29 blacks in Fraser, and in 1910 there were only 13 blacks left in Fraser.

In the labor and racial tension that came with the strikes of 1897 and 1899, there was an escalating level of tension and violence that encouraged many to leave Fraser, contributing to the extreme mobility of the population. Mobility made solidarity for the miners difficult to maintain. It was a mobility encouraged and used by the company.

Disease epidemics Another factor that contributed to the extreme mobility of the population was not directly amenable to company control. It was the outbreak of infectious disease.

In early 1900, an epidemic of smallpox broke out in Fraser. Initially, Dr. Shafer, the County Health Officer from Fraser, diagnosed the disease as chickenpox or possibly "Cuban itch" (BCR, Feb. 15, 1900). He was annoyed that rumors were circulating in Boone that there was a smallpox epidemic in Fraser. He wrote to the newspaper that there was "...no danger to the public from it" (BCR, Feb. 15, 1900).

In late March, a Fraser resident was quarantined by Lehigh residents while visiting there (BCR, Mar. 30, 1900). By the end of April, the Dodge Township authorities had decided the disease was smallpox and that 150 cases had been diagnosed in and around Fraser (BCR, Apr. 29, 1900). Seventeen families were quarantined (BCR, April 29, 1900; BCR, May 3, 1900). Hamilton Browne now wrote to the newspaper in Boone and stated that there was no cause for alarm, as only nine houses were under quarantine (BCR, May 10, 1900). The only death from the epidemic was a child of Ed Bass, living near Fraser (BCR, May 10, 1900).

By the end of May, only three cases were left quarantined (BCR, May 24, 1900). By the middle of June, there were no more cases of smallpox in Fraser (BCR, June 21, 1900). Some 21 houses in Fraser had been quarantined. All buildings in town were fumigated, and all outhouses were renovated and the town generally cleaned up (BCR, June 21, 1900). A number of families had left during the epidemic but now returned after it was over (BCR, June 21, 1900).

Thus far, this chapter has explored the origins of the population of Fraser. It has been shown that they were largely of immigrant and ethnic heritage with limited opportunities in the American social system of their day. The extreme mobility of the population, circulating among mining camps, was actually encouraged and to the advantage of the employer, Hamilton Browne. The external control of the population for the purpose of coal mining shaped the specific nature of the population of Fraser.

Conclusion

The external development, ownership, and control of Fraser led to certain population characteristics. Foremost among these is the character of Fraser's recruited population. Fraser was largely composed of Euro-ethnics and Southern blacks. Blacks were used for breaking the union. They were valued very little by the company beyond that function. They were useful as they allowed the company to maintain control over the rest of the workforce.

While there was some improvement in wages and living standards from 1895 to 1910, measured by household size and home ownership, the early years were years of struggle by labor against what they considered abusive conditions from the company. In the light of center and periphery theory which suggests that life on the periphery is characterized by a domination by the center, the labor unrest and the extreme measures used by the company to maintain control do make sense. To maintain the low wage scale, the workers must be kept from organizing. To accomplish this, strikebreakers, blacks not known for union activities, were recruited. The correlary to this was the eviction of whites from company housing. Both strategies increased the already high mobility of the population giving the company greater control and limiting worker solidarity.

Wages did improve through hard struggles and numerous setbacks. The company apparently initiated a policy of selling houses shortly before 1910. This suggests at the very time when workers were seeing an improvement in the quality of living, the company lost interest in Fraser. It was no longer as profitable as it had once been. This is the very finding of Frank (1975), who suggested that the metropole often extracts minerals from a region all the while underdeveloping labor and then retreats leaving a ghost region.

However, labor in its struggle at the periphery was not alone. Indigenous institutions and vertical ties of these institutions, with external organizations developed. It is to the development of these

horizontal ties as expressions of communal interests, and the development of countervailing vertical ties that the next chapter turns.

CHAPTER VI. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL
COMMUNITY LIFE IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTERNAL CONTROL

External economic control and its occupational structure constrained community life in Fraser, but did not completely control that life. The main interest of the company owning Fraser was in capital and land. The primary reason for Fraser's existence was as a base of operation to mine coal. In order to mine coal, labor was needed. This led to housing, and company stores. The company impacted the lives of Fraser residents economically as employees in the mines, and as consumers at the stores, and in housing. This was company control in its most explicit form, through economic institutions.

The company also attempted to extend its influence into non-economic institutions such as religion, education, and recreation. In this way, the company could gain some influence over the non-worktime activities of the miners, encouraging a confluence of interest between company and workers. Yet many of the non-economic institutions in Fraser would be initiated by the residents themselves, others by organizing agents visiting Fraser, and still others by the company.

There were non-economic institutions such as the Union and local political control that the residents were successful in organizing in direct opposition to the company's control. Thus, some communal institutions did mediate company control in Fraser. The Union was also an example of a vertical tie to another external organization that

would countervail external control of the company. The local citizen's political movement represented horizontal ties to mediate company control.

The company most directly attempted to extend its control over non-economic institutions in the case of religious life in Fraser. It also attempted some level of control over education. Evidence of the company's control over fraternal organizations is lacking. While the company tried to maintain complete control over labor and political leadership in Fraser, two non-economic institutions, the Union and the citizens' movement to incorporate Fraser frustrated the company's efforts at complete control of Fraser. While the company attempted to exert control over religion and education, these may not have been resisted, as the company's paternalism may have been fostered by a common interest. The population were all too happy to receive company help in constructing a church or school. External ties were also established with groups such as the government and religious denominations.

Religion and Education

Religion

While religion was one institution which the company made a concerted effort to control, it was also an institution which gave expression to communal desires and preferences. When the company encouraged religion, it did so with a great deal of communal support.

Early residents religious preference The 1895 census was the only early census in which religious preference was measured. Unfortunately, the census was taken two years after Fraser was built, and no church had then established a foothold in Fraser. What was measured in the census was not current attendance, but past preference. Table 33 shows that of household heads who showed a religious preference, 15.5 percent were Catholic, 52.4 percent were Protestant, and 32.1 percent showed no religious preference. Two churches, the Baptist (7.1%) and Methodist (14.3%), both of which would later have a building in Fraser, accounted for 21.4 percent of the households. In this way, the indigenous communal religious preferences led to the building of churches in Fraser. That communal preference complemented the company's desire to encourage religion in Fraser.

The first recorded religious services were held in Fraser in 1894 by Rev. Abner Williams of the Mineral Ridge Baptist Church, five miles north of Fraser (BCR, March 28, 1894). These services did not lead to the establishment of a Baptist Church. The Methodist Episcopal Church was holding some services mostly Ladies Aid meetings in 1896, but these meetings were later to become the Primitive Methodist Church (BCD, June 12, 1896). The Catholics held services in Bailey's Hall throughout 1896 (BCD, April 24, 1896). It is clear that not only did religious preference of the early Fraser residents lead to the building of churches, but that preference led them to invite and encourage out

side organizers who came to hold services in Fraser. The earliest religious expression led to vertical ties with groups outside Fraser.

William Morris and the Primitive Methodists The founding of the Primitive Methodist Church in Fraser was an example of a vertical tie which helped the residents give expression to their religious preference. Early in 1897, Rev. William Morris from Angus began holding services with some women who had already attempted forming a Methodist Church in Fraser. The Methodist Episcopal and Free Methodists had been unsuccessful in getting a permanent church started (Tyrrell, 1984).

The Primitive Methodist denomination was founded in coal mining regions of England and spread throughout mining regions in the United States. It was known as a working-class denomination (Tyrrell, 1984).

In 1872, Rev. William Morris and his wife, Mary, emigrated from England to Rock Island, Illinois. Rev. William Morris was born in England in 1847. At 17 years old, he began preaching two Primitive Methodist Circuits at Leonminster and Webley in Herefordshire (Tyrrell, 1984). He worked for some time as a lay preacher for the Methodist Episcopal Church in Illinois, rejecting their appeals to pay his way through college. He wished to remain a lay-preacher. For the next ten years, he worked in coal mines in Coal Valley near Rock Island, Illinois, and pastored a Primitive Methodist circuit there. When his health began to give out, he moved to Angus, Iowa, giving up coal

mining, to work as a mason (Tyrrell, 1984), but later sold insurance instead (Morris family documents)

Angus, Iowa, in Boone County was a town that was largely developed by James J. Hill, and Hamilton Browne, and their Climax Coal Company. From 1883 until his death in 1939, Rev. William Morris lived in Angus, Iowa. He started and pastored a Primitive Methodist congregation there.

Early in 1897, William Morris preached his first services in Fraser in the schoolhouse (BCD, Jan. 22, 1897). There were only a few women meeting there, and they were just about to close their church services because of lack of interest (Tyrrell, 1984)). They invited Morris to start a church there. He was disinclined to do so at first, but later accepted the invitation. Morris had initially come to Fraser, not to build a church, but to sell insurance.

In 1901, Morris held revival meetings both in Fraser and just outside Fraser in the Wolf School House (BCD, Feb. 21, 1901; Aug. 2, 1901; Tyrrell, 1984). At that time, those attending formed a society in Fraser (Primitive Methodist Journal, Mar. 1901, in Tyrrell, 1984). Morris described his work in the following way:

...men and women that have not attended a religious meeting in years came. Drunkards stopped drinking and some were saved. Praise God that there have been seven mothers saved. I purposed to stop the meeting on the 13th but the merchants requested me to continue two weeks longer. I visited every home with good results.... In my house to house work, saloon goers were induced to go there no more. The missions were successful... (Primitive Methodist Journal, Mar. 1901, in Tyrrell).

Morris began to build a church building in 1902 (Tyrrell, 1984).

However, this was not without difficulties, one of which was the tremendous population turnover. Morris would later recall:

...just as we were planning to get into full swing with our future programme, the miners went on strike, colored labor was brought into the region, and before long the whites were moving away. (Fraser never really recovered from this labor conflict (Tyrrell, 1984).)

While most of the striking miners left town, a few stayed and helped Morris with the building, as did some of the wives of miners who left to find other work. Because of these difficulties, it took four years to build the church (Tyrrell, 1984). The cornerstone was laid in September 1904 (BWN, Sept. 29, 1904).

The company was interested in encouraging the Primitive Methodist Church in Fraser. They gave the land on which the church was built to the church (Tyrrell, 1984). The lumber for the building was logged by Rev. Morris, one can guess from company land, at a total cost of \$6.00 (Tyrrell, 1984). The church borrowed \$300.00 to pay for furnishings.

To repay this, Morris took work at the coal mines for \$3.50 per day (Tyrrell, 1984). Other miners were making around \$1.50 per day. It is clear that Rev. Morris' pay was more than the company's recognition in the industry of a 58-year old preacher. Morris had already stopped mining coal due to poor health ten years previous. The company was helping the church and buying public relations by hiring Rev. Morris at these rates. In 1909, the newspaper carried reference to the Fraser Mercantile giving ten percent of one day's dry goods

sales receipts to the Primitive Methodist Church (BNR, April 29, 1909). The company was probably looking both for good public relations, and the civilizing effect of a church on a community.

Still, Morris was not simply a company man. At his funeral, he was eulogized as a union official (Primitive Methodist Journal, January 1940). Nor was the Primitive Methodist Church simply a company church. It had popular support. It could easily attract a crowd of 73 people to Sunday School (Primitive Methodist Church Records, 1906). The Ladies Aid was well attended by nearly 20 women (Ladies Aid Records, 1906).

The Primitive Methodist Church not only had popular support, it also had an economic base that was beyond company control. It had an independent source of funds supplied by its members. In 1906, the Ladies Aid Society raised an average of \$16.65 per month through ice cream socials, quilt sales, apron sales, and other craft sales. Much of this money went to support the general funding of the church. In 1906, the Sunday School contributed \$5.57 per month; in 1907, \$3.58 per month to its own support. In 1906 and 1907, there was a fund-raising drive among members of the church and town to pay for furnishing the church. Individuals contributed \$464.71 in contributions that averaged \$3.23 each. With the exception of land and financial help in furnishing the building, the company did not give sustained support to the Primitive Methodist Church.

The Primitive Methodist Church received some economic help from the company in land, possibly timber, and money. However, this help came only after the residents showed an interest in forming a church and an outside agent came to help in the organizing process. When the church was established, it provided most of its own support. In this case, it is possible that the vertical ties of the Primitive Methodist denomination were operating with complimentary interests to the vertical ties with the company.

Strike-breaking and the Black Fraser Baptist Church The most direct company control of a church was the case of the black Baptist Church in Fraser. James J. Hill had used a preacher from southern Iowa to recruit blacks to Lehigh, Iowa, and Hamilton Browne would do the same in Fraser. The preacher was Rev. P. T. Strange from Muchakinock, a coal town in southeastern Iowa (Browne to Healion, Aug. 23, 1897).

When the blacks arrived in Fraser in 1897, they were accompanied by the Rev. P. T. Strange. Rev. Strange immediately gave them a sermon on the virtues of hard work and the avoidance of whites and union organizers (BCR, Sept. 30, 1897). Clearly, religion was being used by the company as a form of social control.

The Fraser Baptist Church built the first church building in Fraser (BCR, Aug. 18, 1898). The cornerstone was laid in 1898. The church was cheaply constructed of wood frame laid on a number of strategically placed stones, much like the early miners' houses. It was funded both by the company and the church members. The black congrega-

tional members raised \$180.00 to build the church. This was with the assurance of William Kelly, then superintendent of the Coal Company, that the company would give "...aid in the future" (BCR, Aug. 18, 1898). It appears from land records that the black church was built on company land as was the Primitive Methodist Church.

The value of the building was \$1,500, which had an indebtedness of \$586.00; yet, only \$151.00 income for 1903 (Iowa Baptist State Convention, Annual Minutes, 1903). Church contributions for 1899 had been \$319.00, and for 1901, \$39.00 (Annual Reports, 1900; 1902). Yet the 1900 census shows two black pastors who list no other occupation. If we assume that one of them received primary support through pastoral work, it is difficult to believe such a small congregation could support him. The congregation's membership was only from 14 to 30 members (Annual Reports, 1900; 1902). Supporting a pastor and constructing a building surely took more than their listed contributions. Apparently, the company gave a large portion of their expenses. It seems that in the case of blacks in Fraser, the company gained good public relations and social control through helping their church.

The story of the black Baptist Church in Fraser also included something of non-company control. The Fraser Baptist Church joined the Iowa Baptist Convention (Iowa Baptist State Convention, Annual Minutes, 1900). In this way, an external organization provided leadership in founding a church, and the members had some non-company control over

their lives. This was another example of vertical ties with a religious denomination forming a common interest with the vertical ties to the company. Indigenous communal control is also seen in the fact that the blacks raised some of their own support to build the building (BCR, Aug. 18, 1898).

The Gospel Tabernacle The other major church in Fraser's history was the Gospel Tabernacle, an independent church founded by J. Charles Crawford, who also founded the Gospel Tabernacle in Boone (Crawford, 1981). When the Gospel Tabernacle did build, it built several miles out of Fraser at Four Corners, and was thus unaffected by company control (Western Christian Alliance, July, 1910). The Gospel Tabernacle was the only major example of a church that did not receive land or financial help from the company. The Gospel Tabernacle was the result of vertical linkages and indigenous interest, not the company's support.

The Gospel Tabernacle near Fraser maintained strong external ties with its parent church, the Gospel Tabernacle in Boone. The Gospel Tabernacle in Boone had started a Biblical College and often sent their students to Fraser to preach. Some students from Fraser were also recruited to the Biblical College in Boone (Crawford, 1981).

The primary method of the Gospel Tabernacle was the revival meeting. They shared this in common with the Primitive Methodists, and in later years both held joint revival meetings (Lois Crawford, Interview,

1984). After most of the blacks left Fraser, the Gospel Tabernacle often set up their tent near the Primitive Methodist churches and in case of rain, held services in the black Baptist Church (Crawford, 1981). In later years, the Gospel Tabernacle would erect their tent next to the Primitive Methodist Church and hold joint Vacation Bible School for the children in the summer. In this way, horizontal linkages between community churches provided for sharing of resources.

Revivalism, which the major churches in Fraser held in common, was an appropriate response to the mobile population at Fraser. Each year a couple of periods of protracted meetings were held for the purpose of appealing to the largely unchurched but religious population (See BCD, July 31, 1896). At the end of the meetings, baptisms were held to solidify any gains. Baptisms were important enough to cut the ice in the river (BCD, Feb. 2, 1896). In 1905, Rev. Crawford held a revival meeting in which nearly 200 persons were converted, and 100 persons were baptised (Crawford, 1981). A photograph from that era in Fraser shows the levee in the Des Moines River covered with people attending a mass baptismal service.

Liston Pope's classic study, Millhands and Preachers (1942), found that revivalism was important in company towns with high population turnover. A church's impact had to be quick before people moved on. Highly emotional and protracted meetings with mass conversions and baptisms played this role in a company town with high geographic mobility.

The emotionalism and the style of ministry was well-adapted to the uneducated population in a mining town. This style of service appealed to communal sentiments already present in the culture. Lois Crawford tells of the style of services when her father preached and Julian Ross, a black, attended:

...Brother Ross would leave his seat, his big Bible open on his left palm, his ill-fitting glasses jiggling on his nose, and start to go up and down the aisles. His free right arm outstretched toward Papa, he would shout as he walked, "Preach it, boy; preach it, boy." Sometimes he would stop, as he went up and down, to give a personal nudge or exhortation to someone in the audience. Papa said it always made preaching easier for him when Brother Ross was there praying. Papa liked the shouting, too, and could even outshout Brother Ross...(Crawford, 1981:123).

Sometimes Julian Ross,

...would jump up and crack his heels together. "One time... a little dog that had got into the church went up and down the aisles, too, yapping at Brother Ross's heels" (Crawford, 1981:69, also Earl Winters, Interview, 1984).

Not only were services emotional and appealing to an uneducated population, but many of the preachers were either lay-preachers and/or uneducated preachers. William Morris, pastor of the Primitive Methodist Church, was a coal miner with no ministerial education. Charles Davis, pastor of the Gospel Tabernacle in Fraser, was a coal miner in one census and a preacher in the next.

Brandes (1970) found that American industrial capitalists and some company town owners saw religion as the ideal alternative to the saloon. Here, there was a confluence of vertical linkages with similar

interests. That may be why in Fraser, William Morris was encouraged by the business people to stay longer in Fraser with one of his revival meetings. Both William Morris and Charles Crawford were prohibitionists. Lois Crawford (1981) wrote of experiences when some from the meetings in Fraser would go down to the saloons to find one who was slipping back to drunkenness after having attended the church meetings.

In summary, the churches in Fraser functioned to provide some social and ideational control of the population for the company and serve a highly mobile population through revivalism. The two churches that built buildings in Fraser were the Primitive Methodist Church and the Black Baptist Church, which were subject to company control through financial assistance. Yet, they had strong vertical ties to their denominations and a popular base of support from church members. The one church that was built near Fraser without company help, the Gospel Tabernacle, was strongly linked by vertical ties to its parent church, the Gospel Tabernacle in Boone.

Interest in religion Religion as organized in Fraser was not simply the result of the company wanting the population churched and carrying out a plan to bring about churches in its town. There was a confluence of interests in Fraser such that the people, the external religious groups, and the company all wanted the same thing regarding religion. All had different reasons. The company wanted religion in Fraser as a form of social control, a way of encouraging industrious

ness on and off the job. The external religious groups and denominations were always looking for a new town in which to start one of their churches. The residents of Fraser, many of them religious before coming to Fraser, wanted a church in which to worship. All three groups seemed pleased enough to work together. In some instances, the churches were company controlled but they were not forced on the people. The Gospel Tabernacle was an instance of a church free from company control. The company had an interest in the churches and may have hoped that churches would thrive, but the company did not have full control of the churches in Fraser.

Education

The company did not completely dominate the lives of Fraser residents in education. There appears to have been a confluence of interests. The company, government and residents all had an interest in a viable educational institution in Fraser.

If the company was to attract labor to Fraser, they needed the non-economic institution of education. The more inexpensively they could cover that need, the better. The government and the townspeople also needed a school. The government had mandated an educated populace, and the townspeople both needed to meet that mandate and desired an education for their children. The company had obvious benefits from the school in Fraser, but it was not the only party to benefit from the school.

Within seven months after Fraser was built, a decision had been made to build a school in town (BCR, Apr. 4, 1894). The first school used by Fraser residents was located outside of Fraser (Daughter, 1976) and was built long before the town was a township school. In the summer of 1894, construction began (BCR, July 25, 1894). The Boone Valley Coal and Railway Company donated four lots for the school (Warranty Deed, Boone Valley Coal and Railway Co. to District Township of Dodge, Apr. 4, 1894). The stipulation was made that the Township must construct a building of at least \$1,400 value. Thus, the company was able to get the township to provide a school for the company town with as little incentive as \$200 worth of property. In 1896, Fraser formed an independent school district (BCD, Apr. 10, 1896), and in the summer the school was moved and enlarged. In 1904, the school building in Incline, Iowa, was purchased and attached to the Fraser school. Since Browne's company also owned the town of Incline, one could assume that they welcomed the opportunity to rid themselves of that school, as a part of dismantling the town of Incline.

The company may have held some ideational control in the school through influence over the school board. Of the seven people on the school board from 1897-1899 (BCR, Mar. 31, 1898; BCD, Mar. 30, 1900), one was a storemanager in the company store, five were coal mine employees, and one was a day laborer. Almost nobody on the school board at this time was free from company control through employment.

Still, company control over personnel for the school was not absolute. Nine different persons served as secretary or treasurer for the school district from 1897 to 1904. These were paid positions. Of the nine, the employment of seven is known from the census. Four were business owners, one a coal company clerk and two were miners. Possibly the business owners had skills that made them useful as secretary or treasurer for the school district. This may also be a small example of the non-coal company business class exercising some community control.

In the educational institution in Fraser, there was a confluence of vertical and communal interests. The government mandated an educated populous. It was a part of enculturating immigrants. The company probably hoped to transmit values of hard work and loyalty to future employees. The town population wanted their children educated.

Recreation and Entertainment

A number of recreational institutions grew up in Fraser. Some recreational institutions developed with company sponsorship, and others developed as community expression.

Holidays

Major holidays were celebrated with picnics in the town park, with the 4th of July and Labor Day the most significant. They were usually celebrated with a picnic, foot races, baseball games, a band, a dance and important speakers (BCD, July 1, 1898: Je. 13, 1901). In the years

that blacks lived in Fraser, they played a central role in these holiday celebrations. They held cake walks and barbeques, and invited the whites to celebrate with them (BCD, July 1, 1898; July 7, 1899). The appearances was that of a company picnic. In 1895, the miners' picnic on May 11 was attended by over 500 guests (BCR, May 15, 1895). They came by "trains from Ogden, Pilot Mound, Lehigh, Ft. Dodge, Angus and other nearby towns" (BCR, May 15, 1895). Over 2,000 people attended the Labor Day picnic in 1910 (BNR, Sept. 8, 1910). In one case, there was an annual Scotch picnic in Fraser (BCD, Jl. 31, 1896). This was a communal-ethnic expression and unrelated to company control.

Atheltic recreation

The major athletic recreation was baseball. Baseball was something of an institution in the community. There was weekly competition with other towns, sometimes with a purse as large as \$100 (BCR, May 28, 1908). The company provided land for a public park with a baseball diamond. Fraser generally had two or three active baseball teams. In 1899, Hamilton Browne purchased uniforms for the black baseball team (BCD, June 9, 1899). The occasion was a time of intense labor unrest, when black strikebreakers were tempted to join whites in unionizing (BCD, June 9, 1899; BCR, June 15, 1899). Browne's paternalism apparently worked, as only a small number of blacks joined the union (BCR, June 15, 1899).

Competitive foot races were held in conjunction with annual picnics (BCR, May 15, 1895). Foot races were also held in competition with other towns (BCD, July 19, 1901). Later, a football team was organized in Fraser (BNR, Sept. 19, 1907). A bicycle track operation in 1899 met with disapproval from some residents (BCD, Je. 9, 1899). In winter, ice skating parties were held on the river (BCD, Je. 22, 1897). Many of these athletic activities were generated by the community because they enjoyed them. The company was probably supportive of these activities, but knew that the town would support these on their own and simply let them do so.

Entertainment

There were no shortage of local entertainment events in Fraser. Often masquerade parties were held, as well as surprise parties in individual homes (BCR, Feb. 3, 1898; BCD, Oct. 30, 1896). There were orchestral concerts, drum-corp performances, amateur nights, and performances by fraternal organizations as fundraisers (BNR, Dec. 27, 1906; BCD, Feb. 9, 1906; BCD, Je. 8, 1906; BNR, July 30, 1908). Travelling road shows also brought in theatrical performances, medicine shows, novelty shows, circuses, stereo slide shows, movies, comedians, concerts with bubblemen, operas, and the Canadian Jubilee Singers (BNR, Dec. 6, 1906; BCR, May 9, 1907; BNR, Je. 27, 1907; BNR, Jan. 23, 1908; BNR, Apr. 2, 1908; BCD, Mar. 30, 1906; BCR, Dec. 5, 1907). The company

had no direct interest in these events, and apparently they were completely generated by communal interest.

Fishing

Some recreation had practical advantages. Fishing was an example. At times, the fish were plentiful. In the summer of 1907, it was claimed 1,000 fish were caught in one day (BNR, Je. 27, 1907). During a national coal miners strike, fishing and gardening became an important way of providing food (BCD, Apr. 17, 1908). Here, the people were organizing their own life in a way that may well have undermined company control. Fishing may have been recreational, but more likely it was a necessity. Armando Ferrari told of ice fishing in the Des Moines River and wondered how people ate the fish and survived. He recollected how the stench of sewer gas escaping from the hole in the ice used to make the fishermen nauseous (Armando Ferrari interview, 1984). Ft. Dodge dumped its sewage into the river upstream.

Saloons

Like many coal mining towns, saloons and liquor were a significant part of the community landscape. The company discouraged saloons. However, portable saloons both on wheels and on boats on the Des Moines River were common (BCR, May 14, 1896.) One saloon was dubbed the "white elephant" because it was built on four posts over the Des Moines River with a walkway extending over to the shore (BCD, Apr. 24, 1896). Portable saloons overcame company control that may have disallowed a

building in the town. In time a number of saloons opened on the fringes of town in sheds and other buildings (Boone News, Aug. 29, 1901). In one case a bootlegger was said to have pitched a tent and used it as a saloon (BCR, Nov. 19, 1896). Yet saloons may be less suggestive of internal community control than simple escapism by the miners. The local population created a demand for saloons.

Fraternal Organizations

Numerous lodges had weekly meetings and occasional celebrations in the Miner's Hall. The following men's lodges met regularly in Fraser: Odd Fellows, Redmen, Foresters of America, Knights of Pythias, Modoc Tribe, Sons of Daniel Boone, and the Good Templars (BCR, Nov. 30, 1905; BN, Jan. 19, 1905; BWN, Dec. 7, 1905). Women also had lodges which met regularly: Rebecca Lodge, Court Lilly of the Valley, Companions of the Forest, and Circle Pride Lodge (BCR, Nov. 30, 1905; BCD, Jan. 19, 1906; BCD, J1. 20, 1906).

Often lodges held dances or fundraising suppers. In 1905, the Court Lilly of the Valley held a Thanksgiving supper for 150 guests, complete with musical presentations and guest speakers (BN, Dec. 7, 1905). The Red Men held a dance and Thanksgiving supper in the same week for 53 guests (BN, Dec. 7, 1905).

It is difficult to know from the sparse records, the composition of officers in the lodges. In the Foresters of America in 1903,

the store owners and a hotel owner were dominant leaders (BCD, Jan. 16, 1905). In the Knights of Pythias for 1905, all the leaders were coal mine employees (BCD, Dec. 15, 1905). The company had little interest in promoting lodges. They were communally generated. They also were established by vertical linkages to lodges in other locations. Besides the obvious fraternity provided by the lodges, they also provided a service to the community and to individuals in need through mutual aid. Late in 1909, with the decline in coal mining and population, the Knights of Pythias closed their lodge, and most other lodges were dying out (BNR, Nov 11, 1909).

Mutual Aid

Little is known of how people banded together to help each other in cases of emergencies in Fraser. What little remains in the documentary record comes from Boone County newspapers.

Orphans

The way in which orphans were cared for in Fraser shows that both personal help and institutional help were important factors in providing mutual aid in Fraser. It also provides a case in which local voluntary organizations provided a vertical link with institutions providing mutual aid for many communities. In 1909, Charles Olsen died from pneumonia. He and his wife had just adopted a girl from Des Moines and his wife was unable to provide for her at his death. Another couple from Fraser, the Watsons who owned a store, adopted her (BCD, Apr. 9,

1909; BNR, Apr. 29, 1909). They later adopted a son. When Ira Showers died in 1906, his children were taken to the Odd Fellows Home in Mason City, Iowa (BCD, Apr. 13, 1906). When the three black children of Richard and Anne Payne were orphaned, they were raised by the Gospel Tabernacle orphanage in Boone (Nayse Daugherty interview, 1984; Lawrence Payne interview, 1984).

Care for the indigent

Apparently in the case of a mining accident, the mining company could not be counted on to help the victim when they were no longer productive. In some cases, the community banded together to help the victims. In 1896, the Knights of Pythias gave a dance as a benefit for a member who had lost a leg as a result of a mining accident (BCD, Nov. 27, 1896). When Charles Forbes experienced a similar amputation in 1898, the community made a collection for him and received \$135 (BCR, Feb. 3, 1898). When James Hulbert, a mine foreman, was killed under a fall of slate in 1902, he left a wife and eight children. The Odd Fellows took care of the funeral arrangements (BCD, July 4, 1902). The community made a fundraising event out of the July 4th celebration and gave the proceeds to his widow (BCD, July 4, 1902). When Phillip Showers suffered a stroke in 1906, the community took up a collection to help him (BCD, Apr. 27, 1906; May 18, 1906). Showers was on some kind of pension, which paid him \$12.00 per month, and a group in Fraser was working to get that increased (BCD, Aug. 17, 1906). Apparently,

the attempt was unsuccessful (BCD, Dec. 11, 1906). In 1907, a collection was taken to help pay for a second trial for Len Wemply from Fraser who was sentenced to 30 years in prison in Des Moines (BNR, May 9, 1907).

In many of the cases where mutual aid was provided in Fraser, the voluntary organizations in Fraser either directly provided the aid or became the vertical link to institutions outside of Fraser.

Non-economic Institutions as Defiance of Company Control

In some cases the company worked to gain control over non-economic institutions for its own advantage as it did with churches. In other cases the company paid little attention to non-economic institutions, such as fraternities and recreation. Other non-economic institutional arrangements were formed, which the company could neither control nor ignore. The formation of the United Mine Workers of America and the incorporation of Fraser were two such institutional arrangements which developed in defiance of company control. The case of the union involved the workers making an alliance with an external organization that could compete with the company for power over the lives of the workers. The incorporation of Fraser was an indigenous movement to arrest company control.

United Mine Worker of America

One institution that held the potential of mediating external control in company towns was the union. Through the union, the workers

could use a solidarity alliance with an external organization in hopes of winning concessions from the company. The solidarity included solidarity on a national level. In this way, the United Mine Workers of America was a vertical tie in defiance of the company's control of Fraser.

Actually the United Mine Workers Union in Fraser did show success in mediating external control. In 1896, L. P. Joyce, the state president of the United Mine Workers, came to Fraser and discussed organizing a union at Fraser (BCR, April 14, 1898). This was immediately after a disastrous failure of striking miners to receive any concessions from the company in a five month work stoppage in 1897. The company had successfully broken the strike by importing black strikebreakers.

In 1899, John Ream, District President of the United Mine Workers came to Fraser and was successful in organizing a local union (BCD, June 23, 1899). Initially, 94 miners, of which twelve were black, joined the union. The company fired a number of them, and the rest of the miners struck. The company imported black miners and a contingent of 200 white union miners from nearby Milford and Logansport came to Fraser to "...have a talk with the colored miners..." (BCR, July 27, 1899). The blacks knew better than to show up for the talks, and formed an armed militia of 23 men with Winchester rifles and pistols. Blacks began holding target practice in the streets, and in a short the white miners and their families left town in large numbers (BCD, July 28, 1899). A number of violent incidents followed over the next

few months, with some blacks shooting blacks, and a white strikebreaker shooting a white striking miner (BCR, Sept. 21, 1899). While the violence showed no signs of being organized or racially motivated, it was indicative of the fact that the strikebreakers felt the need to carry weapons at all times.

By October, there was a growing coal shortage, and Hamilton Browne recognized the United Mine Workers Union in Fraser, giving them a ten cent per ton pay raise (BCR, October 12, 1899; Nov. 9, 1899). The work of the Fraser miners also resulted in a raise for other miners in the county (BCR, Nov. 9, 1899). The union would play an important part in the lives of the miners in Fraser in the years to come. In 1907, the retail clerks also organized a union in Fraser (BNR, Oct. 17, 1907).

It was surely through the union that a large portion of the Fraser population became socialist in their political persuasion. Although other parties exercised influence among Fraser residents, the Socialist Party became the party of choice. In 1906, four Fraser residents ran for Boone County positions on the Socialist ticket. Since Fraser had incorporated in 1904, they could elect local officials. Their full slate of local officials in 1906 were socialists (Nov. 30, 1906). It appears that the labor union movement had provided Fraser residents with a counter ideology to company control in the form of socialism.

Fraser's incorporation as a Town

One of the keys to company control of a company town was not only ownership of the principal housing and businesses in the town, but political control as well. When the citizens of Fraser decided to incorporate the town, they met serious resistance from the owners. In 1903, a Petition was presented in District Court in Boone to incorporate Fraser. It was signed by 112 workers, of which 82 were miners. The election was carried in favor of incorporation by a vote of 87 to 57. However, the election was legally challenged by William A. Kelly. Kelly was one of the owners of the corporation that owned the town along with Hamilton Browne (BN, Sept. 25, 1902). Kelly, who lived in Fraser, could act in the interests of the company in a way that Browne, now living in Chicago, could not. The case went to court, but the judge finally ruled in favor of the incorporators late in 1903 (Articles of Incorporation, Fraser, Iowa).

The immediate effect of incorporation was to choose a local town government. Nobody representing the company was elected to office. By 1906, the whole slate of elected officials in Fraser were from the Socialist ticket (BCD, Nov. 30, 1906).

There were some other changes in Fraser following incorporation. The town built a jail (BN, June 8, 1904). The streets were graded and filled, and gravel sidewalks were laid (BCD, November 24, 1905). The Fraser Supply Store, the company store owned by the corporation owning the town, was sold to new owners. While the investors in the new firm,

the Fraser Mercantile, were not local, for the first time they were not the same people on the Board of the railroad that owned the town. With the new ownership of the Fraser Supply Store, came a decision to open a savings deposit system to function like a bank, paying interest on deposits for the first time (BCD, November 24, 1905). By incorporating, the citizens of Fraser had taken some control over their own lives.

Ironically, the very time when the citizens were gaining some control over their own lives through communal initiative and vertical ties with organizations other than the company, was the very time the company was making ready to close down mining operations in Fraser.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that many of the non-economic institutions were examples of communal initiative and vertical ties with organizations wishing to organize in Fraser. Warren (1972) did not paint vertical ties in completely negative terms. While the vertical ties to the company of Hamilton Browne and James J. Hill appear to have had negative effects on the lives of Fraser residents, other vertical ties may have been welcomed and even helpful. The question may not be so much whether linkages were vertical or horizontal, but who was initiating such linkages and in whose interests. Center and periphery literature describes the tremendous dissimilarity of interests between

the center and periphery. It appears that Fraser was on the periphery in terms of the economic organization of the town and this was found in the dissimilar interests to St. Paul, Minnesota. However, in the non-economic relations, the center and periphery relationship may have had no negative connotations at all. The Fraser residents both appreciated and were helped by these vertical ties.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

This thesis is a social-historical community study of a coal mining company town in the Midwest at the end of the nineteenth century. The theoretical perspectives of community literature (Warren, 1972), coal mining company town literature, and center and periphery literature, have been used to frame the story of Fraser, Iowa.

This thesis found exception to Warren's (1972) great change thesis that suggested that communities in the nineteenth century did not experience the extent of vertical ties that predominate in communities in the twentieth century. In this study, vertical ties were found to predominate the economic structures and non-economic institutions from the very beginning of Fraser. The very growth in horizontal ties that took place, as many non-economic institutions took root in Fraser, were fostered in relations with organizations outside of Fraser.

That vertical ties were common in coal mining and company towns is clear from the literature (Corbin, 1981). This thesis adds to that discussion the uniqueness of placing the town of Fraser in a context of external control that is intentional. This was done through the study of correspondence between James J. Hill of St. Paul, Minnesota, and Hamilton Browne of Boone, Iowa. Hill, as the correspondence shows, directly controlled Browne at every juncture. Both showed that they intended to control Fraser for their own profits. This thesis also documents Hill's control of Browne through debt servicing.

This whole phenomenon of external control of a community fits better into the existing center and periphery perspective through the Hill and Browne connection. Fraser can easily be understood as a peripheral community linked to a center metropolis through Hamilton Browne. But if this thesis challenges Warren's (1972) great change thesis in suggesting that Fraser was dominated by vertical ties from the beginning, it also offers a challenge to center and periphery literature.

It may be that the vertical ties that were established in Fraser are not only significant because of their being vertical. It could be that the significance lies in the question of who initiated those ties and who benefitted from them. In the case of the company's external domination, the company initiated the ties and it was completely for the benefit of the company. In the case of the non-economic institutional vertical ties, many of them were either initiated by community groups or welcomed by the community. They appear to have benefitted the community as well as the unit of groups external to Fraser. It may be that the center and periphery theoretical perspective has most to offer in its analysis of the economic bases of a social system, but it is unclear if the non-economic vertical linkages were those of a periphery linking to the center.

Having granted that rejoinder, external control by the center was still the key to Fraser's history. In the case of this coal mining company town, the very time when the townspeople were gaining control

over some of their lives through vertical ties and communal initiative, the company lost economic interest in Fraser. The most profitable coal had been mined shortly after 1905, and the company was no longer interested in Fraser. In the end, the economic control exercised by the center over this periphery was the decisive factor. When the company decided not to open any more mines, the town went into irreversable decline.

Although Fraser was the theme of this thesis study, it was a peripheral concern of James J. Hill in St. Paul. Hill's control of Browne and Browne's control of Fraser dominated the life of that community but was only a small concern to Hill. For Hill and Browne, the abandonment of Iowa interests was a simple economic matter. Nute (n.d.) noted the way the decision was made.

When Illinois coal became more easily available, cheaper, and of better quality for his purposes than Iowa coal, Hill with characteristic lack of sentimental loyalty abandoned the Iowa coal field in favor of the bigger and better field....

Hamilton Browne and James J. Hill turned their interests to Illinois (Nute n.d.) and Fraser was quickly forgotten. By 1914, when a historian visited Fraser, he considered it nearly a ghost town (Goldwaite, n.d.:214)

A visit to the town...found the population reduced to less than three hundred. Half the buildings, both business and residences, were empty....
...it will not be long until the house of Fraser will be sold, torn down, and hauled away....

The only reason that Fraser was not completely dismantled and moved to another coal mining site was that it had become the

center of a railroad, the Ft. Dodge, Des Moines, and Southern Railway. From Fraser they generated electric power through a coal fired generator. Ironically, coal was now shipped into Fraser to fire the generator to run this railroad. The townsite was sold to speculators in Boone County. The only people who stayed in Fraser were a few small business owners and the workers at the power plant.

Today Fraser has no businesses and has one church which continues to meet weekly with a few members. The town provides housing for commuters and retired people. The population is less than 150 people. The church is served by a pastor from Boone, who also serves a church in Boone. In every way today, the most significant ties in Fraser, what is left of Fraser, are vertical ties. It is the prototypical example of what Frank (1975) refers to as a "ghost region" after the center loses interest in the periphery.

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APPENDIX

There are no Tables 1, 9, and 10.

Table 2. 1900: U.S. born by state of origin

State	White	%	Black	%	Total	% of U.S. Born
Iowa	372	58.7	14	2.2	386	60.9
Illinois	19	3.0	17	2.7	36	5.7
Indiana	18	2.8	12	1.9	30	4.7
Missouri	5	.8	26	4.1	31	4.9
Kansas	4	.6	8	1.3	12	1.9
Ohio	12	1.9	--	--	12	1.9
Pennsylvania	23	3.6	--	--	23	3.6
Virginia ^a	--	--	28	4.4	28	4.4
Kentucky	1	.2	17	2.7	18	2.8
Tennessee	1	.2	6	.9	7	1.1
N. Carolina	--	--	13	2.1	13	2.1
Georgia	--	--	5	.8	5	.8
Alabama	1	.2	11	1.7	12	1.9
Other ^b	15	2.4	6	.9	21	3.3

^aOften no distinction as to which Virginia. Probably most often West Virginia.

^bOthers include Colorado, Montana, Dakota, Wisconsin, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Mississippi, and Indian Territory.

Table 3. 1900: U.S. born by state of origin, excluding Iowa

State	White	%	Black	%	Total	% of U.S. Born
Illinois	19	7.7	17	6.9	36	14.5
Indiana	18	7.3	12	4.8	30	12.1
Missouri	5	2.0	26	10.5	31	12.5
Kansas	4	1.6	8	3.2	12	4.8
Ohio	12	4.8	--	--	12	4.8
Pennsylvania	23	9.3	--	--	23	9.3
Virginia ^a	--	--	28	11.3	28	11.3
Kentucky	1	.4	17	6.9	18	7.3
Tennessee	1	.4	6	2.4	7	2.8
N. Carolina	--	--	13	5.2	13	5.2
Georgia	--	--	5	2.0	5	2.0
Alabama	1	.4	11	4.4	12	4.8
Other ^b	15	6.0	6	2.4	21	8.5

^aOften no distinction as to which Virginia. Probably most often West Virginia.

^bOthers include Colorado, Montana, Dakota, Wisconsin, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Mississippi, and Indian Territory.

Table 4. 1905 U.S. born by state

State	Total	% U.S. Born	% All Fraser
Colorado	2	.2	.2
Dakota	4	.4	.3
Illinois	44	4.5	3.5
Indiana	15	1.5	1.2
Iowa	733	74.9	59.0
Kansas	9	.9	.7
Kentucky	3	.3	.2
Maryland	4	.4	.3
Michigan	7	.7	.6
Missouri	23	2.4	1.9
Nebraska	18	1.8	1.4
New Hampshire	2	.2	.2
New York	9	.9	.7
North Carolina	2	.2	.2
Ohio	15	1.5	1.2
Oklahoma	2	.2	.2
Pennsylvania	42	4.3	3.4
Tennessee	1	.1	.1
Texas	2	.2	.2
West Virginia	1	.1	.1
Wisconsin	6	.6	.5
Virginia	7	.7	.6
Washington	2	.2	.2
Unknown	25	2.6	2.0
TOTAL			
U.S. born	978	100.0%	78.7%
Foreign born	236		19.0%
TOTAL			
U.S./foreign	1,214		97.7%
Missing value	28		2.3%
TOTAL	1,243		100.0%

Table 5. 1905: U.S. born by state of origin, excluding Iowa

State	Persons	%
Illinois	44	18.0
Indiana	15	6.1
Missouri	23	9.4
Kansas	9	3.7
Ohio	15	6.1
Pennsylvania	42	17.1
Virginia ^a	8	3.3
Kentucky	3	1.2
Tennessee	1	.4
N. Carolina	2	.8
Nebraska	18	7.3
Other ^b	65	26.5
TOTAL	245	99.9

^aOften no distinction as to which Virginia. Probably most often West Virginia.

^bOthers include 25 persons of unknown origin.

Table 6. 1895: Recent origins measure; children's birthplace

Birthplace County	0-4 yrs. %		5-9 yrs. %		10-14 yrs. %		Total %	
Boone	32	41.6	44	50.6	29	45.3	105	46.1
Webster	21	27.3	12	13.8	14	21.9	47	20.6
Story	--	--	1	1.1	1	1.6	2	.9
Polk	7	9.1	1	1.1	--	--	8	3.5
Dallas	8	10.4	10	11.5	1	1.6	19	8.3
Greene	2	2.6	4	4.6	2	3.1	8	3.5
Carroll	1	1.3	--	--	2	3.1	3	1.3
Other	3	3.9	7	8.0	4	6.3	14	6.1
U.S. (outside Iowa)	2	2.6	4	4.6	5	7.8	11	4.8
Foreign	1	1.3	4	4.6	6	9.4	11	4.8
TOTAL	77	100.1	87	99.9	64	100.1	228	99.9

Table 7. 1900: Blacks state of origin

State	Number	Percentage
Iowa	14	8.6
Missouri	26	16.0
Illinois	17	10.4
Indiana	12	7.4
Kansas	8	4.9
Kentucky	17	10.4
Tennessee	6	3.7
Alabama	11	6.7
Georgia	5	3.1
N. Carolina	13	8.0
Virginia	28	17.2
Other ^a	6	3.7
Total	163	100.1

^aOther includes one each for Michigan, Washington, Indian Territory, Mississippi, and two from Texas.

Table 8. Fraser Ethnic Population: 1900, 1905, 1910

Ethnic Group	1900		1905		1910		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
United States	455	60.1	609	49.0	224	46.0	1,288	51.8
British Isles ^a	152	20.1	291	23.4	131	26.9	574	23.1
Scandinavia ^b	87	11.5	152	12.2	54	11.1	293	11.8
Germany	40	5.3	37	3.0	14	2.9	91	3.7
Slavic ^c	4	.5	25	2.0	19	3.9	48	1.9
Russia	13	1.7	44	3.5			57	2.3
Italy	2	.3	29	2.3	30	6.2	61	2.5
Other ^d	4	.5	26	2.1	6	1.2	36	1.4
Unknown ^d			30	2.4	9	1.8	39	1.6
TOTAL	757	100.0	1,243	99.9	487	100.0	2,487	100.0

^aEngland, Ireland, Wales, Scotland.

^bSweden, Norway, Denmark.

^cHungary, Austria, Bohemia, Lithuania.

^dCanada, France, Switzerland.

Table 11. 1895 age by gender

Age	Males	%	Females	%	Total	%
0 - 4	39	6.2	38	6.0	77	12.2
5 - 9	48	7.6	42	6.7	90	14.3
10-14	33	5.2	31	4.9	64	10.2
15-19	30	4.8	32	5.1	62	9.8
20-24	49	7.8	22	3.5	71	11.3
25-29	35	5.6	16	2.5	51	8.1
30-34	47	7.5	20	3.2	67	10.6
35-39	30	4.8	21	3.3	51	8.1
40-44	14	2.2	5	0.8	19	3.0
45-49	22	3.5	8	1.3	30	4.8
50-54	11	1.7	9	1.4	20	3.2
55-59	6	1.0	2	0.3	8	1.3
60-64	3	0.5	3	0.5	6	1.0
65-69	3	0.5	0	0.0	3	0.5
70-74	3	0.5	1	0.2	4	0.6
75-89	1	0.2	2	0.3	3	0.5
Age Unknown	0	.0	0	.0	0	.0
Subtotal	374	59.6	252	40.0	626	99.6
Missing values	2	0.3	2	0.3	4	0.6
TOTAL	376	59.9	254	40.3	630	100.2

Table 12. 1900 age by gender

Age	Males	%	Females	%	Total	%
0 - 4	66	8.7	40	5.3	106	14.0
5 - 9	41	5.4	44	5.8	85	11.2
10-14	47	6.2	46	6.1	93	12.3
15-19	39	5.2	37	4.9	76	10.0
20-24	35	4.6	35	4.6	70	9.2
25-29	50	6.6	29	3.8	79	10.4
30-34	30	4.0	31	4.1	61	8.1
35-39	38	5.0	17	2.2	55	7.3
40-44	22	2.9	15	2.0	37	4.9
45-49	20	2.6	14	1.8	34	4.5
50-54	18	2.4	5	0.7	23	3.0
55-59	12	1.6	6	0.8	18	2.4
60-64	4	0.5	4	0.5	8	1.1
65-69	1	0.1	1	0.1	2	.3
70-74	1	0.1	1	0.1	2	.3
75-89	1	0.1	1	0.1	2	.3
Age Unknown	3	.4	3	.4	6	0.8
Subtotal	428	56.4	329	43.3	757	100.1
Missing values	0	.0	0	.0	0	.0
TOTAL	425	56.6	329	43.3	757	100.0

Table 13. 1905 Age by gender

Age	Males	%	Females	%	Total	%
0 - 4	88	7.1	98	7.9	186	15.0
5 - 9	73	5.9	76	6.1	149	12.0
10-14	62	5.0	58	4.7	120	9.7
15-19	70	5.6	62	5.0	132	10.6
20-24	69	5.6	61	4.9	130	10.4
25-29	64	5.1	46	3.7	110	8.8
30-34	57	4.6	23	1.9	80	6.4
35-39	41	3.3	35	2.8	76	6.1
40-44	30	2.4	27	2.2	57	4.6
45-49	36	2.9	24	1.9	60	4.8
50-54	21	1.7	10	.8	31	2.5
55-59	21	1.7	10	.8	31	2.5
60-64	11	.9	7	.6	18	1.4
65-69	3	.2	4	.3	7	.6
70-74	5	.4	0	.0	5	.4
75-89	1	.1	1	.1	2	.2
Age Unknown	23	1.9	18	1.5	42	3.4
Subtotal	674	54.4	560	45.2	1,235	99.4
Missing values	4	.3	4	.3	8	.6
TOTAL	678.5	54.00	564.5	45.5	1,243	100.0

Table 14. 1910 age by gender

Age	Males	%	Females	%	Total	%
0 - 4	38	7.8	36	7.4	74	15.2
5 - 9	35	7.2	32	6.6	67	13.8
10-14	29	6.0	31	6.4	60	12.3
15-19	23	4.7	21	4.3	44	9.0
20-24	28	5.7	16	3.3	44	9.0
25-29	21	4.3	15	3.1	36	7.4
30-34	21	4.3	18	3.7	39	8.0
35-39	13	2.7	10	2.1	23	4.7
40-44	9	1.8	7	1.4	16	3.4
45-49	10	2.1	12	2.5	22	4.5
50-54	13	2.7	10	2.1	23	4.7
55-59	6	1.2	7	1.4	13	2.7
60-64	7	1.4	4	0.8	11	2.3
65-69	6	1.2	4	0.8	10	2.1
70-74	1	0.2	1	0.2	2	.4
75-89	0	.0	0	0.2	1	.2
Age Unknown	0	.0	1	0.2	1	.2
Subtotal	260	53.3	226	46.5		99.9
Missing values	.5	.1	.5	.1	1	.1
TOTAL		53.40		46.6	487	100.0

Table 15. 1900: Age and gender of Fraser blacks

Age	Males	%	Females	%	Total	%
0 - 4	9	5.5	6	3.7	15	9.2
5 - 9	3	1.8	9	5.5	12	7.4
10-14	9	5.5	12	7.4	21	12.9
15-19	4	2.5	10	6.1	14	8.6
20-24	4	2.5	9	5.5	13	8.0
25-29	11	6.7	11	6.7	22	13.5
30-34	17	10.4	12	7.4	29	17.8
35-39	15	9.2	1	.6	16	9.8
40-44	3	1.8	2	1.2	5	3.1
45-49	4	2.5	2	1.2	6	3.7
50-54	2	1.2	1	.6	3	1.8
55-59	2	1.2	1	.6	3	1.8
60-64						
65-69						
70-74			1	.6	1	.6
75-89						
Age Unknown	2	1.2	1	.6	3	1.8
TOTAL	85	52.0	78	47.7	163	100.0

Table 16. 1905 Gender by ethnic group

<u>Ethnic</u>	<u>Gender Male</u>	<u>Gender Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sweden	25	17	42
Norway	3	4	7
Denmark	1	1	2
England	22	12	34
Scotland	27	14	41
Wales	3	2	5
Ireland	3	0	3
France	4	1	5
Canada	2	3	5
Australia	3	0	3
Germany	10	5	15
Switzerland	0	2	2
Austria	1	1	2
Hungary	9	6	15
Russia	26	7	33
Italy	15	7	22
Total Foreign	154	82	236

Table 17. 1895 - 1910^a Number of households by household size

House- hold Size	1895			1900			1910			TOTAL		
	(587) # of House- holds	(630) % of House- holds	(630) % of Popu- lation	(728) # of House- holds	(728) % of House- holds	(757) % of Popu- lation	# of House- holds	% of House- holds	(487) % of Popu- lation	# of House- holds	% of House- holds	% of Popu- lation
1	1	1.0	.2	5	3.2	.7	5	4.8	1.0	11	3.1	.6
2	9	9.2	2.9	21	13.5	5.5	9	8.6	3.7	39	10.9	4.2
3	10	10.2	4.8	32	20.6	12.7	20	19.0	12.3	62	17.3	10.0
4	9	9.2	5.7	29	18.7	15.3	22	21.0	18.1	60	16.8	12.8
5	17	17.3	13.5	16	10.3	10.6	19	18.1	19.5	52	14.5	13.9
6	13	13.3	12.4	17	11.0	13.5	9	8.6	11.1	39	10.9	12.5
7	13	13.3	14.4	14	9.0	12.9	9	8.6	12.9	36	10.1	13.4
8	12	12.2	15.2	9	5.8	9.5	6	5.7	9.9	27	7.5	11.5
9	4	4.1	5.7	7	4.5	8.3	5	4.8	9.2	16	4.5	7.7
10	5	5.1	7.9	2	1.3	2.6				7	2.0	3.7
11	3	3.1	5.2	2	1.3	2.9	1	1.0	2.3	6	1.7	3.5
12				1	.6	1.6				1	.3	.6
16	1	1.0	2.5							1	.3	.9
17	1	1.0	2.7							1	.3	.9
TOTAL	98	100.0	93.1 ^b	155	99.8	96.1 ^c	105	100.2	100.0	358	100.2	96.2 ^d

^a1905 data not available.

^bIn 1895, 6.7% of the population, or 42 people, lived in two boarding houses or hotels.

^cIn 1900, 4.0% of the population, or 30 people, lived in two boarding houses or hotels.

^d3.8% of the population in the three censuses totalled, or 72 people, lived in boarding houses.

Table 18. Fraser households with boarders 1895-1900^a

Numbers of Boarders Household	1895 (630)			1900 (757)				No. of Boarders Households	No. of House- holds	% of all Households	% of Population
	No. of House- holds	% of House- holds	% of Population	No. of Boarders Households	% of House- holds	% of Population					
0	64	64.0	78.9	0	124	80.0	90.4	0	188	73.7	85.2
1	10	10.0	10.0	1	16	10.3	2.1	1	26	10.2	1.9
2	7	7.0	2.2	2	8	5.2	2.1	2	15	5.9	2.2
3	7	7.0	3.3	3	2	1.3	.8	3	9	3.5	1.9
4	4	4.0	2.5	4	1	.6	.5	4	5	2.0	1.4
5	3	3.0	2.4	5	1	.6	.7	5	4	1.6	1.4
6	1	1.0	1.0	6	1	.6	.8	6	2	.8	.9
7				7				7			
8	1	1.0	1.3	8	1	.6	1.1	8	2	.8	1.2
9				9				9			
10				10				10			
11				11	1	.6	1.5	11	1	.4	.8
12	1	1.0	1.9					12	1	.4	.8
14 ^b	1	1.0	2.2					14	1	.4	.9
17 ^c	1	1.0	2.7					17	1	.4	1.2
TOTAL	100	100.0	100.0		155	99.3	100.0		255	100.1	100.0

^a1910 No households showed boarders. No boardinghouses or hotels operated. 1905 data unavailable.

^bMyers Hotel (Boardinghouse).

^cDonahue Hotel (Boardinghouse).

Table 19. Number of black boarders per household in 1900

Boarders	Number of Households	% of Households	% of Black Residents
0	22	56.4	--
1	9	23.1	5.5
2	6	15.4	7.4
3			
4	1	2.6	2.5
5	1	2.6	3.1
TOTAL	39	100.1	18.5

Table 20. 1895 - 1900 Number of families^a by family size

Family Size	1895			1900			Total No. of Families	% of all Families	% of total Population
	(496) No. of Families	(496) % of families	(630) % of Population	(682) No. of Families	(682) % of Families	(757) % of Population			
1	1	1.0	.2	11	7.1	1.5	12	4.7	.9
2	17	17.0	5.4	24	15.5	6.3	41	16.1	5.9
3	14	14.0	6.7	31	20.0	12.3	45	17.6	9.7
4	9	9.0	5.1	26	16.8	13.7	35	13.7	9.8
5	17	17.0	13.5	14	9.0	9.2	31	12.2	11.2
6	15	15.0	14.3	18	11.6	14.3	33	12.9	14.3
7	11	11.0	12.2	13	8.4	12.0	24	9.4	12.1
8	11	11.0	14.0	9	5.8	9.5	20	7.8	11.5
9	3	3.0	4.3	7	4.5	8.3	10	3.9	6.5
10	2	2.0	3.2				2	.8	1.4
11				2	1.3	2.9	2	.8	1.6
12									
16									
17									
TOTAL	100	100.0	78.9	155	100.0	90.0	255	99.9	84.9

^aFamily = one or more individuals related by blood residing in one place. (In the rare case where two families related to each other reside in one residence, they are counted separately.) When an individual relative lives with a family, such as a mother-in-law, they are counted as part of the family.

Table 21. Black family size: 1900

Family Size	Number of Families	% of Families	% of Black Persons
1	1	2.6	.6
2	8	20.5	9.8
3	17	43.6	31.3
4	8	20.5	19.6
5	3	7.7	9.2
8	1	2.6	4.9
9	1	2.6	5.5
TOTAL	39	100.1	80.9 ^a

^a132 or 81.0% persons lived with relations as family. Thirty persons or 18.4% were boarders. The discrepancy of .6% is found in the fact that two Blacks boarded with a white family and one white boarded with a black family.

Table 22. 1900, 1910 Home ownership/rental by number of paid workers in household^a

No. of Paid Workers/ House- hold	% of 1900			% of 1900			% of 1910			% of 1910			TOTAL			TOTAL		
	1900 Own	1900 Owners	1900 House- holds	1900 Rent	1900 Renters	1900 House- holds	1910 Own	1910 Owners	1910 House- holds	1910 Rent	1910 Renters	1910 House- holds	1900/ 1910 Own	1900/ 1910 Own	1900/ 1910 Households	1900/ 1910 Rent	1900/ 1910 Rent	1900/ 1910 Households
0	1	1.9	.7	1	1.0	.7							1	.8	.4	1	.7	.4
1	28	51.9	18.4	60	61.2	39.5	36	53.7	34.6	26	70.3	25.0	64	52.9	25.0	86	63.7	33.6
2	8	14.8	5.3	23	23.5	15.1	19	28.4	18.3	7	18.9	6.7	27	22.3	10.5	30	22.2	11.7
3	7	13.0	4.6	8	8.2	5.3	8	11.9	7.7	4	10.8	3.8	15	12.4	5.9	12	8.9	4.7
4	6	11.1	3.9	3	3.1	2.0	3	4.5	2.9				9	7.4	3.5	3	2.2	1.2
5	1	1.9	.7	1	1.0	.7	1	1.5	1.0				2	1.7	.8	1	.7	.4
6																		
7	1	1.9	.7										1	.8	.4			
Missing Value	2	3.7	1.3	2	2.0	1.3							2	1.7	.8	2	1.5	.8
TOTAL	54	100.2	35.6	98	100.0	64.6	67	100.0	64.5	37	100.0	35.5	121	100.0	47.3	135	99.9	52.8

^aExclusive of two boardinghouses/hotels found in 1900 and not found in 1910. In 1900, the Donahue Hotel housed 12 paid workers including the owner. The Myers Hotel housed ten paid workers including the owner. Both hotels were owned by Donahue & Myers respectively.

Table 23. Occupations

	1895	%	1900	%	1905	%	1910	%
<u>Agricultural</u>								
Farmer	22		4		4		8	
Farm laborer			4				1	
Retired farmer			2					
TOTAL	22	10.2	10	5.3	4	.9	9	5.5
<u>Professional and semi-professional</u>								
Nurse							1	
Veterinarians					1			
Teachers	2		3		4		1	
School principal							1	
Physician	2		2		2		1	
Clergyman			2				1	
Druggist			1		1		1	
Music teacher					3		1	
TOTAL	4	1.9	8	4.3	11	2.4	7	4.3
<u>Personal services</u>								
Hotel/owner	2		2		1			
Hotel/servants			2					
Barbers	1		2		2		1	
Restaurant(cook)							1	
Saloonkeeper			1				1	
Pool hall proprietor			1				1	
TOTAL	3	1.4	8	4.3	3	.6	3	1.8
<u>Business</u>								
Merchant/manager	6		3		3		4	
Clerk/sales	1		6		7		3	
Bookkeeper							3	
Delivery					1		1	
TOTAL	7	3.3	9	4.8	11	2.4	11	6.7
<u>Transportation/communication</u>								
Drayman/teamster	1		4		7		1	
Postal clerk			1				1	
Postmistress					1			
Newsboy							1	
TOTAL	1	.5	5	2.7	8	1.7	3	1.8

Table 23. (continued)

	1895	%	1900	%	1905	%	1910	%
<u>Artsians</u>								
Carpenter	6		1		3		1	
Blacksmith			2		3		1	
Dressmaker	1		3		1		3	
Butcher	1		1		3		1	
Machinist	1				1			
Well driller			1					
Wood cutter			1				3	
Mason	1				1			
Tinner			1		1			
Milliner					1			
Canvasser					1			
Cobbler					1			
TOTAL	10	4.7	10	5.3	16	3.4	9	5.5
<u>Coal Company Employees</u>								
Superintendent			1		2			
Mine foreman					1			
Weighmaster			3		3			
Hoisting engineer (stationary engine)			4		4		2	
Fireman							1	
Driller							1	
Miner	159		89		322		89	
Night watchman					2			
Laborer							3	
Office clerk	1		1		1			
Bookkeeper			1		2		1	
Stenographer			1					
TOTAL	160	74.4	100	53.2	337	72.2	97	59.1
<u>Railroad</u>								
General manager			1		1			
Engineer	2		1		1			
Conductor			1					
Station agent							1	
Section gang/laborer			3				4	
Locomotive fireman					2			
Unspecified	3				1			
TOTAL	5	2.3	6	3.2	5	1.1	5	3.0

Table 23. (continued)

	1895	%	1900	%	1905	%	1910	%
<u>Tile Factory</u>								
Foreman								
Laborer							4	
Engineer							1	
TOTAL							5	3.0
<u>Electric power plant</u>								
Superintendent								
Foreman								
Fireman							4	
Laborer							5	
TOTAL							9	5.5
<u>Laborer</u>								
Day laborer			26		34		3	
Domestic servants					32		2	
Washerwoman					2			
Janitor							1	
Cook			1					
TOTAL			27	14.4	68	14.6	6	3.7
<u>Other</u>								
Soldier			1					
Invalid			3					
Retired	3		1		4			
TOTAL	3	1.4	5	2.7	4	.9		
TOTAL	215	100.1	188	100.2	467	100.2	164	99.9

Table 24. Women's occupations: 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910

Occupation	1895	1900	1905	1910
Nurse				1
School teacher	2	2	4	1
Music teacher			3	1
Store clerk		1	2	
Bookkeeper				3
Postal clerk				1
Postmistress			1	
Dressmaker	1	2	1	2
Millinary			1	
Domestic servant			32	2
Washerwoman			2	
Cook		1		
TOTAL	3	6	46	11

Table 25. Fraser's employed sector during 1895, 1900, 1905 and 1910

	1895	1900	1905	1910
Number of workers	215	188	467	164
Percentage of population	34.1%	24.8%	37.6%	33.7%
Percentage of population 15 years and older	53.9%	39.7%	59.3%	57.3%

Table 26. 1900: Number of workers per Black household in Fraser

Number of workers	Number of households	% of Black households
0		
1	18	46.2
2	14	35.9
3	5	12.8
5	1	2.6
7	1	2.6
TOTAL	39	100.1

Table 27. 1900: Number of workers per white household in Fraser

Number of workers	Number of households	% of white households
0	2	1.8
1	70	64.2
2	17	15.6
3	10	9.2
4	9	8.3
5	1	.9
TOTAL	109	100.0

Table 28. 1900: Home ownership/rental by male workers of a white household in Fraser

Number of paid workers per household	Own	% of Whites	Rent	% of Whites	Total of white households	%
0	1	.9	1	.9	2	1.8
1	28	25.7	42	38.5	70	64.2
2	8	7.3	9	8.3	17	15.6
3	7	6.4	3	2.8	10	9.2
4	6	5.5	3	2.8	9	8.3
5	1	.9	0	--	1	.9
7	1	.9	0	--	--	--
TOTAL	52	47.6	57	53.3	109	100.0

Table 29. Age of coal miners by year

Age	1895		1900		1905		1910		% all miners	
	no.	% of miners	no.	% of miners	no.	% of miners	no.	% of miners	total	
13-14			11	5.8	1	.3				
15-19	5	3.1	18	9.5	51	15.8	10	11.2	12	1.6
20-24	27	17.0	23	12.2	60	18.6	17	19.1	84	11.1
25-29	29	18.2	33	17.5	53	16.5	15	16.5	127	16.7
30-34	32	20.1	28	14.8	44	13.7	12	13.5	130	17.1
35-39	26	16.3	26	13.6	31	9.6	10	11.2	116	15.3
40-44	12	7.5	13	6.9	17	5.3	8	9.0	93	12.3
45-49	17	10.7	19	10.1	25	7.8	3	3.4	50	6.6
50-54	9	5.7	10	5.3	18	5.6	7	7.9	44	5.8
55-59	1	.6	5	2.6	15	4.7	4	4.5	25	3.4
60-64	1	.6			4	1.2	3	3.4	8	1.1
Age Unknown			3	1.6	3	.9			6	.8
Total	159	99.8	89	100.1	322	100.0	89	100.1	759	100.2
Total Employed										
All Occupations		209		285		495		167		1,156

Table 30. Coal miners; months unemployed: 1900, 1905, 1910^a

Months Unemployed	1900		1905		1910	
	no.	%	no.	%	No.	%
0	3	1.5	8	2.4	14	15.6
1			11	3.4	7	7.8
2	2	1.0	17	5.2	8	8.9
3	16	8.1	31	9.5	12	13.3
4	165	83.8	113	34.6	16	17.8
5	4	2.0	49	15.0	6	6.7
6	3	1.5	60	18.3	13	14.4
7			7	2.1	7	7.8
8			18	5.5	3	3.3
9	1	.5	3	.9	1	1.1
10			1	.3		
11						
12			1	.3	2	2.2
Unknown	3	1.5	8	2.4	1	1.1
Total	197	99.9	327	99.9	90	100.0
(average)	3.9 months		4.5 months		3.8 months	
Other mining occupations, months unemployed						
0	5	83.3	3	23.1	5	71.4
1			4	30.8	1	14.3
2			2	15.4		
3						
4	1	16.7				
5			1	7.7		
6			1	7.7		
Unknown			2	15.4		
Total	6	100.0	13	100.1	7	100.0
(average)	.7 months		1.7 months		.6 months	

^aData unavailable for 1895.

Table 31. 1900 Mobility measure: number of state moves within family^a

Number of Moves	Blacks		Whites		Total	
		%		%		%
0	13	41.9	41	42.7	54	42.5
1	14	45.2	45	46.9	59	46.5
2	2	6.5	7	7.3	9	7.1
3	1	3.2	3	3.1	4	3.1
4	1	3.2	--	--	1	.8
TOTAL	31	100.0	96	100.0	127	100.0

^aMeasured by number of states where children were born, which were different from the birthplace of both parents.

Table 32. Fraser geographic mobility/stability measure: 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910

Tenure	Very Mobile 1 Census Persons	Somewhat Stable 2 Census Persons	Moderately Stable 3 Census Persons	Very Stable 4 Census Persons			
1a 1895	479	2a 1895 1900	33	3a 1895 1900 1905	44	4a 1895 1900 1905 1910	25
1b 1900	434	2b 1895 1905	21	3b 1900 1905 1910	94		
1c 1905	830	2c 1895 1910	8	3c 1895 1905 1910	18		
1d 1910	236	2d 1900 1905	116	3d 1895 1900 1910	2		
		2e 1900 1910	9				
		2f 1905 1910	95				
TOTAL	1,979 X 1		282 X 2		158 X 3		25 X 4
	1,979		564		474		100 = 3,117

Table 33. 1895 Religious preference

Religion	Head of Household		Wife ^a different from husband		Boarders		Composite	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<u>Catholic</u>	13				12	36.4	25	19.8
<u>Protestant</u>								
Baptist	6	7.1	3	33.3			9	7.1
Congregational	1	1.2	1	11.1	1	3.0	3	2.4
Presbyterian	2	2.4	1	11.1	2	6.1	5	4.0
Methodist	12	14.3	2	22.2	2	6.1	16	12.7
Christian	6	7.1	1	11.1	1	3.0	8	6.3
Lutheran	9	10.7	1	11.1	1	3.0	11	8.7
Mission	5	6.0			1	3.0	6	4.8
Evangelical	2	2.4					2	1.6
United Brethern								
E.P.								
Unitarian	1	1.2					1	.8
Adventist								
Latter Day Saints								
Total								
Protestant	44	52.4	9	99.9	8	24.2	61	48.4
None	27	32.1	--	----	13	39.4	40	31.7
TOTAL	84	100.0	9	99.9	33	100.0	126	99.9

^aThe category "wife different from husband" contained 9 wives, of whom 8 were Protestants while their husbands were listed as "none," and one was Protestant whose husband was Catholic.